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Abstract
Studies of political communication in the UK have focused primarily on election campaigns 
and reportage of parliamentary and public policy issues. In these contexts, two or more 
parties compete for coverage in the news media. However, the main British party 
conferences present a different context, where one party’s activities form the (almost 
exclusive) focus of the news media's attention for a week, and that party’s leadership 
‘negotiates* coverage in a direct one-to-one relationship. Conference weeks are the key 
points in the organizational year for each party (irrespective of their internal arrangements), 
and a critical period for communicating information about the party to voters at large, 
especially via television news coverage, which forms the focus of this study. The visual 
and audio impressions generated in the conference hall shape the way in which citizens not 
involved with that party perceive its organization, membership and policies. This thesis is 
the first specialized study of how TV news coverage of party conferences is shaped.
Source-centred approaches to understanding the production of news focus on the 
activities of extra-media actors such as party elites in shaping coverage. Media-centred 
approaches substantially disagree, stressing the media elites' exercise of discretionary 
power or licensed autonomy in framing news. Party conference coverage reveals the 
activities of both party and media elites in an exceptionally clear and uncluttered form. 
Using qualitative interviews with party and media influentials, content analysis of TV news 
coverage and transcripts, direct observation of conferences and newsrooms, and collateral 
material from press coverage, historical material and other sources, this study explores the 
main stages in the production of news. Parties and media organizations both undertake 
detailed pre-planning for conference week, in the process negotiating key parameters which 
shape coverage. Journalistic news gathering activities shape the emergence of stories once 
the conference week begins. The parties have developed specialist teams to handle 
immediate news management, taking account of media strategies, but coverage can also be 
affected by internal dissent inside the parties, and by collective and individual responses 
among TV organizations.
The production of conference news is symbiotic at many levels. The one-to-one 
character of party-media relations in conference weeks demonstrates clearly that 
broadcasting organisations exert a disciplinary effect upon political parties. Media pressures 
have fostered a degree of homogenization in parties' internal structures, and a certain 
standardization in their previously unique organizational cultures and modes of public self­
presentation. Party conferences have come to look and sound similar, partly in response to
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the organizational demands of media professionals and the emergence of media-oriented 
party cadres. But access to TV news is also an increasingly effective tool for party 
leaderships to influence the internal debates and power struggles within the parties 
themselves.
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Introduction
The Symbiotic Production of Party Conference News
Television news from the annual autumn party conferences matters for both the political
parties and the broadcasters. Coverage of the party conferences started in 1954, five years
before the first fully televised election campaign!, since these early days the conferences
have grown in significance for all three parties and for the BBC and ITN. Kavanagh notes: 
‘There are certain predictable high points in the political calendar. Local elections, 
the Queen’s speech and the budget are pencilled in at each party’s headquarters and 
the media devote acres of newsprint and hours of broadcast time to each. Yet none 
of these compare in duration to the season of party conferences, which last for the 
best part of a month. For political commentators and activists they are the political 
equivalent of an Olympic games for sports fans and competitors'2.
Rosenbaum concurs that: 'These autumnal seaside gatherings are the most important
occasions in the annual calendar of the main political parties’5. Yet there are only two major
academic studies of the Labour and Conservative conferences (Minkin, 1978 and Kelly,
1989). And despite academic recognition of the importance of the news broadcasters in
British politics, and of the conferences as key political events, the production of party
conference news has not so far been specifically analysed in a full-length study.
Television news in the 1990s is widely seen as an increasingly important conduit 
for publicity-oriented political parties to get their messages across to an audience (Blumler 
et al, 1995; Franklin, 1994; McNair, 1995; Scammell, 1995). McNair notes that ‘political 
actors have come to believe in the importance of “free media” in achieving their goals as 
opposed to the paid for variety’4. The party conferences are the one time in the year when 
the main political parties are guaranteed exclusive coverage. At each conference the other 
parties are relegated to the ‘sidelines’; the sole focus of the broadcasters* attention is the 
party hosting the conference. In an age when political communication is deemed of vital 
importance, the conferences have become an important platform for achieving ‘free media* 
- in particular, television news coverage and an audience of millions. Kelly (1989,1994) 
and Minkin (1978) mention in passing the growing importance of television coverage for 
the parties in the 1970s and 1980s. In the 1990s its importance has increased. News 
coverage of the conferences provide the parties with a publicity window which is ‘less 
manufactured than advertisements and, as such, may be thought to carry more legitimacy 
and credibility’5 with the audience. It enables them to promote new policies and present an 
appropriate image of their organisations to the viewers beyond the conference hall.
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News broadcasters see the conferences as key events, as one broadcaster 
suggested: 'It kind of shapes the whole of the new year, because the television new year is 
really September the first... it is when the autumn schedules hit the screen. The conferences 
provide a useful injection of manageable politics in that early phase of the television year'6. 
Along with coverage of other political events, such as the state opening of parliament and 
general elections, the party conferences are events of significance and warrant not only 
extensive news coverage but live coverage as well. Conferences also provide the news 
broadcasters with a series of opportunities not available in their ‘run of the miir 
programmes based at Westminster. They gain greater access to the whole political party, 
not just the parliamentary party and the leadership but also to the delegates, providing 
almost their only opportunity to test activists' opinions. Second, conference coverage is an 
outward sign of the political seriousness of the broadcasters. Coverage of the conferences 
remains part of the news broadcasters' public service remit, a sign of their commitment to 
the coverage of politics. To explain the structure of this study: I begin with a brief review 
of the existing literature, and then set out the framework for a new study. The final section 
of the chapter elaborates some key themes which guide the subsequent research.
1.1 Literature
The thesis draws on many different sources of literature, including works on news 
production, news organisations, political party organisation, election studies, interactional 
studies, and studies of media events (not all within the rubric of political communications). 
The differences within the literature on news production are ones of focus and location of 
power. A range of approaches have stressed the complexity of the news production process 
and the variety of factors which need to be considered.
In examining these differences a useful place to start is with a classification 
provided by Schlesinger (1990), who argues that most studies within what he terms the 
sociology of journalism have been ‘far too media centric'7. The focus of the studies has 
mainly been on the activity of journalists and other news professionals in the construction 
of news (the best known of these studies being works by Gans 1979; Golding and Elliott, 
1979; Schlesinger, 1987; and Tracey, 1978). While not completely ignoring the news 
sources, their emphasis was on how journalists make use of such sources. In political 
communications terms, the most numerous studies of the role of news broadcasters in the 
production of political news have been produced by Blumler and Gurevitch, 1995 and with 
Nossiter 1985, 1989, 1995. These studies have re-emphasised the importance of 
journalists in the construction of campaign agendas, and are based on observations carried 
out during the general election campaigns through the 1980s and 1990s. They also focused
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on editorial decision-making, looked at journalistic attitudes towards political parties and 
their publicity initiatives, and examined the intricacies of the news-packaging process.
Another body of literature focuses predominantly on the activity of source 
organisations in the production of news (most notably Deacon, 1996; Ericson et al 1989; 
Schlesinger, 1990 and with Tumber, 1994). These frameworks have examined the ways in 
which sources increasingly manipulate the news production process. They focus on the 
strategies such organisations use to manage the news, often categorised into a series of 
dualities, such as offensive and defensive strategies (Ericson et al, 1989), and promotion 
and the avoidance of risk (Schlesinger and Tumber, 1994). Recent studies in political 
communications (Bruce, 1992; Franklin 1994; Harrop, 1990; Jones, 1995; McNair, 1995; 
Negrine, 1996; Scammell, 1995; Seymour-Ure, 1991) argue that political parties and 
certain communication professionals have numerous influences on news content. These 
studies demonstrate that parties are not passive sources of news, but actively try to 
influence its content to benefit themselves. According to these studies, parties can influence 
a report's subject matter, its visual nature and the individuals who appear. These studies 
give precedence in analysis to strategies, particularly ‘marketing* and ’public relations', as 
the main form of party influence on news production. The parties develop strategies to 
manage the media such as Franklin’s (1994) four strategies of agenda setting, or McNair’s 
(1995) four types of media management.
Cutting across this division is a little-mentioned but important difference of focus 
between studies centred on organisations or institutions studies and studies centred on 
events. Both source-centric and media-centric studies can be either organisation-centred or 
events-centred. Media organisational centred studies (including Blumler and Gurevitch, 
1995; Blumler et al 1985, 1989, 1995; Gans, 1979; Golding and Elliott, 1979; 
Schlesinger, 1987; Tuchman, 1978) have examined the organisational structure of news 
organisations, the attitudes of journalists, and the broadcasting organisations’ norms and 
values. Studies of source organisations (Ericson et al, 1989 and Schlesinger and Tumber, 
1994) have particularly focused on their structure and media orientation. There has also 
been a movement in focus toward news events. Glasgow University Media Group’s 
numerous studies were early media-centric research into non-routine news events, and 
there have also been studies of the relations between journalists and the military during war 
(Taylor, 1992). There has been further research into events, particularly Dayan and Katz's 
(1992) study of media events; Boorstin’s (1961) study of pseudo-events; and Molotch and 
Lester’s (1974) study of the organisation of routine news events. In political 
communications in Britain, one routine event in particular has generated numerous studies: 
general elections. Studies of the British election news (Butler and Kavanagh, 1997; Crewe 
and Harrop, 1986, 1989; Crewe and Gosschalk, 1995; Harrison 1992, 1997; Semetko et
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al, 1991) have focused on the activities both of news organisations and of political parties.
Although vastly different in their subject areas, all these studies are centrally 
concerned with ‘definitional power* (Schlesinger, 1990) - that is, the power of source 
organisations and/  or the news media to set news agendas. From a neo-Marxist perspective 
Hall et al (1978) argue that news media exist in a relationship of structured subordination to 
powerful source organisations, particularly the state. The news media act as ‘secondary 
definers’ amplifying the ‘primary definers’* definition of events. As McNair (1995) points 
out, the news media for Hall et al are not only ‘biased towards elite groups... [but show] 
deference to, recognised authority’8. The autonomy of the media is severely constrained by 
their own attitudes and their position vis-a-vis the primary definer. Curran (1990) argues 
that Schlesinger ‘fired a devastating Exocet’9 against Hall’s source-centric approach, 
criticising it for not taking account of the differing influence of sources and their changing 
composition, and for overstating the passivity of the media. Schlesinger (1990) and with 
Tumber (1994) attempt to rework the primary definition thesis. Primary definition is no 
longer a status but an aim which sources compete to achieve within a given arena.
There are also those studies, particularly within a pluralist ‘agenda-setting 
paradigm*, that focus on the definitional power of the news media (Semetko et al, 1991). 
Within this literature there is an argument that the news media do possess a ‘discretionary 
power’ or relative autonomy. The news media do not merely reflect the definition of events 
constructed by political elites. Semetko et al (1991) argue that the contribution of the news 
media to the construction of an agenda needs to be considered in terms of a continuum 
'from agenda-setting to agenda-reflecting, with agenda-shaping and agenda-amplifying 
falling in between the two extremes’1°. Definitional contestation occurs not only between 
sources but also between different sources and the news media.
To such attempts to locate definitional power, however, should be added those 
studies which hold what could be termed an interactionist perspective (mainly work by 
Blumler and Gurevitch, 1995; Mancini, 1994; Sigal, 1973 and Tunstall, 1970). These 
studies focus on interaction and the relationships between journalists and news sources, 
with Blumler and Gurevitch (1995) and Tunstall (1970) examining the Parliamentary lobby 
(the privileged group of Parliamentary correspondents). They develop a wider interactionist 
theoretical framework, analysing the interrelationship between political parties and the 
broadcasters. These interrelationships have been characterised in different ways. Tunstall 
(1970) sees the relationship as exchange-driven, based on a complex series of interactions. 
For Sigal (1973) the relationship is based on bargaining, consensus and routine. For 
Mancini (1994) it fluctuates between trust and suspicion. And Blumler and Gurevitch 
(1995) argue that it is based on dependence and adaptation.
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There are several shortcomings within the existing communications literature. One 
problem with existing studies is the unresolved question of primacy. Definitional power 
can never be satisfactorily located in either the activities of sources or of the news media 
alone. Despite the contribution of source-centred studies to the understanding of the 
competitive nature of source activity and the fluidity of definitional potential, the role of the 
news media in the representation of definitions is placed on the ‘back burner*. Indeed, it 
could be argued that Schlesinger and Tumber (1994) need to give greater prominence to the 
role of the news media in reporting crime. Similarly, while there has been some attempt to 
highlight the role of the media in agenda construction and definitional processes, such 
attempts have seen the role of news sources largely from the perspective of the journalists. 
The focus has been on the internal organisational processes that go into the formation of a 
finished report. The question of definitional primacy is not resolved. Further, the 
organisational bias of the source-centric and media-centric approaches largely means that 
the question of definitional primacy remains located within context of organisations, 
oscillating from source to media according to the approach of the different studies.
The existing political communications literature pays insufficient attention to the 
organisational structure of political parties, despite the wealth of research in this area 
(McKenzie, 1963; Katz and Mair, 1995; Kelly, 1994b; Kelly and Foster, 1990; 
Panebianco, 1988; Webb, 1994; Whiteley et al 1994). In fact, one of the main problems 
with existing studies of political communications is the examination of the organisational 
structure of political parties. Schlesinger (1990) does recognise the complex nature of 
primary definition and interestingly raises the importance of competition between sources 
for primary definer status. But the structural make-up of primary definers is not really 
examined. The political parties, commonly considered to be primary definers, are complex 
heterogeneous organisations. Indeed, there has been a vast amount of literature on the 
structure of political parties which seems to have been largely ignored in the field of 
political communications. One question which needs to be considered is: Where does 
definitional power lie within a primary definer? If, externally, parties are competing with 
each other to set the news agenda, there is also competition within the parties. While the 
growing importance of news management and the professionalisation hypothesis (Blumler, 
1990; Harrop, 1990; Scammell, 1995) is difficult to refute, it tends to under-emphasise the 
heterogeneous nature of parties and the continuing importance of relationships between 
news broadcasters and political parties. Parties are made up formally of different sections - 
such as conference delegates, MPs, in Labour's case the trade unions, and the leadership - 
and informally divide into different ‘ideological factions* (loosely described) on particular 
issues.
There is a tendency for most party-based studies to focus on the activities of the
16
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parliamentary parties and the party leaderships, and to ignore the activities of the rank and 
file - although there are extensive survey-based studies of party members’ attitudes 
(Whiteley et al 1994). The conference, however, is a somewhat different and indeed unique 
contest, because to some degree the whole party becomes involved in the production of 
news, not just the parliamentary party. So the question ‘What role do the parties play in 
political communications?’ should raise the further question ‘What part of any particular 
party are we talking about?* Parties are hierarchical organisations, but is it safe to assume a 
necessarily dominant role for the party elite in the news production process for the whole 
party? Existing events-studies in party political communications tend to focus on election 
campaigning, while relatively few examine other events over the lifetime of a parliament 
(Negrine, 1996; Franklin, 1992).
None of these studies deals specifically with the question of news production at the 
party conferences. Instead, they tend to use the conferences in passing as an example of the 
political parties’ success in being able to strongly influence the news production process. 
Conferences have been classified as ‘pseudo events'11 (Boorstin, 1961; McNair, 1995) or 
as ‘media events'12 (Dayan and Katz, 1992), because they are designed by party elites very 
much with the broadcasters in mind, and intended to attract their attention and their 
compliance with party-designed messages. Analysts who argue such positions place too 
much emphasis on party promotional activity, ignoring the active and partly counter vailing 
role of the news broadcasters at the conferences. Conferences are an arena of interaction 
between different party and broadcast actors. Although, increasingly, promotional activity 
is perceived as important by certain members of the parties in order to frame a positive 
public image for their organisations with the news broadcasters, this perception is not 
always shared within the parties. With limited resources, excessive promotion is seen by 
some as potentially counter productive.
Existing organisational-centred studies tend to concentrate either on the 
interrelationship of the journalists within the news organisation (Gans, 1979; Golding and 
Elliott, 1979; Schlesinger, 1987), or on actors within the source organisation and the 
processes of selection and construction that take place there (Ericson et al, 1989; 
Schlesinger and Tumber 1994). While the interrelationships examined by these studies are 
important, in the context of a media event equal if not more significance needs to be 
attached to the interrelationships between journalists and the political actors. There are few 
actual interactional studies of how parties and journalists portray 'pseudo* or media 
events. The analysis tends to focus either on the activities of the journalists in reporting 
such events (Blumler et al, 1985,1989 and 1995) or on the activities of the political parties 
or other source organisations in trying to originate coverage (Dayan and Katz, 1992; 
Scammell, 1995).
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The existing analyses of the interrelationship between the parties and the 
broadcasters almost universally see relationships in a triadic way, with party A competing 
with party B to shape media coverage under the normal strong ‘bi-partisanship* 
conventions of political balance under which regulated broadcasters must operate in Britain. 
Based on encounters in the Westminster lobby, they focus on the relationship between the 
different political parties and the news media, but always within the expectation that media- 
party relations are permanently located within a framework of inter-party competition. But 
in conference week party A does not have to be constantly looking over its shoulder at the 
interpretative or promotional plays being made by other parties. For that week, uniquely in 
the political year, the party-in-conference commands the almost undivided attention of the 
news media.
1.2 The Framework
This thesis does not set out to provide another media-centric or source-centric analysis. 
Any new framework for understanding the production of conference news' reports needs 
to draw on a media-source centred approach. This study adopted an extra-organisational 
approach (Curran et al, 1982). It took account both of the activity and decisions made by 
journalists and members of the respective political parties, and of their complex and multi­
level relationships. It focused on conferences as a news events constructed in a dyadic way 
by both the parties and the news broadcasters, responding to their own imperatives, values 
and beliefs. Both organisations possessed definitional power and used it. The framing of 
conference news needs to be considered as a negotiated process involving the activities of 
both sides. The news production process was symbiotic (Lance Bennett et al, 1985), a 
product both of the activities of the news broadcasters at one level and of the political 
parties at another level: it was produced through interaction between actors with close 
working relationships and multiple inter-dependencies.
Existing studies of news production categorise news-producing activity using 
informal typologies of various ‘stages’, each typology slightly different from the other. 
Thus Golding and Elliott (1979) identify planning, gathering, selection and presentation 
stages, while Gans (1979) distinguishes gathering, selection and processing stages. These 
informal structures can be simplified into a two-stage production cycle: advance planning 
for the event; and gathering, selection and presentation of news stories at the conferences. 
Conference news was the product of the sum total of these different stages. What is more, 
at all the conferences the political parties have to be considered as an integral part of the 
news production cycle. Conference news was produced through the interrelated activity of
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both the broadcasters and the political parties at each stage of the production cycle (see 
Figure 1.1). And relationships during each stage of the news production cycle were dyadic, 
not triadic. The nature of the conferences meant that - unlike any other time of the political 
year - the parties and broadcasters are in a one-on-one relationship for roughly a week.
Figure 1.1: Activities in the conference news production process.
Party TV News
Pre-conference Planning Planning
At conference Disseminate Gather/select/present
It is important to note that the activities at each stage of the production process were 
linked horizontally to the next stage. Planning by the broadcasters and parties was a 
fundamental prerequisite for later news dissemination and gathering. The essential logistical 
elements of conference coverage all had to be in place prior to the conference starting. 
These elements made the next stages possible. In addition, the activity of broadcasters and 
party actors was routine and organised. Their activities were not random, but instead 
planned and directed to the production of a final product: news.
1.3 Themes
This study looks at certain themes within the overall structure of the news production cycle. 
It locates those actors involved in the production process in their respective organisational 
settings. It examines their relationships and interaction at each stage of the production 
process, the development and implementation of strategies of promotion and control by the 
parties, and their shared and divergent interests.
Organisational Settings
It is important to identify which actors in the three main political parties and the news 
broadcasters were involved in the different stages of the production cycle. Each part of the 
production cycle involved different parts of the two complex organisations, although 
activity was co-ordinated from the centre of each. Conference planning was carried out six 
to nine months prior to the start of each conference. It was conducted at different levels 
within each organisation. First, the professional ‘machine bureaucracy* (Mintzberg, 1983) 
at party headquarters were involved, working with 'conference units' within the BBC and 
ITN. They were concerned with conference logistics such as camera positions, venue space 
and accreditation. Second, a key role was played by the parties* ‘adhocracy* structures
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(Mintzberg, 1983), consisting of specially formed committees and work groups, involving 
a range of media specialists within each party and often co-ordinated by leadership figures 
directly. They focused on aesthetic planning, including the design of the main stage set, 
management of the agenda timetable and communication strategies. Third, maybe weeks or 
days before conference, various factions and actors within the parties entered into the 
process, along with producers, editors and journalists. Indeed, planning by the news 
broadcasters was last-minute, and they met shortly before the conferences began and daily 
throughout their duration.
Gathering and processing of information was conducted by journalists working as 
part of a hierarchical broadcast news team quite separate from the conference units. The 
political editors were responsible for the output and were in charge of the news team. Each 
of the news channels had their own editors, correspondents and reporters. In the case of 
Newsnight and Channel Four News the presenters were also at the conferences, producing 
reports of their own. Some members of the conference news teams, particularly the 
programme producers, were in continuous contact with the main London news rooms. 
Their plans were relayed back to the capital, covering matters such as which politicians 
have consented to be interviewed and the possible story angles for each main slot The 
main news editors in London decided on the amount of time to be allocated to the whole 
party conference report, the salience and running order, and whether additional news items 
would be required.
A key role in dissemination was played by the parties' leaderships and by 
communications specialists who were part of the parties’ adhocracy. All the senior party 
spokespersons, ministers and shadow ministers were the main.speechifiers during the 
conferences. Each of the parties' leaderships employed a team of spin doctors for the 
duration of the conferences. They assumed a central co-ordinating role, implementing 
agreed strategies and regularly monitoring the latest developments at the conferences. Other 
party actors were also engaged in the dissemination of information: the parliamentary 
parties; the constituency parties; affiliated groups, such as the trade unions in Labour's 
ranks; 'old stars' and disaffected former ministers; and factions divided by differing 
ideologies which cut across existing hierarchies.
Interrelationships
A dyadic interrelationship existed between different parts of both organisations. Thus, 
different parts of the organisations were interdependent at different stages of the production 
cycle. The parties' and the broadcasters’ bureaucratic apparatuses were heavily
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interdependent during the planning stage. Once conferences started, the relationship shifted 
to that between various political actors in the party hierarchy and its bureaucracy, and the 
correspondents, political editors and producers. These relationships too were differentiated.
The planning stage was marked by a strong level of co-operation and repeated 
interactions between the party professional machine and the conference units. These two 
parts of the organisations were dependent on each other for a successful outcome. This 
stage was also marked by a striking amount of adaptation on both sides. Both the news 
broadcasters and the political parties adapted many elements of the conference in the 
planning stage to meet the requirements of the other. To a large extent such adaptations 
formed part of the routinised procedures which had taken place over a long period of time, 
but both sides tended to be flexible in meeting new demands. The planning exercise 
culminated in a series of meetings at each venue where final decisions were made jointly 
over the space allocated to the broadcasters, the position of the cameras, the lighting and 
sound arrangements, editing facilities for live TV camera crews, broadcast booths looking 
on to the main arena and special rooms for press conferences.
During the conference week there was a large amount of personal interaction
between the party actors and broadcast journalists. Both were dependent on the other, the
journalists for information and the parties for publicity. Tunstall notes that in the ‘role as
news gatherer, in relation to news sources, there is an exchange of information for
publicity’13. Blumler and Gurevitch (1995) concur that each side benefits from offering the
other a resource it considers valuable. ‘The mass media offer politicians access to an
audience through a credible outlet while politicians offer journalists information about a
theatre of presumed relevance, significance, impact and spectacle for audience
consumption’14. Conferences amplified this dependence. In the case of a similar media
event - the presidential conventions in the US - Fant notes:
‘The networks and the parties share a common desire to attract as many television 
viewers as possible, the co-operation between them in attempting to achieve this 
end has over the years developed into a strong reciprocal relationship from which 
the parties receive free, national exposure and the networks are given a rare 
opportunity to present live, emotional programming and to promote their news 
departments’13.
Adaptation was also manifest during the conference week. As Blumler and Gurevitch also
note, politicians must:
‘Adapt their messages to the demands of formats and genres devised inside [news] 
organisations and to their associated styles, story models and audience images. 
Likewise, journalists cannot perform their task of political scrutiny without access 
to politicians for information, news, interviews, action and comment'16.
Parties have adapted to the presence of the broadcasters in a strategic fashion, developing
strategies of promotion and control. But the broadcasters have in turn learnt to fit into the
controlled environment this created at conference.
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Actors in the parties’ and the broadcasters’ bureaucratic apparatuses often had close 
professional relationships. The broadcast journalists and politicians from the parliamentary 
party had pre-existing relationships as actors in the Westminster lobby. To this extent, 
conference could be seen as a continued extension of lobby relations but in a different 
location. There were some differences, though. Journalists interacted with party actors with 
whom they had had little previous contact. They often had no direct relationship with the 
delegates outside the conference season, although some non-Westminster sections of the 
party may have built up relations with broadcast journalists during previous conferences. 
Journalists’ relationships with them were not as close as with their parliamentary 
colleagues. On the whole, most contact tended to be between journalists and those 
parliamentary actors whom they knew, those who had a track record, the party leadership 
and senior MPs - what Tunstall (1970) calls ‘key individuals’. Such individuals made up a 
substantial amount of the news’ raw material. Broadcast journalists were dependent on and 
favoured these sources over the others. In particular, journalists were reliant on these 
senior sources to provide novel or distinctive information. This dependency increased 
when these sources were newsworthy, allowing them, as Blumler and Gurevitch (1995) 
argue, ‘to ration the goodies, use them as bargaining counters and direct reporters* attention 
to their pet themes’17. Journalists were dependent realists with deadlines to meet and 
therefore normally compromised in order to obtain information. The rank and file only 
found themselves courted if they were particularly newsworthy.
Gathering also brought broadcast journalists into contact with the wider 'news 
community' (Sigal, 1973) and colleagues from the Lobby. There was much discussion 
between broadcast journalists and their colleagues from the national press. Tunstall (1970) 
describes the relationship between journalists working in the Lobby as one based on 
competition and co-operation: they are to all intents and purposes ‘competitor colleagues’ 
(Tunstall, 1970). Competition focuses on: speed, being the first with the news; exclusivity; 
interpretation; and finally, strength, the quality of the story. A BBC correspondent when 
interviewed said: ‘Yes, there is considerable competition between the various outlets... and 
stories will often be treated in different ways... But one bulletin would not go out at a 
complete tangent and say the opposite of another bulletin or programme. That would 
prompt an intervention at a senior level’l8.
Promotion and Control
All the parties regularly used promotional strategies and sought to control the conference 
environment in order to ensure they received the best coverage possible. Promotional 
strategies focused on adapting dissemination to the demands of the news medium.
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Schlesinger and Tumber (1994) suggest that a ‘promotional dynamic’ impels all source
organisations: ‘news sources... continue to be driven by the promotional dynamic to attain
new heights of sophistication in trying to manage the news’19. Strategies of control
focused on regulating party actors and access to information. Shaw (1994) argues that
these two dynamics reached a height at the Labour conference.
‘In the past, party conferences tended to be sources of political embarrassment and 
poor publicity. The control the leadership now wielded over conference... enabled 
Labour strategists to convert it into a media event The whole operation was aimed 
at securing maximum favourable media coverage; in Mandelson’s words: “Totally 
unashamedly, we have used the conference to project the party, to make an impact 
on the public”...' 20.
Each partiy’s adhocracy was geared up for promotional planning which occurred 
simultaneously with logistical planning. This took account of the aesthetic aspects of the 
conference, the conference agenda and timetable, and communication strategies. The main 
hall was treated as a promotional platform by the parties. A great amount of concerted 
attention was paid to the ‘look’ of the conference hall. The design of the main platform has 
changed greatly over the last twenty years, becoming, one could argue, a stage upon which 
the main drama unfolded. Particular attention was paid to its colour, its shape, the logo, the 
platform seating arrangements and the position of the rostrum. The parties hired specialists 
to design the hall and main platform to produce a professional set. The specialists over the 
years have adapted their designs to the requirements of the broadcasters, ranging from 
specific technical realities raised during discussions with the BBC and ITN through to the 
general demands of the medium based on experience from previous events. Both 
organisations had to adapt their planning to make use of a series of technological 
innovations. Planning also enabled both sides to determine what was permissible and what 
was possible.
Unlike aesthetic planning, the planning of the conference agenda and timetable was 
carried out by elected and selected members of party agenda committees, in liaison with the 
parties’ leaderships and other specialist groups. While there was no direct contact between 
the broadcasters and the parties on agenda and timetable control, the presence of TV had 
become an important factor to be taken into account. Planning committees in all three 
parties met frequently prior to the start of each conference; motions from the constituencies 
and other party bodies were examined and a rough timetable and agenda fashioned. There 
were numerous forces influencing the decision-making processes within these committees 
over what to select and what to reject. In a practical sense the sheer number of motions 
received by the arrangements committees meant that not all could be included and many 
disappeared either being amalgamated in a compositing process or were simply not selected 
for debate. The media-oriented leaderships, through the agenda committees, were keen to
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adapt the timetable and agenda to the demands of the televisual medium in order to 
maximise the promotion of party policy. For example, an increasing amount of time was 
set aside in the timetable for speeches by the parties’ leaderships. Speeches were seen as a 
more televisually effective way of promoting party messages. Particularly detailed attention 
was paid to the leaders’ speeches. The parties had built up these speeches to become the 
centre piece of each of their conference weeks. The cabinet and shadow cabinet met with 
members of the party’s media arm to plan a co-ordinated release of information through the 
various speeches during themed debates. Key announcements by the various ministers and 
shadows were saved for the leaders’ speeches. This late planning sought to orchestrate the 
announcements in each speech to avoid repeats and contradictions.
Communication strategies were then developed and employed to sell these 
announcements to the broadcasters. All parties* communication teams regularly used public 
relations strategies to aid the promotional process. These strategies worked through 
adapting to the demands of the broadcasters but in a way that was advantageous to the 
leaderships. The information had to be 'framed in optimal terms capable of satisfying news 
values'21. The strategies allowed information to be targeted toward the appropriate news 
outlet, taking account of deadlines. Speeches made after the journalists’ deadlines would 
not receive the attention they would have if made earlier. Schlesinger writes: ‘journalists are 
among those occupational groups... for whom precision in timing... is necessary'22. And 
of course party actors realised this and so timed their own activities and announcements 
accordingly. Expectations of the news broadcasters had to be accounted for. The 
leaderships used spin doctors to ‘hype* or ‘talk down* the significance of certain 
forthcoming events on the conference timetable, in order to increase or decrease the 
attention paid to these events.
As part of the promotional process, the parties’ leaderships and their teams of spin 
doctors also sought to offer journalists ‘information subsidies* (Gandy, 1982) - that is 
‘...reduce the price of information to the media and provide them with a subsidy'23. Every 
conference had a press office. It provided computer terminals, fax machines, other facilities 
journalists required and, importantly, transcripts of speeches, policy statements and press 
releases. The aim was to make the gathering of information that much easier and quicker 
for the journalists. Other factions within the parties were excluded from using the main 
press office, but this did not stop them producing their own information for journalists. 
Heffeman and Marqusee (1992) and Minkin (1978) suggest that factions may ‘hire a 
couple of rooms in a hotel as headquarters firom which a daily bulletin is published'24, and 
will often print and distribute press releases.
At a personal level the promotional dynamic led to the leadership in particular taking
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an increasing interest in their appearance and in techniques used in speech delivery. This 
has been well documented outside the conference period (Cockerell, 1989; Franklin, 1994; 
McNair, 1995; Seymour-Ure, 1996). At the conferences the near-saturation coverage by 
the news provided leadership actors with an important opportunity to present the public 
with a particular image. Personal presentation required planning; senior members of each 
party regularly rehearsed major set piece speeches in the presence of media professionals. 
Speeches needed to ’satisfy ’’the journalists" requirement for easily-reportable "bits" of 
political information'25. Speeches were constructed with the expectation ‘that only a small 
part of it will be reported... [they] are loaded with “sound bites” -convenient, memorable 
words and phrases which can become a "hook" around which journalists will hang the 
story'26. The key phrases needed to be emphasised and speakers* voices raised 
accordingly. The parties' leadership normally used a well-known minister or senior party 
figure to start or conclude a debate. These points aggregated together show that decisions 
taken over the conference promotion endeavoured to employ the logic of the communicator, 
or according to Altheide and Snow (1990) a ‘media logic*. Promotional activity had to tread 
a ‘thin wire’ between transparency and being ignored. The success of the activity depended 
on the ability of parties to use their limited budgets and resources to bring about the desired 
effect. However, there were occasional conflicts at elite levels about the necessity of 
promotional activity, its cost and potential success.
In addition to promotion, the leaderships of the parties also sought to control 
conference proceedings. Timetable and agenda management was not only to ‘project their 
leaders, propound policy, launch initiatives and attack the opposition, with no rights of 
rebuttal, or interventions by television interviewers...'27 but also to avoid the risk of 
embarrassment The leadership and their staffs possessed and increasingly used their ability 
to control and influence the agenda committees* selection of issues for debate and the 
positioning of these issues in the conference timetable. As the broadcasters conveyed the 
conference to a wide audience, there was increasing pressure from the parties* leaderships 
to avoid public embarrassment and negative publicity by avoiding issues over which there 
was disagreement within the party. Existing studies (Franklin, 1994; Heffeman and 
Marqusee, 1992; Scammell, 1995; Shaw, 1994) show that such activity had increasingly 
become the norm in each party, although at conferences it is not always successful by any 
means. Scammell (1995) talks about the increasing amount of effort leaderships spent on 
eliminating risk and increasing the discipline of the overall communication operation. 
Through the agenda committees party leaderships were able to have some influence on the 
selection and positioning of speeches and debates, either blocking them because the issues 
they raised may be controversial, or placing them in a position in the conference timetable 
where it was judged that they received less attention from the journalists.
25
During conference the communications teams sought to control the availability of 
and access to leadership actors. Communications teams were aware that news reports were 
heavily influenced by the availability of particular sources (Bruce, 1992; Jones, 1995). 
Through regulating availability and access they were able to control centrally, to some 
extent, who appeared, on what bulletin and when. The competitive bulletins hoped for 
exclusive access and usually co-operated, although more often than not leadership actors 
were made available to several outlets. Outside the main conference venue the presence of 
leading party actors and the leaders was also regulated. All three parties provided regular 
photo opportunities essential as ‘visual fills’ for television news reports.
While the odds were stacked in favour of the parties’ elites, this is not to suggest 
that they were always successful. The control of information could never be total. Despite 
the increasing discipline with which communications were orchestrated, the parties did not 
play to one tune alone. All three main parties were far from a unified whole, consisting of 
various groupings which might be in conflict at the conferences. Each of the leaderships 
faced a certain amount of intra-party competition for the journalists’ attention.
Party elites could not completely control the conference agenda and timetable, and 
dissent by party actors could not be completely silenced. During the period of the study 
dissent was expressed at the Liberal Democrat conference in 1994, where the delegates 
voted in favour of several motions (such as the legalisation of cannabis) against the express 
wishes of the leadership. Some trade unions were in open conflict with the Labour 
leadership at the 1993 Labour conference over voting reform and again in 1994 over the 
issue of Clause 4 of the party's constitution. At the Conservatives' 1994 conference 
factions within the parliamentary party were in conflict over Europe.
Despite the fact that these groupings often did not command the same resources or 
have the same contacts as the leaderships, they regularly planned to attract TV broadcasters* 
attention by using fringe meetings. Any faction could plan a fringe meeting, a timetable of 
which was sent to all journalists, to widen the agenda being debated in the main hall. They 
also planned their meetings to coincide with that debate and use well-known speakers in 
order to attract journalists’ attention. Recent examples of factions successfully doing this 
include the Campaign Group at the Labour conferences; and the ‘Bruges Group*, the ‘No 
Turning Back Group* and the ‘Selsdon Group’ at the Conservative party conferences. The 
above groups all featured in news reports analysed. Such fringe meetings would not occur 
when they did, nor feature the senior politicians they do, if it were not for the possibility 
that TV broadcasters would be present.
The proliferation of journalists at the conferences meant that there was a constant
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demand for comment which could not be completely managed. Party factions realised that, 
because of external regulations and professional norms, broadcast journalists were limited 
in being able to provide an editorial opinion of their own, and so often required reactions 
broadly for and against the issues under debate. Indeed, factions within the parties planned 
to target certain sympathetic journalists, providing them with a list of contacts should 
balance considerations mean a particular reaction was required.
Conferences also provided opportunities for gaffes by leadership actors which 
could undermine the promotion of a particular policy. Planned speeches could be 
overshadowed by newsworthy external events. The co-ordination of the communications 
operation did not always go according to plan. The spin doctors sometimes found 
themselves in competition with their colleagues, trying equally to ‘hype* or ‘talk down* the 
significance of a particular announcement or occurrence.
The parties’ leaderships and their spin doctors partly anticipated such developments 
and had instituted reactive communication strategies. These strategies of damage limitation 
involved the in-house team of public relations specialists in providing an interpretation of 
events friendly to the leadership. They were aimed at ensuring not only that the 
broadcasters reflected these views but that these views became the dominant interpretation 
of events. If the circumstance required, the reactions of senior party actors had to be 
mobilised to condemn a particular actor or perspective. Such strategies were an essential 
part in maintaining their position as conference 'primary definer' (Hall et al, 1978).
The ultimate goal therefore of promotion and control was in Minkin's words to 
achieve ‘a “good” conference'28. A good conference, Kavanagh suggests, ‘is defined by 
managers as one which does not have unseemly divisions'29, and, one could add, one that 
enabled the promotion of party policy through the news broadcasters to a wide audience. 
Such an aim could not be taken for granted and required substantial effort of behalf of the 
leadership.
Shared and Divergent Interests
The different parts of the organisations had shared interests at each stage of the production 
cycle. On a general level both the news broadcasters and the parties had an interest in 
seeing that they were a ‘success*. As Blumler and Gurevitch note; ‘each side of the 
politician-media professional partnership is striving to realise certain goals vis-a-vis the 
audience; yet it can not pursue them without securing in some form the co-operation of the 
other side'30. Both had a shared interest in the conferences being a success in terms of
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attracting high audience viewing figures. In the planning stages both organisational 
bureaucracies wanted the event to run smoothly, so that the operation looked slick and 
professionally produced to the viewing audience. They therefore co-operated on the 
logistical prerequisites of broadcasting, making sure that they were in place prior to the 
conferences starting.
Shared interests, in part, continued to characterise the activity of dissemination and
news gathering. But interests also diverged. The divergence centred around the perceived
role of the broadcasters at the conferences, as Blumler and Gurevitch note:
‘...Journalists are primarily aiming to hold the attention of a target audience through 
some mixture of alerting, informing and entertaining them; politicians are primarily 
trying to persuade audience members to adopt a certain view of themselves, or of 
their parties or factions, and of what they are trying to achieve in politics’31.
The broadcasters and the journalists who worked for them were generally reluctant to be
passive relayers of information, a conduit for politicians* gambits. The parties wanted to
reach as wide an audience as possible, and news, unlike live coverage, provided an
audience of millions, which ordinarily the political parties would not expect outside
elections. While the broadcasters reflected the issues raised in speeches and debates, they
also reserved the right to inform their audiences as they saw fit.
Each bulletin had a target audience, with the BBC’s and ITN’s main bulletins in 
particular being in ratings-driven competition. The bulletins wanted to make sure that their 
conference coverage was not a ‘turn off and did not adversely affect their ratings. Even the 
longer bulletins provided by Channel Four News and Newsnight had to cater for and 
maintain their audiences. The content of all reports had to fulfil certain audience criteria, 
even if the audience might be ‘a concept more than a real force’32. Gans (1979) argues that 
while source considerations ‘weigh on* a journalist's mind in the gathering stage, during 
the selection and presentation stages audience considerations became more important Pace 
was one such criterion. Schlesinger suggests that reports needed to be constructed to ‘try 
and ’’hook” the audiences attention'33.
The determination not to be used, along with the conventionally journalistic instinct 
for a ‘new angle* on the news, meant that the communication teams could not force any 
agenda upon the news bulletins. The parties could do little to prevent the broadcasters 
reporting intra-party conflict or shining a light on and amplifying other newsworthy issues 
which they would have preferred to remain unseen. While the journalists expected 
interaction to be strategically guided to a certain extent, and the strategies developed by the 
parties were aimed at minimising divergences while providing journalists with what they 
required, they resented attempts at editorial interference - particularly complaining.
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Broadcasters' Attitudes
The broadcasters' 'discretionary power* (Semetko et al, 1991) was an important factor in 
the framing of conference news. Important decisions on coverage were made on a daily 
basis independent of the parties. These decisions were influenced by attitudes. The 
broadcasters approached the conferences with a particular attitude. Studies on parliamentary 
broadcasting by Blumler and Gurevitch (1995) and on general elections with Nossiter 
(1985, 1989, 1995) show that the broadcasters' approach to political events was clearly 
attitudinal.
The broadcasters decided what events would be covered, which sources would be 
included and which excluded, the amount of coverage an event would receive and its 
prominence. In addition they provided an extra element of journalistic input to the framing 
of the conferences. This was similar to what Blumler et al (1995) describe as the BBC’s 
response to parties in election campaigns. ‘It was reactive in the sense of being obliged to 
report the parties* main campaign initiatives day by day... [but] the BBC’s role was also 
able to “add value”, however, by putting party statements in a context helpful to 
viewers'34. The value added in the context of conferences could be seen in reports. These 
comprised a mix of speeches and debates or several speeches or several debates. They were 
a package of the day's events produced by a ‘process of selecting, collating and 
juxtaposing statements which may have been made independently of each other' 33. They 
were bound together by a narrative which often included assessments of party leadership 
performance and the state of party unity. Added value was also introduced in a series of 
additional news items such as two-ways and interviews. Bulletins regularly used two- 
ways. These were live link ups between the anchor and the correspondent or political editor 
in which a series of questions were asked. The questions encouraged speculation about and 
explanation of the significant events of the day. Finally there were interviews with the party 
leadership and, occasionally, delegates.
The final television news agenda was the product of this interrelationship. News 
agendas from the party conferences manifested themselves in an ideal sense in a series of 
two-and-a-half to three-minute reports designed to fill an available time ‘slot’, often 
accompanied by additional news items. The reports were a 'boiled down' montage of the 
day’s issues, conveyed in debates and speeches and reactions from party actors, with a 
voice-over narrative. The range of issues portrayed varied from bulletin to bulletin. The 
news broadcasters and the parties were the co-producers - they were the co-constructors of 
the conference news agenda. While the parties were the originators of the information, the 
broadcast journalists repackaged the material for the viewing audience.
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1.4 Structure of the Thesis
The nature of the conferences meant that the political parties and broadcasters were 
uniquely in a one-to-one relationship, without their political rivals and in close geographical 
and social proximity to each other. The framework sketched above places at its centre this 
unique dyadic and symbiotic relationship. This relationship was not formed anew at each 
conference, but was instead based on numerous previous relationships, and its 
distinctiveness was amplified by the lack of political rivals. The interrelationship was 
characterised by several factors: an exchange of news for publicity; dependence upon each 
other; adaptation to the demands of the other participant; the mixing of shared interests with 
aims that can diverge at different times; and the routinisation of interactions around a series 
of events.
The thesis concentrates on the activities of the ‘prime movers* in the production of 
conference news. In planning these activities the parties* bureaucracy and adhocracy 
elements and the broadcasters* logistical planners were the key actors. In dissemination and 
gathering, the parties* leaderships and the broadcast journalists took over. The relationship 
placed both groups of actors under pressure. The news broadcasters may be the subject of 
complaints from the parties* leaderships but the leaderships* also come under the 
broadcasters ‘gaze*^6. However, neither party nor media elites were ever in total control of 
the conference. Events often occurred that interrupted the routine, placing the parties’ 
leaderships on the defensive.
News from the conferences and the agenda it conveyed was a product of this 
symbiotic relationship between the different constituent parts of both organisations but also 
revealed the mutual adaptation of both to the needs of the other. The thesis seeks to 
examine further each part of the news production cycle and the issues raised in this chapter.
The thesis is structured in same the way as the news production cycle. Chapter 2 
examines the joint planning of coverage and the relationship between the two broadcasters 
(BBC and ITN) and the political parties. This relationship was based on a series of 
discussions, some of which were routine confirmations of existing plans whereas others 
involved a certain level of negotiation in order to bring about a desired change. Both were 
able to affect certain key decisions made during a process of negotiation, either through 
blocking them completely or forcing a compromise. There was also strong inter- 
organisational co-operation between the BBC and ITN during the planning process. This 
chapter outlines organisational structure and the parts of the organisations involved in 
planning. It focuses on the personnel and coverage logistics and the negotiation and co­
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operation between the broadcasters and the parties.
Chapter 3 focuses on the co-ordination of conference planning by the parties’ 
leaderships. The chapter argues that in order to avoid embarrassment and promote 
themselves and their policies the leadership galvanised the adhocracy into promotional 
planning to take full advantage of the presence of the broadcasters. Planning across the 
different parts of the parties’ adhocracy was focused on publicity opportunities provided by 
the conferences, and on the risks. The planning goal of the adhocracies was to maximise 
the use of the broadcasters in promotional terms while simultaneously minimising potential 
risks. The chapter focuses on the structure of the adhocracy, the agenda and timetable, the 
planning of communications strategies and aesthetic planning.
The analysis then moves on in the fourth chapter to examine the organisational 
structure of the broadcasters and parties at the conferences, highlighting the different actors 
involved in the processes of gathering and dissemination of information. It focuses on 
competition and co-operation between both groups of actors and the attitudes of the 
broadcasters towards different events during the conferences.
The fifth chapter picks up on the divergences of interest. The broadcasters* goals 
did not consistently match those of the parties’ leaderships to provide a favourable account 
of events at conference. The broadcasters exercised a certain amount of autonomy, 
particularly over considerations of newsworthiness but also in providing comment, 
criticism, speculation and interpretations of events. The chapter focuses on the 
implementation of communication strategies and management techniques and the response 
of the broadcasters. Such strategies were used in order to minimise divergence and make 
sure that the broadcasters' news agenda corresponded to the planned agenda in the main 
hall.
The sixth and seventh chapters examine the news coverage of a series of debates, 
the fringe and the leaders’ speeches. Chapter six, through content analysis and interviews, 
empirically examines the reportage of debates at the Labour and Liberal Democrat party 
conferences and the reportage of the fringe at the Conservative conferences on six evening 
news bulletins (ITN's News at 5.40 PM, BBC Six O'clock News, ITN's Channel Four 
News at Seven O'clock, BBC Nine O'clock News, ITN's News at Ten O'clock and the 
BBC's Newsnight at 10.30 PM). It highlights the manifestation of certain journalistic 
attitudes towards events and the party actors involved, and the value added contributed by 
the news broadcasters. Chapter seven similarly examines the coverage of the leaders’ 
speeches.
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Chapter 2
Advanced Planning of Conference Coverage
Both the broadcasters and the parties were involved in planning the party conferences’ TV 
coverage1. It was an increasingly important aspect of the overall planning process because 
of the large number of news outlets broadcasting from conferences. Conference coverage 
took a relatively long time to plan, starting in one interviewee’s words ‘as soon as the 
conferences were finished’2. This year-long process, however, really began in earnest in 
the February before the autumn conferences, ‘slowly at first, then come June, July it starts 
hotting up in to a sort of planning whirl’3. The broadcasters and the parties therefore were 
engaged in a cycle of planning: as soon as one round of conferences finished they started 
planning for the next.
Planning occurred at different levels within the organisations but in the 1990s the 
great majority of coverage planning was carried out simultaneously by a series of 
professionals within the main body of both the broadcasting organisations and the parties 
and formed part of a wider process of logistical planning for the conferences. Although not 
all logistical planning was coverage-oriented, the planning of conference coverage was 
essentially a joint exercise involving co-operation first between the parties and the 
broadcasters, and second between BBC and ITN and other broadcasters such as BSkyB.
The two broadcasters and the political parties had a close relationship, developed 
over time through a series of formal and informal contacts. Contact took the form of a 
series of discussions, some of which were routine confirmations of existing plans, 
whereas others involved a certain level of negotiation to bring about a desired aim. Both 
sides were able to affect certain key decisions made during a process of negotiation, either 
through blocking them completely or forcing a compromise.
This chapter focuses on those elements of logistical planning that concern 
conference coverage. It outlines the organisational structures and the parts of the 
organisations involved in planning. It focuses on the logistics of personnel and coverage. 
Finally it examines joint planning, negotiation and co-operation between the broadcasters 
and the parties.
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2.1 Organisational Structures and Logistical Planning
The political parties are complex organisations but they shared a similar organisational 
structure. Within each party there was a relic of the ‘old mass party* apparatus housed in 
the party headquarters. This was the bureaucratic heart of each party, directed by the 
leadership and concerned mainly with organisational and logistical matters. It was 
essentially a 'machine bureaucracy' (Mintzberg, 1983) operated by professionals oriented 
towards particular routinised goals. In some ways the broadcast organisations resembled 
Schlesinger’s description of the BBC as a ‘formal bureaucratic hierarchy*4. However, in 
operational terms this is too vague a description of organisational structure. Despite their 
difference in size, both broadcasters were more akin in structure to what Mintzberg (1983) 
calls a ‘divisionalised form* of bureaucracy: ‘Not so much an integrated organisation as a 
set of quasi-autonomous entities coupled together by a central administrative structure*5. 
Conference coverage involved at least one of these entities, or units, and parts of the 
departmentalised administrative structure at the BBC and ITN headquarters. Political news 
on an everyday basis was gathered and produced within both organisations* political units, 
based mainly at Millbank and the press gallery at the House of Commons. The units were 
organised hierarchically and consisted of both appointed managers and operators 
(producers, editors and correspondents). The political unit produced political news for the 
main news bulletins. Broadcasters’ programme-level planning occurred within the units 
and was last-minute, taking place within existing regular meetings a few days before 
conference started and, importantly, at the conferences themselves.
Both the political units' policy direction and the level of commitment to conference 
coverage (the amount of live coverage and the number of programmes being produced at 
conference) was decided by the apex of the administrative structure, while operational 
decisions were made at the unit level. The political units were also reliant for logistical 
prerequisites on logistical actors within the administrative structure. There were of course 
variations between the BBC and ITN. At ITN the logistical prerequisites were controlled 
within the administrative structure at Grey’s Inn Road, whereas at the BBC the political 
unit contained its own small administrative body6. Logistical planning was carried out by 
these administrative units operating in a ‘machine bureaucracy’ fashion (Mintzberg, 1983). 
They were goal-oriented, running without necessarily direct supervision, but they remained 
accountable. In the case of parties' logistical planners, they reported to the parties* 
leaderships and other committees, in the case of broadcasters they were accountable to the 
administrative apex. There was both intra-departmental interaction within the broadcasters 
and interaction also between the broadcasters and the parties' machine bureaucracies.
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The parties’ machine bureaucracies were staffed by professional managers and 
located at party headquarters. For the Liberal Democrats, this was the Conference and 
Exhibitions Office (CEO) at Cowley St, for the Labour party the Department of 
Development and Organisation at John Smith House (now Millbank Tower) and for the 
Conservatives the Administration Department at Conservative Central Office. These 
departments were hierarchically run and centrally co-ordinated by directors. The 
responsibility for conference planning was devolved to particular administrators who then 
focused on specific aspects of logistical planning. The size of the machine bureaucracy 
within each party varied. At the Liberal Democrats, logistical planning was conducted by 
the Press and Broadcasting office and by a small team of three in the Conference and 
Exhibitions Office7. In the other two parties aspects of logistical planning were spread 
between a greater number of individuals. At the Labour party it involved the Campaigns 
Office, the Conference Office, the Exhibitions and Events office and the Press and 
Broadcasting office. At the Conservative party the Conference Unit, Press and 
Broadcasting Office, the set designers and the National Union were all involved. The 
number of administrators involved increased and the departments’ activity became more 
conference-oriented nearer to the start of each conference. A Labour source suggested that, 
‘The different departments... in head office... came together to plan’8, with the different 
sections having their own areas of planning responsibility. ‘It is a very big event People 
became very professional about it and knew their own area of work extremely well’9.
The overall responsibility for logistical planning at the BBC lay with its 
Westminster political unit at 4 Millbank. Logistical planning was co-ordinated by the 
Conference Unit in liaison with Sports and Events (the Outside Broadcast Unit, OBU). 
The manager of the Conference Unit (CU) at Millbank acted as the central co-ordinator. 
Their conference commitment was decided by BBC News and Current Affairs and relayed 
to the unit, who then planned accordingly. As much of the commitment was the same as in 
the previous years, there was a certain element of routine. There was no need for senior 
personnel to issue instructions to the CU manager. A senior BBC source remarked 
‘...these things are so much in the history and culture of the place... if there are any 
problems, we have discussions, but because we have always done it like that it tends not to 
vary from year to year’l°. The CU then got involved in making key decisions on matters 
such as personnel numbers, allocation of resources and timing, as well as meeting with the 
parties and liaising with the engineers of the OBU.
Logistical planning at ITN in the main was carried out by News Resources 
at its headquarters on the Grey's Inn RoadU, and at a programme level by ITN’s 
Westminster operation at Millbank. Logistical planning was co-ordinated by a News
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Resources manager at headquarters:
‘My role in terms of the party conferences is [to] look after the budget and the 
overall strategic part of conference planning. So I liaise with the various customers 
that ITN has for the service which are: our main news outlets on ITV and Channel 
Four; the ITV regional companies; and one or two other people who make 
programmes at the conferences’12.
His role also involved him co-ordinating with ITN’s equivalent of the OBU. However, on
a general level the role of the ITN planners seemed less delineated than at the BBC. There
was more ‘multi-skilling’, where individuals charged with planning would be responsible
for a combination of different tasks. One ITN news engineer suggested comparing his role
with those at the BBC:
‘The difference is people like myself are engineers as well. I ’ll sit and plan 
everything, I’ll book all the phones, I’ll book all the circuit, I’ll then go on site and 
put all the cables in and stay there and do the work during the week. Whereas the 
BBC would go along and do the planning then hand over to all their rigging teams 
who will put everything and they will then check it out*13.
So News Resources were at the centre of the planning operation. The process was marked
by a certain degree of routine, with the commitments of News Resources’ customers not
changing in any significant way throughout the period of the study. As with the BBC,
logistical planning involved accommodation, the allocation of resources and the timing of
operations.
The Logistics of Personnel
Not all logistical planning was directly coverage-oriented. It was also directed towards 
making sure that certain basic prerequisites for coverage were in place. For the news teams 
to operate efficiently they needed to be kept in a team with accommodation near the venue, 
and office space. The facilities such as studio and editing booths also needed to be in place. 
Planning the accommodation of journalists and the movement of equipment and personnel 
was carried out by the CU manager at the BBC and by News Resources at ITN, whereas 
the logistics of coverage were left to the outside broadcast units (OBU).
Both the BBC and ITN were involved in planning accommodation for the staff and
journalists. This was crucial for the efficient operating of news teams when conference
started. The news teams had to be kept together in hotels that were preferably near the main
conference venue, and affordable. The need to keep news teams together was also an
important consideration when planning the venue work space. One source noted:
‘I keep radio news and television news together plus current affairs radio, 
Breakfast News and the political correspondent I keep sort of at one end of the 
building. And the Live Coverage and the Political Research Unit have another 
office. And then Newsnight, regions and World Service and the others have an 
office’14.
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Keeping the crews together made subsequent news-gathering that much easier. One source
explained the problems which arose when crews were not near each other:
‘The real problems are logistic problems where the spaces become disconnected so 
they find themselves spending half their time walking from one bit of ITN’s base to 
another. When the conference venue is full of people that certainly doesn’t become 
a trivial thing. They are working to very tight deadlines and it can make big 
differences. The other thing is that you can become disconnected from your camera 
man. You might say to him: “There is nothing going on and go and have a coffee”. 
Then two minutes later news breaks that some body has just said something and 
you need your camera man back’15.
The BBC and ITN also had to plan the allocation of their main resources - camera
crews and equipment. Planning for the required number of camera crews became the
responsibility of the CU manager at Millbank for the first time in 1995. Decisions over the
number of crews to be sent were worked out in advance according to the number of
programmes that would be broadcast from the conferences.
‘We are actually providing the crews this year for news. So if some one says we 
want seven one man crews which will cover breakfast news and news for the 
regions, they have to be provided. Newsnight will provide their own camera men, 
their own editing equipment and their own staff who they are used to working 
with, whereas the rest of it we will take from a pool* ^
At ITN, a source suggested that at the conferences:
‘There would be two crews for each of the main customers. So Channel Four 
would have two crews there, ITV news would have two crews. I would take three 
crews for general use and they are hired out by the hour and half hour to the 
regional clients. Then there would be OBU camera men in the hall covering the 
proceedings. If a big story broke they could easily send more, so they will 
probably send one to start with and wait to see what comes up on the agenda. If 
the... conference[s] move up the running order of the bulletin they will send extra 
resources*17.
Planning the necessary equipment required for the news rooms had also been 
centralised with the CU manager. As she suggested: ‘Millbank has taken over... ordering 
all the tables and chairs; who needs special kinds of chairs, who needs ordinary chairs.. So 
all the logistics of how many terminals you are going to need, how many modems, 
photocopiers and stuff’18. This presented a particular problem, as equipment had to be 
moved from one conference venue to another and put in the appropriate place: ‘It all 
congregates in London and then we’ll go up to Glasgow and come back, then to Brighton 
and Blackpool so actually it is co-ordinating all the timing* I9. In addition the Political 
Research Unit (PRU) at Millbank were also involved in their own planning for the 
conferences. The PRU produced 'The Conference Guide' for journalists, which was a 
comprehensive 270-page book. The Guide provided explanations of conference procedure 
at the three main parties* conferences, as well as detailed background information on the 
issues likely to be raised at conference.
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Accreditation
Having the right number of broadcasting personnel was crucial for conference coverage. 
All personnel, however, needed to be accredited by the parties for security reasons. Both 
the parties and the broadcasters realised the importance of having the relevant staff present 
and while there were tensions at the margins of any negotiations, they were marked mainly 
by co-operation between the two. Accreditation involved the logistical managers organising 
the registration of their staff with the parties and also negotiating on the numbers. The 
numbers of staff the broadcasters needed for any one conference varied according to their 
commitment: ‘It moves up and down. We had a very busy year last year [1995], we had 
extra editing in. There were one or two people in trying to make special programmes, and 
we had some regional companies who were not normally customers of ours*20.
Negotiations over accreditation were on-going during the whole planning period. 
Overall the number of media personnel attending conference had increased; one party 
source suggested the figure to be as high as two thousand. ‘We issue 2,000 press and 
media passes. Two thousand of these guys [sic] running round - not all at the front with 
cameras, thank God! But there is 2,000 people of press and media’21. However, as not all 
of these were broadcast staff and the parties* organisers did not place strict limits on them 
attending, the same source suggested that there was no immediate intention of controlling 
the numbers: ‘We can’t keep a lid on it. What keeps a lid on it is their own financial 
situation’22.
A differing picture of negotiations emerged between the broadcasters. A source
from ITN suggested that: ‘They are very understanding about the number of people we
need...We have a very good relationship over accreditation’23. But one BBC source
referred to the parties questioning the number of their staff and saw a degree of conflict:
The BBC has a constant battle over credentials. We have far and away the hugest 
output of any of the organisations covering the conferences. So, say The Times, a 
daily newspaper, maybe it would credit a dozen people. We probably need 
something like 180. And they’ll just say: “Hang on a minute. The Times has only 
got 12 and you’ve got 180”...*24.
When asked about the numbers of BBC staff that were accredited, a CU manager refused
to divulge a number, saying: ‘This was a problem. I don’t think I should really tell you
that... enormous*25. But he added: ‘for the Liberal Democrats obviously less [were]
accredited than for Tories and Labour’26.
The Independent suggested that for the 1996 conferences ‘... the BBC had more 
than 400 staff at the Labour party conference in Blackpool, and more than 500 converging 
on Bournemouth for the Conservative conference’27. The Labour leader’s press secretary
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Alastair Campbell noted in The Sunday Times that the BBC had accredited 410 people to
the party conference28. The lack of willingness to discuss numbers was in part explained in
terms of pressure from ever-questioning parties but also from the press.
‘It gets into The Evening Standard, you know, all the sort of BBC freebies, 
millions of people there, free parties, John Birt parties. And it makes it sound like a 
debauched set up rather than something everybody works extremely hard for*29.
The impact of these pressures was a decision by CU managers to make an across-the-board
cut in the numbers of BBC staff accredited: ‘We are having an accreditation bash at the
moment. This has been going on since last October-November to keep numbers down. We
are trying to cut it down by some 1% which might not seem a lot’30.
Even with the cut, such numbers were far in excess of the other broadcasters
present. A source from ITN suggested: ‘Fifty to fifty-five people. I take a team of about
somewhere between eighteen and twenty. And then there are a few more technical people
and then the journalists/presenters, so it is around the fifty mark*31. Sky News suggested:
‘We probably put in eighty applications and out of that send twenty-five to thirty people’32.
One reason for the BBC’s need to accredit so many staff was their wide-ranging
commitment to conference coverage. However, in addition, a problem facing all the
broadcasters was that they never knew exactly how many people they would need and so
accredited far more than actually went. One broadcaster explained:
‘We tend to accredit more people than we need, which is a privilege really. From a 
security point of view [the parties] would like to accredit the fewest number of 
people possible. But they understand our difficulties - that the one person we may 
have accredited might be on a story somewhere and not be able to get back’33.
Another said simply: ‘Because we don’t know who is going to be around at that particular
time... we accredit a lot more people than actually go*34. The parties indeed recognised this
and made allowances.
The Logistics of Coverage
The other important area of internal logistical planning directly concerned, and was carried 
out by, news engineers within the OBUs of both the BBC and ITN. The OBUs' planning 
was determined by the requirements of BBC Westminster and ITN. Many of these 
commitments were fairly stable and routinised, so that the planners were aware of them and 
were able make their decisions accordingly. Any changes were relayed via a series of inter­
departmental meetings. The OBUs of both organisations were charged with making sure 
the prerequisites were in place prior to the conferences starting. Planning was an 
incremental process from drawing board to assembly and disassembly of equipment. The 
OBU’s equipment included a scanner (a large vehicle which acts as the control room for
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live television coverage), floor cameras, lighting, a sound system and television sets. In
addition, the OBUs needed to hire portakabins in which to house this equipment and edit
suites. The news engineers at the BBC and ITN were committed to providing certain
facilities for their ‘clients’. The commitment of the two organisations differed in size, with
the BBC providing, in addition to television news coverage, live, regional, national and
international, radio and television coverage. As one BBC source said: ‘We’ve got three
national radio stations... 38 local stations, the World Service, news bulletins, live TV
coverage, Breakfast News, [and] On the Record’35. This presence was partly replicated in
the commercial sector. ITN was committed to providing news coverage on ITV and
Channel Four, as well as coverage for the use of the ITV regions and others who wanted
the service. An ITN source suggested:
‘The ITV commitments are usually just the news room requirements, editing 
requirements and the stand up positions so that they can interview somebody. 
Channel Four 4 News always fronts from the two major conferences on site so 
we’ll actually do the majority of the programme, the first twenty, twenty five 
minutes and the last ten minutes of the programme, from site so Jon Snow will 
actually be with us at the conference and he will present the programme from 
there’36.
However, both the BBC’s and ITN’s commitment varied between the conferences.
Both organisations put fewer resources into the coverage of the Liberal Democrats'
conference than into Labour’s and the Conservatives'. As one source suggested:
‘There is a difference between say the Liberal Democratic conference and the 
Labour and Tory conference. I refer to the Liberal Democratic conference as a 
minor conference and to the others as major conferences.[..] As far as we are 
concerned we don’t normally front programmes from the Liberal Democrats, 
whereas we do from Labour and the Tories’37.
ITN’s commitment further varied between Channel Four and ITV on the day of the
leader’s speech and the other days. Channel Four was committed to covering the party
leaders’ speeches live, whereas ITV news was not:
‘Now the problem with that is the leader's speech day on the major conferences. 
We do the leader's speech programme from site. At the Liberal Democratic 
conference for the last three years we haven’t done that. We have actually presented 
the programme from London, Jon [Snow] has been in London and we have just 
interviewees on site' 38.
Bearing these commitments in mind, ITN had to decide upon the necessary levels of
equipment; the same informant suggested that Channel Four's coverage needed an OBU,
because 'it requires say three cameras or maybe four cameras, whereas the Channel 3
commitment doesn’t. We can do it on one camera, but it is nice sometimes to have two
which we can switch around’39. Similarly for ‘the Labour and the Tories' conferences we
need an OBU. For the Liberal Democrats we don’t actually need one, we actually get away
with one camera’4®. In planning ITN’s coverage, decisions needed to be made on the
necessity of outside broadcast equipment. This was particularly important for ITN because,
as a source pointed out, ‘we don’t have our own unit, we actually sold our unit to some
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people who used to work for us*41. The planning process therefore had to incorporate into 
it the use of an OBU where it was seen as necessary: ‘The first thing we do is look to see if 
we need an OBU*42. If needed, the OBU facilities were provided by an outside contractor 
after being put out to tender43.
The alternative to hiring an OBU was to take the pictures from somebody else, as 
one source suggested: ‘We might decide to take the core coverage from somebody else. It 
might be that Sky is the originator or we will take it from the BBC or whoever*44. But ITN 
did not do this, for cost and technical reasons. ‘We stopped taking it from the BBC 
because it was too expensive and it wasn’t really the sort of coverage we wanted. The BBC 
are doing live television whereas we are interested in editing, so it is a different type of 
coverage*45. Once this issue had been decided, then the technical managers needed to plan 
the installation of the equipment, which was done with the aid of a designer shared jointly 
by the BBC, ITN and Sky. When the final designs were drawn up, then the equipment 
was installed by the same technical managers.
Those planning coverage faced the same problem as the CU managers. Because the 
three party conferences were now in a row, and there was only enough equipment to cover 
two venues, a ‘leap-frogging’ of the conferences had to be planned. This meant that the 
equipment for the first conference had to disassembled and reassembled for the last.
2.2 Joint Planning: Negotiation and Adaptation
Planning of television coverage was a joint exercise. It was a three-way process of 
interaction: broadcaster to broadcaster, and the broadcasters as a group to each party. The 
process involved first a series of negotiations and co-operation between ITN and the BBC 
(and Sky News), and second a simultaneous set of negotiations between the political 
parties and the news broadcasters. Negotiations and contacts between all actors took place 
on a regular basis in the build-up to each conference, informally over the phone, and also 
in a series of formal meetings convened by the parties at the conference venues.
Co-operation amongst broadcasters manifested itself in a series of meetings 
between the organisations, and in the centralisation of conference layout design. Through 
co-operating, information vital for planning was passed between the organisations and 
within departments inside each. The broadcasters hoped first to gain future cost benefits 
through reducing the duplication of technical resources, and second, to utilise efficiently 
the existing venue space, partly because of its inherent scarcity, and partly because the
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parties limited the space broadcasters could have.
CU managers and technical managers at the BBC, ITN (and Sky) were in contact 
with each other. In the planning stage, although a lot of information was passed on 
informally by phone, there were a series of formal meetings at the conference venues prior 
to the conferences starting. In the case of the planning managers this contact was facilitated 
by the fact that they were based at 4 Millbank and its vicinity. As one source said, ‘I do 
meet up with them other than at the meetings we go to, because they work in this 
building*46 and added ‘the relationship between us, ITN and Sky is very good and it’s 
helpful’47.
Negotiations with the parties took place in a series of meetings and subsequent 
smaller meetings. The main meetings occurred in February, March or April each year 
before the autumn conferences. An ITN source suggested: ‘it starts off with a get-together. 
We all sit round a table*48. These meetings acted as a forum for discussion between the 
principal actors and other interested groups - such as the venue’s management, the fire 
brigade and the police. ‘There were 50 people there, for big ones, Labour and 
Conservative, that’s the average. You’ll find there is more there than at the Liberal 
Democrats...’49. For example, prior to the Conservatives' conference in Bournemouth in 
1994:
‘You’ve got the Conservative party themselves, Securicor [running conference 
security], the Bournemouth Centre people, Sky news, the conference hotel, BBC 
news, Linda Parker [BBC], a producer, director engineering manager, Roy 
Graham [architect], Meridian, BBC Public Affairs, GMTV, two from ITN, ITN 
press office they were trying to get space for a stand, police and Central 
Broadcasting. It's just a big talking shop round a huge square or rectangular table 
or whatever’50.
At these meetings both broadcasters and parties negotiated around a series of topics to do 
with coverage. As one source suggested, ‘We’d go along and listen to what they have to 
say... and we would all sit there and discuss it’51. An agenda was drawn up for the 
meetings with points for discussion on: conference sessions, accreditation, entrances and 
security, stage, lighting, cameras and commentary positions, sound, radio broadcasters, 
media facilities, media technical vehicles, TV sets, hotel and other matters52. Of the thirteen 
items on the agenda there were five areas where negotiation arose. These were: media 
facilities (space), camera and commentary positions, accreditation, lighting and courtesy 
TV sets 53.
Like all regular meetings that have developed over the years, these events were 
routinised. As one party source said: ‘We’ll sit there and say “The same as last year, or is 
there something else?”.. We’ve been doing it long enough, and if there is no objection to 
how it was done last year they [the broadcasters] say “Fine”, unless they have a particular
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request’54. The broadcasters often had particular requests concerning coverage. They 
presented their opinions but it was the parties that had the final say. As one party source 
said: ‘They tell us what they want, we then tell them they can’t have half of it*55. Another 
suggested: ‘They constantly make demands. We go through this thing every time you 
know... They want the best for them - that is their job. My job is to fight for my party’s 
interests... But we always reach an amicable agreement’56. Another party source 
suggested: ‘We try to play fair. We give them a little bit but we won’t go over the top. In 
the end they take what we are prepared to give them, and we give quite a lot, to be 
honest*57. An ITN source suggested: ‘We then say what our requirements are for space, 
where we want our camera positions, what we want to change from previous years, if 
anything, and they tell us why we can’t’58. However, the broadcasters were more limited 
in what they were allowed in some areas than in others. Some topics on the agenda 
provided more scope for negotiation, if not at the main meeting then in the long run over 
several conferences.
Coverage was also negotiated in a series of smaller informal meetings on specific
agenda areas: ‘We close the meeting and all go away and have a hundred little meetings:
everyone has got their own little packages they want to discuss’59. Another source agreed: 
‘We usually finish going up several times. The party obviously have theirs first... 
After the party has gone we can deal with the venue management and their 
engineering people. Very often, not long before [the conferences], say a couple of 
weeks sometimes, we have another quick meeting at the venue just for the technical 
people*60.
But broadcasters' coverage discussions were not confined to these events and were carried 
out informally where necessary. Another source suggested: ‘We normally have a chat 
about what we are going to do, and occasionally we’ll either meet here or at the BBC’61.
Venue Space
Discussions about media facilities concerned, according to one source, ‘where we are 
going to build and what we all want, offices and everything else besides’62. Space was 
vitally important for the broadcasters. They needed enough space to utilise all the facilities 
they needed to ensure coverage. While they required a large amount of space, the actual 
space available at each venue was limited. Negotiations surrounded the amount of space set 
aside out of sight for edit suites, office space and the transmission trucks.
The size of each conference venue was the main influence on the amount of space 
available for the behind-the-scenes news rooms and vehicles. Of the four venues used by 
the parties since 1993, Blackpool, Brighton, Bournemouth and Glasgow each produced
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different spatial problems for the broadcasters. While the amount of space at each venue 
had remained fixed, the demand for space by the broadcasters had increased. At Blackpool 
Winter Gardens the broadcasters used 1230 sq. metres for studios and offices and had a 
further 1066 sq. metres for vehicles in a car park. The Scottish Exhibition Centre in 
Glasgow provided a huge hangar of 3592 sq. metres of which a small area was used by 
portakabins and the OBU vehicles. At the Bournemouth Centre the broadcasters occupied 
597 sq. metres of space and had a further 165 sq. metres for vehicles. At Brighton the 
broadcasters used some 811 sq. metres over several floors and there was no parking space 
for vehicles, which had to be parked in the street**3.
The Blackpool Winter Gardens, the Bournemouth Centre and Glasgow’s Scottish 
Exhibition Centre provided the planners with a large open space in the form of a car park or 
hall next to the venue. The broadcasters then filled this space with prefabricated structures 
which became the news rooms. However, at the Brighton Conference Centre the space 
available behind the scenes was more restricted. ‘Brighton is quite small and it’s not great, 
in some ways it is better working at the other venues’, said one source 64. And another 
commented: ‘Brighton is very bad, there is hardly any space there at all. We can just about 
survive with a small conference. The Tories won’t go there any more. Labour were there 
last year and we barely survived’65.
The large growth in demand for space by the broadcasters created problems. As
one BBC source suggested: ‘Space is at a premium now... [We] assume every year [we]
can have more but in fact [we] can’t. I suspect we are probably at saturation point: the
venues won’t get any bigger. In fact we’ve played around with the plan to make it more
roomy’66. A reason for the pressure on space, a source suggested, was ‘the news room
ha[d] increased in size...’67 because, in his words:
‘There was an awful lot more things happening that never used to. For instance [the 
BBC] have moved radio in, which has four edit suites and five studios, and they 
have things like the language service and Newsnight and Breakfast News. These 
are all separate programmes that they do while they are at the conferences which 
they never used to do. They’ve changed everything over to what they call bi-media. 
At one time the radio and television were separate units, but now they have all 
moved together so they can pool information and everything else. There are seven 
edit rooms in all just for the hand held cameras, the live cameras are controlled from 
the vehicles’6**.
The greater demand for space was not limited to the BBC, because the commercial 
television sector had increased its presence at conference, so they had ‘eaten* in to the 
space available for the BBC: ‘ITN managed to get a bit of space off the BBC at each of the 
venues’69. But as an ITN source suggested: ‘Overall we use less space than the BBC’70.
The allocation of space was routine: ‘Most of these things have a history to them.
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They have sort of grown up over the years, so there is a sort of status quo about who has
what space*71. Another interviewee concurred:
‘It is set in stone really. What we do say is that we are not using that space this 
year, so the BBC say “we will take it up*’ and we say “Yeah, that is fine for this 
year. Next year it goes back to the status quo**. We have a set amount of space and 
we give it away on a yearly basis.’72.
Co-operation between the broadcasters enabled an efficient allocation of space at 
each venue, and between 1993 and 1996 it reduced the amount of conflict that used to 
exist. According to one source: ‘[space is] where the fights all started and that’s a problem 
that has been solved. Now it’s on a very friendly basis. Everyone is aware of everybody's 
problems and they all try to help each other’73. Another summary view was that: ‘Well, 
there is some competition, although we co-operate where we can, because it is silly not to, 
it is obviously cheaper to’74.
The broadcasters’ co-operation was manifest in the fact that they had centralised the
design of the conference layout with one designer, which avoided unnecessary conflict and
allowed them to present a united front in negotiations with the parties. This arrangement
has prevailed since 1989. The designer, Roy Graham, produced the plan on which
construction was based: ‘We share the same designer, who will plan exactly where
everything is going to be. And he also sorts out the office accommodation for everybody as
well’75. Graham was responsible for designing the layout of the news area for the BBC,
ITN (and Sky), as well as the positioning of the cameras and commentary booths in the
main conference hall. The final design evolved out of a series of meetings between the
various managers and Graham in which the design was continually modified according to
their requirements. From his viewpoint:
‘I get a breakdown from [the BBC and ITN]... I then work out the area I think we 
need. Having done that I submit it back to [the BBC and ITN] so that they are 
happy with it... They all go away and come back and say “Yes, No, but maybe, 
could we alter this and could we alter that?”. When every one is more or less happy 
I send off to the venue itself saying “This is what we are trying to do” and I send it 
to the party, the Police and Fire Brigade and any body else who has an interest in it, 
and they say “Yes or No” and again we come back and things get altered or they 
stay the same*76.
It took six drafts to complete the final design on which the assembly of the news rooms 
was based. The same source suggested it was not until ‘you have got a drawing that is 
approved by everybody that you send them an open construction plan, price it and send off 
to the companies see if they all approve; and from then on it is a question of draw it all up, 
get it built and go fit it all in’77.
At the formal meetings there was pressure on the conference administrators to 
concede more space to the broadcasters. The response of the parties has been two fold.
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First, to try to charge commercial rates for the space occupied. As one source remarked:
‘The thing that all the parties do is they want the space for exhibitions because 
exhibitions make money. Space is at a premium for exhibitions so that is one of the 
things you are always fighting over. Some times if you want space in an exhibition 
area the party will try and charge you exhibition rates, which are not cheap, and 
there are always rows about that’78.
The broadcasters either refrained from using such a space or negotiated a reduced fee. An
ITN interviewee suggested:
‘They would like to charge us exhibition rates but our argument is that we have to 
build the place, we have to carpet it, air condition it properly and we have to build 
the walls. My argument is that we shouldn’t actually pay the full rate, but in fact we 
do a deal so we don’t really, although on paper it might say we do*79.
Second, to block any encroachment by the broadcasters, decisions were weighed
up by the party managers against the requirements of the party members present to have a
good view of the main platform. A party manager commented:
‘We have to draw a line. It would be to easy to go too far over to TV. But at the 
end of the day it is no good if our activists in the hall are unhappy: that will come 
through the television screens as well. So we have got to keep them happy as 
well... So it is a balancing act and we try to walk the line really’8®
This point was reinforced by what seemed to be a general belief amongst party actors that 
conceding too much space to the broadcasters during negotiation could be counter­
productive and not beneficial to the conference, a point echoed by the same person, who 
suggested: ‘...If they had their way, they’d take all the audience out... and just turn the 
whole thing in to a big studio...’81.
Camera Positions
In terms of cameras and positions there was both competition between the broadcasters, 
who were looking for the best angles and the best shots to improve their coverage, and co­
operation due to economic necessity. As one source suggested:
‘There is good co-operation between ourselves, the BBC and ITN in conference 
coverage... We do help each other out. At the end of the day it comes down to 
costs as well. Say you have got three cameras in the same position, all within six 
feet of each other, it's better if two of you can agree and split the cost It is of 
course only the core coverage. We still have our own cameras there to do other 
things’82.
In their negotiations with the parties, broadcasters tended to push for closer and 
more revealing positions for their cameras. As one Conservative source put it: ‘They want 
coverage right up on the platform so they can cover people sitting on the platform and 
zoom in on their notes. They wanted a camera back stage so they could see all the ministers 
as they go on’83. Space for cameras was also at premium and their positions and numbers
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were controlled. The large studio cameras were not allowed on to the main conference 
floor, but were instead situated strategically around the hall balcony. One Liberal Democrat 
conference manager explained: ‘A visit is made to the venue with an experienced 
conference organiser during which camera angles are decided’84.
While hand-held cameras were allowed on to the conference floor, their presence 
and numbers were still something the conference organisers needed to decide upon. 
However, evidence pointed to long-term concessions over the years to the broadcasters 
demands on this point, although the parties were 'sticky1 about it. As a broadcaster 
suggested: ‘The parties are very good up to a point until it becomes intrusive’85. Another 
said that ‘they will only allow you to go so far’86. But this resistance had not stopped the 
broadcasters* pressure: ‘We’ll push for whatever we can get away with. And if they agree 
to it, fine! If they don’t, we’ll push it a bit’87. He gave as an example: ‘During the leader’s 
speeches we like to have a radio camera on the floor. They don’t like that but they accept 
it.. But it is usually fairly amicable: we’ll warn them usually’88.
The camera's possible intrusion was of particular concern to the parties, as a 
broadcaster noted:
‘What they [parties] have been hot on in recent years [was] cameras on the floor. 
You have to have close-up cameras, and you are probably talking about fifteen foot 
[away] from whoever is speaking. And if you have manned cameras they are fairly 
high. You are blocking off quite a lot of the audience’s view. Then they say “right 
there is no more floor cameras with men”...’89.
Another broadcaster said: ‘The parties aren’t going to be too pleased to see another camera
appear in the middle of the hall. The real problem is down at the front. To get a decent shot
of the main speaker you need a camera right down at the front’90. A party manager
commented: ‘They get their cameras at the front of the hall which is very irritating for our
own people. They promise they’ll stay in one place. Two minutes later they’re in another.
They are a law unto themselves’91. The parties therefore sought to limit this intrusion but
still enable the broadcasters to get the shots they wanted and which would ultimately
benefit the parties. This led to an innovative compromise which was accepted by the
parties. Some of the broadcasters outlined the solution. ‘What they have agreed is that we
can put little hot heads on, which are small cameras on top of a pole. And some one is sat
in a chair below them with a little control box to move the camera so there is no need for
standing’92. Another concurred: ‘we have a floor camera which is on a pedestal so the
chap can actually sit down and manoeuvre from the bottom so he doesn’t block the
view’92.
While the parties were wary of the intrusive nature of cameras into the conference 
hall, they also negotiated with the broadcasters to get the best possible shots of the main
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stage. As one party manager explained:
‘When designing the stage set I consult with the media for the look on television. 
You don’t want [things] coming out of the left ear or something, so you look at that 
carefully. We don’t actually put up the... logo and the words until we are doing a 
camera position check so we have got somebody at the lectern and we can get die 
height and the distancing right and just the right camera angles. Prior to that we 
have drawn up the camera angles on the stage set design and the seating area so [we 
know] where they are coming from and what are they looking at’94.
There was also a ‘me too’ process in planning camera positions. If one of the
broadcasters managed to negotiate a new camera position then the others would insist that
they had it too. This was particularly the case with new ‘pin hole* cameras placed in the set
behind the speakers’ rostrum to ‘get a shot over the shoulder or of the delegates sitting*95.
One broadcaster confided:
‘The BBC had., a rear view camera coming out of the back of the set. Then we 
wanted one, to which [the parties] said “No” to begin with because we were too 
late in the day to start drilling holes in the back of the set. But they agreed the 
following year... If the BBC or ITN say we want an extra camera... that is going to 
get a much better shot that nobody has had before, the answer is so do we*96.
Another broadcaster agreed: ‘Obviously if it is something that will augment our coverage
then we would want to do the same’97.
The parties took a fairly pragmatic approach to the competition between the 
broadcasters for closer and closer coverage. Overall the parties ’try to be very careful not to 
get into any disputes between ourselves and the BBC or BBC and Sky', as an ITN 
respondent put it98. The parties forced the broadcasters to share any new camera positions 
or blocked them completely99. On critical shots, the broadcasters therefore shared camera 
positions: ‘You can’t physically get three cameras in the one spot that every one wants. 
And by and large ourselves and the BBC we sort of worked on the set design together to 
make sure we can get two clean shots from angles that suit both of us’1®®. Another 
broadcaster agreed:
‘The party says “Unless you can sort it out between you, none of you are going to 
get it”. So they don’t actually say to the BBC or us or ITN “Yes, that is yours and 
nobody else can have it”. They have got to keep everybody happy. If it is a really 
nice shot and we have got a camera there, every body gets it’1®1.
Another source suggested: ‘Normally what happens is that we will have a big row about it
and we will end up sharing the camera*1®2.
Commentary Booths
Within the conference hall, space was also at a premium. With three main TV broadcasters 
presenting coverage live, and radio, the pressure for the balcony studio sites overlooking
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the venue was strong. Each broadcaster wanted to have its own balcony studio from which 
to present commentary on the conference, conduct interviews and generally provide the 
best coverage for its network. While the construction of such studios was the responsibility 
of the broadcasters, their location was decided through negotiation. Broadcast booths were 
a broadcaster-inspired idea first used on the balcony overlooking the Empress Ball Room 
in Blackpool. They had now become a standard feature situated in the conference halls at 
all venues. Indeed, Channel Four News and occasionally Newsnight anchored their news 
coverage out of these ‘observation hides’.
The need for booths was due to two main factors: first, the demand for space in the
news rooms for editing facilities and from the regions and radio meant that studio space
could no longer be located there. In the case of Blackpool one manager noted: ‘studio
space... has been reduced; they have done away with hard studio presentation*103. The
second factor concerned changes in ideas on programme presentation, and here
‘[ITN]found that they were always stuck for presentation areas and they were 
always looking for something so that they could see the stage and audience and 
present the presenters so that the viewers could see the conference in the 
background. So we finished up building a booth with a huge window in it so that 
they could see and do interviews... The BBC said “That’s a good idea” and Sky 
now has one too’104.
As conferences were not set in one venue, the standards pioneered at Blackpool were
replicated at other venues. However, these venues, unlike Blackpool, did not have either
the balcony space or balconies at all. The solution was that broadcasters planned and built
their own booths in the main hall. In Glasgow for the 1995 Liberal Democrat Conference,
a BBC interviewee recalled: ‘We built a huge double-decker which was a studio and a
production [desk], so we had the production desk down stairs and a flight of stairs up to a
studio*105. Bournemouth also created the need for a similar structure because:
‘There are no booths in the actual hall apart from those at the back which are used 
as a sound and lighting control. One of the problems we have here is that we have 
to build a studio in the main hall. The “big hut” it became called, with a window 
looking on to the Windsor hall’106.
Not to be outdone, ITN planned to build additional booths on a balcony to the side of the
main conference hall at Brighton and take the same structure to Bournemouth:
‘What I want to do is build a structure on the balcony at Brighton, I then want to 
transport that down to Bournemouth and have it actually in the hall. The BBC built 
something similar last year and I want to build something the same on the other side 
of the hall’107.
The main reason, another source suggested, was to help coverage:
‘What we found last year was that we ended up at the mercy of the weather. We 
were outside, it was a great shot, everybody was very happy with it. But if it had 
been foul weather we would have been caught short because we would have had 
nowhere that would have told you that we weren’t standing in front of a board in 
London and that doesn’t look good. So this year we decided that we will build a 
studio in the hall a bit smaller than we would normally use’108.
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Again the problem of intrusion arose. For the parties these were intrusive
structures, particularly where they had to be built on the spot. The broadcasters had to
engage in negotiation to persuade the parties to let them build them at the venue. As one
source suggested: T think also one or two of the reservations of the parties to us building
these things in the hall are a bit less strong than they used to be* l09. The same source was
mindful of the imposition the broadcasters caused in constructing the commentary booths: 
‘It is a question of you are better off asking the parties to know how they feel. We 
are very mindful that we have got to get their delegates in. It is very easy to say: 
“Well, can’t we just nick a few seats here and a few seats there?” And they go: 
“That means somebody doesn’t get a seat in the conference venue”. I think it is a 
difficult balance for them, they have got to balance how it looks on the TV where 
they have the audience which they need to address, against the party members who 
want seating in the auditorium’110.
This was why he suggested the broadcasters offered a ‘carrot’ to the parties during
negotiating. ‘I think that is why we do things like provide a video wall, it is part of helping
that balance. It’s saying “Well we know we impose a great deal, but you want us there”. It
is a balance you strike, you have to be sensitive’111. In a partly related development, the
broadcasters also shared in the provision of courtesy monitors for the parties for the
transmission of speeches and debates to other areas of the venue. The cost of these sets
was met by the three broadcasters and was an area of some conflict:
‘The TV sets, that always starts a row, because at one time the television companies 
used to provide these monitors free, gratis. And it ended up becoming bigger and 
bigger. The accountants started cutting down and saying: “Why are we providing 
the parties with all these free monitors?” It was ridiculous - it is not actually the 
monitors, it is the cost of wiring them all up. Some of the cables go for miles, so 
we all chip in six monitors each’112.
Lighting and Sound
The lighting and sound were an integral part of television coverage of the conferences and
the negotiation on these matters was marked largely by co-operation. In the past the BBC
took a leading role in the provision of lighting, as one interviewee noted: ‘The BBC used to
light the whole thing, they used to light the stage, and they used to light the audience
because they needed audience shots’113. However, with the advent of new technology the
broadcasters did not need to floodlight the whole proceedings114 and did not think they
should bear the cost for it all. A broadcaster said:
‘We objected [the BBC, ITN and Sky] to paying and everybody else benefiting. 
The party is benefiting from it, all the foreign broadcasters benefit from it and 
anybody else who puts cameras in is benefiting. And we had a meeting a couple of 
years ago with the parties and said “Something has got to be done”...’115.
The result of these discussions was a scheme whereby 'the stage lighting [was] done by
the parties... and the BBC [lit] the audience...’116. A party source confirmed the point:
‘We all came to an arrangement. We will light the stage and they light the audience. As
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simple as that. Because I’ve taken care of them by lighting the stage, the audience can see, 
can hear. That is as far as I will go. I won’t pay for the television to light the audience*117. 
The BBC retained its responsibility for sound. It provided the sound for the broadcasters: 
‘All the broadcasters take a feed from the BBC. [The BBC] rig the microphones and 
everybody gets their own feed from that*118. This was confirmed by another source: ‘The 
sound we take from the BBC. What happens is... they put their own sound in and they just 
split it off to every body’119.
There were real benefits for the broadcasters in sharing the costs of the technical 
operation amongst themselves. As the largest broadcaster present, the BBC took the 
leading role in technical planning. To some extent the technical planners at ITN and Sky 
co-operated with them in this process because, first, they lacked the resources and, second, 
the costs were too prohibitive. In the planning stage the BBC guaranteed to provide some 
of the basic technical prerequisites for broadcasting such as scaffolding, lighting and 
sound. ‘The BBC light the audience and the companies split the cost... Everybody chips in 
their share of the lighting money, [and] anybody who comes in with a camera*120. Another 
source concurred: ‘We provide the lighting for the audience because obviously we want the 
best shots. And we share the cost of that between us and anybody else who wants to put 
cameras in*121.
The cost of these technical prerequisites (space, cameras, booths and lighting) was 
discussed amongst the technical managers and varied from venue to venue according to its 
size. The BBC benefited as it shared the cost of provision with ITN and Sky, as a CU 
manager suggested: ‘When we do the scaffolding and lighting then obviously they have got 
to put in a share of the costs as well, because there is no point them doing it: so we 
share’122. None of the sources were willing to reveal the cost of the operation. As to the 
manner of how the costs were distributed, one informant suggested that the BBC paid the 
‘lion’s share’, around 65%. ‘I get a cost from Geoff Taylor [BBC] and say can you tell me 
how much it is going to cost to scaffold and light all these various places. He will then say 
if I were you I would charge 25% to ITN, 10% to Sky or something like that’123. The 
costs were also shared according to the amount of space occupied by the broadcasters: ‘It is 
done on square footage basically, on the percentage of area we use’124. Overall, the 
sources interviewed were very cost-conscious and a general theme of many interviews was 
a conscious desire to reduce the overall cost of the operation.
Conclusion
The vast majority of logistical and long-range planning was carried out by ‘machine
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bureaucracies* within both the parties and the broadcast organisations. Their interactions 
focused on making the production of conference news easier and more effective, and trying 
to provide the best possible coverage of the event. Both sets of organisations were 
mutually dependent on each other and shared many of the same overall planning goals. 
The period of planning was essentially routine and characterised by intermittent interaction 
between party conference organisers and their opposites in the BBC and ITN (and Sky), 
focused in formal and informal meetings on a specific agenda. At such meetings, amongst 
many routine issues, active negotiation occurred around certain key issues crucial for 
coverage. In these areas the broadcasters had pushed for change, which was rejected and 
then sometimes conceded, either because the parties saw benefits for themselves in 
coverage terms, or because the broadcasters compromised.
This was not to deny that there were occasional conflicts in certain areas of 
negotiations. But compromise solutions always seemed to be reached. The broadcasters in 
particular were willing to make a trade-off to ensure that they achieved the best coverage 
possible. Practical limitations and costs meant that co-operation was necessary between the 
broadcasters, and between them and the parties, if goals were to be achieved. Co-operation 
was aimed at sharing facilities and coverage and at the problems involved in allocating 
limited space at each venue in the face of increased demand created by an expanding 
broadcaster presence. These meetings highlighted the extent of mutual adaptation and co­
operation between all the actors involved in logistical planning, and were an important part 
of TV coverage of the conferences.
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1. There were some striking similarities between planning of the party conferences and 
planning of the US Presidential conventions. Waltzer’s study of the conventions notes: 
‘Political parties and television networks cannot separately plan national conventions or 
coverage of them. In 1964 a television advisory committee worked with the parties in 
planning the conventions and coverage of them... Meetings were held between the 
networks and each of the parties to deal with such matters as convention site; facilities and 
schedule; sponsors; network space; location and credentials; access and coverage*. 1966, p
36.
2. Interview with Linda Parker.
3. Ibid.
4. Schlesinger, 1987, p 135.
5. Mintzberg, 1983, p 215.
6. The period of study coincided with a transition in conference planning at the BBC. 
Previously logistical planning was carried out by News Resources but from 1995 it had 
now been centralised under BBC Westminster. The centralisation of the planning process 
was seen as an improvement by one BBC source.‘It is much better because everything is 
under one roof. It is more sensible because all political correspondents are there and all the 
news producers are there too, there is a small team actually of producers coming in from 
television centre who are used to working on the One, Six and Nine O’clock news as well’ 
(Interview with Linda Parker).
7. The Liberal Democrats* Conference and Events Office may be considered too small to 
count as a machine bureaucracy in the sense that Mintzberg (1983) intended. A party source 
noted: ‘At the present I have one full time assistant [who] is paid by me three days a week 
and my other assistant is a volunteer and works two days a week and I do the whole lot 
with that staff (Interview with Penny McCormack). But it was nevertheless part of a wider 
bureaucratic machine with devolved responsibilities specifically for conference planning.
8. Interview with Joyce Gould.
9. Ibid.
10. Interview with Ric Bailey.
11. Like the BBC and ITN, Sky’s political unit was housed in the vicinity of Millbank. 
However, unlike the BBC’s and ITN’s political unit, it was much smaller in staff size and 
did not have access to the same level of internal resources. Logistical planning was co­
ordinated by the equivalent of a CU manager in Osterley. Sky’s manager had no assistants 
although he had the same logistical planning liabilities as the ones at the BBC and ITN. He 
was responsible for accommodation, accreditation, the allocation of crews and equipment. 
The decisions in such areas were influenced by similar factors to those influencing the BBC 
and ITN: the parties, cost and the need to keep programme teams together. Sky had no
54
equivalent of the OBU on which to rely, so it had to hire one or take pictures from ITN or 
the BBC for its live coverage. In 1995-96 it took its coverage from ITN.
12. Interview with Martin Smith.
13. Interview with Steve White.
14. Interview with Linda Parker.
15. Interview with Martin Smith.
16. Interview with Linda Parker.
17. Interview with Martin Smith.
18. Interview with Linda Parker.
19. Ibid.
20. Interview with Martin Smith.
21. Interview with Chris Poole.
22. Ibid.
• 23. Interview with Martin Smith.
24. Interview with Bill Bush.
25. Interview with Linda Parker.
26. Ibid.
27. Walker, 1996, p 15.
28. Campbell, 1996, p 6.
29. Interview with Linda Parker.
30. Ibid.
31. Interview with Martin Smith.
32. Interview with Bob Oliver.
33. Interview with Martin Smith.
34. Interview with Bob Oliver.
35. Interview with Bill Bush.
36. Interview with Steve White.
37. Ibid.
38. Ibid.
39. Ibid.
40. Ibid.
41. Ibid.
42. Ibid.
43. A source suggested: ‘Last year we asked people to tender for it, we chose Border* 
(Interview with Steve White), a point confirmed by another source: ‘ITN used Border 
television because ITN don’t have an OBU fleet. They got rid of it., the whole unit with 
all the cameras and crews work for ITN as a subcontractor* (Interview with Roy Graham).
55
44. Interview with Steve White.
45. Ibid.
46. Interview with Linda Parker.
47. Ibid.
48. Interview with Steve White.
49. Interview with Roy Graham.
50. Ibid.
51. Ibid.
52. There are striking similarities with Waltzer’s study of US Presidential conventions. He 
notes: ‘Network representatives attend meetings of the conventions sites committees to 
explain television’s needs... The networks and the parties consulted about the physical 
appearances, programs, and schedules of the conventions. Lighting was left largely to the 
determination of the television networks*. 1966, p 36.
53. Security was also an area that several interviewees raised as important. In particular 
they mentioned the sharing of venue and security costs. The BBC CU manager suggested: 
‘We have to have extra police in to man the doors, because Breakfast News comes on at 
four /  four thirty in the morning and in the evening obviously we do World Tonight and 
Newsnight so the office has got to be kept open longer and stewards, Securicor and police 
will keep it open, so we have to pay extra to get that’ (Interview with Linda Parker).
54. Interview with Roy Graham.
55. Interview with Chris Poole.
56. Interview with Penny McCormack.
57. Interview with Chris Poole.
58. Interview with Steve White.
59. Interview with Roy Graham.
60. Ibid.
61. Interview with Steve White.
62. Interview with Roy Graham.
63. All information was calculated from scaled architectural drawings of the venues 
provided by Roy Graham.
64. Interview with Linda Parker.
65. Interview with Steve White.
66. Interview with Linda Parker.
67. Interview with Roy Graham.
68. Ibid.
69. Interview with Linda Parker.
70. Interview with Steve White.
56
71. Interview with Martin Smith.
72. Ibid.
73. Interview with Linda Parker.
74. Interview with Steve White.
75. Interview with Linda Parker.
76. Interview with Roy Graham.
77. Ibid.
78. Ibid.
79. Interview with Steve White.
80. Interview with Chris Poole.
81. Ibid.
82. Interview with Bob Oliver.
83. Interview with Chris Poole.
84. A written reply to questions by Judith Fryer, Head of Press and Broadcasting at the 
Liberal Democrats.
85. Interview with Martin Smith.
86. Interview with Roy Graham.
87. Interview with Steve White.
88. Ibid.
89. Interview with Bob Oliver.
90. Interview with Martin Smith.
91. Interview with Chris Poole.
92. Interview with Bob Oliver.
93. Interview with Roy Graham.
94. Interview with Penny McCormack.
95. Interview with Roy Graham.
96. Interview with Bob Oliver.
97. Interview with Steve White.
98. Interview with Martin Smith.
99. Interestingly, Waltzer notes a similar occurrence in planning coverage of the US 
Presidential conventions. *To avoid possible allegations of preferential treatment... the 
parties made over-all bloc assignments to the television networks and other media, and 
delegated to them the task of dividing [it] among themselves’. 1966, p 36.
100. Interview with Martin Smith.
101. Interview with Bob Oliver.
102. Interview with Steve White.
103. Interview with Roy Graham.
57
104. Ibid.
105. Ibid.
106. Ibid.
107. Interview with Steve White.
108. Interview with Martin Smith.
109. Ibid.
110. Ibid.
111. Ibid.
112. Interview with Roy Graham.
113. Ibid.
114. Rosenbaum notes of early conference coverage: ‘One down side of televising was that 
it subjected those sitting on the platform to the intense and uncomfortable glare of early TV 
lighting. Many Labour politicians in particular (even including party leader Hugh Gaitskell) 
responded be wearing dark glasses, making this political assembly look more like a 
convention of gangsters’. 1997, p 140.
115. Interview with Steve White.
116. Interview with Roy Graham.
117. Interview with Penny McCormack.
118. Interview with Roy Graham.
119. Interview with Steve White.
120. Interview with Roy Graham.
121. Interview with Steve White.
122. Interview with Linda Parker.
123. Ibid.
124. Interview with Steve White.
58
Chapter 3
Long-Range Media Planning by the Parties
The political parties set long-range media management strategies for their conferences each 
year, using a very different approach from the planning of logistical issues. Each party’s 
deliberations were completely private to it and kept secret from the broadcasters. Decisions 
were made not by large machine bureaucracies but instead by fluid, organismic groupings 
close to the political leadership and mostly assembled specifically for this task. The 
organisational forms used in all three parties most closely approximate what Mintzberg 
terms ‘adhocracies*. An adhocracy is a series of task forces or committees, *a system of 
work constellations each located at the level of the hierarchy commensurate with the kinds 
of functional decisions [the organisations] must make’1. The adhocracy in each party 
existed to service the parties’ ‘inner core’ in carrying out numerous specific planning goals. 
The committees drew flexibly on experts in particular fields from inside or outside the 
parties’ ranks in order to complete key tasks - people such as media experts, spin doctors, 
heads of departments, an advertising agency or campaign teams, and pollsters. The exact 
mix varied between parties, and responsibilities were delineated formally. Through placing 
actors on these committees, the parties' leaderships (usually the party leader and one or two 
advisors) managed and monitored the adhocracy’s planning progress. The inner core was a 
clique, supplementary to the adhocracy, that ran with the leaders’ authority. It planned and 
made decisions with the leaders’ blessing and was accountable to him or her alone.
The concentration of power in the hands of the parties’ leadership has been well 
documented in British politics (Heffeman and Stanyer, 1997; Kavanagh, 1996; Kelly, 
1994; McKenzie, 1964; Panebianco, 1988; Shaw, 1994; Webb, 1994)2. Many observers 
have also claimed to detect an increasing sensitivity amongst the parties* leaderships to 
news coverage (Franklin, 1994; McNair, 1995; Scammell, 1995). The parties' leaderships 
created adhocracy structures to: undertake active promotional planning well in advance of 
the conference; take full advantage of the presence of the broadcasters; create positive 
publicity opportunities; convey a key sense of strategy; and plan ahead for potential risks 
and methods for combating them. The primacy of promotional-oriented planning led the 
leaderships and other actors in the parties’ inner core first to ‘politically fix* existing 
committees within the party structures with similar or overlapping remits, and to centralise
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effective control instead in special informal teams. The adhocracy structures were much 
more ‘sensitised* to the presence of the news broadcasters, and much less concerned with 
internal party organisation or conference housekeeping - so long as these areas did not 
threaten to impact on media reporting of the conference.
Key issues that the planning adhocracies focused on included the planning of 
conference communication strategies, the broad agenda and timetable, and the aesthetics of 
designing the main stage and the conference hall: ‘The agenda gets organised timetable- 
wise more for the media than in the past'3. Promotional-oriented planning was not only a 
‘science* of detail, with nothing being left to chance - it was also 'reflexive* (Schlesinger 
and Tumber 1994; Thompson, 1995). The planners continually sought ways to improve 
presentation by taking account of failures or perceived defects in the previous year’s 
conference. This chapter discusses the structure of the adhocracies and who was involved; 
the advance planning of communication strategies; the construction of the agenda and 
timetable; and aesthetic planning.
3.1 Basic Conference Planning Arrangements
Conference planning was controlled and directed, with final decisions resting with the 
leaderships. Each party’s planning effort was centrally co-ordinated by at least one senior 
party actor (the Director of Strategy and Planning for the Liberal Democrats, the General 
Secretary for Labour, and the Party Chairman for the Conservatives) who liaised with the 
various committees and department heads and provided a strong link to the leader's offices. 
In each party the conference agenda and timetable were the responsibility of a formally 
institutionalised committee. These committees were responsible for sorting through and 
selecting the motions for debate - the Liberal Democrats had the Federal Conference 
Committee (FCC), Labour the Conference Arrangements Committee (CAC) and the 
Conservatives' the Conference Agenda Subcommittee (CAS)4. Responsibility for planning 
communication strategies fell both to communications departments (the Communications 
Office at the Liberal Democrats, the Press and Broadcasting Department for Labour and the 
Communications Department for the Conservatives) and to informal committees drawing 
on specialists from various departments to provide input. Each party used a special 
organisation to design the main conference platform and hall.
These different committees did not plan in isolation but were interconnected and
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interacted during the planning process. They were joined through their members sitting on 
other, usually more senior, committees and by overlapping links with departments. 
Together they formed an interlinked planning network. Certain key actors, particularly 
those in the inner core of each party, had an input on several committees, whereas others 
were confined purely to their own department or to one committee. There was often a 
complex relationship between the committees and departments. While departments were 
essentially the domain of professional managers, department managers often sat on 
committees where their expertise was needed. *
In the Liberal Democrats* structure, the Federal Conference Committee was linked 
to other committees and departments. For example, two of the unelected representatives on 
the FCC were also members of the Federal Executive (FE), the party’s directing and co­
ordinating committee, and two were from the Federal Policy Committee (FPC), which was 
responsible for developing and initiating policy proposals. Represented on all committees 
was the Party President and the Chief Whip. A Liberal Democrat source highlighted how 
the FCC was further linked to the Leader's Office, the Organisation and Event Office and
the Communications Committee.
‘The FCC is open to members of party staff and obviously we have our own 
conference organiser on the staff, the Director of Policy and at least one of his 
people is always there, Alan [Director of Strategy and Planning] comes to about 
half of them, Judith [the chief press officer] comes to about half of them and there 
is usually someone fix>m the general election team if we are that stage of the cycle. It 
is important that they know what is going on and they can contribute as wefl: they 
are not forced to sit there and be silent’5.
The Communications Committee was an informal advisory group formed by the Leader’s
Office and run by the party’s Director of Strategy and Planning after their 1994 party
conference. The Committee consisted of the Director, Head of Communications, Director
of Organisation and Events, party press officers, the leader’s press officer and other
outside specialists. The Committee’s aim was to plan the promotional aspect of the motions
that had been put forward by the FCC. The Director of Organisation and Events was
responsible for liaising with the company hired to design the stage set. Both the Federal
Executive and the party leadership were kept informed of the motions that had been selected
and the promotional strategies being considered.
At the Labour party the main planners were the Leader’s Office, the Conference 
Arrangements Committee (CAC), the General Secretary, and the Campaigns, Elections and 
Media Department. The CAC maintained links to the Leader’s Office and the General 
Secretary and with the National Executive Committee (NEC) - Labour's official governing
61
body. Formal links were maintained through the chair of the committee and the secretary. 
Minkin (1978) in his study describes several informal links between the CAC and the 
party’s leadership, the General Secretary and the NEC. ‘It is possible to discern a subtle 
and discreet pattern of interactions... between leading administrative and political figures’6. 
Within this pattern of interaction soundings7 were taken.
Minkin argues that there was a crucial link between the Leader’s Office and the 
CAC through the CAC’s Secretary. The CAC's Secretary sounded out the leader's opinion 
on the resolutions and amendments selected, in order to avoid an open clash at conference 
and subsequent negative publicity. One Labour source reaffirmed that, ‘There would be a 
discussion with the Leader’s Office’8. This sounding-out process was not limited to the 
leader but also included important members of the inner core. The same source suggested 
there would be discussions with the General Secretary outside the time allotted to the 
official meetings. Another insider noted: ‘Sometimes [the General Secretary] would come 
to the CAC and the link would be through regular contact with the Secretary*9. Such links 
were routinised:
‘We were going through a ritual... The CAC would write to the NEC and so I
would write to Larry [the General Secretary] and Larry would write to me.
Everybody knew what you were doing, that some request was being made, or you
were putting a case drawing the NEC’s attention to certain things’10.
The General Secretary played a pivotal role in the planning process within the 
Labour party, bringing decisions and queries raised by other groups to the attention of the 
CAC and vice versa. As a former General Secretary admitted, *1 hold the ring really’11. His 
role was the ‘lynch pin in... decision taking’12. The two other important elements in the 
planning process - the main party machine bureaucracy and the communications operation - 
had directors who were also important to the overall planning process. The same source 
continued: ‘The lynch pin in keeping things rolling... [would be] the Director of 
Organisation and the lynch pin in the creative presentational side would be [the Director of 
Campaigns, Elections and Media], but the lynch pin on the decisions is still the General 
Secretary’13. Through a series of meetings the General Secretary was able to monitor what 
was going on and keep the Leader's Office informed. ‘There was a running conference 
meeting which either I or [Director of Organisations]... would run’14.
Conference communication strategies were planned by the Campaigns, Elections 
and Media Department, but in liaison with the General Secretary and the Leader's Office. 
The Campaign Department's planning was given the final approval by the General
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Secretary. He commented that planning was:
‘Done between the campaigns people and myself, decisions like whether we had a 
band at the conference or played “We are the Champions”. And that basically is my 
decision to tell them to go ahead. The campaigns people would come up with these 
propositions and you would have to say yes or no to them. It’s a decision every 
year if you sing “The Red Flag” or not [...]. There was even one year where we 
had to make a serious decision whether to sing “Auld Lang Syne” or “Jerusalem”. 
John Smith didn’t like “Jerusalem” because it referred to England’s mountains 
green. So there are some decisions which are trivial [and some] which can only be 
taken by the General Secretary because people get so upset by them’15.
The Campaigns and Communications Office was also in contact with the Leader’s Office. 
‘In general it was wise to tell the Leader’s Office early on about presentation [...]. 
The Leader’s Office would be involved in some of the presentationa1 decisions and 
normally the campaigns people would talk directly to the Leader's Office and if 
there was a problem it would come back to me and so I would already know 
broadly what the campaigns people were proposing’1^
The NEC was kept informed of the progress of planning by the CAC and the 
General Secretary. While the NEC and CAC did not officially meet until the Friday before 
conference, there was plenty of time for informal interaction. A former CAC member 
suggested: ‘We had two members of the NEC on the committee in the CAC meeting the 
August before conference. So their role there was to explain to us the views of the National 
Executive and also to take our views to the NEC*17. NEC members also attended the 
conference meetings initiated by the General Secretary. One source noted: ‘members of the 
NEC were getting upset about various decisions we had taken. That didn’t have much 
impact but it meant that you were more conscious of the need to take the NEC along’18. 
The NEC had some influence on the planning process, although its influence in no way 
rivalled that of the Labour leadership.
In the Conservative party, conference planning involved the Leader’s Office, the 
directors of departments housed at Conservative Central Office (CCO), particularly the 
Communications Department, the set designers, the Party Chairman, and the CAS. The 
conference agenda and timetable were planned by the CAS, and media strategy and 
conference aesthetics were the responsibility of the relevant departments at CCO. The Party 
Chairman was the key link person overseeing planning. He provided a link between the 
Leader’s Office and CCO and, via the National Union Chairman and Secretary, to the 
National Union (NU). The Chairman was left to his own devices to organise the 
conference themes, and was only constrained by the desires of the Cabinet and to a lesser 
extent the wishes of the NU. As the Party Chairman sat in on meetings of the cabinet and 
the National Union Executive Committee (NUEC), of which the CAS was part, he was the
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main conduit through which information passed between both bodies. The Party Chairman
dealt with and had direct access to the Prime Minister, as a former Chairman stated:
‘On a Monday morning, at 9.30,1 would have a bilateral with the Prime Minister, 
one-on-one until at least ten o’clock. We would discuss issues between ourselves. 
Very often in the build-up towards conference season he would be asking me 
whether there was a need for him to discuss with others as to what he should be 
saying and doing. This particular Prime Minister [was] always keen to know what 
the format of the party conference is going to be and if there are any changes. Then 
between 10 and 10.30 we had our business meeting - the week in parliament of 
course - and then 10.30 until 11 was usually the Cabinet Committees. But in that 
first half hour, the bilateral between the Chairman and the Prime Minister, he would 
often say “Let’s have a meeting to discuss the Party conference”... It is a very 
important part of the planning process’19.
The Chairman further had access to the rest of the Cabinet. ‘The Chairman’s 
leadership [was] so important within the cabinet - that is why having a Chairman who is a 
Cabinet minister is vital because we go from main cabinet into political cabinet on 
Thursday, the civil servants leave and you are purely a political cabinet*20. The political 
cabinet provided the forum where communication strategies were discussed, along with 
presentations by the set designers. Armed with such information, the Chairman then talked 
to the NU: ‘I very much took his [the leader’s] and the Cabinet’s particular thoughts into 
account when helping to suggest to the NU and others involved how conference should be 
run*21. These decisions were then conveyed to the CAS. The Party Chairman was also 
involved with the Communication Department in formulating an overall communications 
strategy for the conference.
3.2 The Agenda and Timetable: Promotion
In each party, as we have seen, the agenda and timetable were planned by an agenda 
committee 22 In the 1990s planning the agenda and timetable was not just concerned with 
inviting resolutions or motions from affiliated organisations, deciding from the submitted 
resolutions what would be selected to form the conference agenda, then placing both 
speeches and debates in particular slots. A sizeable amount of agenda and timetable 
planning dealt with policy that originated from the parties* policy committees, government 
departments and policy units - rather than from activists* or affiliated members’ motions. 
Agenda committees did not abandon their former task, but planning nevertheless focused 
primarily on the promotion of formulated policy, not on facilitating a broader policy­
making process inside the party23. A key part of the promotional dynamic was seen in the
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adaptation of the conference timetable to the presence of the broadcasters. The agenda 
committees not only gave precedence to formulated policy but also sought to reserve the 
slots in the timetable that would provide maximum television coverage. In addition the 
agenda committees' planning took on a ‘managerial a ir\ The agenda committees were 
intent on avoiding controversy, or at the very least preparing for it in advance. This was 
especially true with debates that attracted adverse publicity or showed the party leadership 
in a poor light. The agenda committees sought to minimise controversy or distractions in 
the planning stages through managing the contribution from party activists, either by 
rejecting motions24 or manipulating their position within the timetable to reduce their 
coverage.
The desire by the parties* leaderships and the communications committees to use 
conference as a platform to promote key policies and individuals had a major impact on the 
agenda committees, who actively co-operated with these aims. The agenda committees 
acted as the planning conduit through which the promotional desires of the inner core were 
brought about, whether the agenda committee was elected or appointed. Despite their 
democratic credentials, the agenda committees of Labour and the Liberal Democrats like 
that of the Conservatives, sought to give most attention to prepared policy motions rather 
than those submitted by delegates, provided more space in the timetable to promote 
members of the parties’ leaderships and aimed to control the agenda and timetable to avoid 
embarrassment. As Minkin (1978) noted of Labour’s CAC, and as is equally applicable to 
the other two parties' committees, the agenda committees were amenable to being 
influenced - amenable in the sense that they saw themselves as insiders and were therefore 
‘prey to that sense of joining in the burdens of the mighty’25. This led to some members of 
the committee perceiving their role in terms of the party interest as a whole. This 
amenability was the key to the development of a consensus between the members of the 
agenda committees and the leaderships on what Minkin describes as the ‘managerial 
fundamentals* in the attainment of a successful conference. It was a consensus that affected 
the decisions by the committee: ‘the degree of agreement on the basic elements of a "good 
conference" resulted in a significant mobilisation of bias in the conference agenda’2**.
The conference agenda and timetable, therefore, were not the product merely of the 
deliberations of the agenda committees; their planning was interconnected with the 
promotional desires of other sections within the party adhocracy, particularly the
leaderships. A Labour source said:
‘There would obviously... be a broad kind of agreement between the Chair and the
secretary taking account of what the Leader's Office wanted, not necessarily
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delivering on everything but certainly taking a strong account of that..There [was] 
also a kind of unwritten code... that turning out a good conference meant the 
leadership not being overturned and therefore some recognition of planning the 
conference accordingly*27.
Another source underlined the CAC*s readiness to take account of the leadership. ‘It is
independent and on occasion asserts its independence, but it was always trying to be
helpful’28. The amenability of the CAC stretched to adapting the timetable in line with the
leader’s wishes.
‘The decisions on timetabling and the balance of debates would be taken very much 
with the Leader’s Office on board and those political decisions would basically be 
taken with me in the chair. In most cases obviously the leader himself may have 
some views. [The] Leader’s Office would be kept informed by a series of “fairly 
informal meetings” and continually in contact by phone’29.
In addition the CAC was also amenable to the bodies where policy was formulated,
particularly towards motions coming from the National Policy Forum30 and to motions
which
‘the NEC or particular Shadow Cabinet members want[ed] to put through 
conference, which [were] decided to be of political importance[...]. It meant that 
what [was] actually being presented was a lot of work which had already been 
prepared by the major actors before you [got] to conference. Therefore what was 
debated at conference is much less of a range of ritual debates... because a lot of it 
had been prepared beforehand’3!.
The Liberal Democrats' FCC was also amenable. The FCC co-operated with the
policy-making committee and the Communications Committee. In particular, the FCC gave
preference to motions from the Federal Policy Committee (FPC), the main policy forum,
and in many cases asked for motions and advice. One source suggested:
‘We will certainly take a policy motion [and] we would normally take an ordinary 
motion from the FPC. We can suggest things to them as well, for instance, 
economics - any economic issue is difficult for a local party to draft. So what one 
wants to say in those circumstances to the policy committee is: “Look we have got a 
problem here, we want a decent motion on this subject. We haven’t got one at the 
preliminary agenda stage, so we will reserve a slot here on the agenda”. So if we 
find we need a particular topic on the agenda we have the facility at the preliminary 
agenda stage to reserve a slot for a topical motion. The representatives from the 
RPC would be expected to get back to the policy committee and say “Well, this is 
what the conference committee wants: can we collaborate?”. And in a sense it is the 
same issue with the Federal Executive over business issues*32.
Advice from the Communications Committee was readily accepted by the FCC. One source
noted that the communications department were important ‘in bringing together the various
strands... If they say they are going to launch a campaign on homelessness we will have a
motion on housing. It may not be the one they wanted for the campaign but in most cases it
will be. But there will be a peg on which they can hang their campaign*33.
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A key aspect in planning the promotion of policy was the division of the conference
agenda into themes. All conference agendas had a large planned thematic element to them.
The aim was to provide the news broadcasters with a coherent, easily reportable package of
policies on an issue rather than a series of unrelated debates and speeches. Asked about the
use of themes, a Liberal Democrat source suggested: ‘That is something we have not
historically done but we have begun to do... I think it has been generally appreciated that it
has worked reasonably well*34. A Labour source similarly pointed towards such a change: 
‘Instead of having the structure of debates determined by the number of 
resolutions..., there was a structure put on it. So we had an overall link in the 
debates... So instead of having umpteen mini debates we had an economic debate, 
an international debate which was put in an overall context by a major presentation 
of our political stance at the beginning of that debate. I think that has changed and 
improved the coherence of conference to a large extent’35.
Themes also took precedence in the planning of the Conservatives’ conference
agenda3^ . The themes of the conference were already decided upon and the meetings
sought to slot ministerial speeches into these themes.
‘It is then enforcing, with the Prime Minister's backing, what the theme is and the 
order of the speeches, which matters a great deal to Secretaries of State. This last 
time [1994] the idea of two Secretaries of State speaking in one debate, one at the 
beginning one at the end, was to make the themes of the conference more cohesive. 
Rather than having four or five or six separate debates - i.e. one debate’s gone, on 
with the next debate - the idea was to get it more on to a theme, a coherent whole 
for those attending. This is an important challenge, but it can only be done basically 
by agreement and then by political will’37.
The focus on themes led to much tighter control, particularly by the Prime Minister’s
Office, over the content of the Tories’ speeches. One source noted: ‘We have a system of
liaison with the special advisers of the ministers. Virtually every minister who speaks has a
special adviser, what was different this year [1995] compared to some past years was that
there was more central involvement, which was as much Downing Street as Central
Office’38.
In Major’s later years certain requirements were placed on the planning of major
Tory speeches in order to make sure they conformed to these themes:
‘Generally speaking, ministers write their speeches or write it with their own team. 
They don’t consult us, but this time we imposed on them two demands. One was 
they had to be forward-looking and had to have announcements to go in with the 
general theme of the conference. And the second was that the speech had to be 
cleared in advance by Downing Street. Generally speaking, in the past that hadn’t 
been done: they were allowed to do their own thing. The Prime Minister’s political 
position was so much stronger and therefore he was in a position to insist on that in 
a way in past years he probably wouldn’t have been’3^ .
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Intimately connected with the promotion of policy was the promotion of key
individuals, usually part of the leadership cadre. These individuals were used to attract the
news broadcasters' attention to policy announcements. The parties* leaders in particular
were the peg on which numerous policy announcements were hung. In order to enhance
the promotion of policy announcements, the agenda committees sought to manage the
timetable to leave more slots open for speeches by key individuals. While the
Conservatives' conference always featured speeches by ministers (Kelly, 1989), speeches
by party spokespersons in the other two parties were also a dominant feature. More time
was also allotted in the conferences prior to general elections to give television exposure to
certain parliamentary candidates and backbench MPs. A Liberal Democrat source
underlined this point: ‘Of course not all the conference is actually physical debate: we do
have presentations from party spokesmen’40. The FCC were active in making sure in the
planning stages that slots were available in the conference timetable for presentations by
party spokespersons. The initiative behind this process came from the Communications
Committee. The Communications Committee also made sure that speakers were prepared to
maximise the use of the slots afforded them. One source noted:
‘There is a bit of a trade going on with the MPs which is: they will get the better 
slots, longer slots, but in return for that they will have to prepare themselves 
properly [...]. We just encourage everybody to make sure that they know this is a 
big event They have the whole summer to prepare and we've laid on some training 
in speech-writing’41.
In some circumstances the Liberal Democrat timetable was especially adapted to allow key
spokespersons within the party to contribute to a particular debate and gain coverage.
‘If Menzies Campbell, our Foreign Affairs spokesman, was abroad somewhere 
away from the conference and whilst we don’t have a duty to make sure he is 
available for the foreign affairs debate it is obviously sensible if we can arrange to 
have the foreign affairs slot at a time that he is going to be around. Alan Beith the 
Home Affairs spokesman won't do any public political activity on a Sunday for 
religious reasons. It doesn’t mean we won’t take home affairs stuff on a Sunday. 
But it does mean that we will be careful about it’42.
A similar picture emerged in the planning of the Labour conference timetable. 
Debates at Labour conferences were ‘presented by shadow cabinet member[s] who [were] 
not necessarily members of the NEC and wound up by a member of the NEC’4^. The 
Shadow Cabinet and members of the NEC were given more time to reply to debates, as 
Wintour notes: ‘more shadow cabinet members are given a chance to speak, consuming 
time that used to belong to delegates... even more presentable prospective parliamentary 
candidates in targeted seats are called to the rostrum to make a local media splash’44. The 
CAC changed the timetabling of conference to make sure that key individuals received 
television coverage.
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‘There have been marginal changes to fit in with media schedules. They [the 
broadcasters] don’t start until after half an hour into the morning which is a problem 
because we would like to start the debate, say, on the environment first thing in the 
morning with a speech by Michael Meacher or Frank Dobson, or whoever, whereas 
we have to find some business to fill up the first half hour’45.
A CAC source concurred.
‘We actually changed the timing of conference... to fit with the transmission times 
because they [the broadcasters] were coming on at quarter past [2.15pm] and our 
conference started at two and our keynote speakers were coming on at five past two 
or ten past, so conference times were changed to fit that’46.
The Conservatives also paid similar attention to making sure that key actors spoke 
at certain times; a senior source noted in terms of news coverage that ‘placing of certain 
individuals and certain debates is an important matter’47. Another source suggested that the 
‘stars’ needed to be spread throughout the week: ‘You have your big beasts, your great 
speakers, your great orators, people who move the conference, they need to be spread out. 
There is no point having them all speaking on the same day’48. Another Conservative 
source stressed it was ‘using the potential you have got*4 .^ The communication specialists 
used their main players to add gravitas to announcements on policy which they wanted to 
make.
The leaders’ speeches attracted the most news attention and were the promotional
centrepiece of the conference week. Consequently a lot of planning went into the speeches
as specific events. The parties’ leaders started to focus on the preparation of the speech in
early September. Working with their advisers they prepared a series of drafts; the speech
then went through a continuous process of revising, in which drafts were commented on
by the key members of the partiy's inner core. The speeches were written to include a
number of themes - the health service, foreign affairs, home affairs - and, importantly, to
deliver newsworthy policy announcements. In fact such announcements were saved for
delivery in the leader’s speech to enhance the coverage they would receive. The
presentational aspects of the leaders’ speeches were also planned carefully. Dan Clifton, a
former Labour broadcasting officer, described a meeting prior to Blair’s 1996 speech with
himself, Peter Mandelson, Jackie Stacy and some media professionals to discuss the
presentational elements of the Labour leader’s speech.
‘Sitting on the sofa we batted around a number of ideas. Could the leader’s speech 
be moved into television prime time? The broadcasters would be compelled to cover 
it, securing a better audience. We talked about improving the seating arrangements 
during the speech, radically redesigning the set by extending the stage, and using 
video inserts to improve the presentation. Most of the suggestions proved 
impracticable, but some ideas were incorporated by Jackie Stacy’50.
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Similar ideas were discussed and implemented by the Conservatives prior to the 1994
conference. A party source commented.
‘He (Major) is a magnetic character when close to people, you get within five feet 
of John Major and you're hooked, so it was bringing him further forward down 
towards the front of the platform, so that he was very much closer to the audience, 
that was something which maximised his natural talents and that was something that 
was done in conjunction with the conference organisers’51.
There was also careful consideration of their placement within the conference
timetable. In this respect two major changes had occurred by the 1995 conferences in the
location of leaders’ speeches within the timetable, aimed at improving their coverage. For
the Liberal Democrats one source suggested: ‘Paddy’s speech must be on television live.
So we schedule his speech for a time when there is live coverage’52. In order to benefit
Ashdown and enhance publicity, the Liberal Democrats moved the slot allocated for
Ashdown’s speech from the Thursday, the last day of conference, to the Tuesday
afternoon. This was partly to stop the need for Ashdown to update the content of his
speech continually throughout conference week. As one source noted: ‘He is constantly
working on [it] and is getting uptight because there are more changes. He is constantly
being looked for by the media to do interviews - his time is not his own. We tried the
experiment last year [1995] of him speaking on the Tuesday*53. Several additional
promotional advantages flowed from the move:
‘It gives the opportunity to schedule different items pre and post Paddy’s speech. 
Before, everything was before Paddy’s speech - anything could have happened. 
This way he can make comments on so and so’s remarks or on such and such. 
Afterwards, he can concentrate on the message he wants to get across on behalf of 
the party to the world at large’54.
Another party source concurred:
‘By having the speech at the end of the conference we are actually losing some of 
his best skills. We put to Paddy the suggestion that he might like to move it, both to 
make it easier to himself and to make it easier for our people to be more constructive 
in the use of the [media] - and he jumped at it. Also if things are beginning to go 
wrong - which will inevitably happen some times - it gives him an opportunity to 
rescue it rather than just letting it build’55.
John Major’s speech was also brought forward in 1995 from its usual slot on the 
Friday afternoon to the Friday morning, replacing a second balloted motion and a second 
speech by the Party Chairman. The idea behind this decision, taken by the party’s 
leadership and the Party Chairman in particular, seems to have been twofold, first, freeing 
up the Party Chairman to take a more active role in media management and, second, 
providing greater publicity opportunities for the Prime Minister’s speech. By relieving the 
Party Chairman of having to make his second speech, this freed him up to act as an
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important media briefer for the party after delivering his first speech to conference on the 
Tuesday. The Chairman was ‘able to take a more strategic overview of management of the 
conference and also in part the arrangements for the media because he didn’t have this other 
thing at the back of his mind’56. In addition, another source suggested, ‘and of course it 
was difficult to interest the media in the second speech by the same person’57.
Bringing the Prime Minister’s speech forward created greater publicity for it, as a
former Chairman suggested:
‘The added advantage of bringing the Prime Minister forward to before lunch was 
that his speech could be on the lunch time news, which is increasingly important, 
rather than having his speech in the afternoon on the Friday and missing the lunch 
time news and then having crowded evening news programmes. And that seemed 
to go very well indeed’5®.
This point was reinforced by another source who suggested:
‘I think it turned out to be right to move. First, by putting him on in the morning he 
of all the three party leaders was the only one who was televised on BBC 1 as 
opposed to BBC 2. And you will know an identical programme at an identical time 
will get double the ratings just because it is BBC 1 compared to BBC 2. So he 
spoke to a live audience of between three and four million people when you count 
that Channel Four was on air at the same time, whereas Blair and Ashdown spoke 
to less than half that simply because they were BBC 2. We also had a perennial 
problem in terms of the lunch time bulletins... You have a different audience, 
although there may be an overlap, it is a different audience and quite an important 
audience separate from the evening bulletins. Also by bringing it forward into the 
morning it was felt that the atmosphere in the hall would be even more stoked up 
than it had been in the past - because they [representatives] wouldn’t all have to sit 
twiddling their thumbs through lunch’59.
All three leaders were additionally used as a key promotional resource in conference 
week. They had their own timetable of engagements planned by their office. Particularly 
important were the rounds of interviews they did with, and exclusives they offered to, the 
broadcasters. In 1996, in addition to the main speeches, the parties’ leaders made further 
active appearances on stage. Tony Blair joined John Prescott in saluting the audience on the 
final day of Labour’s conference, and Paddy Ashdown made an impromptu speech on the 
last day of his conference. The Conservatives' communications team devised and 
timetabled a special question-and-answer session in which John Major fielded questions 
from the audience in the hall60.
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3.3 Setting Party Communication Strategies
Responsibility for planning conference communication strategies was delegated to the 
communications departments and various specialists who with the leaders* authority carried 
out specific tasks. All parties felt that their communication strategies needed to be in place 
well in advance of conference in order to 'sell' the planned policy announcements. The 
planning of communication strategies was conducted by leading members of 
communications departments in liaison with the leaderships and the relevant heads of 
ministerial or shadow departments. As a committee, those managers in the communications 
departments learnt about what the others sections within the party were planning, what the 
themes of the conference were, who was making speeches and what debates would be 
held. Communication planning involved three areas: first, logistics; second, advice to other 
committees and the party leadership; and, third, the development of communication 
strategies.
The success of communication strategies depended heavily on logistical factors 
being in place. At the Conservative and Labour parties there was one section of the head 
office especially devoted to the informational needs of the broadcasters. As one source 
said, ‘There were the media people... working with the television companies and the press 
about all the arrangements that had to be made for them at conference...*61. Within all three 
parties conference managers were responsible for planning the installation of the media 
information (press) office. Planning needed to take account of all the equipment necessary 
for the functioning of the press office and to oversee the shipment of such equipment to the 
venue. Not only did the press office require numerous photocopiers and printers to 
produce the sheer bulk of speeches and press releases demanded, but it also required an 
army of staff. All three parties expanded their press office during conference using 
volunteers. A Liberal Democrat source remarked how the operation of the press office had 
grown: ‘It is a much more professional operation this year, unlike the days I remember, 
when it used to be “two men and their dog”[sic], and the job of the media office was to 
hand out press releases. And the journalists would probably go away and follow them 
up'62. One Conservative source noted: ‘We always expand greatly for party conference 
week. We bring in a lot of volunteers...’63. The conference managers also had to provide a 
suitable space for press conferences, usually consisting of a platform and a series of chairs. 
Internal party communications were also planned. Bleepers and cell phones were 
distributed to the main personnel who required them so that they could be easily contacted.
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The communications departments frequently advised other committees, particularly
the agenda committees and also the parties* leaderships, on the communications aspect of
their planning. As a Liberal Democrat source noted: ‘Members of our media team would
suggest X debate could be iffy in the media and the FCC [would] say “I’m sorry, No it has
got to go in that spot” or the FCC [would] say “Maybe we could fit that one there and that
one there”...*64. Another suggested: ‘We give our advice... on both policy and
communications - obviously that concerns the topic and the way it should be presented’65.
The communications departments needed to persuade the leaderships of the value of such
strategies for the promotion of policy announcements, but this did not mean that such
endeavours would be accepted. They were at times rejected. In the case of the
Conservatives, one source noted that under Major: ‘There was strong resistance particularly
from Downing Street to any idea of trailing*66. He continued:
‘The fault being that if you trailed it you would spoil the story for the day when it 
came out. I in particular was bashing my head against a brick wall, when you 
would see Tony Blair for example get three or four days’ worth of publicity out of a 
speech which we would desperately like to do with a speech of the Prime 
Minister’s. For a long time he and his team absolutely forbade, now we are finally 
beginning to be allowed to do what [Blair’s] team do’67.
Such resistance hampered the planning of a nuanced strategy or led to a rethink by the
communications departments, in the short run. The communications departments made
demands of their own on the other planners and party actors which generally required a
more media-centred approach to conference planning by those involved.
The presence of the broadcasters provided the planners with a major publicity 
opportunity, a vital chance to develop new ways to present policies and personalities to a 
TV audience68. However, the ‘oxygen of publicity’, in Margaret Thatcher’s phrase, also 
carried risks. Communication strategies were developed in two main forms, proactive and 
reactive (Heffeman and Stanyer, 1997; McNair, 1995). Proactive communication strategies 
were planned, first, to enhance the dissemination of formally agreed party policies, namely 
those that were the product of professional committees, and, second, to aid the presentation 
of personalised information, namely the leaderships' views on existing policy and new 
directions in party policy. Their planning also needed to satisfy the broadcasters’ demand 
for visuals. Reactive communication strategies were planned to limit potentially damaging 
negative publicity and to second-guess and contain any problems that might arise for the 
parties and their leaderships.
All proactive or reactive strategies were targeted. Targeting was in part a response 
to the broadcasters' desire for exclusives and also to allow the spin doctors time and effort
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to be more effectively utilised and monitored. Communications departments were aware 
which of the broadcast outlets present at conference might be most compliant in using an 
exclusive and most likely to frame it in a way they liked. Hence they would try to plan to 
target a particular broadcaster with exclusive information.
Certain basic proactive strategies were developed in all three parties: making sure if
possible before hand that each speech made significant policy announcements; ensuring that
these announcements were trailed before a speech and followed up by further briefing; and
checking that there were numerous photo opportunities. The planning of proactive
strategies not only adapted to the broadcasters’ demands for newsworthy information but
also went beyond that, seeking to provide some with exclusive pre-packaged stories. There
was a noticeable belief amongst those interviewed that the journalists at conference needed
a ‘story*, a ‘big idea*, an ‘interesting angle*, or else they would go and find one themselves
and that would mean trouble. One Conservative spin doctor suggested: ‘The alpha and
omega of all media relations is that they are interested in a story. If you have got a story, it
is much easier to sell than if you haven’t*69. Another Liberal Democrat spin doctor
suggested: ‘The strategy as far as the media is concerned is to make it interesting and keep
supplying them with stuff which keeps them occupied’70. He added:
‘You have to be able to keep one step ahead of the journalists because if you are not 
very careful and not supplying them with material and interesting angles they’ll go 
off and do their own stuff. I think I can tell when things go wrong, it’s when they 
[journalists] start interviewing each other about how they think the conference is 
going. It’s a sure sign that it’s not going very well, they really [should] be 
interviewing our people’71.
The importance of a story and announcements in speeches was also emphasised by two
sources at Conservative Central Office. The first suggested: ‘You can’t gag them. What we
try to do is to make sure that there are stories all ready for the taking, so that they don’t
make them up themselves’72. The second added:
‘To my mind content is more important than how it is sold. There were always 
going to be problems in selling party conference speeches in the past where the only 
announcement was a new motorway service station, or widdle stops as the Daily 
Mail calls them. And equally it is going to be much easier to sell a speech of the sort 
we had last week [1995] which had a big idea, ‘The Enterprise Centre of Europe*, 
but also a range of significant announcements, such as five thousand extra 
policemen’73.
The trailing of announcements - a method whereby the communication departments 
provided an extract of the announcements to be made in forthcoming speeches - was 
planned in detail. Such announcements were either selectively trailed or generally trailed for 
all the media. Trailing had been successfully practised by all three parties’ spin doctors for
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some time. The main advantage of trailing, a source added, was that ‘you do get better 
coverage. News broadcasters will give extensive coverage if they think it’s either an 
exclusive or it’s a trailer’74. The same source suggested that problems had arisen if they 
didn’t trail announcement from a speech. ‘We had learnt from bitter experience in the past 
that if you don’t give them things, it doesn’t mean that they don’t trail them: they just make 
it up. So it is far better if you can trail things’75.
‘Photo opportunity’ planning was the last ingredient in long-run promotional 
planning. While the main conference hall proceedings provided a continuous supply of 
photo opportunities, there was still a demand form the broadcasters for opportunities to 
film the party elite in other distinctive locations. In this respect the Liberal Democrats lead 
the way in producing a daily bulletin planned in advance, detailing the whereabouts of their 
senior spokespersons. The other parties provided similar information but not in the same 
regular documented format
Reactive strategies were essentially reflexive, based on experience from previous 
conferences. Basic steps included making sure key members of the leadership were on 
hand to react to stories, and developing strategies aimed at diverting journalistic attention 
from ‘ugly* stories. The needs of the broadcasters shaped the nature of the strategies being 
planned. Successful plans were reused, but to some extent the onus was still on the 
communications departments, with their daily experience of journalists, to persuade the 
agenda committees and the leaderships of the benefit of new strategies for promoting 
policy.
3.4 Minimising Risk
The agreement amongst party leaders and managers about what constituted a successful 
conference led to a concerted effort during planning to control the agenda so as to prevent 
awkward motions being timetabled or locate them in such a position that they received as 
little attention from the broadcasters as possible. Judgements of timing, as Minkin (1978) 
called them, were very important to the overall success of the conference. Controversial 
and disciplinary matters were always scheduled at an appropriate time, preferably before 
the TV broadcasters came on air or after they went off the air. A Labour CAC source 
suggested that the broadcasters were an important consideration in timetabling certain 
debates.
‘There was a tacit understanding that we would timetable things not to run into the
news or whatever... but some of it is exaggerated: you cannot, except for closed
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sessions of conference, completely block debates off air. They used to say the 
Lesbian and Gay debate was always on during “Play School” [a children’s 
programme break in BBC2's coverage] - that takes the reality and adds to it in a 
sense. Yes, okay, you would not have had a debate like that, perhaps not at peak 
viewing time, because of people parading and shouting from the platform or
whatever’76.
In addition, at the Labour conference ‘all disciplinary issues have been effectively taken 
away from conference.[..] So those things have been changed in the procedure with the 
agreement of the NEC and the CAC pulling together’77.
Another gambit was to position controversial items before or on the same day as the
leader’s speech in order to prevent the conference being overshadowed by them and
broadcasters being distracted from other planned events78. A CAC source suggested:
‘[The CAC are] not eunuchs: they understand what it is all about. My motto was get 
the blood off the floor by Monday night. I didn’t want controversial things hanging 
over beyond the leader's speech and & there was anything highly controversial and 
which had been hyped by the media at the weekend then we knew beforehand that 
the idea was to get it over and done with on the Monday. Hopefully the leader [in 
his Tuesday speech] would then set the tone that carries you through’79.
Another CAC source suggested: ‘we put things in front of the leader’s [speech] in the half
past nine [am] slot. This year [1995] it was Clause Four and the NUM messing around,
because [at that time] the media are doing interviews and the delegates aren’t awake*80.
Another source concurred: ‘You also take unpopular stuff immediately after the leader’s
speech because [on TV] there will be a review of the leader’s speech. They [broadcasters]
will have taken it [the conference session] all off-camera, and half the delegates will have
walked out the hall’81.
Similar tactics were also used in the planning of the Liberal Democrats’ conference 
timetable. ‘The media are interested in seeing debates - the more hassle the better, of 
course, for the media . And sometimes we think “Yes” and sometimes we think “No” 
because very often you know what the headline is going to be’82. One possible tactic open 
to the FCC was to place awkward motions for debate in the Liberal Democrats' spring 
conference instead of the autumn conference, which received far more media attention. A 
source suggested that this could be done, but added it was difficult to ‘juggle things to that 
extent’83. Party business was discussed on days when there was no television coverage 
usually the Sunday of conference. As one source suggested: ‘There are certain things 
which are pretty boring to be on television - business motions, report of the FCC, report of 
the Federal Executive’84. This latitude provided more time and space for the presentation of 
policy motions.
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Another strategy was to turn down motions and amendments submitted by
constituency parties. The FCC had special powers to reject constitutional and standing
order amendments and any other amendment could be batted back if ‘in the opinion of the
committee it is insubstantial, outside the scope of the motion, or tantamount to a direct
negative of the motion’85. As for the selection of topical or emergency motions, it was the
committee that decided whether or not it had time for a topical motion and the particular
subject of that motion. The FCC had no similar power to exclude reports submitted to
conference for debate by the FPC or the FE. A Liberal Democrat source commented:
‘By and large they [constituency parties] tend to draft the same sort of stuff, good 
Liberal Democrat philosophy and all the rest of it. But it has been debated 403 times 
before and really is desperately uninteresting.[.. We would say] “We could only put 
twenty motions in the preliminary agenda and we received 250 and that is why 
yours is not selected”. And in that sense that is always the truth. There are queries 
to the rejection letters, anything from factual errors to triviality: [We would also 
say] “Yes this is something that ought to be party policy but isn’t something we 
ought to spend any time at conference on television debating”. We tend to get quite 
a lot of those sorts of motions you know: “When you build roads you ought to 
provide badger tunnels because of the migrating habits of badgers”. And, yes of 
course you should. But it is not something you debate at conference. So we do 
have to give credible reasons for turning things down and sometimes it is legitimate 
to go back to the local party and say: “We don’t think this is going to enter into the 
debate as a particular motion”..’86.
This was particularly the case in the conference before a general election. One source noted: 
‘There is a sort of rule for the first couple of conferences after an election: you let it 
hang out a bit. And part of the role of conference is to enable people to move on and 
enable people to come forward with new ideas. But the nearer you get to an election 
it does become more serious’87.
Another source also suggested that potentially unpopular issues were unlikely to find their
way on to the conference agenda immediately prior to an election:
‘Now you could take some other issue where we could potentially as a party take a 
very unpopular view, like gypsies for instance, where anything vaguely supportive 
of gypsies is an [electorally] unpopular view. And I think you'd find that would not 
find its way onto the agenda if the truth be told six months or eighteen months 
before a general election.[..] And we said: “We are not going to take this before a 
general election. We don’t think it would be in the party’s interest. Put it into the 
conference after the general election and it will have a very good chance of being 
taken”.. *88.
Similar practices emerged in the planning of the Conservatives’ conference 
timetable. With practical time limits in mind and no power to composite motions, only a 
tiny fraction of the motions that were submitted were called for debate. In 1995, of the 
1250 motions submitted, only sixteen were debated. The subject areas for debate were pre­
fixed by the CAS, with some subject areas always being debated and others intermittently
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so, as a Conservative source stated:
‘We have to accept no matter how good the motions are on certain subjects, the 
audience both in the hall and out in the country are going to want to see or hear Ken 
Clarke, Michael Howard etc. So we are in a way limited to the subject headings. 
There has got to be one on the economy; there’s got to be one on law and order; 
there’s got to be one on foreign affairs, education, whatever. So we take that as a 
framework and if you like we look at the subject headings first - which of the 
subjects should we discuss? Some of them come up every year, some of them some 
years they’re in some years they’re out. Northern Ireland was out two years ago, 
came in last year and is going to be in again this year. Housing comes and goes. 
But the big ones come every year and smaller ones come in after that. So we look at 
the framework’89.
Within the preordained subject areas it was generally accepted that the motions
selected would be as general as possible in order to facilitate debate (Davies, 1995). As
Kelly noted: ‘the committee chooses ones that will give an opportunity for discussion and
criticism where necessary’9*1. A Conservative source concurred:
‘We’ll look at all of the motions that have come in on the conference and we will 
come up with one that we believe is not so narrow that it’s blinkered and will have a 
limit on the sort of debate that you can hold. So we do tend to have fairly bland 
motions in the main, but simply because we want to make it all-embracing’91.
These general motions were also importantly non-controversial in nature. Ball (1996)
argues that many critical motions, from associations, very often did not get the required
support of the Area Offices ‘for fear of being tarred with the brush of disloyalty.
Supportive motions have an easier ride especially if they are being “pushed” by the
professional section of the party’92. He further suggests that the main ‘cause of exclusion
is the charge that the motion is unhelpful to the government’s [i.e. the leadership’s]
position, particularly where it is made in sensitive areas of policies’9 .^
When asked whether potentially embarrassing motions, however broadly worded,
were passed over because of the presence of the broadcasters, the NU Secretary suggested: 
‘If you’re trying to put on a conference for whoever and you get a motion that says 
that “This government has got to bring back the death penalty tomorrow” or else 
“This conference has got to hold a referendum on Europe”, are you going to urge 
everyone to put that in to the agenda knowing the sort of publicity the press would 
give it? Or do you want to steer away from it? If there is going to be any bad 
publicity, well, we’ll leave it to the Labour party to try and hit us with it rather than 
go and give the media the luxury of getting it on a plate. We don’t actually want 
motions that are pure back-slapping, they need to be constructive, but to be 
constructive they have got to be reasonably supportive in the first place, we just 
don't want the country to have the impression that the Conservative party is at each 
other's throats on every subject. So we end up just saying “No, we won’t go for 
the difficult ones" ’94.
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3.5 Aesthetic Planning
The main conference hall was the central showpiece of the conference. A setting with 
strong aesthetic appeal was now a minimum requirement - the ‘bottom line* below which 
no party would want to fall for fear of undermining the presentation of policy on television. 
A large amount of time was spent in planning in three respects: the design of the main 
platform, the use of special effects and the seating arrangements. The main influence on the 
decisions reached by the conference managers was the leaderships of the respective parties. 
The parties' leaders were image-conscious, seeing the potential of set design and 
choreography to enhance the presentation of policy to a television audience. They therefore 
took a particular interest in the planning process that led to the final platform design, logo 
and seating arrangements and made their own inputs to that. Any suggested changes were 
incorporated into the final product by specialised design organisations and by those 
responsible for planning the seating, both on the platform and in the hall. Jackie Stacy, 
Labour's head of organisation, quoted in The Times, suggested: ‘I don’t get involved in 
policy. I just think about presenting what they come up with in the best way’95.
The main platforms were designed by specialist organisations. The Liberal
Democrats tendered design out to a private firm called ‘Moving Experiences’. A Liberal
Democrat source suggested: ‘We’ll put it out to tender and they come forward with
designs*96. Labour created in January 1994 a specialised internal body for the job, the
Events and Exhibitions Unit, consisting of a manager, an events officer and an exhibition
organiser, whose tasks included ‘designing the floor plan, marketing and promoting the
exhibition, liaising with exhibitors...*97. The proposed design of the main stage would be
relayed to the General Secretary, who made a final decision:
‘There is early preparation for what conference is going to look like, any changes 
that you have to engage in, and budgets... The financial and presentationally stuff 
starts then, although quite often the final decisions on the look of the stage isn't 
taken until July’98.
The Conservatives’ design was carried out since April 1994 by CCO Conferences Ltd, a 
wholly-owned subsidiary of World Conference Travel, an international firm of conference 
management and organisers. A Conservative source said that ‘We basically tell them what 
we want. They then go away and come back with ideas’99. As noted, these specialist 
organisations worked in tandem with the communication departments and committees and 
the parties* leaderships.
As the centrepiece of conference, and therefore of its coverage, the design of the
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main platform was hugely important While the broadcasters placed certain practical limits
on the size of the platform and its colour, it was parties' leaderships that had the greatest
influence on the design. The design needed to combine shape, colour and logo to provide a
new and different product, which acted as a presentational springboard creating the right
ambience for speeches and debates100. Changes in the design of the set were pioneered by
Harvey Thomas for the Conservatives in 1979, and Labour followed:
‘The first time that Labour had a custom-built set for the platform... was at 
Brighton in 1983. Kinnock wanted a proper set for what would be his first 
conference as leader. Labour’s publicity team had no idea who to get to build it. 
So... they phoned Conservative central office to obtain the details of the company 
that had constructed the Tory conference set in Brighton the previous year'101.
In the 1990s, having a different platform design each year, one which overcame the 
mistakes of previous years and provided a new aesthetic look to the hall, was of the utmost 
importance for both the Tories and Labour. Resources were the only limiting factor, 
particularly in the case of the Liberal Democrats, who had a much bigger resource 
constraint and so wanted a design which ’servefd] a number of conferences’102. With the 
advent of the professional set design some fifteen or more years ago, there have been 
numerous subtle trends. One in particular was a move away from high-fronted platforms to 
ones which looked less formal and obtrusive on television, as one Conservative source 
noted:
‘The stage has got to be user-friendly and viewer-friendly. We got to the stage a 
few years ago of a very big stage set which looked more like the Kremlin, a lot of 
people sitting up there, all you could see was their heads... So last year [1994] we 
changed it and used steps up so it made a gradual rise to the level of the 
platform’10^ .
The platforms also began to change shape during the conference, a fashion again led by the
Conservative party. The main idea here was to augment the presentation of the leader's
speech on television. The platform, the evening before the leader's speech, was extended
into the audience - something a former Party Chairman took credit for:
‘Instead of speaking at the podium in the middle of a long platform...we brought 
him [Major] further forward, down towards the front of the platform, so unlike all 
the other speakers he was very much closer to the audience. That was something 
which maximised his natural talents and that was something that was done in 
conjunction with the conference organisers'104.
While it may have been this informant's idea, John Major also took an active part in
changes to the design. ‘He was., of course, naturally, being so exposed and out at the front
there, I won’t say he was concerned, but naturally he wanted to take part in going through
the planning of that particular staging’105. The Liberal Democrats in 1995 also changed the
shape of the platform, at the insistence of Paddy Ashdown, for his speech. One Liberal
source said: ‘The set this year [1995] was slightly redesigned because Paddy wanted to
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change his style of presentation on the leader’s speech, so it was less talking from top table 
and more talking from nearer the people’l l .
Just as much planning went into choosing the colour of the main platform. Colour 
schemes were worked out between the party organisers. An important consideration was 
whether the colours were easily picked up by the cameras. One Conservative source 
suggested that the colour blue ‘is a very difficult colour for the cameras’107. There was 
much experimentation with colours. Labour’s 1994 conference backdrop of ‘pistachio 
green’ was thought to have looked poor on television and was replaced with a more sober 
‘television white’ in 1995, merging into red and white in 1996. Quoting Joy Johnson, 
Labour’s former Director of Campaigns, Election and Media, Wintour notes: ‘TV white, 
she said, is clean and sharp on TV - even though in real life it is grey. By contrast, 
pistachio green... was “hideous, awful and cold” and “did not combine well with human 
flesh”...’1°8. Colour was important in that its function was to complement the general 
ambience of the platform, without being the focus of news media attention itself. The 
Liberal Democrats changed the colour of their set to make the most of yellow, the party 
colour, one with which a television audience could easily identify. A source noted: ‘Up to 
[1993] yellow wasn’t being used at all, the only yellow you saw was a tiny little bird. All 
the rest was black and grey which I thought was wrong. [..] Yellow is a cheerful colour, 
it’s an optimistic colour and makes a bright and futuristic image’109.
A lot of thought also went into the planning of the conference slogan on the
platform backdrop. The slogan and logo were designed to capture the theme of the
conference and were placed in a position clearly visible to the television cameras. Each year
there was a different slogan110 selected by the parties* leaderships. In the Conservatives’
case, the Party Chairman recommended certain slogans to the leader.
‘He [the leader] was terribly involved in the choice of slogan. The slogan, after all, 
is now more and more important. And I can remember for Bournemouth, for 
instance, I actually put to him a wide range of slogans, which could be narrowed 
down to two and he very firmly picked one’111.
Great attention was paid to selecting the right slogan for the conference. Hogg and Hill
(1995) note that conference themes encapsulated in the slogan occupied many anxious
hours of discussion in party headquarters. ‘Some words bob up time and again: “Britain”,
“winning”, “forward”, “right”, “strength”, “future”...*112. The reason for the attention to
detail was that the wrong conference slogan, like the wrong colour, could divert news
media attention. The backdrop to the main platform for Labour’s 1990 conference, with the
slogan, contained five eight-foot-high pictures of so-called ‘ordinary Labour voters’, one
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of whom was a woman. Attention for the week, particularly amongst the press and then 
amongst the broadcasters, focused on finding out who the woman was; for the party it was 
‘irritating, unpleasant and unrelenting as toothache’113. Since then, the platform backdrop 
has never featured photographs.
The latest technological gadgetry was also included in the design of the main 
platform, mainly to improve the presentation of speeches on television. Key innovations 
were introduced by the Conservatives, via Harvey Thomas. The 1982 Conservative 
conference saw the introduction of the ‘head-up display unit*. This so called ‘sincerity 
machine’, now widely used by the other parties, allowed ‘the speaker to read his/her text 
from unobtrusive, transparent perspex screens, thus creating the illusion that the orator is 
speaking without notes*114. Its introduction was of mutual benefit to both parties and 
broadcasters, allowing the speaker to look directly into the cameras and providing clear 
shots of the speaker. Also pioneered at the 1982 conference was the ‘electronic adjustable 
height lectern’ which could be raised when in use, and then lowered, allowing the cameras 
a clear view of the platform and speaker. These innovations were incorporated by the other 
two parties in'subsequent conferences and have now become standard features of all the 
conference sets. While Thatcher embraced such technology and rarely spoke in public 
without it1!5, John Major abandoned it in favour of reading his speech from a script. 
However, the rest of his ministers and the other parties still used such equipment, and it 
remained part and parcel of the main platform.
All the parties, for the leader’s speech, used visual technology to inform and 
entertain the conference audience, with the aim that the pictures would be captured by the 
cameras present for the wider television audience. The main platform for the 1993 
conferences and for the next three years included one or more large video screens on the 
platform backdrop. Such technology was integrated into the conference set design. These 
screens showed short films, mainly party promotional material set to music. The number of 
screenings increased over the period of this study, with every speech by major party actors 
being introduced by a short film. The Labour platform backdrop acted as a screen on which 
images were projected, mainly the information on the results of ballots, particularly the 
results of the NEC elections. But it was also used to entertain the delegates present. All 
three parties sought to enhance such visual displays through using a technique pioneered in 
US Presidential conventions of dimming the main lights in the hall when such a film was 
shown,116 thus forcing the TV cameras to focus on the big screen. This was particularly 
true in the build-up to the leaders’ speeches, which were trailed with biographical videos of
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each of the leaders. However, broadcasters in turn sometimes scheduled small out-takes or 
commentary slots for such occasions, to avoid the impression of carrying ‘party 
propaganda*.
The organisation of the seating arrangements at conference was nothing new in 
itself117. Conference organisers spent an increasing amount of time planning the seating 
arrangements on the main platform. With the cameras in mind, the attention to detail even 
went as far as choreographing the movement of people on to the main platform and 
reducing their overall number. According to Harvey Thomas, ‘generally there are too many 
bodies on stage... I’ve fought with this problem for years and gradually we have been able 
to improve the situation. If you compare the platform parties of the middle and late eighties 
with those of 1979, the effect is quite noticeable. We set the tone at the Tory conferences 
and the other parties have followed suit’118. Further, to make sure the cameras focused 
only on the speaker, and any distractions were minimised, the speaker’s rostrum was 
isolated from the rest of the platforml19. The practice has continued since Thomas’s time. 
At each conference, the number of seats on the main platform was carefully planned for 
each speech and debate in order to avoid any excess seats, which might give the impression 
to the broadcasters that either had been underattended.
Conference organisers used advance information to regulate the number of people
who were able to sit on the platform at any one time. A Conservative source suggested:
‘The planning that goes into it has increased over the last two years, simply because 
one believes in attention to detail. And certainly up until two years ago we always 
made sure that the front row of the platform was clear, that there weren’t rows of 
seats behind. In the past, people could just pop up if they wanted to, but in most 
cases we found that there were empty seats at the back and the front row was full. 
Well I don’t think you can do that on television’!20.
At the Labour conference seats on the platform were strictly limited to members of the
NEC, and the general consensus amongst observers was that delegations and individuals
who were particularly hostile to the main platform were seated away from the front of it121.
For the Liberal Democrats’ conference, access to the stage was controlled for key speeches
and allocated to senior party members. The regulation of seating arrangements led to the
need for detailed planning - in the Conservatives’ case, for each debate, a responsibility
which fell to the NU Secretary, who suggested:
‘I now, session by session, debate by debate, three times in the afternoon, three 
times in the morning have a different seating plan. You’re talking about fifty 
people, so every debate it changes. Different people come on, other people come 
off, there is an average six and half minutes between one debate finishing and the 
next one starting because of the turnover and ministers getting ready and all the 
rest. So now this year what I ’m doing is people sitting in the second row are the
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people who are going to be in the front row in the debate afterwards. So as soon as 
the debate finishes, the front row leaves, they just come forward and we are ready 
to go again... They [those on the platform] have all got to have a detailed seating 
plan of every debate so they know when they are going to be on the platform. On 
the Friday, the last day of conference, you are talking about ninety people on the 
platform and you cannot afford to have mistakes... they can’t just meander on. This 
year [1995] they are going to be regimented backstage into a line’122.
He also suggested that the party leadership took an active interest in the planning of their
own seating arrangements to make sure that there was no adverse publicity.
‘The position of each Minister on the platform has to be planned, I have to go to 12 
Downing street and go through it with the Chief Whip so that we are both happy 
that it is right. There are no two ways about it, you have got the PM in the middle, 
Michael Heseltine nearest him, but then you’ve got Ken Clarke that side so you 
move out that way, so you end up every one next to each other to each end. Again 
if you get it wrong (a) they’ll be unhappy; (b) the media will pick it up. That’s why 
Peter Lilley, demoted, will be one down lower than Virginia Bottomley, when he 
should have been one above her’123.
Like control of the agenda and timetable, aesthetic planning was to a large extent the 
product of a reflexive process by which the managers sought to improve on the previous 
year’s aesthetic planning, making conference more effective for presenting policy. This 
process was driven in large parts by the presence of the broadcasters and the audience they 
provided.
Conclusion
Long-range conference planning was focused on promotion and control, directed towards 
the promotion of certain policies and actors at conference and the shaping of how 
conference proceedings would be perceived so as to avoid embarrassment for an 
increasingly image-conscious party leadership. Final decisions were taken by an inner core 
close to the leader. Planning the aesthetics of the hall and the contours of the agenda and 
timetable was done mainly with broadcasters in mind. Although the press were also an 
influential factor taken into account, their reactions were in part premised on whether these 
other decisions had been effectively managed to create a favourable TV impression. 
Communication departments took a more active role in planning promotions of policy and 
individuals and in advising committees. Agenda committees were encouraged to take the 
broadcasters more into account by other committees, especially those involved with 
communications, but agenda committees were generally amenable to such influence 
anyway. Agenda committees maintained some balancing tactics, trying to take account of 
the input of motions from the party activists but giving precedence to the promotion of
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policy formulated within the adhocracy. Timetabling worked to promote policy and 
individuals within the party. The promotions of policy and individuals in the timetable was 
adapted to television’s presence.
A ‘promotional psychosis’ permeated all parts of the adhocracies which controlled 
effective decision-making in all three modem political parties. All planning that was not 
logistical was promotionally oriented, focused on trying to maximise the promotional 
potential the broadcasters’ presence offered and minimise the risk presented by motions and 
certain individuals. Plans were continually improved to enhance the achievement of these 
goals. The final product of the planning process was a complete promotional package. Pre­
prepared policy announcements, deliberately newsworthy, were delivered by a 
recognisable member of the party leadership, on a platform designed to minimise 
distraction and amplify both the policy and the presenter 124 - all for the benefit of the 
television news audience.
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Chapter 4
How the Broadcasters and the Parties Arranged News 
Production at Conference
The next stage of the production cycle involved dissemination and gathering of 
information, the first conducted by the parties and the second by the political news teams. 
Interaction occurred first between these two sides and second between competing 
journalists. All the actors involved had established relationships prior to each conference 
and were familiar with lobby rules and immersed in its culture. This chapter examines the 
institutional structures adopted by both the broadcasters and the political parties to disperse 
information at conference, the long-term relationship between them, and the broadcasters’ 
attitudes.
4.1 The Broadcasters' Set-Up at Conference
Each news bulletin employed a team of political journalists composed of those who worked 
in their Millbank studios plus additional producers and editors. The hierarchical 
organisation of these teams did not change greatly for the party conferences. At the top of 
each team were the editorial staff, most notably the programme editor, and under the editor 
one or two producers and the political correspondents; as one correspondent noted:4 [In] 
the hierarchy the editor is the boss*1. There were some differences in structure between the 
broadcasters. The BBC were the largest broadcaster present, with on average 60 
presenters, editors, producers, assistants and correspondents in regular attendance at 
Labour and the Conservative conferences2. The BBC Millbank team provided news items 
for all the BBC news outlets. A BBC source noted: 4My aim really [was] to develop 
conference coverage as our normal Millbank operation... to provide political coverage to all 
the different outlets across the BBC’3. In charge of the Millbank team was the editor of 
political news and an assistant editor. They worked alongside the political editor and chief 
correspondent and other political correspondents. They formed a news-gathering core 
which individual BBC programme editors could draw upon. However, Newsnight was 
editorially independent from this structure: its team included its own programme editor, 
along with a producer, a presenter and a maximum of two or three correspondents. The 
ITN and Channel Four teams were much smaller. Both were editorially independent of 
each other. ITN 5.40 news and News at Ten had their programme editors, producers, a 
political editor and a team of one or two correspondents. Channel Four’s editorial set-up
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was similar, with the addition of the programme’s presenter:
‘You’ll have the editor of the programme, the home desk editor, the political 
producers and political reporters and myself, plus our two producers and the on- 
the-day programme producers... In conference weeks one of those producers will 
go to the conference venue and will be specifically in charge of everything that 
comes out of there and the one other programme producer stays at home and does 
everything else’4.
Within each news team the political editor and senior political correspondents were 
the key news actors. The majority of information was gathered and processed by them. As 
Schlesinger notes, ‘The stories which lead the bulletin or are given the longest duration got 
to the most senior [people]’5: conferences were no different in this respect. Tables 4.1 to 
4.4 show who these key actors were.
Table 4.1: The number of reports produced bv the different members of the 
main BBC news team at the conferences 1993-1996.
Liberal Labour Conservative Total % Total
Oakley (Pol Editor) 11 21 21 53 (30%)
Sergeant (Chief Corres) 11 19 19 49 (28%)
Richards (Pol Corres) 1 4 2 7 (4%)
Pienaar (Pol Cones) 1 2 3 6 (3%)
Other Pol Corres 2 4 8 14 (8%)
Non-Pol Cones 0 5 18 23 (14%)
Anchor only 4 10 8 22 (13%)
Total 30 65 79 174 (100%)
(Pol = Political; Corres = correspondent)
Table 4.2: The number of reports produced bv the different members of the 
ITN news team at the conferences 1993-1996.
Liberal Labour Conservative Total % Total
Brunson (Pol Editor) 5 23 19 47 (34%)
Pym (Pol Cones) 18 10 10 38 (28%)
Ashley (Pol Cones) 0 6 3 9 (6%)
Bradley (Pol Cones) 0 5 4 9 (6%)
Webster (Pol Cones) 0 0 7 7 (5%)
Andrews (Pol Cones) 6 0 0 6 (4%)
Mathias (Pol Cones) 0 3 0 3 (2%)
Non-Pol Cones 1 3 3 7 (5%)
Anchor only 2 3 9 14 (10%)
Total 32 53 55 140 (100%)
(Pol = Political; Corres = correspondent)
Table 4.3: The number of reports produced bv the different members of the 
Channel Four news team at the conferences 1993-1996.
Liberal Labour Conservative Total % Total
Goodman (Pol Editor) 11 16 20 47 (48%)
Gibbon (Pol Cones) 2 8 10 20 (21%)
Perkins (Pol Cones) 0 5 2 7 (7%)
Non-Pol Cones 3 4 7 14 (14%)
Snow (Anchor) 0 3 1 4 (4%)
Other Anchor 2 1 3 6 (6%)
Total 18 37 43 98 (100%)
(Pol = Political; Corres = correspondent)
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Table 4.4: The number of reports produced hv the different members of the 
Newsnight news team at the conferences 1993-1996.
Liberal Labour Conservative Total % Total
Mardell (Pol Corres) 7 13 13 33 (33%)
Kellner (Pundit) 2 4 4 10 (10%)
Cox (Corres) 2 0 5 7 (7%)
Brewer (Corres) 0 1 3 4 (4%)
Howard (Corres) 0 3 0 3 (3%)
Crick (Corres) 0 1 2 3 (3%)
Non-Pol Corres 0 4 6 10 (10%)
Paxman (Anchor) 0 1 6 7 (7%)
Snow (Anchor) 1 9 1 11 (11%)
Wark (Anchor) 2 4 0 6 (6%)
Other Anchor 1 2 3 6 (6%)
Total 15 42 43 100 (100%)
(Pol = Political; Corres = correspondent)
The four tables show the dominance of a small number of journalists. For the main BBC 
news, the political editor and the chief political correspondent produced 58 per cent of all 
reports, on Newsnight 32 per cent, on ITN they accounted for 62 per cent and on Channel 
Four News 69 per cent On Newsnight the anchors also produced 33 per cent of the 
reports. The tables show that the broadcasters also used other non-political correspondents 
to produce additional reports, 'pegged items', on issues raised in conference debates and 
speeches.
Meetings
The news teams met daily. The BBC and Channel Four met at least twice in the morning
before the official start of conference proceedings. A BBC source suggested:
‘One of the things we are trying to develop there [the conferences], which reflects 
what happens here now, is to have our own editorial meetings in the morning of all 
the correspondents, producers, the news organisers, the Research Unit and the Live 
Programme’6.
A Channel Four source noted: ‘We’ll tend to sort of meet for breakfast in a hotel, then there 
will be a fuller meeting at nine o’clock, just before the first conference debate*7. But an 
ITN source argued:
‘You don’t need a meeting - it sorts itself out We are a much smaller team. We tend 
to say: ‘This is the story, let’s do it”. You go down on the floor, you come back 
and ring the programme editor, who says: “Right, go and do it”. I think that’s the 
way it works best. I think meetings can be rather pointless’8.
Where meetings did take place, their main aim was to determine what the 'big' story or the
most newsworthy event was going to be. On certain days, such as when the parties’
leaders delivered their speeches, decisions were relatively straightforward. However on
others, as one source noted: ‘You see we try and make so many guesses beforehand...
[about] what is going to be the big story on the day, and worrying what we are going to put
95
in it’9. On these days the news teams were faced with a series of dilemmas. Was the most 
newsworthy event going to be the planned debates and speeches in the main hall or a wider 
issue affecting the parties, such as their electoral standing or internal divisions on certain 
policy issues evident on the fringe? While everyone attending these meetings had a say, the 
editorial team's preferences were made clear to the others and the final selection of stories 
rested with them:
‘It’ll be carved up. The political editor... has really quite a lot of say. But some 
times the programme producer has a very strong idea in their head and they just pull 
rank and say “It is my programme. I’m doing it this way”. But for the most part the 
political editors can get their way*10.
The meetings also sought to determine whether the news teams were going to 
expand upon the issues raised in an event they were covering through an additional news 
item. The number of additional news items that were commissioned depended in part on the 
newsworthiness of an event and could also be seen importantly as evidence of a bulletin's 
conference commitment. There were three forms of additional news item. (1) The 'pegged' 
item or report - additional reports scrutinising the impact of policy proposals made in a 
particular speech and seeking the reactions and opinion of other elite players, both in and 
outside the parties. (2) Two-ways (between the anchor and the journalist) which sought ‘to 
assess or make sense of a political event... from a position of authority, based on [a] track 
record as an expert in broadcasting terms, and on... access to reliable elite sources’11. But 
besides explanation, two-ways also importantly involved speculation12 and scrutiny of 
events. (3) Interviews and discussions with members of the party leadership, with the rank 
and file or with journalists. These also sought to explain, speculate and scrutinise and were 
at times confrontational (Franklin, 1994; McNair, 1995), particularly with members of the 
party leadership. Table 4.5 shows the various forms of additional news items used.
Table 4.5: The type and number of additional news items used bv bulletin 
1993-1996.
ITN5.40 BBC6 ITN10 BBC9 Ch 4 NN Total
Pegged Items 1 18 21 24 31 42 137
Two-ways 26 12 10 9 15 8 80
Interviews 0 1 1 0 59 69 130
Total 27 31 32 33 105 119 347
(BBC6 = BBC Six O'clock News; BBC9 = BBC Nine O'clock News; ITN5.40 = ITN News at 5.40 PM; 
ITN 10 = ITN News at Ten O'clock; Ch 4 = Channel Four News; NN = Newsnight)
The most widely used form of additional news item was pegged reports, closely followed 
by interviews, with two-ways being used the least. The table also shows that the different 
bulletins had preferred different ways of expanding the conference agenda. The BBC and
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ITN almost solely used pegged items and two-ways, with the overwhelming majority of 
the ITN 5.40’s additional news items being two-ways. Channel Four News and 
Newsnight largely preferred the use of interviews and to a lesser extent pegged items and 
two-ways.
The decisions reached at meetings largely determined the subsequent gathering 
activity of the news teams and the deployment of additional ENG camera crews. Of course 
they could be ’blown out of the water' by an issue which suddenly and unexpectedly arose, 
such as an MP’s defection from the party (which happened at the 1995 Conservative 
conference). Decisions were not made by the news teams alone. There were important links 
between them and the London news rooms. London decided the running order of the 
bulletins, and the amount of time allocated to each slot. Conference news stories, 
particularly from the Labour and Conservative conferences, were guaranteed at least one 
slot in the running order - although its position and length were determined according to a 
shared concept of new values within the organisation. There was constant contact between 
the news teams and London, usually by computer. This contact kept the London news 
room informed about developing events. Of course there were both agreements and 
disagreements over the newsworthiness of particular conference stories. A BBC editor saw 
his task as providing a 'balance between what [Television Centre] see as the story and what 
we feel is the story being there'13. Where there was agreement, such as on the coverage of 
a major event like the leader's speech, the conference news teams had some influence on 
the size and positioning of the slot and on the space allotted for an interview or pegged 
item. Where there was a disagreement on the news value of a conference story, the size and 
positioning of the slot and the space for an interview or pegged item were subject to a 
process of negotiation. However, overt differences of opinion over a story's 
newsworthiness were rare: the only conference example concerned the coincidence in 1995 
of the Labour leader’s speech and the OJ Simpson trial verdict14. Newsnight and Channel 
Four's news teams carried greater weight in these negotiations compared to the other 
bulletins. This was primarily because of their commitment to conference coverage. As one 
Channel Four source suggested, ‘It would take a very big story to dislodge the conference 
coverage from the top of the programme’15.
The News Community
Outside their immediate news team, broadcast journalists were part of a looser ‘news 
community’ (Sigal, 1973), ‘which sets standards and shapes perspectives for its 
members’16. This community incorporated both rival broadcast journalists and those from 
the press. There was frequent contact between members of the news community, as one 
source suggested: ‘We are constantly nattering to each other all the time: “What did you
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think of that speech? Do you think they were applauding much? Do you think the 
conference like him? Doesn’t he look hung over?” and that sort of thing’17. Another source 
commented: ‘I would say as much time is spent lurking around with the hacks, as is spent 
with the politicians, spinning between ourselves*18. AU the parties indirecdy faciUtated 
contact by providing a press room. The vast majority of contact took place within this space 
and it was frequently visited by the broadcast journalists, as one acknowledged: T would 
normally go in there in the morning, maybe for twenty minutes, to see what everyone is up 
to, and then go back late afternoon. By then they will know what their stories are’*9.
The news community was a source of information in addition to that provided by
parties, a source whose actors were known to each other from the Westminster lobby. The
news community played an important part in forming a consensus about what the main
story was and aided in interpreting party policy. The community had its own ’opinion
formers'. These were usually senior journalists with close relationships to members of the
parties' leaderships and able to provide insights into the reasoning behind the latest policy
announcements or generate informed speculation. Certain members of the community had
specialised knowledge on policy areas which the broadcast journalists did not One noted:
‘I might talk to them. Peter Riddell [The Times] is a very experienced guy and very 
friendly. And you might say: “What do you think about that?” and he’ll say “I was 
very struck by x,y,z”. If they have got time it will be helpful to put something in 
context, because they have been doing the job a lot longer than you have’20.
The opinion formers were also important sources of information for news reports. Over the
period of the study, they were used to provide comment and speculation for the bulletins on
particular developments at the conferences.
Table 4.6: The num ber of times news community members appeared as 
sources in conference reports 1993-1996.
ITN5.40 BBC6 Ch 4 BBC9 ITN10 NN Total
Independent (Editor) 0 0 1 0 0 1 2
Guardian (Editor) 0 0 1 0 1 0 2
Guardian (Political Editor) 0 0 0 0 1 1 2
Sunday Times (Editor) 1 1 0 1 1 0 4
Times (Sketch writer) 0 0 0 0 0 2 2
Telegraph (Political Editor) 0 0 0 0 0 1 1
Daily Mail (Political Editor) 0 0 0 0 0 2 2
Daily Mail (Editor) 0 0 0 0 1 0 1
Mirror (Political Editor) 1 1 0 1 1 0 4
Sun (Political Editor) 0 0 3 0 0 1 4
Other Media 0 0 0 0 0 6 6
Total 2 2 5 2 4 14 29
(BBC6 = BBC Six O’clock News; BBC9 = BBC Nine O’clock News; ITN5.40 = ITN News at 5.40 PM; 
ITN 10 = ITN News at Ten O’clock; Ch 4 = Channel Four News; NN = Newsnight Other Media = regional 
press, broadcasters, and news agencies)
Table 4.6 shows that the majority of news community sources used were senior members 
of the national press, either the editors of major papers or their political editors. It also
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shows a wide a variation in their use between the bulletins, with Newsnight using far more 
than the other bulletins. The BBC and ITN's use of opinion formers was limited to the 
1993 Conservative party conference and the publication in the Daily Mirror of leaked 
extracts from Thatcher’s autobiography criticising John Major. In this case both the Mirror 
and the Sunday Times were a key part of the story.
The news community also acted as a 'safety blanket* (Mancini, 1990) for its
members, a source of reassurance during periods of uncertainty. It enabled broadcasters to
check their interpretations of events against the interpretation provided by party sources. As
one source noted: The story often emerges after the event when people talk about whether
it was what it really was’21. In addition the news community provided an idea of what
stories were being followed by which outlets. It enabled a confirmation of the broadcast
journalists’ news priorities - a test to see if they were widely held. The same source noted:
‘There is a lot of “Hey chaps, [sicjwhat's the line? What are you doing? What are you up
to? Well the Mail are doing this, are they”. They are keen to know what News at Ten are
leading with and you are always keen to know what the papers are going to say’22.
Another source indicated that the news community acted as a sounding board: ‘Initially it
informs priorities. You test to see if they agree with you that x is a priority, that it may be at
the top of a story rather than the extent of the story or the bones of it. But then equally on
some issues it may assist with an analytical structure*23. If challenged by the programme
editors, the correspondents could always point to the common definition originated within
the news community.
‘They are quite happy to tell you, because if News at Ten runs something that they 
are not a bit certain about, it gives them a bit of back up that the broadcasters have 
done the same thing. But it is incestuous, I have to admit that. It is not as if 
everyone there comes to their own conclusions’24.
The BBC brought their Political Research Unit (PRU) to the conferences, although
ITN did not have such a facility. They acted as an important source of information for the
BBC, providing back-up research and a conference guide. They enabled journalists and
presenters to have ‘instant access to... knowledge’25. A senior BBC source suggested: ‘To
have that in-house, as part of our own editorial structure, is just fantastically useful*26. The
PRU also acted as a further ‘security blanket’ for the BBC journalists. The same source
suggested of the PRU:
‘It really does come into its own at conferences, because what it specialises in is 
policy, background, knowing the history of particular policy areas and so on in a 
way that the cab rank correspondent [doesn’t] - 1 mean correspondents have to 
cover a wide range of stories and cannot be expected to be up on policy in every 
single area. Often at conferences that is what it is about, it’s being able to spot the 
nuances of differences between different parts of the party, between what people 
are saying... [and]... to have people who have that at their finger tips is a fantastic 
resource for the correspondents. You could see if you were working without that, 
and other organisations do, you would feel you are often in the dark. If nothing else
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it is a security blanket’27.
The presence of the PRU meant that BBC journalists did not have to be as reliant on the 
views of the news community on certain issues.
4.2 The Political Parties at Conference
In terms of identifying those engaged in the dissemination of information at the 
conferences, each party could be doubly divided - first, into a series of concentric circles, 
with an inner core, an outer core and a periphery. The inner core consisted of the party 
leaders, aides and confidants, some cabinet ministers and shadows, and some 
communication specialists. The outer core included other communications specialists and 
other cabinet ministers and shadows28. The periphery, was a loose heterogeneous 
collective of recognisable personalities (Heffeman and Stanyer, 1997) composed of 
prominent back-benchers, external power brokers (such as the unions in the Labour party) 
and ‘old stars’. Second, the inner and outer core could be further divided between front 
region and back region actors (Ericson et al, 1989). The front region actors were those 
officials who visibly disseminated information - the party leader, the ministers and 
spokespersons who appeared in reports; the back region actors were the communications 
specialists or spin doctors2  ^who had been active in planning conference communication 
strategy but remained largely invisible to the viewer even though they were crucial in the 
dissemination of information.
- The spin doctors were a group of individuals sometimes brought together 
specifically for the conferences whose task was primarily to push a particular agenda or 
interpretation of events and issues. Bruce argues that their main task was to be the ‘public 
voice of the principal; to fill in the background facts; to provide a context for events and 
issues for the day; to correct misconceptions and factual errors; and to act as a liaison for 
media “bids”...’30. The term spin doctor is, however, vague and could be applied to all 
those who were engaged in briefing journalists at the conferences. It does not allow for 
differences, say, between Peter Mandelson and a perfunctory press officer.
The spin doctors at each of the conferences could be classified in two ways. First 
into those who worked for actors in the inner core and the outer core, and second into three 
loose groupings: those who were ’principals', sometimes famous in their own right; other 
professionals; and part-timers and volunteers. If we take the inner core spin doctors first: 
the principal spin doctors did not have a formal constitutional role but were courtiers who 
served the inner core rather than the party as a whole. These were former full-time media
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professionals or journalists, now MPs, Prospective Parliamentary Candidates (PPCs) or 
media aides, whose reputations had been honed over numerous years. They formulated and 
controlled the dissemination of inner core's perspectives to the broadcast journalists, 
because they were very close to or part of it. Peter Mandelson in this period was both a 
member of Labour’s inner core and a spin doctor - there was no distinction. Equally this 
distinction had become more blurred in the other two parties.
As ‘access to the inner core elite was not automatically granted to the electoral 
professionals however talented’31 the second group worked under the direction of the inner 
core. This group consisted of the full-time professional employees, directed by the heads of 
the communications departments who themselves were in constant contact with certain 
principal spin doctors. Their utility lay in their professional experience, and they were 
active in co-ordinating and implementing strategy on behalf of the party. The third group 
consisted of part-timers and volunteers. These were party staff and activists who had 
experience of the broadcasters, or MPs with a specialist knowledge of a particular area of 
policy. They were called upon by the inner core to be spin doctors for the duration of each 
conference. The spin doctors who served the ministers and their shadows in the outer core 
were outside the inner spinning sanctum and consisted largely of their press secretaries or 
like-minded junior colleagues.
A distinction also needs to be drawn between the strategic tasks performed by these 
communication specialists. The principal inner core spin doctors had two main tasks. First, 
as they were part of the inner core, they disseminated personalised information on their 
behalf. This information concerned indications of new directions in party policy and the 
inner core's opinions or perspectives on an issue or existing policy. The term 'perspective' 
refers to a ‘set of views, arguments, explanations and policy suggestions...*32. Second, 
they implemented specialised communication strategies to 'sell' this personalised 
information. The principal spin doctors knew what party policy was, but they were 
engaged in trailing something different to journalists - exclusives on the latest inner core 
policy announcement or opinions, providing a new direction or angle for journalists during 
follow-up briefing. In some situations they were also key decision-makers in the 
implementation of conventional communication strategies. The heads of the 
communications departments and their personnel, as professionals, did not deal with 
personalised information but with conventional information such as the official, formally 
agreed party message. While the heads were also key decision-makers, they and their staff 
implemented conventional communication strategies aimed at 'selling' the collective party 
message to journalists. The part-timers followed agreed strategy and focused on their 
specialist areas and official party policy and sold that. Those spin doctors who served the 
outer core used strategies to sell their perspectives whether they coincided with the
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collective party message or not.
The inner core spinning operation at the Liberal Democrat conferences involved a 
mixture of the three groupings. A key role was played by the Director of Strategy and 
Planning (Alan Leaman), a personal friend and former aide to the leader, whose official 
role included the co-ordination of communications strategies, which involved working 
closely with the principals, with knowledgeable individuals and with the Director of 
Communications. There was also the leader's press officer and the spin doctors/ 
researchers of key spokespersons close to the leader. This group of actors was responsible 
for specialised strategies and personalised information. Organisation of the conventional 
media operation was conducted by the Director of Communications with the Head of Press 
and Broadcasting and sixteen professional press officers33. The Liberal Democrat inner 
core also drew heavily on a series of actors with specialised knowledge - in particular, the 
Chair of the General Election Campaign (Lord Holme), General Secretary (Graham Elson), 
Director of Campaigns and Elections (Chris Rennard) and senior MPs.
Labour's inner core spinning operation was dominated by Alastair Campbell, the 
leader's press secretary, and Peter Mandelson34, in 1996 officially the Chairman of the 
party's General Election Planning Group. The centrality of Mandelson derived from his 
experience and from ‘his close personal association with the Labour leader and his 
membership of the Blairite inner circle’35. Mandelson played a central co-ordinating role, 
displacing the role of Director of Media, Campaigns and Elections. This involved him 
working with other principal spin doctors and the Head of Press and Broadcasting (David 
Hill) to provide a central coherence to the implementation of communication strategy. In 
addition, members of the Shadow Cabinet close to the leader had their own press officers. 
Richards argues that these personal officers were becoming ‘the equivalent for Labour of 
senior civil servants... Gordon Brown [the Shadow Chancellor] has his own press 
officer... and not to be outdone, John Prescott [the Deputy Leader] has got one too'36. In 
fact most of the Shadow Cabinet had their own press officers ‘who are, in the main, 
energetic and assiduous in the promotion of the interests of their charges - Charlie Whelan, 
who works for Gordon Brown, commonly being regarded as the doyen of the breed'37. 
The conventional media operation, until the 1996 conference, was run by a Director of 
Media, Campaigns and Elections, and after that date by the Head of Press and 
Broadcasting. Under him there were a Chief Press and Broadcasting Officer, a 
Parliamentary Officer and Broadcasting officer and around six further press officers. In 
addition there were also press officers from regional headquarters and Scotland and Wales 
present. There were also notable part-timers used by the Labour inner core. These were 
MPs or PPCs like Steven Byers, not part of the shadow cabinet but ideologically in tune 
with the inner core.
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In terms of inner core spinning, at the Conservative conference the party leader had 
his own team, consisting of his political secretary and the Head of the Downing Street 
policy unit. In addition each senior cabinet minister had his own spin doctor. The central 
co-ordination of communications rested with the Party Chairman and to a lesser extent his 
media advisor and the Director of Communications. Communications strategy was co­
ordinated through a daily meeting between inner core members:
‘This last conference (1995) we had a meeting at 7.30 in the morning chaired by the 
Party Chairman and present there were, Michael Heseltine, Tony Newton, Alistair 
Goodlad the Chief Whip, Howel Jones the Prime Minister’s Political Secretary, 
Norman Blackwell head of the Policy Unit, Hugh Colver and myself. Michael 
Trend was also present as Deputy Chairman’38.
This group of party actors and senior communication personnel formed an inner circle. In 
addition there was also a group of leadership loyalists used by the inner core, mostly MPs 
with specialist knowledge on certain specific policy areas. The same source suggested that 
this group would be briefed after the daily meetings. ‘Hugh [Colver] and myself [would 
then] go to a meeting with the outer circle, if you like, of spin doctors, which this year for 
the first time had some Members of Parliament - Michael Mates, David Liddington, David 
Willets [and] in particular Alan Duncan, who’s the Chairman’s PPS*39. The conventional 
media operation was conducted by the Director of Communications and 22 staff, including 
a media consultant, the Head of News, the Head of Scottish Media, four broadcasting 
officers, three press officers, two photo opportunities officers, two information officers, a 
press office manager, three secretaries and two messengers.
Party actors on the periphery did not have the resources of the inner core elite to 
employ a back region team of communication specialists. They engaged in the 
dissemination of information themselves but also relied on sympathetic political actors to 
propagate their views on their behalf. They tended to be interested in promoting a single 
issue or providing an alternative interpretation of events to that being disseminated by the 
inner core. Their status was a product of a position formerly held within the inner core and 
of their recognisability by the broadcasters. Their backgrounds provided the peripheral 
actors with legitimacy in the eyes of the broadcasters and a quasi-elite status. This 
legitimacy and status went some way to counterbalancing the resource differentials that 
existed.
In the Liberal Democrats the peripheral elite was small in number and tended to be 
mostly ‘old stars’: the founders of the former SDP, Lord Jenkins, Lord Rodgers and 
Baroness Williams, as well as Sir David Steel, the former party leader. There were also 
prominent back-benchers, such as Liz Lynne and other actors such as Lord Russell. The 
Labour party peripheral elite was larger, consisting again of ‘old stars’: Tony Benn MP,
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Lord Hattersley, Neil Kinnock (former leader), Gerald Kaufman, Lord Shore* Baroness 
Castle. It also featured prominent back-benchers. Some in this period were critical of the 
inner core, such as, Dennis Skinner, Peter Hain, Ken Livingstone, Dianne Abbott, Dale 
Campbell-Savors and Tam Dayell. Others were favourably disposed towards it, such as 
Giles Radice and Steven Byers. Within the Conservative party there were also prominent 
‘old stars* - Thatcher and Heath in their capacity as former party leaders, and Lord Howe, 
Lord Lawson and John Redwood and Norman Lamont, all former recent members of the 
party’s inner core. There were also prominent back-benchers in the form of a grouping of 
Eurosceptic MPs.
In addition, at the Labour conference there were also external power brokers. The 
union leaders had the resources to be able to employ spin doctors of their own. The large 
unions did not suffer from the same resource problem as other members of Labour’s 
peripheral elite and maintained a position of power in conference. While the block vote had 
been reduced between 1993 and 1996, they still commanded 50 per cent of the votes at 
conference. The unions were particularly eager to get their interpretation of events across to 
the journalists, aware that the Labour leadership had improved its media operation. Over 
recent conferences the unions had become more sensitised to the need to run a similar 
operation. Jones suggests: ‘Like the party, they too had developed close links with many 
journalists. If the unions considered their interests were at stake then obviously they would 
do all they could to take advantage of the access and opportunities which the news media 
afforded them’40. Some of the unions were in active opposition to One Member, One Vote 
reforms put through by Labour’s leadership at the 1993 conference. Each of the union 
leaders present had their own press officers and some (particularly the Transport and 
General Workers and the General and Municipal Boilermakers) used the resources at their 
disposal to pursue actively an agenda of opposition to the party’s inner core.
Finally the delegates or representatives signalled their mood, either through the 
length of an ovation at the Conservatives’ conferences or in ballots at the Labour and 
Liberal Democrat parties'. Even the attendance at a particular fringe meeting or the kind of 
motions submitted provided indicators of delegates’ moods or opinions. Organised groups 
of activists did seek to engage in the dissemination of information (Heffeman and 
Marqusee, 1992). Without the resources or contacts with journalists, such attempts were 
only successful if they could mobilise enough delegates or could forge alliances with 
members of the inner or outer core elites, the periphery or the external power brokers.
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4.3 Events, Gathering, Interaction and Relationships
Each conference consisted of a series of planned events. These events were the focus of the 
dissemination and gathering of information and could be seen, in a basic sense, as a series 
of channels along which information flowed. Sigal (1973) argues that there are three types 
of 'information channel' between journalists and political actors: Routine, Informal and 
Enterprise41. Similarly at conferences there were three types of event. First, routine events. 
These were the pre-planned debates and speeches in the main hall, plus meetings on the 
fringe, but they also included press conferences and interviews. They were routine in the 
sense that they occurred at every conference. The main aim behind routine events was to 
communicate conventional information on policy and the views of party actors to a wider 
TV audience. Second, informal events. These were the non-timetabled behind-the-scenes 
background briefings, leaks and conversations with colleagues. Third, there were 
unexpected events. These included gaffes, spontaneous external events or ones which 
arose out of interviews conducted at the journalist’s initiative, or from independent 
research.
Gathering of information and video footage occurred in linked stages. The first 
involved gathering from routine events the news teams had decided to cover. The second, 
gathering from informal events and through independent research. This was a continuous 
process throughout the period of the conferences, with deadlines acting as pressure on 
journalists to get all the film material available, and prepare scripts, in time for the link-line 
to London. In the first stage, gathering was largely passive and required little effort. 
Footage of speeches and debates came from cameras already in the main hall, and further 
information on these events was given to the journalists in the form of press releases or 
came from newspapers and the wire services. The second stage provided scope for active 
gathering42. Journalists actively went in search of the views of party actors, particularly the 
inner core's, and camera crews went to find new sources of visual material. Active 
gathering was driven by the need to incorporate new material into reports before the next 
deadline, and there was certainly more pressure on those journalists working with more 
than one deadline. Some of their behaviour observed at several conferences43 involved 
'door stepping' senior party members for comment in numerous different locations, talking 
to the spin doctors in the press room and taking notes from impromptu briefings. In 
particular the conference hotel was the haunt of evening news gathering (Baker, 1993; 
Prior, 1986). One former Tory Party Chairman described a typical scene in the hotel foyer. 
'Radio mikes are pushed in front of you; television crews record you entering, being 
searched, checking in and chatting to friends. If you have to wait for the lift then you are 
trapped, and comment can only be refused by being churlish'44.
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The passive gathering of information from routine events involved little direct
interaction, whereas active gathering at informal events often involved direct face-to-face
contact whether on or off camera. Direct contact between the news teams and spin doctors
occurred off camera around the press room, usually after a speech or debate in the main
hall, but also in a social setting in the evenings. Journalists also interacted spasmodically
with actors on the periphery and delegates, but on the journalists’ terms: ‘Of course you go
out of your way to talk to activists. But you probably go with a pretty prejudiced and
uninformed idea of what they are going to be thinking when you chat to them’45. All
interaction between journalists and party actors was exchange-driven (Blumler and
Gurevitch, 1995; Jones. B, 1993; Tunstall, 1970). As Tunstall argues ‘the interaction of
any journalists with news sources can be seen as an exchange of information for
publicity*46. Conferences were no different, in this respect, from Westminster. ‘Each
side... is in a position to offer the other access to a resource it values. The mass media offer
politicians access to an audience through a credible outlet, while politicians offer journalists
information about a theatre of presumed relevance, significance, impact and spectacle for
audience consumption*47. For instance, new policies raised in speeches and elaborated
upon through informal events were provided with publicity in a news report. As one
correspondent suggested:
‘It is a lot like it is in Westminster, it*s symbiotic. We look to them for favours and 
any gossip. We look to them to give us off-the-record a line which they haven’t 
given the BBC, they haven’t given a colleague. They look to us presumably to get 
their point across. I don’t think they look for exceptionally favourable coverage: 
they don’t expect us to be totally uncritical’48.
Another correspondent concurred: ‘If you like, it is a trade o ff49.
The majority of interaction that occurred during news gathering was largely 
between actors with pre-existing exchange relationships established within the lobby at 
Westminster.
‘You walk in and there is one familiar face after another and it’s a journalist's joy 
[...]. It is a road show, you meet them at by-elections, you meet them all day long 
at Westminster, all year round I should say. Once a year you meet them away from 
home like a sort of journalist's holiday and there are an awful lot of familiar faces 
there’50.
The journalists tended to be at least familiar, if not on first-name terms, with the spin 
doctors and members of the parties' inner and outer core. The depth of the relationship built 
up between the journalists and party actors, in particular the spin doctors, was an important 
factor when considering the exchanges that occurred. As one correspondent suggested: ‘I 
think you’d be right in thinking that you have the most contact with the people you are most 
familiar with’51. Spin doctors had both formal and close relations with journalists - indeed, 
they could not hope to ‘operate successfully without first having established a coterie of 
trusted reporters and other contacts’52. They had formal relationships with many
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journalists. These were based on the routinised exchange of conventional information and 
dictated by their role as communication specialists. Indeed, conferences provided a greater 
opportunity for this to happen than at Westminster. While at the conferences I noted 
frequent discussions between spin doctors and lower ranking correspondents. However, 
the spin doctors also had a series of close relationships. Many of these relationships had 
been cultivated over lengthy periods of time. Such closeness was also the product of the 
provision and reporting of accurate information and insight into inner core elite thinking.
Bearing in mind the hierarchically differentiated nature of relationships (Franklin,
1994), principal spin doctors built up a series of close relationships with correspondingly
senior journalists. The dissemination and gathering of personalised information took place
between the principal spin doctors of the inner core and the political editors and ‘star*
presenters. This was the inner sanctum of information exchange. The exchange was
personal and intense and involved the trade of exclusive personalised information for
informed representation. In addition, the continued use of particular journalists as recipients
for the latest personalised information subsequently maintained and raised their status in a
competitive broadcast hierarchy. One source highlighted the courting of the journalistic elite
by the principal spin doctors:
‘Their [the spin doctors'] most valuable and remorseless expenditure is on the 
electronic media. Oakley and Brunson are powerful. If you go back a decade or 
more I don’t think you would find the political editors of the electronic media 
anything like as influential as they are now. Influential because they get attention 
from the parties and influential because they are the sort of mouth pieces, the first 
brig in the political line. They are courted the whole time by the parties’53.
Oakley, Brunson, Goodman, the Snows, Wark and Paxman shared a privileged
relationship with the inner core elites' spin doctors in each party. As their interpretations
carried a lot of weight with their junior colleagues, and they had tremendous credibility
with other journalists in the news community, they were the conduit through which such
personalised information passed. To a certain extent this ‘matchmaking’ did not exclude
brief exchanges developing between ‘suitors who would generally consider themselves
above such a partner’54. However, in the main, the relationships between the spin doctors
and the correspondents and producers were formal and based on publicising conventional
information. The author observed such journalist briefings in 1994, 1995 and 1996. For
example, the Shadow Scottish Secretary (George Robertson) and his press secretary held
regular briefings for Scottish journalists, and there were several other briefings by the press
secretaries of the other members of the shadow cabinet on their specialist areas, a pattern
followed at the other two parties' conferences. The conferences also provided journalists
with the opportunity to renew acquaintance with other party actors on the periphery, and
delegates, but these relationships in the main remained formal.
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4.4 Competition
The resources which both the broadcasters and the parties had to offer in terms of 
information and publicity were finite (Blumler and Gurevitch, 1995). Therefore actors in 
both organisations had to compete for them. While the nature of journalistic competition 
remained the same at the conferences as at Westminster, party competition for publicity was 
transformed from inter-party to intra-party competition, often pitching the inner core against 
the other actors. However, intra-party competition at conferences was imperfect and did not 
take place on a level playing field. The aim of the competition was to achieve and maintain 
the role of party ‘primary definer’55 (Hall et al, 1978) throughout the conference. In 
achieving this aim, the inner core had organisational and informational resource advantages 
as well as ones which arose from experience and close relationships. In simple terms the 
competitive advantage and the ability to achieve primary definer status decreased the further 
down the party hierarchy an actor moved. The advantages of the inner core elite could be 
compared to those which lay with the government vis-a-vis the opposition or other source 
organisations. As chapter three showed, the inner core were able to gain a significant 
advantage from being able to exert influence on the issues raised in speeches and debates 
and their timetabling. This control of planning allowed them to prepare the necessary 
strategies prior to the start of the conferences. The inner core elite had substantial help from 
the cadre of spin doctors, experienced in dealing with the broadcasters and their demands. 
Such a cadre was an indispensable tool in the provision of interpretations for the 
broadcasters at informal events.
The inner core spin doctors controlled to a greater extent than the other groups the 
key elements required in any information exchange with journalists. As part of the 
conventional media operation they were able to provide ‘information subsidies* (Gandy, 
1982) in the form of press conferences, press releases, factual information and copies of 
speeches, so reducing the 'cost' of information for the broadcast journalists and its ease of 
capture. Through specialised media operations, the principal spin doctors controlled the 
flow of advanced information and also journalistic access to the inner core for interviews. 
The inner core faced relatively little competition from other actors for interviews. As they 
were deemed to be important news sources they were often in a dominant position to decide 
who would be fielded in interviews on Channel Four and Newsnight.
Control of these informational resources enabled the inner core to ensure their 
dominant role as the party’s ‘primary definer*. This advantage was not a permanent state of 
affairs. It provided them with a relative and not an absolute advantage over other sections 
of the party. The inner core elite continually needed to make sure that such an advantage
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was maintained in the face of continual challenges from other actors and groups, 
particularly on the periphery.
The journalists similarly were in competition with each other. While competition at 
conferences was somewhat less strong than at other times of the year, broadcast journalists 
were still ‘competitor colleagues* (Tunstall, 1970) at both an inter-organisational and intra- 
organisational level. Inter-organisational competition took place between journalists at ITN 
and the BBC, and also between the broadcasters and the press. Intra-organisational 
competition took place between different programmes within the same organisation and 
was more prevalent between the BBC news programmes than at ITN. Like that described 
by Tunstall (1970), the competition that was observed took three forms: first over speed; 
second over exclusives; and third over access.
Concerns with speed manifested themselves in the competition to be first with
particular information. A BBC source suggested: ‘There is considerable competition
between the various outlets, for example, which programme got the first full-length Blair
interview; which outlet was first to report the Clause Four conference defeat’5**. There was
also competition importantly ‘not to be last with the news’57. This point was illustrated by
a senior BBC source’s expression of worry about missing a story:
‘One of our difficulties often is the fact that the newspapers, even more so than at 
Westminster, are all under the same roof. At a lot of conference venues they are at 
one end of the building: we are at the other. The newspapers are all together, so a 
rumour can go round like wild fire, which if we are not careful we can be 
completely excluded from. Often ITN, because they are much smaller, their 
proximity to the newspapers will be much better than ours. And it is quite possible, 
even though we have lots of people at the conference, for us to miss a story which 
suddenly finds itself across the newspapers and ITN. So we are quite vulnerable to 
stories slipping by us there, and it is something you have always got to be aware of 
at conferences because it is a rumour mill’58.
Conferences were an information-rich environment, as one source suggested: 
‘Because of the competition with your colleagues, they might get a story you missed. But 
on the whole, the story happens in the arena, so you tend to get it’59. In such an 
environment, with all journalists in close proximity, the chances of one journalist or 
organisation getting an exclusive were reduced. ‘Competition comes to mean getting the 
same stories as the competitors, but getting the information earlier and in more detail’60. 
However, this did not stop bulletins and their journalists competing for exclusive 
information from, or access to, the inner core. There was much competition for the 
newsworthy personalised information provided by the principal spin doctors to supplement 
conventional information from a speech. The journalists were interested in and anxious to 
learn the opinions of the inner core elite, who were often unavailable for continuous 
comment. Jones suggests that: ‘journalists were often desperate to speak to authoritative
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sources capable of giving them an instant interpretation of what happened and also the 
background guidance on the likely consequences’61. Some broadcast journalists, 
particularly the political editors, selectively sought to use existing close relationships with 
principal spin doctors to establish the views of the inner core, so as to get an exclusive 
insight into their opinion on an issue, which their rivals did not have. The BBC and ITN 
regularly held receptions at each conference, to which the inner core was invited, to aid the 
gathering of exclusive information.
In addition, competition did manifest itself in a limited way in the drive to gather
additional comments to make the reports look fresher. With only a finite number of
newsworthy individuals around, the gathering journalists were forced into ‘door stepping*
in the hope that they would get a short exclusive answer to a question. The search for
exclusive sources of information to provide fresh insights and opinions for reports also
took place at fringe meetings. A Channel Four source summed up his experiences:
‘A typical day will begin with a breakfast [If] it is an event-breakfast, like one that 
Channel 4 stages, in which case you are likely to be sitting between two cabinet 
ministers or a cabinet minister and somebody else's wife[...]. Then you go on to 
the 9.30 opening of conference and that morning period, first, in immediate terms, 
is to find what’s swilling about for the day. And second, for a more long term 
period, is to get people in the margins who came out of a debate bored perhaps with 
the immediate subject in hand and more than happy to have coffee and grit through 
some of the things which are not immediately on the agenda. I team up with the 
assistant editor of The Times and we in fact have a remorseless programme of 
dining cabinet ministers and front bench spokespersons throughout the week. I 
mean my diary for last year, there would certainly be a lunch and a dinner every day 
with somebody who was worth having dinner with [...]. The fringe obviously is a 
moment, again in immediate terms, to see how passions are running on particular 
subjects. And in the more long term it’s possible to make contact with people who 
are rather germane to a subject but do not have heads above the parapet. They may 
be people from think tanks, pressure groups or whatever, who in subsequent times 
will become useful, should the issue be important. Take Europe for example: 
obviously there are endless people who materialise to input in a European debate in 
the fringes who may well subsequently become useful’62.
All journalists jealously guarded any exclusives they were given, not sharing them even
with other programmes in the same network. As one source noted: ‘if you’ve had a private
chat with someone [in the leadership] you keep it to yourself and run it as an exclusive’63.
Competition between the evening bulletins for access to leading actors for formal 
interviews was less intense. Only Channel Four News and Newsnight had the time 
available within the programme for extensive live or pre-recorded interviews. Both 
bulletins, because of their large time slots, were able to get the interviews with the political 
actors. Channel Four News conducted a total of 58 interviews between 1993 and 1996: 6 at 
the Liberal Democrat conference, 25 at Labour’s and 27 at the Conservatives*. Newsnight 
conducted a total of 67 interviews: 11 at the Liberal Democrat conference, 27 at Labour’s 
and 29 at the Conservatives*. But News at Ten and the BBC Six conducted only one
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interview each between 1993 and 1996. However, the late-evening bulletins on U V  and 
BBC did include highlights of interviews in some reports, either conducted by themselves 
or by Newsnight or Channel Four News.
At the BBC there was some movement at an editorial and managerial level to co­
ordinate competition between outlets. The BBC had begun to co-ordinate centrally its news 
gathering operation at conferences, seeking to increase co-operation between the various
news programmes. As a BBC source suggested:
‘We don’t want to pull in all the BBC’s coverage and make it the same, but 
inevitably if you are not going to be competing in a way that is counter-productive 
you need to at least have that form of trust and communication between the outlets. 
So I’d like to think if Newsnight had some form of exclusive they would at least be 
able to plan how it came out by talking to me’64.
While content remained the responsibility of the programme, an overall news co-ordinator
brought editors and producers together. The aim was to improve the BBC’s internal
transfer of information at conference using the existing series of daily meetings. The same
source suggested:
‘We are trying to pull them all into pooling information. So I will take part in a 
“conference core” for instance with the television morning editorial meeting and 
then a little later we will have some form of editorial meeting whereby we try and 
pull all the strands together’65.
He admitted, however, that ‘they wouldn’t be proper journalists if they didn’t want their
own exclusive and there is an enormous amount of competition’66, but that there were in
place ‘editorial structures whereby these things can be sorted out’67. These editorial
structures, he argued, were ‘to make sure the channels of communication between
programmes and ourselves exist without trying to standardise everything’6 .^ They were
also part of an effort to avoid an incoherent interpretation of events within the BBC. One
journalist suggested: ‘One outlet would not go out at a complete tangent and say the
opposite of another bulletin or programme’69. The same senior BBC source noted: ‘It is
something you would want to avoid’70.
4.5 Broadcasters’ Attitudes
The broadcasters at conferences were faced with a large amount of information from 
events, not all of which could become news or be given the publicity the parties desired. 
They had a certain amount of discretionary power (Semetko et al, 1991). They were able to 
choose, make suitability judgements (Gans, 1979), firstly about what events and what 
information were to be selected or rejected, secondly about its importance and thirdly about 
whether to ‘expand the agenda beyond the issues of the day...’71. These judgements, made 
with daily deadlines in mind, were routinised (Sigal, 1973) and guided by a series of 
professional, organisationally-derived attitudes toward the conferences and events.
I l l
A study of broadcasters’ attitudes towards Parliament, by Blumler and Gurevitch 
(1995), provides a structure which could be transposed to the coverage of the party 
conferences. They argue that broadcasters had two fundamentally different attitudes to 
Parliament as a source of news. The first was ‘sacerdotal*: it considers that parliamentary 
developments ‘deserve a regular and prominent airing as an inherent right and regardless of 
news value calculations’72. The second was ‘pragmatic’: in this approach, ‘the treatment of 
politicians’ activities is based on... assessments of their intrinsic newsworthiness... [so] 
that consequently the prominence given to the stories reporting these activities, the amount 
of time or space allocated to them will be determined by a strict consideration of news 
values’73. Choices were therefore routinely made on both a sacerdotal and pragmatic basis.
However, such attitudes were not distributed randomly but differed according to 
people’s roles (Blumler and Gurevitch, 1995) and between bulletins. There was ‘a 
tendency for broadcasters in certain roles to adpt one set of attitudes, while incumbents of 
others exhibit different orientations’74. While there was a hierarchical divide, attitudes also 
varied across the different groups involved in covering conference. Those involved in news 
gathering (namely the correspondents and the political editors) had a different attitude 
towards the conferences as a source of news from those further removed from its 
proximity. The correspondents’ attitudes towards events at conference, as to parliament, 
was more sacerdotal than pragmatic, even though it was critical, because, as with 
Westminster, they were immersed in the conferences (like their subjects), and they were 
dependent on access to party actors to do their job.
The editors and producers, and the higher executives within the organisations at the 
periphery of conference broadcasting, were less involved in news gathering. They were 
more pragmatically oriented towards conference as a source of news, although sacerdotal in 
their attitudes towards some news events within it. For the news rooms in London, news 
values were an important determinant of the amount of time and the position of conference 
reports allocated within the overall bulletin running order.
The broadcasters were both pragmatically and sacerdotally oriented towards the 
conferences. Blumler and Gurevitch argue that orientations ‘towards a given institution will 
reflect the interaction between two sets of influences - its more or less abiding sacerdotal 
standing... and its momentary weight on news value scales*75. These attitudes were 
revealed in the prominence and amount of attention given to the various conferences and in 
the selection of routine events for coverage.
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Attitudes Towards the Conferences
An analysis of conference news revealed that there were variations between the bulletins’ 
editorial attitudes. Channel Four News and Newsnight were more sacerdotal towards the 
conferences. Both were anchored out of the Labour and Conservative conferences and both 
programmes devoted more time to additional news items. In addition, both were more 
committed to them as significant political events. The main BBC news and ITN showed a 
more pragmatic editorial attitude; they treated the conferences as news events which had to 
compete on their newsworthiness. The different editorial attitudes towards the conferences 
were indicated in the number of reports produced; their prominence, as Schlesinger notes, 
the ‘prestige’ of any news item, is importantly shown in its 'placement in the running 
order’76; and in the amount of additional news items. Tables 4.7, 4.8 and 4.9 show the 
total number of reports77 and their prominence on all six bulletins over a four-year period.
Table 4.7: Prominence of Liberal Democrat conference reports bv bulletin 
1993-1996 (cell contents show the number of reports in each position).
Story Position
1st 2nd 3rd 4th 5th+ Tot
ITN 5.40 2 0 0 3 10 15
BBC 6 1 2 0 3 9 15
Ch 4 0 1 2 2 13 18
BBC 9 2 0 0 4 9 15
ITN 10 0 2 0 1 14 17
NN 2 1 5 0 7 15
Total 7 6 7 13 62 95
(BBC6 = BBC Six O’clock News; BBC9 = BBC Nine O'clock News; ITN5.40 = ITN News at 5.40 PM; 
ITN10 = ITN News at Ten O’clock; Ch 4 = Channel Four News; NN = Newsnight.)
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Table 4.8: Prominence of the Labour conference reports bv bulletin 1993- 
1996 (cell contents show the number of reports in each position).
Story Position
1st 2nd 3rd 4th 5th+ Total
ITN 5.40 7 5 3 2 4 21
BBC 6 7 9 5 4 7 32
Ch 4 12 7 6 5 8 38
BBC 9 9 6 7 5 6 33
ITN 10 8 5 4 5 9 31
NN 14 6 7 3 12 42
Total 57 38 32 24 46 197
(BBC6 = BBC Six O’clock News; BBC9 = BBC Nine O’clock News; ITN5.40 = ITN News at 5.40 PM; 
ITN10 = ITN News at Ten O'clock; Ch 4 = Channel Four News; NN = Newsnight.)
Table 4.9: Prominence of Conservative conference reports bv bulletin 
1993-1996 (cell contents show the number of reports in each position).
Story Position
1st 2nd 3rd 4th 5th+ Total
ITN 5.40 15 5 1 2 1 24
BBC 6 11 10 6 4 10 41
Ch 4 14 9 6 4 12 45
BBC 9 11 10 6 6 4 37
ITN 10 14 6 3 3 5 31
NN 13 7 8 4 13 45
Total 78 47 30 23 45 223
(BBC6 = BBC Six O'clock News; BBC9 = BBC Nine O'clock News; ITN5.40 = ITN News at 5.40 PM; 
ITN10 = ITN News at Ten O'clock; Ch 4 = Channel Four News; NN = Newsnight.)
A comparison of the three tables shows that the Liberal Democrat conference was 
considered the least newsworthy. It received the least amount of coverage in terms of the 
number of reports and was never the lead item on Channel Four News or News at Ten. 
The vast majority of their reports - 62 out of 95 (63%) - featured in the fifth slot or below. 
In comparison, the Labour and Conservative conferences were the subject of a far greater 
number of reports. At the Labour conference 57 out of 195 reports (29%) were lead news 
items. Labour conference reports were rarely further down the running order than fourth, 
with only 46 out of 197 reports (23%) in the fifth slot or below. A similar picture emerged 
in the treatment of reports from the Conservative conference. There, 78 out of 223 reports 
(35%) were lead items, with the vast majority featuring in the top four: only 45 out of 223 
(20%) reports featured in the fifth slot or below. This difference in attitude was further
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revealed in the number of additional news items produced for each conference.
Table 4.10: The number of "additional” news items broadcast bv conference 
1993-1996.
ITN 5.40 BBC6 ITN10 BBC9 Ch 4 NN Total
Liberal Democrat 2 2 1 0 8 14 27
Labour 14 9 17 12 47 53 152
Conservative 11 20 14 21 50 52 168
Total 27 31 32 33 105 119 347
(BBC6 = BBC Six O’clock News; BBC9 = BBC Nine O’clock News; ITN5.40 = ITN News at 5.40 PM; 
ITN10 = ITN News at Ten O'clock; Ch 4 = Channel Four News; NN = Newsnight.)
Table 4.10 shows that events at the Liberal Democrats’ conference triggered the least 
number of additional news items and the Conservatives’ the most. At each conference, the 
table shows that Channel Four News (105 items) and Newsnight (119) consistently 
produced the greatest number of additional items when compared to the other bulletins. 
There were also small differences between the BBC and ITN. While there was little 
difference editorially between them at the Liberal Democrat conference, ITN produced more 
additional items for the Labour conference and the BBC for the Conservative conference.
Despite differences across all bulletins, the editorial apparatus judged the
Conservative conference to be the most newsworthy and the Liberal Democrats the least.
Routine events at the Labour and Conservative conferences were seen as more newsworthy
by comparison with those at the Liberal Democrats. As one source indicated:
‘There is a difference between say the Liberal Democratic conference and the 
Labour and Tory conference, I’ll get in to trouble immediately I refer to the Liberal 
Democratic conference as a minor conference or if I refer to the others as major 
conferences, but as far as we are concerned the Lib Dems are’78.
Attitudes Towards Speeches
In terms of deciding what to cover at each conference, the bulletins and their journalists 
were oriented towards particular routine events such as speeches and debates, with a more 
pragmatic attitude being indicated by prominent but irregular coverage and a sacerdotal 
orientation by regular and prominent coverage. The party leader’s speech was consistently 
given a high degree of prominence and received a lot of attention, whereas the attention 
given to the other party actors’ speeches was more irregular. The broadcasters treated 
speeches of inner core elite actors with a mixture of pragmatic and sacerdotal attitudes. 
Ministers, their shadows and senior spokespersons’ speeches received attention, but the 
amount and prominence depended upon the policy announcements the speeches contained.
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The more radical and significant an announcement, the greater its newsworthiness and the 
more prominent coverage it received.
Home affairs speeches provided a mixed picture between the conferences (Table
4.11, next page). The Shadow Home Secretary’s speeches were treated pragmatically and 
received prominent coverage only in 1993 and to a lesser extent in 1995. The Liberal 
Democrats' spokesperson's speech was deemed completely unnewsworthy and received no 
coverage at all. The Home Secretary’s speeches received regular coverage but the striking 
prominence of some of his speeches was determined by the newsworthiness of their 
content. Those speeches which contained the major policy announcements in 1993 and 
1995 were given greater prominence by all broadcasters.
Table 4.11: Prominence of all reports on home affairs speeches bv 
conference 1993-1996 (cell contents show the number of reports in each 
position).
Story Position 
1st 2nd 3rd 4th 5th+ Total
Conservative
1993 6 0 0 0 0 6
1994 0 1 0 2 3 6
1995 5 0 1 0 0 6
1996 1 2 0 0 1 4
Total 12 3 1 2 4 22
Labour
1993 1 0 0 2 3 6
1995 0 0 1 0 1 2
1996 0 0 0 0 1 1
Total 1 0 1 2 5 9
Liberal Democrat (No reports)
Speeches by the Chancellor, his shadow and the Liberal Democrats' Treasury 
spokespersons were treated more sacerdotally than speeches by their counterparts (Table
4.12, next page). There was little doubt that they were considered important, with regular 
coverage across the time period. However, each speech was not considered equally 
important and news values largely determined the prominence of the coverage. The 
Shadow Chancellor's (Gordon Brown's) speeches were regularly given greater 
prominence by the broadcasters than those of either of his rivals, while again the Liberal 
Democrats' spokesperson attracted least attention. Brown’s speeches were considered more 
newsworthy, perhaps because he used them as an opportunity to present ideas on new
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directions in Labour party economic policy and because of his centrality to New Labour. In 
addition, Brown’s speeches were on the Monday opening of the conference and as a senior 
party figure he received little or no competition from his colleagues. The Chancellor’s 
speeches, surprisingly, received less prominence, with the exception of 1996, than those of 
his Shadow, partly because of their content: he never used them to make major 
announcements of economic policy. This was also due to competition in the announcement 
stakes in 1994 and 1995, when the Home Secretary made important policy-laden speeches 
on the same day.
Table 4.12: Prominence of all reports on economic speeches bv conference 
1993-1996 (cell contents show the number of reports in each position).
Story Position
Conservative
1st 2nd 3rd 4th 5th+ Total
1993 1 2 2 1 0 6
1994 0 0 0 0 2 2
1995 0 2 1 0 1 4
1996 6 0 0 0 0 6
Total
Labour
7 4 3 1 3 18
1993 3 2 0 0 0 5
1994 4 1 1 0 0 6
1995 5 0 0 0 0 5
1996 1 2 1 2 0 6
Total 13 
Liberal Democrat
5 2 2 0 22
1993 0 2 1 1 0 4
1994 0 1 0 0 5 6
1995 0 0 1 0 4 5
1996 0 0 1 4 1 6
Total 0 3 3 5 10 21
The further one moved out along the series of concentric circles from the parties' 
inner core elite, the more pragmatically oriented journalists were towards speeches 
featuring those party actors. The peripheral elite or external power brokers received 
coverage according to a ‘strict consideration of news values’7^. Speeches by back­
benchers, ‘old stars* and the unions received attention only if they were particularly 
newsworthy, and that almost always entailed being critical of the party leadership and party 
policy. As one journalist suggested:
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‘...If there is dissent we report it. You’ve got to be a little bit careful though [...]. I 
think sometimes rightly they get a bit upset if you are giving too much credence to 
one voice who’s really, well out on the fringe. But equally if there is a fringe 
meeting when the line is criticised then we will probably use it because you are 
reflecting what is a real tension in the party’80.
Table 4.13 (next page) shows the prominence given by broadcasters to critical speeches
made by members of the parties’ periphery.
Table 4.13; Prominence of all reports on critical speeches bv conference 
1993-1996 (cell contents show the number of reports in each position).
Story Position
Conservative
1st 2nd 3rd 4th 5th+ Total
Lamont 6 0 0 0 0 6
Redwood
Labour
3 1 0 0 0 4
Hattersley 3 2 1 0 0 6
Castle
Liberal Democrat
0 0 2 2 2 6
Rodgers 0 0 1 3 2 6
Total 12 3 4 5 4 28
(Lamont = speech by Norman Lamont. Redwood = speech by John Redwood MP. Hattersley = speech by 
Lord Hattersley. Castle = speech by Lady Castle. Rodgers = speech by Lord Rodgers.)
Old star Roy Hattersley’s five-minute speech criticising Labour education policy at the 
1995 conference received prominent coverage, as did major speeches delivered outside the 
main hall on the fringe by SDP founder Lord Rodgers in 1996 and by former Conservative 
ministers Lamont and Redwood in 1994 and 1995. All the parties’ inner core had their 
critics on the periphery, but the newsworthiness of what they said faded over time and their 
critical credentials became routinised. If a recent member of the inner core elite who was 
sacked or resigned made a critical speech, it received a lot of attention; the following year a 
similar speech would receive less attention8!. When a speech happened was also important. 
A speech critical of the inner core would increase in newsworthiness with its ease of 
capture. If it coincided on the same day with a speech in the main hall it was more likely to 
receive coverage than if it did not.
Speeches by the peripheral elite were covered only if they said something very 
newsworthy, which meant being critical. The bulletins and journalists otherwise saw 
speeches by the inner core elite as more deserving of an airing because of their status in the 
party: their contributions were amplified even more if they were newsworthy. Conference
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delegates, however, were used primarily as a ‘vox pop* element in reports, largely as an 
illustrative device, a way of registering party opinions.
Attitudes Towards Debates
The broadcasters were pragmatically oriented towards conference debates. The prominence
of debates depended on their newsworthiness in the broadcasters* eyes - for instance, the
journalists expressed a particular preference for contentious issues where there was a level
of overt conflict and clearly divergent perspectives between the sides. The constraint of
television as a medium meant in practical terms that debates were hard to relay unless there
were obvious differences of opinion identifiable with particular actors.
‘...It is very difficult once you have got to condense it into, let’s say, News at 
Ten’s three and a half minute report or even Channel 4’s twelve minute report. It is 
very hard to say: “Okay, lets devote four minutes of that to Robin Cook 
commentating on the debate on foreign affairs”[...]. It is a ten ton pencil, it is the 
most dreadful medium to operate creatively, the worst and yet the best when 
something physically happens. But for politics television is death unless there is a 
real fight’82.
The newsworthiness of conflict was further enhanced by the personnel who were involved 
and the issue. Conflict that involved the inner core was more newsworthy than conflict that 
did not. As for the issue, broadcasters preferred issues to be ones which were significant to 
the party and their viewers. In addition, one source suggested of debates: ‘...interest is 
inevitably nearly always a function of the extent to which there is criticism of the 
leadership, particularly in the case of a government. But I find in the case of the Labour 
party, we are titillated, scintillated and attracted by conflict’83. Table 4.14 shows the 
prominence given to debates with overt conflict by the broadcasters at each conference. A 
fuller exposition can be found in chapter six.
Table 4.14: Prominence of reports on conflictual debates bv conference 
1993-1996 (cell contents show the number of reports in each position).
Story Position 
1st 2nd 3rd 4th 5th+ Total
Conservative
(VAT = debate on Value Added Tax on domestic fuel. OMOV = a debate on One Member, One Vote. 
Cannabis = a debate on the legalisation of Cannabis.)
VAT
Labour
OMOV
Liberal Democrat
Cannabis 1 1 0 2 7 11
1 2  2 1 0  6
10 7 1 0 0 18
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These debates occurred over the introduction of OMOV (One Member, One Vote)
and the downgrading of the block vote in 1993, over the introduction of VAT on fuel and
public expenditure also in 1993, and over the legalisation of Cannabis in 1994. These
debates were particularly prominent because they were on important, salient issues, and
there were openly divergent views on them, held by members of the inner core and their
critics on the periphery. These critics at the Conservatives * conference included a former
Chancellor, at Labour’s some of the main union leaders and at the Liberal Democrats’ the
majority of party delegates. Table 4.13 shows that the OMOV debate in particular received
very prominent coverage across all the bulletins. The broadcasters were more sacerdoatally
oriented towards debates in the main hall and pragmatically to ones on the conference
fringe. A senior Channel Four source suggested:
‘For the moment it’s still the convention that we are going to party conferences to 
report what the parties say. It is very difficult, given the concrete structures of, 
security passes, programme agendas, the physical arena, the backdrop built at great 
expense and the star performers, to break out and say “ No, that’s all bollocks, 
actually we are here to report the minor volcanic eruptions outside what you can 
see”... ’84.
Attitudes Towards Party Actors
The content analysis revealed that journalists exhibited preferences for indexing particular 
front region party actors during routine events. Seymour-Ure (1996) argues that decisions 
about which political actors received coverage, and the amount of coverage, were based on 
a hierarchy of status or power. The amount of coverage party actors received at conferences 
conformed to a similar pattern, with the inner and outer core elite receiving the most 
attention and the individual delegates the least. For Seymour-Ure those at the top of the 
hierarchy were assured coverage; their problem was to ‘ensure good media coverage’85. 
Those at the bottom had to struggle to gain news coverage: ‘the further you are toward this 
end, the more likely will your publicity depend on... news values*86. The inner and outer 
core were the sources most frequently used by journalists. Tables 4.15, 4.16 and 4.17 
(next page) show the frequency with which sources were used by the broadcasters in 
reports at all three parties conferences over a four year period.
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Table 4.15: The frequency of appearance of Liberal Democrat sources in 
reports 1993-1996 (cell contents show number of appearances).
ITN 5.40 BBC6 Ch4 BBC9 ITN10 NN Total No* Freq
Leadership 22 31 32 27 24 23 159 11 14.5
Non Leader 15 18 62 13 20 48 176 147 1.2
Total 37 49 94 40 44 71 335 158 2.1
(* = number of actors. ‘Leadership’ sources are inner and outer core sources. Non-leadership sources include 
everyone else. BBC6 = BBC Six O'clock News; BBC9 = BBC Nine O’clock News; ITN5.40 = ITN News at
5.40 PM; ITN 10 = ITN News at Ten O'clock; Ch4 = Channel Four News; NN = Newsnight.)
Table 4.16: The frequency of appearance of Labour sources in reports 
1993-1996 (cell contents show the num ber of appearances)*
IT N 5.40 BBC6 Ch4 BBC9 ITN10 NN Total No* Freq
Leadership 26 39 45 41 43 44 238 16 15
Non Leader 23 54 161 75 65 107 485 269 1.8
Total 49 93 206 116 108 151 723 285 2.5
(* = number of actors. ‘Leadership’ sources are inner and outer core sources. Non-leadership sources include 
everyone else. BBC6 = BBC Six O'clock News; BBC9 = BBC Nine O'clock News; ITN5.40 = ITN News at
5.40 PM; ITN10 = ITN News at Ten O'clock; Ch4 = Channel Four News; NN = Newsnight.)
Table 4.17: The frequency of appearance of Conservative sources in reports 
1993-1996 (cell contents show the num ber of appearances).
ITN 5.40 BBC6 Ch4 BBC9 ITN10 NN Total No* Freq
Leadership 35 52 51 52 52 56 298 24 12.4
Non Leader 16 76 176 76 59 158 561 323 1.7
Total 51 128 227 128 111 214 859 347 2.5
(* = number of actors. ‘Leadership’ sources are inner and outer core sources. Non-leadership sources include 
everyone else. BBC6 = BBC Six O'clock News; BBC9 = BBC Nine O’clock News; ITN5.40 = ITN News at
5.40 PM; ITN10 = ITN News at Ten O'clock; Ch4 = Channel Four News; NN = Newsnight.)
Across the three parties there was a clear preference for leadership sources, who appeared 
more frequently than the other sources. This was because of the status of leadership actors 
within the parties. Journalists saw leadership actors as authoritative sources of information 
and, importantly, were familiar with them. Non-leadership sources were indexed less 
frequently. ITN and the main BBC news programmes used substantially fewer non 
leadership sources than Newsnight and Channel Four News. Schlesinger et al argue that 
Newsnight, and the same can be said of Channel Four News, 'see themselves as well 
informed, open minded and sceptical - they feel freer to present issues in a more complex 
way which allows greater scope for consideration of alternative views and positions’87.
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The broadcast journalists were less receptive in general towards the information provided
by peripheral actors and delegates unless they had something newsworthy to contribute.
Journalists had preconceptions about the particular political views of these actors. These
shaped their preferences in choosing non-leadership sources. Journalists would pick a
source to represent a particular view that they thought was prevalent in the party. As a
Channel Four source confirmed:
‘One does find a risk that you go towards the person who you think will reinforce 
your prejudice. And you ask them whether they think John Major is a weak leader, 
and funnily enough they say, well, yes actually. Because we are not immersed with 
these people, we really are in that greenhouse across the road all year round, and 
once a year we are supposed to know what the grass roots are like’88.
While leadership sources were indexed because of their status, non-leadership sources
were indexed as representatives of particular views which the journalists thought were held
by different sections within the parties.
Conclusion
Dissemination and gathering focused around events at conference. The structure of both 
organisations was shaped by information dissemination and retrieval around such events. 
The parties' inner core employed a large number of actors to deal with information 
dissemination, in addition to existing party members. Parties were structured in such a way 
as to facilitate the effective dissemination of both conventional and personalised information 
to the broadcasters. Control of this information resource was almost exclusively in the 
hands of the inner core elite within each party. Conventional spin doctor activity was 
carried out by party employees in the press office, whereas personalised information was 
dealt with by principals acting on behalf of the inner core elite. The inner core elite 
controlled timetabling and had the resources to provide information subsidies. The 
broadcasters were structured hierarchically. Editorial control rested with producers and 
editors in the London news room and the conferences. News gathering was conducted by 
small news teams dominated by the political editors and centred around routine and 
informal events.
The parties and the broadcasters enjoyed a strong routinised relationship 
characteristic of the lobby system and (as in the lobby) this relationship was based on a 
well-established exchange of information for publicity (Tunstall, 1970). Both groups were 
dependent on each other. The relationships were hierarchically differentiated, with the 
dominant relationship being a largely exclusive one between the inner core and a 
journalistic elite of political editors and correspondents. Formal professional relationships 
also existed between editorial staff and party press officers, surrounding the routine matters
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of conference coverage. Relationships outside this inner coterie were infrequent, occurring 
sporadically at the conferences only. Both sides competed for the limited resources the 
other had to offer.
Conference coverage was also importantly shaped by the attitudes of the 
broadcasters. The broadcasters were sacerdotally-oriented to events featuring the inner 
core, particularly the party leader. The inner core elite possessed an overall advantage. 
They had an established relationship with the broadcasters; they had a competitive 
advantage over other sections of the party in terms of the resources at their disposal; and 
they benefited from the largely sacerdotal attitude of the broadcasters to events featuring 
them. The broadcasters also derived certain advantages from the way things were organised 
- guaranteed access to sources, and a stable environment essential for planning day-to-day 
coverage. It was in both their interests to co-operate, as there were mutual advantages from 
the conference set-up. However, the advantages which the inner core elite possessed were 
not permanent, and there was a tendency for such advantages to be undermined in certain 
circumstances by news values.
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Chapter 5
Strategies and Responses in Conference Interaction
During the conferences the communications teams wanted the broadcaster to provide the 
maximum positive publicity for the events they had planned and promote their perspectives. 
The broadcasters, driven by a mixture of pragmatic and sacerdotal attitudes, saw their duty 
as not only to relay information on the main events but also to inform their audience as they 
saw fit. While the broadcasters* agenda did broadly coincide with that the parties had 
planned, in the period surveyed here there were also significant divergences - a 
commissioned opinion poll1, a lost vote, a speech on the fringe, a policy gaffe and issues 
generated outside the conference environment. The need to achieve a 'good conference' led 
the spin doctors to try and reduce the risk of divergences occurring by controlling 
conference dissemination.
Divergences were minimised in two ways: by using communication strategies that
adapted to the demands of the broadcasters but in a way that was beneficial to the parties'
leaderships, and by managing the conference to make sure that there were few if any
surprises that would deflect journalists away from reporting the chosen agenda. The aim of
all communication strategies implemented throughout the duration of the conferences was
to ensure, first, that the broadcasters reflected the main conference agendas. If the spin
doctors wanted a particular speech to receive publicity, it had to take account of the
pragmatic attitudes of the broadcasters and include newsworthy announcements. Second,
the aim was to ensure that the inner core's opinions on events were not just heard but
became the dominant perspective on events vis-a-vis other sections of the party. Third, to
ensure that negative publicity was 'killed off, whether it was a news agenda set elsewhere
or comment and criticism. The communication teams also had to limit sources of possible
divergence within the party through co-ordinating the activities of the spin doctors,
controlling the flow of information to journalists and managing the activities of the party as
an entity. Conference management complemented the communications strategies. The
implementation of communication strategies and conference management was designed to: 
‘Maintain a positive politician-media relationship acknowledging the needs each has 
of the other, while exploiting the institutional characteristics of both sets of actors 
for maximum advantage. For the politicians, this requires giving the media 
organisation what it wants, in terms of news or entertainment, while exerting some 
influence over how that something is mediated and presented to the audience’2.
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The strategies were continually being improved by reflecting on the successes and failures 
of previous conferences. The process of adaptation was long-term and was fed by 
conference experiences.
Divergences could never be eradicated. The party elites were not always successful 
at managing the party, despite planning. Other factions within the parties sought to 
influence the broadcasters with their perspectives and agendas. Communication 
professionals had little or no control over information disseminated in fringe debates, 
speeches, ‘maverick* politicians and delegates, or the interpretations which were provided 
by such events - whose importance as a source of information generally rose for the 
broadcasters.
The broadcasters in turn adapted to the information environment constructed by the 
parties. They were aware of management strategies but co-operated. While several 
interviewees grumbled about the stage managed nature of the conferences, there were 
certain advantages to the set-up. They received a regular supply of newsworthy 
information, the access they needed to senior party actors, a share of exclusives - indeed, 
the regulated flow of information made gathering predictable and enabled a more efficient 
allocation of resources. However, their acquiescence did not stop them focusing on the 
issues they perceived as newsworthy and reflecting other opinions and concerns circulating 
at the conferences. The spin doctors could not determine how much coverage an event 
received, the nature of that coverage or the sources used, and attempts at editorial 
interference were actively resisted. This chapter examines the implementation of 
communication strategies by the spin doctors, their management of the conference and the 
problems encountered.
5.1 Implementing Communication Strategies
Dissemination at informal events used well-established and routine proactive and reactive 
communication strategies. The strategies were aimed at 'selling' collectively agreed policy 
announcements and personalised information and minimising the impact of any negative 
publicity when it arose. The spin doctors in each party were the main users of these 
strategies, although other party actors sometimes applied such strategies to generate 
publicity for their views. The strategies were constantly refined by the spin doctors in the 
light of their experiences with the aim of improving the communication process.
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Targeting and Monitoring
All strategies were targeted by journalist or broadcaster, by medium - television, radio or 
newspapers, with a national and regional variation; and finally by time, and deadline. All 
forms were used during each conference. As one spin doctor suggested, ‘it’s horses for 
courses to some extent’3.
Senior spin doctors were well aware of the strengths and weaknesses of the 
journalists present at the conferences. They knew which journalists would be the most 
appropriate receivers of a particular piece of information. It was in this light that the 
‘poachers turned gamekeepers* proved invaluable with their contacts. Former journalists 
Hugh Colver and Charles Lewington at Conservative Central Office had built strong 
contacts in the media in their previous roles. Similarly, for the Liberal Democrats Jane 
Bonham-Carter and previously Oily Grender, and for Labour Joy Johnson before her 
resignation and Alastair Campbell. Jones notes: ‘Campbell will... be able to advise on the 
likely bottom line of political journalists... he knows the strengths and weaknesses of 
individual lobby correspondents - the journalists Blair should avoid, those who will be 
most receptive or, if they have stepped out of line, most vulnerable to discreet pressure’4. 
These actors also had an intimate knowledge of the nature of the organisations the 
journalists worked for - in broadcasting, who the editor, producers and senior personnel 
were. Jones notes:
‘No spin doctor can hope to prove effective without an intimate grasp of the 
complex and confusing hierarchies of... broadcasting organisations. If a complaint 
is to be taken notice of, or if an attempt is being made to influence new coverage it 
will have to be pitched at the right point*5.
Such knowledge enabled a more effective targeting of information.
The spin doctors also targeted the different media present at the conferences, as one 
source suggested: ‘You can organise it by medium, so you give some to the newspapers 
and not to the broadcasters or vice versa’6. This allowed the spin doctors access to different 
audiences. At one extreme, regional and local newspapers and broadcasters were targeted 
with information that was relevant to that particular region. Each party held regular 
briefings for Scottish and Welsh journalists, providing information that was solely of 
relevance to them and would be overlooked by journalists working for the national 
broadcasters. As one source suggested, ‘We have got a set of what are called regional 
media co-ordinators who work for all the party in that region and they spend a lot of that 
week liaising... [with] regional broadcasters’7. All the parties for the 1996 conferences -
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the last before the 1997 General Election - actively targeted the regional broadcasters in 
those areas where their PPCs stood the greatest chance of winning.
Targeting also took account of the broadcasters' deadlines. The spin doctors had a 
knowledge of each bulletin’s deadline, and the impending presence of a deadline offered 
them an opportunity to exert greater leverage over the interpretation of events. The nearer a 
news event occurred to a deadline, the less time the journalists had to seek out alternative 
perspectives to that provided by the spin doctor. This tactic was compounded by the 
pressure to meet feed times and also update the report to include the latest developments at 
conference or just to rework it for a fresher feel. In such an environment the journalists 
were more receptive to spin . One journalist gave an account of how this process worked in 
1994:
‘Peter Mandelson, acting as Tony Blair’s unofficial spin doctor, was bleeping us all 
day long. He’d rung the news desks to say what Tony was saying in his speech. 
Tony was speaking quite late, about an hour before the feed-in by satellite down to 
London. Basically the rule of thumb is that it takes an hour to edit a minute and I 
was editing something like four minutes in one hour. I knew ahead what was the 
interesting part of Tony’s speech [because] I’d been told what the interesting part 
was. At least I could write die script line in to it saying “Tony Blair’s going to call 
for this, this and this”. It just speeds the whole process up so you’re very grateful 
for it. He [Mandelson] got his lines in my script and a few other peoples’ scripts. 
That’s how they do it. They know when to give you help. They know when your 
deadline is pressing. The best of them know exactly when to offer you their helping 
hand’8.
A senior Channel Four News source also confirmed the vulnerability of journalists to spin 
as deadlines neared:
‘They have structured their moments to pounce. There is no doubt that seven 
o’clock is a very good time. There is only twenty-five minutes to the first edition. 
Or the timing of their strikes are just before lunch time where there isn’t really time. 
You know Robin Oakley or Michael Brunson have got to get it on the air and the 
last conversation they have is with Peter Mandelson or is with Brian Mawhinney, 
or whoever it happens to be that is the dominant spin doctor. So their availability at 
moments of panic and crisis for journalists is a critical factor and they certainly 
make themselves available or choose their times to call when it is least easy to 
resist’9.
All the communication operations monitored news reports throughout each day of 
the conference. Rather like ‘watching a radar screen for dangerous blips’10 monitoring 
enabled them to react to the interpretations given to events by various news reports and 
errant comments, as one senior Liberal Democrat source suggested: ‘Somebody can be 
saying something that can dominate the whole day's coverage and becomes the story, so 
we have to make sure that’s monitored all the time...*11. Monitoring also allowed the spin
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doctors to assess the success and failure of the strategies being used. In addition, there was 
another variation of straightforward monitoring: media ‘minding*. Principal spin doctors 
acted as ‘media minders* for their employers, preventing them from being caught unawares 
and making sure they received the best publicity possible.
Proactive Strategies
Two forms of proactive strategy - trailing and follow-up - were widely used. The raison 
d'etre behind trailing was that ‘the media are much more interested in something that is 
about to happen than they are in something that has just happened. And, if it is big enough, 
they will report it after it has happened, as well as before it has happened*12. A 
Conservative source suggested that virtually every speech was trailed at the 1995 party 
conference.
‘We tried every day to have something on the Today programme that looked 
forward to what was going to be happening later that day and what announcements 
were going to happen. So for example on the Wednesday morning they were 
trailing the fact that Gillian Shephard was going to be making announcements about 
new qualifications for Headmasters. On Thursday morning the fact that Michael 
Howard was making new announcements on sentencing policy. On the Friday 
morning we gave them the story about the assisted places scheme in the Prime 
Minister’s speech. Now in most of those cases they weren’t necessarily the biggest 
thing in that speech but they were enough for a programme*13.
Expectations on the outcome of forthcoming events were also trailed (Bruce, 1992). 
The expectations game played by the spin doctors was based on the construction of a 
deceptive set of expectations about the likely outcome of future events. Particularly at the 
Labour and Liberal Democrat conferences, where motions and composites debated were 
balloted and the leadership's position endorsed or rejected, the outcome of such affairs was 
of considerable interest to the journalists. The aim of the game was to trail lower 
expectations of the outcome in advance of the event. The trailing of these low expectations 
performed two functions: if the results were known to be close, it gave follow-up spinning 
more credibility and enabled a planned favourable interpretation to be put on the loss. It 
also enabled the spin doctors to claim a victory for the leadership’s policy proposal if defeat 
was avoided, however narrow the margin. The expectations game deliberately reduced 
expectation in order to maximise the publicity from a victory and minimise the bad publicity 
from a loss.
The aim of follow-up was in part to continue the process of publicity maximisation,
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reinforcing the agreed message and reducing the risks that arose from misinterpretation of 
events and announcements. Follow-up included all activities after an event with these 
goals. As a strategy it was employed in varying strengths and forms. It relied on the 
established relationships with journalists and a degree of co-ordination between the spin 
doctors. Follow-up strategies were designed at one level to help. Liberal Democrat spin 
doctors talked about their role as helpers, and as in the other parties, they were available for 
queries, explaining the mechanics of the conferences. Such help and advice was important 
for the less experienced journalists who regularly descended on each of the conferences. In 
this sense it was a basic form of risk minimisation, preventing mistakes over interpretation 
developing which could be harder to correct in the future.
Follow-up also employed a classic ’carrot and stick' approach. The carrot, so to 
speak, was the authoritative personalised information they possessed. Competing 
journalists were eager to find out the leadership line, and speaking on the behalf of their 
masters gave principal spin doctors in follow-up mode considerable weight in the 
interpretation of events. Hours were spent in social functions and the press rooms briefing 
journalists about the detail behind a policy proposal indicated in a speech, or what the result 
of a ballot or vote meant for the leadership. Such interaction also enabled the spin doctors 
to see what interpretation of events was emerging within the news community and whether 
there was a divergence from or similarity to the party elite's perspective.
When there was a divergence between the party elite's line and the perspective held 
by the journalists, then the stick replaced the carrot. The messages had to be kept on 
course; the higher the stakes, and the more the message that had been delivered looked like 
going off course, the stronger the use of the stick. The mildest form of this follow-up 
manifested itself through complaints and the strongest through bullying. Complaints were 
delivered directly to a particular journalist in the form of a rebuke. Routledge calls such a 
tactic the ‘shame game'. It played on the insecurities of journalists, shaming the journalist 
whose interpretation of events was considered out on a limb into taking the perspective that 
had been adopted by his colleagues. If this was unsuccessful or if the complaint was of a 
more serious nature, then ‘an approach might be made direct to the relevant programme 
editor'14. If this in turn was unsuccessful, then the spin doctor could appeal even higher to 
a senior member of broadcast management. Appealing over the heads of the journalists 
required the necessary seniority and authority. Complaints directed at journalists could also 
be intimidatory and personal, as Jones's citation of Mandelson's attack on Michael 
Brunson of ITN at the Labour conference in 1994 bears out
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Tough on Crime: the Home Secretary’s speech
I want to examine through an example the simultaneous use of two proactive media 
strategies by Conservative spin doctors at their 1995 conference and the response of the 
news broadcasters. This not untypical example focuses on the trailing and targeting of 
News at Ten with personalised information from Home Secretary Michael Howard’s 
speech. News at Ten’s political editor was provided with an exclusive trail of the content of 
the Home Secretary’s speech. News at Ten was targeted because the source suggested it 
was ‘by far the most important news programme’15. The Tories* aim was to maximise 
publicity for the Home Secretary’s announcements, as the other bulletins would pick up on 
the information and carry it too, and the announcements would be further reported the 
following day after the speech.
The report lasted 4 minutes and 21 seconds on Wednesday October 11 1995. It was
the lead story on News at Ten and dealt mainly, although not exclusively, with the trailed
information. The information was framed in the following way.
Anchor : ‘Good evening. The Home Secretary Michael Howard is planning much 
longer jail sentences for serious crime, including a “Two strikes and you are out” 
policy for some sex offenders. He’ll tell the Conservative party conference in 
Blackpool tomorrow that anyone found guilty twice for the most serious sex attacks 
will be locked up for life, most other prisons sentences will be served in full...’. 
Brunson : ‘Tonight the Home Secretary was on the social circuit, but after hard 
argument with his cabinet colleagues, he’ll not only suggest tomorrow that the 
courts should send far more burglars to prison but will seek to end two situations 
within the criminal justice system which he believes ordinary people find offensive: 
criminals apparently getting out of jail early and criminals who repeat very serious 
crime. Mr Howard will say here in this hall tomorrow that in the future the sentence 
the court hands down will usually be the time actually served; 15 years will mean 
15 years. And judges must take that into account in future, suggesting that present 
arrangements for remission for good behaviour are about to be ended. And when 
those who have served time for very serious crimes like sex attacks and then 
commit the same offence again once they are out of jail, Mr Howard will announce 
that in many cases, they will face the certainty of life imprisonment...’.
The same Conservative source suggested that this ‘didn’t actually stop them devoting
another five or six minutes the next day to what he'd just said even though they had
reported it, but they were able to give themselves a nice pat on the back, Mike Brunson was
saying “As News at Ten reported yesterday...” and all this sort of s tu ff16. There was
some truth in this. Wednesday’s report was followed by a 3 minute 32 second report on
Thursday where Brunson did state ‘as we reported last night’. However, the second report
also focused on the reactions to the announcements. News at Ten used its discretionary
power to obtain a reaction from the Lord Chief Justice. In fact, the report’s introduction
134
suggested that the speech ‘Almost immediately ran into trouble with the Lord Chief Justice. 
Lord Taylor... issued a statement saying he didn’t believe the threat of longer periods of 
imprisonment would deter habitual criminals, he suggested more police might’. The 
response of the Lord Chief Justice was also indexed in the report reinforcing the narrative. 
The report also further indexed Howard's reaction to Lord Taylor’s comments.
Interviews conducted with ITN journalists gave some idea of the attitude of ITN’s
Political Editor to the use of trailed exclusive information and more generally of ITN
journalists’ attitudes. An ITN source explained their orientation through a story of a trailed
exclusive but on a different issue:
‘Once I was scooped by my opposite number at the BBC because he got a leak of 
the inflation figures and I was very pissed off. So I took this high moral tone and 
said that he was deliberately leaked them as part of the Department of 
Employment’s news management operation. I remember discussing it with Mike 
Brunson and I said “Would you have chosen to rise above it and not get abused like 
that?” And he said, “To be quite honest, if you get the inflation figures it’s a good 
story. It doesn’t matter what the motive is. You’ve got the inflation figures the night 
before, you use them. It doesn’t matter if some one is trying to manipulate you”. 
Well he didn’t quite say that, but he was right’17.
Discretionary power seems not to have been exercised in terms of the receipt of information
but in terms of the treatment of reactive sources after the event It seems that the
newsworthiness of the trailed information was the priority for the Political Editor. The fact
that News at Ten had been used for the advance release of information was secondary. The
same journalist suggested:
‘I don’t think we have the right to withhold something from the public just because 
we think we are being used with bits and pieces of information. I think if you start 
taking that line you’re in grave danger because you'll end up reporting nothing - 
you’ll end up filtering material just on some abstract principle’18.
Through co-operating, both the Conservative managers and ITN benefited. ITN received
their ‘exclusive’ before their rivals and the Conservative leadership gained maximum
publicity for the announcements. This example further shows that proactive strategies
worked through adapting to the competitive desires of the broadcasters to be first, ahead of
their rivals, and have exclusive material (Tunstall, 1970). Successfully executed proactive
strategies provided benefits for both the inner core and the journalists.
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Reactive Strategies
The parties’ spin doctors made frequent use of reactive strategies which were an essential 
part of political campaigning throughout the year. The conferences provided an internal 
dimension for the implementation of such strategies. The spin doctors, often over the 
course of the study, were forced to react to prevent adverse events ‘snowballing’ into 
something that seriously undermined the planned promotion of policy. However, for 
reactive strategies to be successful a certain amount of second-guessing was required. One 
source suggested that ‘You have to have in the back of your mind constantly, what is the 
potential problem? How can we pull it round [and] get the right people in the right positions 
to control the story?’!9. The spin doctors need to be able to ‘calculate in advance what may 
be the worst-case scenario should the news media decide to put the least favourable 
interpretation on what happened’20.
Rebuttal was the most common reactive strategy used. It entailed a systematic 
countering of perspectives initiated outside the party elite with the aim of ‘killing them off 
before they developed into a full news story. ‘Spinning is not just about placing stories, it 
is about killing them too, either by straight denial or sly innuendo’2!. This involved 
targeting journalists with the counter-points to prove that there was no truth in that 
particular interpretation of events. It was frequently combined with complaining to and 
bullying the particular journalists. Each of the parties established a rebuttal unit, with one or 
more spin doctors responsible for rebutting. The inter-party nature of rebuttal did not 
disappear: the three parties continued to respond to developments at each other’s 
conferences through phoning the journalists directly or faxing them. Jones note that the 
spin doctors ‘obtain the telephone numbers of the temporary news rooms established by the 
radio and television services during the party conferences. Labour’s response to a 
development at a Conservative conference can then be communicated directly to the relevant 
political correspondent’22.
If rebuttal failed, the spin doctors needed to ‘up the ante* through mobilising 
authoritative sources within the party leadership to make a comment. The effective 
mobilisation of comment was done in off-the-record briefings and through interviews. The 
off-the-record mobilisation generally tended to be pernicious in character, involving a 
repudiation for journalists of the source of the stories. The aim of such a technique was to 
undermine the credibility of a source outside the inner elite as unrepresentative of general 
feeling within the party. Such off-the-record comments may be made by members of the
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inner core elite themselves, but was usually made by the principal spin doctors on their 
behalf. However, such strategies by themselves were sometimes not enough. A public 
mobilisation of comment was also on occasion necessary in support or denial of a news 
story. A potentially negative event involving a senior party member often called for the 
support of the rest of the inner core elite or a disagreeable activity might require their 
collective condemnation, but either way the comments were an important part of reducing 
the salience of a potentially negative interpretation of events.
Spinning Gold Bars: the Liberal Democrat health spokesperson’s 
speech
This example serves to illustrate first the use of reactive strategies by the Liberal Democrats
in order to kill off the view that a policy announcement was a gaffe, and second the
response of the news broadcasters. The incident arose at the 1996 conference and
concerned an announcement by the health spokesperson, Simon Hughes. In a speech he
suggested that certain existing tax loopholes would be closed to provide extra revenue for
the NHS. The extract from the speech was as follows.
‘Some of the cats - of all sizes - in the City and elsewhere currently receive huge 
sums from tax-dodging employers who should know better - millions of pounds 
have been paid in gold bars, life policies and other valuables to avoid paying tax to 
the Exchequer. Responsible firms shouldn’t spend their time thinking up tax 
wheezes and we wouldn’t let them - we’d close this illogical loophole for good’.
However, one journalist rang the Inland Revenue that afternoon to enquire about such
exemptions. A source noted:
‘John Sergeant [BBC Chief Political Correspondent] rang the Inland Revenue and 
said “Is this the case?”. And they said “oh no we have been taxing them for a 
while”. So it looked as if Hughes had dropped a huge clanger by trying to tax 
something already taxed’23.
News of the fact that these items were already taxed spread through the news community at
the conference. The same source noted: ‘So this is where the bush telegraph works... some
body said “oh down in the press room they have all been talking about this gold bars
thing”...’ 24. The Liberal Democrat spin doctors engaged in an immediate rebuttal operation
led by their Head of Communications and the Treasury spokesperson’s spin doctor. From
observation in the press room at the time, they held an impromptu press briefing for all the
journalists, fully explaining the party’s policy and arguing that this was an example, not a
proposal. This stance was backed up with press releases from a tax expert indicating that
there were other loopholes that could be closed. The same source, who also attended the
briefing, noted:
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*1 went down to see what was going on and I found Jane Bonham-Carter [head of 
communications] with Malcolm Bruce's spin doctor, who used to work in the City 
himself. And they had already produced an opinion from a tax expert saying you 
could raise three hundred million pounds. And they said: “No, what Simon meant 
was this is what used to happen, but there are lots of other examples”...*25.
The rebuttal exercise was combined with a further mobilisation of comment. Simon
Hughes did a series of interviews for the evening news bulletins where he reiterated the
same line. All reports quoted the same extract from the speech juxtaposed with information
challenging it The BBC Six commented:
*... But tax experts were puzzled. A leading local accountant explained that a good 
part of this loophole had already been closed: “Not fine wine and gold bullion bars 
because those have already been closed down, but there are still ways that national 
insurance isn*t being paid on bonus payments in kind. Those ways are being 
challenged by the authorities but without a more fundamental change in the rules the 
task is going to be much more difficult**...*.
The BBC Nine news before quoting the same source noted:
‘The party estimate that 350 million pounds would be saved, but tax experts were 
puzzled. A leading local tax consultant pointed out that employers couldn’t avoid 
tax by offering gold or vintage wine. The problem had already been tackled by the 
government*.
Channel Four News, News at Ten and Newsnight juxtaposed the passage with a reference 
to government sources claiming that the loopholes had already be closed. The BBC Six, 
Nine and News at Ten further indexed Hughes explaining the passage.
The rebuttal and mobilisation of comment prevented the incident from turning into a
full-blown gaffe. None of the reports contextualised the passage as a gaffe. One journalist
suggested a reason for this:
‘Because the speech was ambiguous you had to give them the benefit of the doubt. 
But they only just got away with it. I still don’t know whether it was just sloppily 
written or they really had just cocked it up and then had to retreat, but they handled 
it quite well actually. It was quite well spun by them, because they put the fire out 
quickly once they realised what was going on. They marshalled their forces, got 
some bits of paper, came down, and that was a partial success from their point of 
view’2^ .
Further, the concluding remarks of the reports left the issue open and did not draw any 
strong conclusions; this is best summarised in News at Ten’s report: ‘But the Liberal 
Democrats have had to work hard today to defend their claim to have policies which are 
clear, costed and coherent*. This example shows that rebuttal prevented the full 
development of an alternative perspective on the issue through effectively muddying the 
interpretative waters and mobilising comment from a tax expert and Hughes himself. It also 
shows the discretionary power of journalists should they wish to check particular policy 
announcements.
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5.2 Managing the Conferences
The spin doctors were continually trying to create a more ordered information environment 
to aid the implementation of communication strategies and prevent the deflection of 
journalistic attention away from the planned agenda. To attain this goal the communication 
professionals sought to regulate the news gathering process. This involved the routine 
provision of timetabled press conferences and press releases, additional visual material in 
the form of photo opportunities, and controlling the access of journalists to senior party 
actors. They also attempted to co-ordinate their own activities and those of other party 
actors. This increasingly disciplined approach towards the party was augmented by a fear 
and nervousness in inner core circles that coverage of differences of opinion and gaffes 
would reflect badly on the party.
The Press Office
Located within the press room, the press office acted as an information nerve centre. A
Conservative source outlined the function of their press office as
‘...processing the press releases, issuing them, organising the briefings for the 
regional lobby, being there to answer any inquiries and in organising the sheer 
horrendous sort of logistics, like making sure every phone works. That stuff is 
certainly bigger than would have been the case ten years ago, but about the same 
level it has been for the last three or four years'27.
While the flow of personalised information was managed by the principal spin doctors, the
press office catered for the journalists' demands for background information on speeches
and debates, but also sought to regulate its flow and encourage passive gathering.
The communications team working within the press office firstly kept journalists 
informed of any changes in the timetabling of routine events in the main hall. Secondly, 
they produced a series of pre and post-speech press releases28. Pre-event releases were the 
first to be issued, and arrived at the news team's desk in time for their morning meetings. 
These took several forms: an outline of the main announcements contained in speeches to 
be made throughout the day, details of the leadership's responses to various motions under 
debate2^, and copies of all the speeches in full, as well as the location of the party 
leadership at specific times of the day. At the Liberal Democrats' conferences the press 
office issued a daily document, called ‘Daily Press Focus*, which was a timetable 
indicating where Paddy Ashdown and the leadership would be throughout the day. Post­
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event releases provided the leadership's official reaction to an event that had occurred. All 
press releases had contact telephone numbers for journalists to follow up. The use of 
embargoes enabled them to control when such information was used. A spin doctor 
suggested:
‘You can organise it by time. For example...(1995) I talked to all the broadcasters 
who would be putting out programmes in the morning and gave them the story 
[...]. And that was given on a strict embargo basis - they couldn’t run it till six 
o’clock the following morning but they were told that no newspaper would have it, 
and that it was just being given to the breakfast broadcasters, and it wasn’t to be 
used that evening*30.
The journalists, having received their advance information, neafly always respected the 
embargoes, the same source noted: 'If they had chosen to break the embargo (which they 
very rarely do) they could have had it running on the six o’clock and the nine o’clock news 
bulletins. But they all understood the terms'31. Thirdly, the communications teams 
organised press conferences. All three parties made extensive use of press conferences in 
two forms: pre-event, to preview the forthcoming speeches that day or week, and post­
event, usually held by those members of the inner core who had made a speech32. The 
communications teams carried out two further important tasks: co-ordinating photo 
opportunities and dealing with requests for interviews.
Photo Opportunities
Television news was driven by a 'pictorial imperative' (Schlesinger, 1987): it had ‘a 
consuming need for pictures...’33. To a large extent the choice of pictures was governed by 
the event on which the report was focused and by the already committed technical 
resources, but this was not exclusively the case. Table 5.1 (next page) shows the origin of 
the visual material used in reports (excluding pegged items, which were mostly, although 
not exclusively, non-conference visually) as a proportion of the total amount of conference, 
coverage accompanied by the actual figure to the nearest minute.
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Table 5.1: The percentage of visual material from different sources used in 
conference reports bv bulletin (and in minutes of coverage) 1993-1996.
Main Hall Fringe Photo Op Other Total
ITN 5.40 63% (95) 1% (2) 2% (3) 34% (50) 100% (150)
ITN 10 57% (105) 4% (8) 3% (5) 36% (66) 100% (184)
Ch 4 56% (200) 7% (24) 3% (11) 34% (120) 100% (355)
BBC 9 55% (125) 6% (14) 3% (7) 36% (84) 100% (230)
BBC 6 53% (114) 2% (5) 4% (9) 41% (86) 100% (214)
NN 41% (138) 8% (28) 2% (5) 49% (168) 100% (339)
Total 53% (777) 6% (81) 3% (40) 38% (574) 100% (1472)
(BBC6 = BBC Six O'clock News; BBC9 = BBC Nine O’clock News; ITN5.40 = ITN News at 5.40 PM;
ITN 10 = ITN News at Ten O'clock; Ch 4 = Channel Four News; NN = Newsnight. Photo Op = Photo 
opportunities. Other = a combination of journalists talking to camera, party actors walking between the 
venue and the conference hotel, computer generated graphics and library and illustrative pictures)
The table shows that over half of all visuals in conference reports were 'actuality clips' 
(Tutt, 1992) of routine events, derived from camera positions in the main hall. There were 
variations between the bulletins. Over half of all pictures used in the majority of bulletins’ 
reports originated in the main hall, although with Newsnight that figure was as low as 
41 %34. However, conference sessions were not a source of dramatic visuals. They 
provided what could be described as a series of ‘talking heads’ - in Schlesinger's words, as 
a ‘second-best’ source of visual material. There was therefore a demand from programme 
editors for additional interesting visual material to illustrate events and show the same 
personalities in different settings. These pictures came from a variety of sources, as the 
table shows. The fringe was the source of an average 6% of visuals used in all reports. The 
'other' visuals, initiated by the broadcasters, were a combination of journalists talking to 
camera, party actors walking between the venue and the conference hotel, computer 
generated graphics and library and illustrative pictures, and accounted for 38% of the visual 
material on average, although in Newsnight’s reports it was as high as 49%.
With the 'gaze' of the cameras focusing outside the main conference auditoriums, 
photo opportunities constituted a direct attempt to adapt to the visual demands of the 
broadcasters but in a controlled manner35. As one Liberal Democrat source noted: ‘There is 
a big demand for photo calls’36. Although the photo opportunities organised by the parties 
only accounted for a small proportion of the total visual material used (on average 3%), in
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providing additional visual material the parties’ communication teams had three aims. First, 
to regulate the conference environment so that key individuals - be they ministers, shadows 
or the party leaders - were less likely to be caught off guard by haphazard 'door stepping'. 
Secondly to make it easier for the broadcasters to gather footage of key party actors to 
supplement their core coverage. The same source noted: Tor instance, you know they are 
all on tight deadlines: they need to know who will be where and when. So all of our MP’s 
are given and have a detailed programme in front of them’37. Thirdly, to provide a visually 
relevant ‘peg* on which to hang reports of policy announcements. It was standard practice 
at all three conferences for ministers, shadow ministers and spokespersons to undertake a 
visit to a school or hospital in the conference locality, to emphasise policy proposals or the 
success of existing policies. Such occasions were just for the cameras, with the key 
protagonists refusing to answer questions that particular journalists lying in wait might ask. 
In addition there was also an attempt to inject newsworthiness into such opportunities by 
using party actors who were in demand, accompanied by other newsworthy actors such as 
show business and sporting celebrities. The Tables 5.2 to 5.4 show the photo opportunities 
used in reports between 1993 and 1996.
Table 5.2: The na tu re of Liberal Democrat photo opportunities, used _in 
reports 1993-1996 (cell contents show the number of opportunities used)*
NN BBC9 ITN 5.40 ITN10 BBC6 Ch 4 Total
Party leader 3 3 3 5 6 6 26
Education spokesperson 1 1 1 1 0 1 5
Other leadership actors 0 0 0 1 1 1 3
Celebrities 0 0 1 0 0 1 2
Home Aff spokesperson 0 0 0 0 1 0 1
Treasury spokesperson 0 0 0 0 1 0 1
Total 4 4 5 7 9 9 38
(BBC6 = BBC Six O'clock News; BBC9 = BBC Nine O'clock News; ITN5.40 = ITN News at 5.40 PM; 
ITN10 = ITN News at Ten O’clock; Ch 4 = Channel Four News; NN = Newsnight. Home Aff = Home 
Affairs)
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Table 5.3: The nature of Labour photo opportunities used in reports 1993^ 
1996 (cell contents show the number of opportunities used).
NN ITN 5.40 BBC9 BBC6 ITN10 Ch 4 Total
Party leader 1 3 4 6 4 4 22
Leader & Celebrities 0 1 1 1 2 1 6
Leader & Wife 0 0 1 1 1 0 3
Shadow Education Sec 1 0 1 0 0 1 3
Other leadership actors 1 0 0 0 0 1 2
Shadow Home Sec 1 1 1 1 1 2 8
Union 0 0 0 0 1 0 1
Shadow Chancellor 1 0 0 0 0 0 1
Total 5 5 8 9 9 10 46
(BBC6 = BBC Six O'clock News; BBC9 = BBC Nine O’clock News; ITN5.40 = ITN News at 5.40 PM; 
ITN 10 = ITN News at Ten O'clock; Ch 4 = Channel Four News; NN = Newsnight Sec = Secretary.)
Table 5.4: The nature of Conservative photo opportunities used in reports 
1993-1996 (cell contents show the number of opportunities used).
ITN10 NN ITN 5.40 BBC6 BBC9 Ch 4 Total
Party leader 1 0 1 4 2 2 10
Leader & Lady Thatcher 0 0 1 0 0 0 1
Party Chairman 1 1 1 2 5 4 14
Party Chairman & Event 0 1 1 0 0 2 4
Labour Party Stunt 0 1 1 1 1 1 5
Total 2 3 5 7 8 9 34
(BBC6 = BBC Six O'clock News; BBC9 = BBC Nine O’clock News; ITN5.40 = ITN News at 5.40 PM; 
ITN10 = ITN News at Ten O'clock; Ch4 = Channel Four News; NN = Newsnight Labour Party Stunt = 
the parading of a Conservative defector to Labour outside the 1996 Conservative party conference. Party 
Chairman and Event = a football practice with the Party Chairman and Bournemouth FC youth side.)
The tables show that the most widely used photo opportunities at Labour and 
Liberal Democrat conferences involved the party leaders. Photo opportunities featuring the 
Liberal Democrat leader accounted for 26 of all the 38 photo opportunities used. The 
Labour leader accounted for 31 of all 46 photo opportunities used. Interestingly, photo 
opportunities featuring the Conservative leader were less frequent than those featuring the 
Party Chairman. This was due in large part to the fact that most of these were on the 
Monday before the start of the conference, when the Chairman was virtually the only inner
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core elite member present
The tables also show the frequent use of photo opportunities featuring the party
leader and other actors, particularly celebrities. Labour held two successful photo
opportunities featuring Tony Blair with football managers Kevin Keegan in 1995 and Alex
Ferguson in 1996. These featured in all bulletins except Newsnight. News at Ten devoted
its ‘And finally * slot to the 1995 Blair-Keegan photo opportunity. A journalist suggested:
‘If you are a news editor and you are told Blair is doing this, Blair is doing that, 
you have got to cover it because if you miss it and something happens or he says 
something you look a complete idiot. But inevitably if you are told nice pictures of 
Blair in front of a tank, nice pictures of Blair playing football, we are television - 
good pictures is the name of the game. We are going to use them and they know 
that’38.
These visuals were more popular with the broadcasters than those that were designed to
provide a peg for particular ministerial or shadow ministerial announcements. Generally,
those broadcasters interviewed did see themselves as partly compromised by overt attempts
to manipulate the use of visuals, but they were also limited in their responses:
*1 think any journalists in our profession would all strongly dispute going down the 
line they wanted but maybe paradoxically we do. We do what we think is a 
professional way of covering it and they achieve something they want to achieve 
because they get nice pictures of Tony Blair. We can’t say: “We won’t use these 
pictures of Tony Blair, we will use shots of the stage” just because we don’t want 
anything to do with it. It doesn’t work like that So if you like it is a trade off’39.
The press office also faced competition from other sources in the photo opportunity stakes.
The parties had taken to organising stunts at each other's conferences, particularly the
Labour party, whose 1996 parade of a Conservative defector outside the Conservative
party conference received wide coverage, as Table 5.4 shows. At the Labour conference
some unions provided photo opportunities, although generally the peripheral elites did not
have the resources to provide large-scale planned photo opportunities. However, as
individuals, they were aware of the ‘pictorial imperatives’ of television news and were able
to provide impromptu publicity opportunities.
The leaderships also responded individually to the pictorial demands of the 
broadcasters. With the proliferation of lightweight electronic news gathering (ENG) 
cameras searching for additional visual material on a virtually twenty-four-hour basis at 
conference the leadership were aware of being caught off guard, ‘door stepped’ at any 
moment The communications departments sought to control door stepping to some extent, 
especially around the parties* leaders. In particular their arrival and departure at the 
conference hotel and main hall and their tours of the conference exhibition stands were all 
controlled. Such situations also provided potential publicity, and the elite actively sought to
144
co-operate with camera crews in the production of important set-up shots for news reports. 
During observation in the press room at the 1996 Labour conference, frequent co-operation 
was observed in the setting up of short interviews for reports. On two separate occasions 
Gordon Brown’s and Alistair Darling’s spin doctors helped organise the broadcasters’ 
shots, insisting that the party logo featured in the background - demands with which the 
journalists and camera crew complied.
Controlling Access
Amongst the broadcasters there was a high demand for interviews with the leaderships. 
The communication teams responded by offering only certain members of the elite for 
interviews, and by monitoring interviews and complaining where necessary. Two of the 
journalists interviewed suggested that the parties exercised a certain amount of control over 
the interview process. One said: ‘Increasingly, I’d say through the Thatcher years, the 
parties have taken a much tougher grip on that whole process and they decide who they are 
fielding’40. This point was reinforced by a senior BBC source who argued: ‘there is a trend 
towards greater control of their leading players and where they appear and how they 
appear*4!.
The first stage of control was the bidding process. News bulletins had to bid for 
interviews in advance. A political correspondent remarked: ‘There are two types of bids. 
There is a bid for a pre-recorded interview for a package, which we might put in ourselves 
or might ask the producer to do. And there is a bid for a live interview on the 
programme’42. Competing bids made through the press office allowed the party elites to 
pick and choose in advance which news programmes they wanted to be interviewed by. 
Jones argues that at the 1994 Labour party conference this process was carried out on an 
‘hour-by-hour- basis, as dictated by events at the conference’43.
All three parties frequently decided to use specific members of the leadership for
interview purposes. They rejected bids for interviews with certain senior party members,
offering instead their own preferred candidate. A political correspondent commented:
‘You know when they are not fielding anybody because Jeffrey Archer comes up. 
At the conferences they’ll decide who they want to put forward. They might have a 
particular message to put forward, but quite often they’ll be trying to share out the 
goodies and let Michael Heseltine, Ken Clarke or whoever it is have a fair go at the 
whip*44.
However, there was a certain amount of negotiation between the two sides, with both
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aware of how far they could push their demands. A senior BBC source suggested:
‘They will constantly have battles about who is available and on what day, people 
pulling out at the last minute and substitutes put up. You have to be prepared to 
indulge in some brinkmanship. If we are going to complain against the conditions 
they are putting up, we have to be prepared to sometimes say: “Well, if you are 
only offering over these conditions, fine, we won’t bother”. And we have to judge 
how important they think it is to go on the air. There is an awful lot of that’45.
Interviews like, communication strategies, were monitored, with the aim of 
improving the way senior party spokespersons communicated particular party policies. A 
not untypical example occurred at the Liberal Democrats* 1996 conference. Here the 
Director of Communications used a team of volunteers to monitor all interviews and 
provide feedback on the strengths and weaknesses of the spokesperson's performance.
Managing the Party
The disciplines of campaigning have been extended well beyond the period of the general 
election, forming what Scammell calls a ‘quasi permanent campaign’. The main impact of 
this change was a ‘tighter central control over internal party mechanisms with the potential 
for dissent’46. The inner core’s aim in all the parties was to provide as unified a response 
as possible to the broadcasters. This entailed co-ordinating the communications operation, 
making sure the inner core elite 'sang from the same hymn sheet', and controlling the 
proceedings in the hall.
A source suggested that, at the Conservatives' conferences, Conservative Central
Office co-ordinated information dissemination. ‘Everything they do and everything they
say and where they say it and when they say it is choreographed for the period of that week
by Conservative Central Office. That only ever otherwise happens during general election
campaigns’47. The aim, suggested the same source, was to try to get ‘ministers to behave
as politicians and not as civil servants’48, the benefit for the party being that ‘the week
when we tended to take politicians out of Whitehall and put them in with the party at the
party conference, although heaven knows it has had its ups and downs, we generally ended
the week stronger than when we went in to it, fairly consistently’49. Another Director of
Communications, quoted in The Times, confirmed that the 1995 conference had
‘been charted out in news management terms... the cabinet has been informed of 
this. There is a ruthless centralisation and co-ordination of announcements. Those 
that might not get a big play on the day because they conflict with other big 
initiatives will be moved forward. In previous years there was substance in the 
ministers* speeches but it dribbled out willy nilly’50.
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The Liberal Democrats’ Director of Strategy and Planning emphasised the need for 
greater co-operation between the party’s spokespersons. ‘They meet every morning, we try 
to get them together so they can work as a team for the whole week. In the morning we can 
review what’s coming up and advise members how we ought to argue it’51. The same 
source also talked in terms of an overall planned and co-ordinated response to the 
journalists:
‘We’re going to start with a management plan for the conference which I have to 
make sure is stuck to. We’ll have a press team of about a dozen people doing 
various different things and I shall be co-ordinating them, making sure that they’re 
all right and dealing with I guess the senior journalists about what's happening, 
what we are trying to get across, in addition to just ordinary spinning’52.
Richards argues that the Labour party elite ‘puts a high premium on collective
responsibility’53. He adds that ‘the shades of opinion within the shadow cabinet and
beyond are rarely expressed for fear of causing trouble*54.
Once the conferences started, there were also attempts to manage the proceedings in 
the hall. This was important in making sure that there was the minimum distraction to the 
promotion of particular policies. At the Labour conference this management role was 
performed by the Conference Arrangements Committee (CAC) and the general secretary. 
The CAC was involved in managing the delegations at the conferences. The aim was to 
absorb any dissent that existed amongst the delegations over the timetabling of events. As 
one source suggested: ‘The name of the game for public reasons and good party reasons 
was to get the people who were concerned about the arrangement of the agenda off the 
floor of conference and in to see us, so you could have a rather more relaxed private 
discussion’55. Another CAC source suggested: ‘There is a strong purpose in doing that. It 
absorbs a lot of the anger[...], it takes a lot of the heat out of it and it is quite an important 
role in terms of calming things down’56. While the CAC were charged with deflating any 
problems with conference delegations, the Labour party General Secretary also undertook a 
behind-the-scenes management role aimed at minimising conference disruptions. The 
General Secretary's role was that of a fixer, particularly as far as the unions were 
concerned. As one former Secretary suggested: ‘My role is to do the political fixing at 
conference, both in terms of the composites that come through and dealing with the trade 
union delegations in particular, and the powerful movers and shakers among the 
constituencies’57. The same source suggested that such a management role would be more 
difficult for the inner core elite to perform mainly because of the suspicions held about it in 
some sections of the party. ‘It is really only the General Secretary, or somebody who is 
known to be acting on behalf of the General Secretary, that can do that If the leader tries, 
or the leader’s office, there is quite a negative reaction. It is better that such activity is seen
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to come from the party’58.
As part of managing the conference proceedings, the Liberal Democrats’ FCC was
actively involved, especially in the 1996 conference, in trying to maximise the exposure of
their parliamentary candidates on television. While this had to be done within conference
procedures, it was part of an active attempt to control those contributing to debates.
‘We obviously want to give maximum media exposure to our parliamentary 
candidates. I had 8 cards in from parliamentary candidates in winnable seats but 6 
of them were in the south west and although it was a long debate there was simply 
no way that you can call 6 parliamentary candidates from the south west to the 
debate, conference just won’t stand for that So you have to work that out with the 
agent. We won’t guarantee to call parliamentary candidates in winnable seats, but 
what we tend to do is to ask them to nominate a couple for each debate, so we don’t 
end up in a situation with them all competing to speak in the same debate’59.
5.3 Shortcomings in Conference Manipulation
Despite the management of conferences and the use of the best prepared communication 
strategies, the spin doctors did not effectively eliminate risk. Access was impossible to 
control completely, press conferences and photo opportunities sometimes unexpectedly 
backfired, internal party disagreements arose that could not be managed, there was 
occasional poor co-ordination of spin doctors, gaffe-prone members of the inner core elite 
and newsworthy external events that impinged on the conference agenda. These risks by 
their nature could not be predicted by the communication teams during planning.
Open Access
The agreed ground rules on interviews could not prevent journalists gaining access to the
inner core and other senior party members. It was difficult for party communication
professionals to control access completely. Journalists at the BBC and ITN indicated in
interviews that conferences provided unrivalled opportunities for reaching party actors
compared to other times of the year, even though they admitted that things had been
toughened-up. A senior Channel Four source noted: ‘It is a period of great access... you
have access to politicians then and there which you really never get at any other time’^ .
Similarly a senior BBC source suggested that:
‘You have much more access across a wider range of contacts within the party at 
conferences than you have any other time of the year. You... do inevitably have 
more access to the leadership and the leading lights in all the parties, you have more
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access to MPs... and perhaps most important of all access to the party grass roots 
which is something you are deprived of unless you make an enormous and 
expensive effort from Westminster’61.
Further, both informants agreed that the open nature of access to sources which were
usually unavailable via the lobby at Westminster limited the influence of the spin doctors
during the conferences:
‘The lobby system at Westminster although it is a system of access it is fairly 
restrictive access [...]. At conferences you have... social access... [and] it is much 
easier for stories to slip through the net of the spin doctor. It is much easier to talk 
to the party mavericks, it is easier to talk to politicians when their guards are 
down*62.
‘The spin doctor to some extent is less effective at conference and more effective in 
isolation in Westminster where you can’t get hold of the real McCoy and you can’t 
pin them to the wall over coffee and say “come on, be candid”. The problem at 
Westminster is that the spinner takes all, as he is the only one on the go very 
often... But when you go to the conferences the spin doctor is only part of the 
mix... not dominant in the way that they are at Westminster’63.
Despite these comments, improved access could not be divorced from already-held
journalistic preferences, as seen in Chapter Four. It was not necessarily access to the grass
roots which was sought but access to certain actors within the inner and outer core elite. As
one journalist suggested:
‘One of the big parts of conferences is the invitations you get to receptions, the 
Saatchi party, for the very elite the Jeffrey Archer Krug Champers Shepherds Pie 
party. If you spend your evenings there talking to the ministers, and it is just the 
ministers and the correspondents that go, you’re not really getting any sort of 
insights into the grass roots [...]. The theory is we go down there and get in touch 
with party grass roots, but I think we spend much more time talking to each other 
and to senior politicians who we know quite well’64.
Greater access opportunities did at least reinforce journalists* discretionary power to choose
by providing a series of elite party actors in one location. Unable to control the activity of
party actors and with greater access and social contact, journalists could usually find a
member of the party elite who was prepared to express an opinion that differed from the
official perspective, if it was given off the record.
Problems with Press Conferences
Press conferences were seen by the spin doctors in all parties until recently as the most 
effective way to impart information. However, during the period of study they proved 
difficult to control66 and highlighted the differences in the way their role was perceived 
between broadcasters and the spin doctors. Three senior Conservative sources expressed a 
certain level of anxiety with the pre-conference press conference traditionally held on the
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Monday before their main conference started, aimed at filling a news vacuum. As one party 
source said: ‘The media’s attention has switched to the Conservative party with effect from 
about midday on Saturday. The Saturday papers try to do a preview of the Tory conference 
but we don’t actually start until the Tuesday morning, and we don’t have an exciting speech 
until noon on Tuesday so you have this terrible vacuum’66. A former Party Chairman 
raised the 1994 press conference as an example of the broadcasters* and the press's attitude 
to such events:
‘The big press conference is a game. It is when the press will try to destabilise the 
conference and blow the Chairman off course. They hunt in packs! And it was 
Mark Thatcher who was the theme for that Monday, which was a story that died a 
death within two days, but that was their attempt to try and destabilise it, this year 
[1995] it was Alan Howarth. You know that is part of the game’67.
Another source reinforced the same point about the 1994 press conference:
‘It was just the four of us. The Party Chairman, the Chairman of the National 
Union, the President and myself and they’re throwing questions at us. Basically 
they are usually about the agenda and the way things are going to pan out over the 
next four days etc., perhaps questions about how many people are coming, whether 
we are down or up, and we are ready for that. Of course the day before on the 
Sunday something blew about Mark Thatcher and every single question at that 
press conference was about Mark Thatcher. The Party Chairman said: “Right we’ve 
had it, we’ve had six questions on Mark Thatcher, we are not taking any more, 
something different”... “Adam Boulton Sky, Mark Thatcher etc., etc. Yeah but we 
want to know”. A total waste of time as far as we were concerned and you cannot 
break them out of it’6**.
Another source suggested:
‘Last year [1994] was the last year that we had the Monday afternoon press 
conference [...]. Basically what happens is that an awful lot of fairly obnoxious 
journalists come along and scream insults at the Party Chairman until he says 
something slightly awkward. Last year with Jeremy Hanley they came along and 
they screamed at him for three-quarters of an hour about Mark Thatcher and he said 
something slightly unfortunate and then bingo the Mark Thatcher story was running 
into Tuesday’s papers’69.
It was in the light of this experience that the third source argued that the party leadership
had decided to abandon this press conference as the solution to the perceived problem:
‘For a long time it had been thought the way to answer this media vacuum problem 
on the Monday is you put the Party Chairman and Basil Feldman to answer to a 
press conference, this was not a clever idea [...]. Press conferences these days are a 
singularly ineffective method of getting across your message, they are the 1990s 
equivalent of bear baiting [...]. So even if we had not known that we had Alan 
Howarth coming, we had decided to scrap that Monday afternoon press 
conference’70.
When asked about the scrapping of the press conference, the former Party Chairman
blamed the journalists:
*1 didn’t know that they got rid of it, I didn’t know that this year. I just experienced 
twenty-four questions out of the twenty-five on the subject of Mark Thatcher. I 
think [they] brought that upon themselves. But I hadn’t decided that press 
conference would go. Obviously Brian Mawhinney did, having decided with Hugh
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Colver, that instead of being on the defensive on a matter of the press’s choice, we 
wanted to promote the conference’71.
The Labour inner elite followed a similar line. At their 1994, 1995 and 1996 
conferences they held two press conferences daily. Each one involved their Head of Press 
and Broadcasting reading the agenda for the morning and afternoon and the NEC’s 
responses to the various amendments and composites. As the week progressed the 
attendance by journalists declined rapidly until the Friday morning when there were only 
five journalists present72. From my observations, none of the journalists asked any direct 
questions. There seemed to be a tacit understanding between journalists and the spin 
doctors about the role of these press conferences. There were also rather few post-speech 
press conferences held by the party elite, despite the fact that Labour had built a rather 
grand stage-set in the press room for press conferences. There was a preference within the 
Labour inner core elite for informal briefings, which could be more easily controlled, a 
preference with which the broadcasters co-operated.
Choreography backfires
The effect of trying to exert tighter control over the visual aspect of conference was in some 
instances to create more conflict with broadcasters and to imbue those gaffes that did occur 
with greater newsworthiness than they might otherwise have had.
The broadcasters and the media in general at conferences were only willing to co­
operate to a certain extent with restrictions on their movement. Attempts to tighten control 
of the activities of camera crews beyond this level, for the benefit of the parties, in one 
instance led to conflict At the 1994 Conservative conference a push by the party Chairman 
to control the movement of camera crews in front of the main stage led to a partial walkout
and a boycott of subsequent arranged photo opportunities.
‘The photographers insisted their job was being made impossible, and downed 
cameras. A tense stand-off developed during the day, with prolonged negotiation 
between the press and Conservative Central Office yielding little result... The first 
photo call to suffer was that of Jeremy Hanley the Tory Chairman, who toured the 
new platform pursued by a gaggle of reporters and a couple of television crews. A 
football match kicked off by Dame Angela Rumbold, the party’s Vice Chairman, 
was the next casualty - her out-door event falling victim to the negotiations. Last 
night it was unclear who would crack first - the Conservative politicians, who want 
coverage, or the media who need the pictures’73.
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While there was increased attention to the choreography of leading party actors, it 
did not always go according to plan. Paradoxically, it increased the visual attractiveness of 
gaffes when they did happen. In fact a ratchet effect seemed to be the consequence. The 
more potential gaffes were ironed out, the more newsworthy they became when they did 
occur. The Conservative Party Chairman's accidental walk off the main platform prior to 
his formal introduction to the conference in 1994 was one such occasion, a senior party 
source remarked:
*1 don’t know if you saw that little snip last year where the Chairman says I 
welcome to the platform the Party Chairman, “oh where has he gone”. He’s gone 
because the PM said to him “Jeremy I want to see you now”. Jeremy Hanley had 
been told to stay put, but the tension was building and the adrenaline was pumping 
and the PM says “get up Jeremy”. Bill, who’s the Conference Chairman, can’t see 
this [...]. The media have run that story of the missing Chairman time after time 
after time. They ran it the whole of the Tuesday morning of conference. That was 
the only thing they referred to: it was very upsetting for die agriculture debate [...]. 
It happened to Norman Fowler [former Party Chairman] the year before [1993] as 
well’74.
Reflecting on the mistake, the same source said that he hoped to introduce measures to
avoid such occurrences in the future:
‘I have got to break the courtesy [and] get the Conference Chairman to welcome the 
Party Chairman as well. So then if the Prime Minister or anybody else comes on 
stage we can welcome them too. You only learn these things, it’s not something 
you think of until it actually happens. But I believe that sort of detail is quite 
important [...]. So you have to try to cover yourself. It probably sounds worse than 
it is, but you always need to get it right’75.
In addition, the planned use of members of the leadership cadre to aid the promotion of
certain policies sometimes had unforeseen consequences, such as a personality clashes. A
Conservative source gave an example from their 1994 party conference.
‘You will have some personality clashes. One or two Ministers who don’t 
particularly want to speak on the same day as some others because they think, for 
example, that if they speak on the same day as Michael Heseltine, however big the 
announcement, it is bound to be overshadowed simply by the reaction to him. That 
was particularly the case in 1994 because Michael Heseltine had not been able to 
speak in ‘93 and therefore his return speech in ‘94 was always going to be a big 
event There were a number of senior ministers who said “I don’t want to speak on 
the same day as Michael Heseltine because whatever I say will be drowned out by 
him”. Michael Heseltine’s speech was alongside Portillo’s. In retrospect that was 
probably an unfortunate fact. On the other hand there were so many other people 
who were not prepared to speak on the same day, and frankly Michael Portillo 
didn’t have any objections, point one. Point two, at the time, although he was 
spoken of as a future leadership contender, he was still a relatively junior member 
of the cabinet and therefore if you had much bigger beasts who were saying I’m not 
prepared to speak on the same day as Michael Heseltine they could not be pushed 
around and Michael Portillo to an extent could, although as I say he did not 
particularly raise any great objections’76.
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Uncoordinated Spin
Despite detailed planning and increased efforts to co-ordinate the communications 
operation, conflicts of interest between the spin doctors still arose and were also manifest 
between the inner core and members of the peripheral elite or external power brokers, as 
well as with the delegates. These differences could not be smoothed over by the use of 
strategies and were obvious to the broadcasters. They acted as a ‘brake* on successful 
policy promotion. To a large extent the success of communication strategies was dependent 
on co-ordination and an ability to avoid internal disagreement. Ironically, success often 
became more difficult to achieve in the period studied because of the activities of party 
actors.
Internal channels of communication had been developed by the party leaderships 
and their advisors to ‘ensure different elements of the public relations operation are 
working with each other effectively’77 but these were not always effective. The level of co­
ordination within the communication operation varied at each of the conferences. The 
literature tends to suggest a significant improvement in the co-ordination of in the parties’ 
media operations in recent years (Franklin, 1994; Scammell, 1995; Shaw, 1994). 
However, from my observations and from other sources, co-ordination of spin doctor 
activity was not guaranteed. Labour’s 1994 conference provided one example of a lapse in 
the orchestration of the media operation. One journalist present noted of that conference: ‘I 
had found it difficult to work out which spin doctor was in charge*78. The lack of co­
ordination surrounded the trailing and follow-up of Blair’s first speech to conference. Hill, 
Campbell and Mandelson were all providing differing insights into the content of Blair’s 
forthcoming speech, giving journalists a confusing picture of whose version was most 
reliable. The lack of co-ordination was underlined by a certain level of tension between the 
three actors on their positions and responsibility within Labour’s new inner core elite. 
Campbell, newly appointed to the position of Blair’s press secretary, took to attacking 
Mandelson in his column in the Today newspaper which he was still writing at the time79. 
‘Turf wars’, in the form of personality conflicts and the jostle for position and power 
within the Labour party, and the inexperience of a new communication team undermined 
the co-ordination and therefore the effectiveness of conference communication strategies.
At the Conservative party conferences there were difficulties in centrally co­
ordinating the dissemination of information within the inner and outer core, leading to 
various members of the leadership promoting their own particular policy areas. A senior
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Conservative admitted at the 1995 conference:
‘There are all sorts of people who are not entirely under Central Office’s control, 
who are going around briefing sometimes with authorisation sometimes without 
All the ministers* special advisers for example are up there and they may be 
pursuing their own strategy in terms of who they want to leak their stories too*80.
The same source gave one example from the 1995 conference:
‘Last weekend our intention had been that we were going to trail with some papers 
the ‘Enterprise Centre of Europe* phrase from the Prime Minister's speech as the 
big idea, now we subsequently learnt that the Foreign Secretary’s team had briefed 
I think the Sunday Telegraph that he was going to be announcing in his speech on 
Tuesday his idea of the North Atlantic Free Trade Area. And we were a bit irritated 
about that because he did that without clearance*81.
Conservative sources argued that being in government rather than opposition made
control more difficult. One noted:
‘When you are in government it's actually much more difficult to exercise a single 
ruthless centralised control over what everybody does than it is when you are in 
opposition. Blair is able to rule his shadow cabinet with a rod of iron and all the rest 
of it, not least because his shadow cabinet do not all have in addition to various 
political advisors a huge staff of departmental press officers working for them’82.
The Liberal Democrat communications team were not immune from similar conflicts of
interest Such conflicts undermined the inner core elite's ability to provide a coherent
perspective and steer journalistic attention on to policy areas which were favourable to
them.
The management of the party also proved difficult, particularly on issues where
there were open disagreements. The spin doctors could not hide or contain divisions within
the parties on certain issues. Such differences of opinion, if overt, were newsworthy and
not ignored by the broadcasters. The fringe acted as a platform for the expression of such
disagreements. At times these divisions led to members of the inner core elite briefing
journalists against each other or making direct attacks on aspects of the leadership’s official
policies. At the 1996 Conservative conference concealed conflicts were highlighted in the
Chancellor’s claimed remark to the Party Chairman ‘tell your kids to get their scooters off
my lawn’, an impression reinforced in complaints by several ministers (Bottomley,
Newton, Shephard and Hogg) that party spin doctors were briefing against them at
conference83. As one Channel Four source suggested: ‘You can’t underestimate the fair
amount of incorrigible gossips around who sometimes can’t stop themselves from
rubbishing their opponents in the same party’84. Another journalists confirmed the point:
‘You would’ve thought the rational way to go about being a party... is that 
everybody sticks to the party line and doesn’t say anything to the contrary because 
then the media will have nothing to report. But it just amazes me that there are 
always people who will talk to the media and brief against their colleagues, I 
suppose because it is just too big and unwieldy and you can never have complete 
silence’85.
Party managers* attempts to make ministers behave less like civil servants and more like
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politicians revealed that Central Office was often frustrated by ministers’ behaviour, hence 
the effort to get ministers to sing from the same hymn sheet organised by the Party 
Chairman, Brian Mawhinney, at the 1995 and 1996 conferences. But the response of 
certain ministers to being told what to do was hostile - they perceived the initiatives as an 
incursion by the Chairman on their policy areas.
External Events
The spin doctors were aware that the broadcasters were oriented towards certain
newsworthy external events over which they had no control. These situations highlighted a
temporary divergence in views between the broadcasters and the spin doctors that
undermined the inner core elite's advantages. It was impossible for the spin doctors to
predict what external events would occur or their ‘size* and impact upon the planned
conference agenda. Consequently it was hard for them to achieve any influence over their
journalistic interpretation, even using reactive strategies. There were several periods during
the study when the broadcasters’ agenda shifted away from planned events at conference to
ones that had occurred externally. While this occurred once at the Labour conference
between 1993 and 1996, when Baroness Turner of Camden openly supported Ian Greer
Associates, the lobby firm at the centre of the 'cash for questions’ scandal, at the
Conservative conference it occurred every year. As one Conservative source suggested:
‘You always have your meltdown on the Sunday and this has happened so often 
that I think it’s a sort of fixture of the party conference as regular as the Mayor’s 
address at the start on the Tuesday morning. What tends to happen is that one of the 
Sunday papers or more will have a story which completely comes out of left field as 
the Americans would say, which you have no warning of, which is absolutely 
devastating in its impact and which is in serious danger of knocking you for six*86.
The news agenda on the opening of each of these conferences was dominated by a series of
events: in 1993 the publishing of leaked extracts from Lady Thatcher’s memoirs in the
Daily Mirror  ^in 1994 Mark Thatcher’s involvement in the Saudi A1 Yamamah arms deal; in
1995 the defection of MP Alan Howarth to the Labour party; and in 1996 the defection of
Lord Mac Alpine, former Conservative party treasurer, to the Referendum party. Table 5.5
(next page) shows, the events dominated the broadcasters' news agenda.
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Table 5.5: The number of news items on external events across all bulletins 
on the opening dav of Conservative conferences 1993-1996,
External events Conference events Total
1993 13 10 23
1994 9 5 14
1995 7 6 13
1996 7 3 10
Total 36 24 60
The table shows that external events accounted for the majority of news items on the
opening days of the conferences. The Conservative communication team's response was
largely to implement a reactive strategy. A Conservative spin doctor outlined the reactive
strategy followed in 1995 after the defection of Alan Howarth:
‘The first any of us heard about it was when one Sunday journalist rang me up on 
Sunday evening and said “Have you heard about Alan Howarth MP for Stratford 
upon Avon” and I have to say I went through in my mind, dead, in bed with a 
woman, in bed with a man, in bed with a camel and the last thing that occurred to 
me was that he had defected to the Labour party no warning at all. That was clearly 
a big story, that wasn't a case where you could sort of try a damage limitation 
exercise. We got the local association's chairman to say basically that this man is a 
git, we had an exercise of statements from various people, we did try what turned 
out to be quite a successful fire break operation in that our concern had been that the 
story could run for two days rather than just the one and that when the Prime 
Minister arrived at Blackpool on the Monday afternoon the only questions he would 
be asked would be about Alan Howarth and that would run the story on into the 
Tuesday. So a decision was taken by the Party Chairman that we would get the 
Prime Minister to respond on the Sunday evening, so he came back from 
Huntingdon deliberately instead of going straight into Downing street he lingered 
and answered some questions predictably enough about Alan Howarth so all the 
reaction was done on the Sunday. We knew the Monday papers were lost because 
they were going to follow up on that, but it did mean that by the Tuesday morning 
we were beginning to slightly regain the full control of the agenda but that sort of 
reactivity really at the beginning of the week is often all that you can do'87.
Conclusion
Conferences were characterised by occasional divergences of interest between the parties 
and the broadcasters. While both complied with the unwritten rules of engagement, they 
also wanted different things out of the conferences. The conventionally journalistic 
broadcasters wanted newsworthy information, the inner core elites wanted coverage of the 
events they had planned regardless of their news value. If the inner core elites did not
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provide such information, the broadcasters would go to other sources or focus on other 
newsworthy developments. The development and implementation of strategies could be 
seen as the inner core elite’s rational attempt not only to adapt but also to innovate to 
overcome any divergence of interest. In effect, strategies of promotion and control were 
inseparable. Inner core elite policy announcements had to be imbued with news value and 
the environment into which the announcements had been delivered controlled. Party 
managers needed to make sure that the journalists* attention on policy announcements was 
not distracted by ministers or shadow ministers talking at cross purposes. Knowing that 
journalists had many access points to the core elite, internal communications within the elite 
were monitored and leadership personnel talking to the media were informed regularly 
about the party line on particular issues. The strategies had to ensure that these policy 
announcements were reported over the welter of other information, and that responses 
could be prepared to the reaction generated by the broadcasters or the press. The party 
elite’s ideal was a conference where all newsworthy events were those planned by them.
However, control over the conference environment could not be guaranteed. Party 
leaderships were not homogeneous. Members of the inner core elite had their own goals in 
terms of the ideas they wanted to put across, and the peripheral elite certainly did. There 
were conflicts of interest between those in the inner core elite and between them and actors 
on the periphery. Such core-periphery tensions occasionally broke out into open conflict in 
front of the journalists, overshadowing any promotional endeavours previously organised. 
The broadcasters also exhibited their discretionary power in deciding which agenda to 
follow. The leadership and their advisors, while continually adapting, could not completely 
control the conference. To some degree the continual quest for greater control made those 
events outside party managers* control all the more newsworthy.
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Chapter 6
Manufacturing Debate
News broadcasters found overt differences of opinion on significant issues particularly 
newsworthy. Debates which exhibited such divergences were subsequently given 
prominent coverage, both in terms of the number of news items and the position within the 
overall bulletin running order. If such differences were already present in a timetabled 
debate, the broadcasters captured this. However, not all the overtly conflictual debates had 
been formally timetabled. Many had been prevented from being aired in the main hall by the 
tighter control exercised over the planning process by the parties’ leaderships. The 
broadcasters sought to circumvent this and construct the debate by juxtaposing differing 
opinions and reactions from protagonists in assorted conference locations. Whatever the 
scenario, and this chapter examines both, the broadcasters’ reports further contextualised 
the conflict in the commentary - for instance, indicating that the debate was a sign of wider 
division within the party on ideological or policy grounds. The broadcasters often 
supplemented the boiled-down version of events in reports with additional news items. 
They typically 'spun' the debate further, through a series of pegged items, two-ways and 
interviews. These expanded upon the issue being debated, examined any 'informal 
agendas' that arose, such as the personal history of those involved, loyalty to the party 
leader, betrayal and other dramatic elements that were part of the debate. They also 
sometimes speculated about the outcome of such debates and what impact they would have 
on a party's electoral fortunes. Conflictual debates were framed as a drama of diametrically 
opposed actors - those for, those against - pulled together and packaged by the broadcast 
journalists, irrespective of the distinct nature of the conferences.
This led to a temporary divergence of interest between broadcasters and the parties' 
leaderships. For the inner core elites in each party, the attention such debates received was 
less than desirable. However, willingly or unwillingly the inner elites were involved, either 
formally through proposing a motion or rule-change or opposing one, or informally 
because their policies were the subject of intra-party debate. Whatever the case, they could 
not afford to ignore the news broadcasters' role in framing the debate. The party elites 
responded, some in a more coherent manner than others, by using the communication 
strategies and management techniques detailed in chapter five. The party elites and their
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spin doctors sought to engage the news gathering journalists proactively and reactively to 
make sure that their perspective was put across and to try and define the dominant line of 
interpretation within the debate. They also simultaneously had to attack their opponents 
(whether peripheral elite actors or, in the Labour party, the trade unions), rebut their 
perspectives on events and even publicly repudiate them. But unlike speeches, debates 
were more difficult to spin as events. The journalists had access to a vast array of relevant 
sources who were beyond the control of the party leadership or even hostile to it. Their 
opponents too used communication strategies - ones that fed on the broadcasters' need for 
divergent perspectives but simultaneously allowed them to express their views to a wider 
audience.
This chapter presents an examination of several overtly conflictual debates in the 
main conference hall and on the fringe. The following debates were analysed. At the 
Labour conference, the Clause Four debate in 1994. At the Liberal Democrats', the debates 
on 'Cannabis', 'the Minimum Wage', and 'the Monarchy' in 1994. At the Conservatives' 
conference, VAT on domestic fuel in 1993 and on Europe in 1994. The analysis focused 
on the use of communication strategies - namely, the proactive and reactive strategies 
followed by the party elites and others during the period of these debates. It also examined 
their framing by six evening news bulletins: in particular, the prominence given to debates 
by the news bulletins in terms of number of bulletins and their position in the running 
order; the 'value added’, the construction and representation of debates by journalists, 
through the juxtaposing of perspectives surrounding those agendas 1; and the use of what 
Semetko et al (1991) have termed 'contextualising remarks' which seek to evaluate debate 
for a television audience. The research also examined the extent to which the bulletins 'go 
beyond' (Semetko et al, 1991) the given agenda, extending coverage through a series of 
pegged items, two-ways and interviews; and the explanatory framework used in these 
items to examine the day’s occurrences and speculate about the likely outcome of a vote 
taken after a debate.
6.1 The Clause Four Debate
The debate to reaffirm the Labour party's commitment to Clause Four of the party's 
constitution occurred on the Thursday of the 1994 conference. The debate's significance 
lay in the fact that it occurred two days after Blair's speech in which he signalled that the 
old Clause Four was to be re-written. The reason for a debate so soon after Blair's speech
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was more to do with the secrecy surrounding the announcement than with poor planning^. 
The vote narrowly went against the leadership, with the delegates voting to reaffirm the 
party's commitment to the old Clause Four.
Framing the Clause Four debate
The debate was highly prominent. Fifteen of the 16 news items that evening focused on the 
debate, and on all the bulletins it was the lead story. In addition the ITN 5.40, Channel 
Four News and the Nine O'clock News (BBC Nine) provided two-ways, and Channel 
Four News and Newsnight included one pegged report and two interviews each.
In the light of the leader's speech on Tuesday, the news agenda was more than 
simply a debate on Clause Four. It became a barometer indicating whether the party would 
accept the proposed reform. Reporting of the debate itself was conveyed through 
juxtaposing the two differing perspectives, the official line in favour of change and the 
oppositional one in favour of retaining the existing Clause Four. Across all bulletins 16 
sources were indexed a total of 45 times. Of these, 7 sources endorsed change and 9 were 
against i t  In terms of the number of times both were indexed it was fairly even, 23 to 22 
respectively. Further, the broadcasters initiated the majority (9) of the 16 sources, only 
taking five from the debate itself and two from fringe meetings. The bulletins actively 
contributed towards the debate, indexing these sources 18 times in addition to those taking 
part in the main debate in the hall. All the correspondents sought out Blair. The BBC Six 
O'clock News (BBC Six) initiated quotes from both an endorser and a detractor, Channel 
Four News from three endorsers, the BBC Nine two endorsers, News at Ten an endorser 
and a detractor and Newsnight from 3 detractors and two endorsers. These additional 
sources were added to the juxtaposition of perspectives from the debate itself. The debate 
was presented in a time-linear fashion with the same five actors being juxtaposed in all the 
evening reports.
There was also some anticipation of events in the previous night's reports. Channel 
Four News in a two-way with its political editor discussed strategies that were being put in 
place by the NEC to avoid the possibility of defeat. The BBC Nine suggested that the 
composite motion 'awkwardly for the leadership calls for re-affirmation of Clause Four...'. 
News at Ten in its report's concluding remarks noted the up-coming debate, as did 
Newsnight, which suggested that 'there could be some embarrassing headlines after 
tomorrow if Composite... 57 is voted through in the morning'.
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Spinning Clause Four
The party elite engaged in both a proactive and a reactive media strategy. The main team of
spin doctors were Blair's press officer Alastair Campbell, David Hill, Director of
Communications, Peter Mandelson, Blair’s confidant, and a team of junior press and
broadcasting officers, amongst whom the most notable were Tim Allan and Gordon
Brown’s press spokesman Charlie Whelan. The proactive strategy was aimed at managing
expectations in three ways prior to the vote taking place. First, the leadership indicated that
they expected to lose. Secondly, although they would lose, they expected the result to be
close. A BBC correspondent suggested that 'reporters were briefed by the party's publicity
staff. Their judgement was that it would be close’3. Calling spinning 'sophisticated
playing’, an ITN correspondent confirmed the same point: 'they knew the vote was going
to be close'4. Thirdly, the spin suggested that the composite supported the aims of Clause
Four, not the existing wording. The same ITN correspondent suggested:
'The spin was based on the wording of the resolution, that it reaffirmed support for 
the aims of Clause Four, not the wording. In other words changing Clause Four 
was compatible with that resolution... So there was some pre-emptive spinning that 
the two were not inconsistent, which is a little bit thin, but they got away with it'5.
The proactive strategy was followed up with a two-pronged reactive strategy. 
Rebuttal was used to 'kill off any other developing interpretations and, secondly, comment 
was mobilised. The same BBC corespondent noted: 'there was a pretty heavy attempt by 
Labour's spin doctors to play down the significance of the defeat... the party's spin 
doctors' spin was that the result was not important. It was what was known as a "snow 
job"- blotting out any other theories'6. This playing down of the significance was 
combined with a further interpretation that (a) the narrowness of the vote indicated how far 
the party had travelled towards Blair's position in a short period of time, and (b) that many 
of the delegates had been mandated to vote the way they were and the big unions would 
soon be backing him. An ITN correspondent noted that the spin took the following format: 
'... even two days after Tony announced it [Clause Four], we still get 49% and that is a 
huge vindication and anyway the motion isn't inconsistent with what Tony tried to do'7. 
This was combined with a mobilisation of comment. Blair in particular did several 
interviews reinforcing his line. This was backed up with further interviews by John 
Prescott (deputy leader), Kinnock (former leader) and Cook (shadow Foreign Secretary). 
There was no reference to a confusion noted by Jones (1995) about whether the re-write 
should be approved in the autumn or at a special conference8.
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The attempt to influence the interpretation of the vote in favour of the leadership line met 
with some success, although the contextualising remarks still referred to Blair's 
embarrassment. The ITN 5.40 in the anchor's introduction suggested that Blair was 
'shrugging off an embarrassing defeat...' and continued that by the 'narrowest of votes the 
party conference had defied the Labour leader...'. In the contextualising commentary, the 
correspondent made reference to two elements of the party elite spin. First, H e says it is 
not a setback for his plans' and, second, that the unions' position would change:'... they'll 
almost certainly be backing Tony Blair by the time he produces his blueprint1.
The BBC Six made no such reference to Blair's embarrassment, just to the fact that 
he had been defeated. The leadership perspective also appeared in the introduction, with 
the anchor stating: '...But he [Blair] said the narrowness of today's vote indicates how far 
the party has travelled in the last 48 hours’. Further, in the correspondent’s commentary, 
Sergeant insisted the 'leadership were adamant the review would continue. They are 
convinced next year's conference will support them...'.
Channel Four News’ introduction suggested 'Blair’s attempt to remodel the Labour 
party suffered a major setback today. Elinor Goodman reports now on the abrupt end to Mr 
Blair’s honeymoon period...’. The programme was careful to balance the party elite’s line 
with reference to the loss of the vote. While mentioning that the TGWU and other unions 
had been mandated, the contextualising remarks were slightly disdainful, making reference 
to the fact that Blair's supporters 'had planned carefully how to discount [the vote]'. In the 
report's concluding remarks a similar balance was present. Goodman suggested: 'Tonight 
he claims to be confident that next year's conference will have approved the new statement 
of the party's aims, but today has been a reminder he can never take his conference for 
granted'.
On the BBC Nine the anchor suggested: 'two days after Tony Blair talked of a new 
Labour party without its Clause Four the old party said no'. But it also made reference to 
the leadership line, stating: ’... but Blair immediately said the vote made absolutely no 
difference to the review of Labour's constitution'. Oakley in the report made reference to 
the fact that conference had ’... embarrassed their new leader by defying the platform...' 
but also included two elements of the inner elite's spin stating that th e '... leadership are 
insistent, the constitutional review goes on'; and second, suggesting that 'Mr Blair with 
union delegations differently mandated will get his new constitution through next year1.
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Similarly, News at Ten in its introduction referred to the loss of the vote: Tony 
Blair was defeated... on the party constitution and his plans to rewrite it...1 and then to the 
leadership perspective: 'Afterwards he said the defeat was of no significance'. Brunson 
reiterated in the report that 'Nothing could alter the fact that Tony Blair has suffered an 
embarrassing defeat...' although he did suggest it was '...not as horrible as he'd feared'. 
Newsnight's introduction again made reference to the embarrassment: ’... what's happened 
here is an embarrassment but hardly a major disaster for Mr Blair' and then to the party elite 
line: 'Blair says it won't make any difference to his drive for change...'. The party elite's 
spin clearly made an impact All the reports accepted the line that change goes on and in the 
long run the unions would come on side. All carried variations of the party leadership’s 
line and all made reference to the closeness of the vote.
Three bulletins provided two-ways in addition to reports. Two-ways were a forum 
in which the anchor invited the correspondent or political editor to speculate upon and 
explain^ the issues of the day. The speculative questions and answers about Clause Four 
were in a minority compared to non-Clause Four issues such as Prescott's speech the next 
day but greater, all the same, than those that provided an explanation. However, on Clause 
Four the party elite's perspective came through clearly in the journalists' answers.
Table 6.1: The num ber of speculative and explanatory questions and 
answers in two-wavs on 6 October 1994.
Speculation Explanation Non Clause 4 Total 
ITN 5.40 0 1 1 2
BBC9 1 0  2 3
Ch 4 2 0 2 4
Total 3 1 5  9
(ITN 5.40 = ITN News at 5.40 PM; BBC 9 = BBC Nine O'clock News; Ch 4 = Channel Four News. None 
of the other bulletins carried two-ways.)
The ITN 5.40 report was followed by a two-way with political editor Michael Brunson.
The question on Clause Four sought more detail on the vote:
Anchor:'... I understand you have some information on how that vote was made 
up'?
Brunson: 'Yes, I'm told that Tony Blair was expecting a far worse defeat than 
this... they are taking quite a lot of comfort from that final figure in the leadership 
because they think quite a lot of delegates did decide to switch on the basis of what 
they heard from Tony Blair'.
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The section of Channel Four’s two-way on Clause Four involved two speculative 
questions. The first was about whether the reforms proposed would be successful and the 
second about whether the debate had caused any damage to the party. The first answer by 
Goodman raised the point that a future debate may divide the party. Her second answer 
suggested that the vote had 'clearly been a setback... but at the end of the day we know that 
he, Mr Blair, will get his way next year'. And she reinforced the point that the debate could 
damage the party: 'the problem for him is that voters don't trust divided parties'. The BBC 
Nine's question asked if this was a setback of any significance for Blair. While Oakley 
referred to the vote by conference as 'bumps and scratches rather than a deep wound', he 
did speculate that success depends on 'how long and bitter the wrangle [gets]... because 
the public doesn't like divided parties'.
Both Channel Four News and Newsnight provided additional reports. The Channel 
Four report took the vote as a peg from which to hang an analysis of the images of division 
within the party past and present The anchor's introduction noted that the Virtual fifty-fifty 
split over Clause Four threatens once again to present an image of a divided Labour party’. 
The report's commentary then dealt with the state of internal party relations under Kinnock 
and how both he and Smith had attempted to unite the party behind their reforms. 
Newsnight's additional pegged report was a retrospective of Tony Blair’s first conference 
as leader. Using the metaphor of a Blackpool roller-coaster, it referred to his speech as a 
high, and to the reaction of the party to the proposed re -write of Clause Four as a low.
6.2 Cannabis, a Minimum Wage and the Monarchy
This section examines news coverage of three debates on the first two days of the 1994 
Liberal Democrat conference. The coverage on the first day in most of the bulletins focused 
on the debate and vote on an amendment to a policy motion on 'the use of drugs'. This 
amendment called for 'The decriminalisation of the use and possession of cannabis in order 
that the police and Customs and Excise are able to target their resources on the vital battle 
against the use of hard drugs'10. The Liberal Democrat party leadership opposed the 
amendment, but it was carried. On the second day, coverage focused on debates around 
two policy motions. The first was on the employment policy paper and an amendment to 
that on a minimum wage, which again the party leadership opposed but lost. The second 
was a policy motion on the head of state, and contained an amendment which called for the
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’abolition of the monarchy after the current Queen’s reign'11. This policy amendment was 
defeated, in line with the leadership’s wishes.
Prominence
These debates were fairly prominent in terms of the amount of coverage they received. On 
the opening day of conference 7 out of 10 news items focused on the drugs debate. On the 
second day all 9 news items focused on the debates and votes surrounding the two policy 
motions. In terms of prominence in overall bulletin running order Table 6.2 shows that it 
was fairly low.
Table 6.2: The prominence of reports on debates at the Liberal Democrat 
conference on the 19 and 20 September 1994.
Story Position Monday Story Position Tuesday
ITN 5.40 0 4
BBC 6 11 4
Ch 4 7 6
BBC9 5 8
ITN 10 5 5
Newsnight 2 1
(BBC 6 = BBC Six O'clock News; BBC 9 = BBC Nine O'clock News; ITN 5.40 = ITN News at 5.40 PM; 
TIN 10 = TIN News at Ten O'clock; Ch4 = Channel Four News.)
Table 6.2 also shows that, once the debate was finished, reports on the result of the debate 
on cannabis moved up the running order of the bulletins over the evening, with the late 
evening bulletins (especially Newsnight) giving it greater prominence. The overt divisions 
between the party leadership and the delegates was clearly seen as newsworthy.
Framing the Cannabis Debate
The cannabis debate was represented in the reports, first through juxtaposition and, 
second, through the contextualising commentary. The news reports were not just confined 
to representing the cannabis debate. They also dealt with the informal agenda of the 
leadership's embarrassment at being defeated. This informal agenda was mainly (though
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not exclusively) represented within the contextual narrative of the report The reports on the 
first day of the conference were mixed, with the cannabis vote being one of several issues 
covered. Indeed, the reports from the conference on the ITN 5.40 and the BBC Six made 
no mention of the debate - in large part owing to the fact that the debate was still in progress 
when these bulletins went on air. The outcome of the debate was treated as a breaking news 
item by the BBC Six, who went live to their correspondent to get the result and reactions to 
i t  The debate was treated very differently across the four mid-to late-evening bulletins. On 
Channel Four News and Newsnight the debate received a small amount of attention in 
comparison to the reports on the BBC Nine and News at Ten. On the latter two, the result 
of the vote was the main focus of each report.
The reports that dealt with the debate acted as an additional forum for the debate in 
the hall, indexing quotations from the various actors involved. All sources that spoke either 
in favour or against the amendment were identified. Two members of the party’s elite and 
two delegates were indexed a total of nine times across the bulletins. Those in favour were 
indexed four times and those against the amendment five times. Channel Four News 
included quotes from Beith (Home Affairs spokesperson) and Hughes (Environment 
Spokesperson 1993-1994, Health spokesperson 1994-97), both opposed to the 
amendment. On the BBC Nine Beith was juxtaposed with two delegates in favour and 
News at Ten also featured two delegates in favour of the amendment. In addition both the 
BBC Nine and News at Ten also included a quote by Beith about the loss of the vote. 
Newsnight only incorporated one quote from a delegate in favour of the amendment. In this 
sense there seems to have been an intermittent attempt by all the bulletins to juxtapose both 
sides of the debate. The debate was represented through the juxtaposition of party elite 
actors for, and delegates against.
The contextualising commentary in four reports referred to the result in general 
terms as a ’snub’ and an embarrassment for the party leadership. Ashdown's reactions 
were also the subject of contextualising remarks on the BBC Nine, with the other reports 
emphasising the delegates' defiance of the party elite. Channel Four's report opened with 
the anchor suggesting that 'the party's leaders were embarrassed...'. The report further 
suggested that'... his [Ashdown's] hopes of presenting the Liberal Democrats as the voice 
of moderation in a Labour coalition received a setback in the debate on drugs...’. The BBC 
Nine's anchor remarked that the '...vote went against strong opposition from the party's 
leadership...'. The report went on to suggest that '...against the wishes of the party 
leadership... there was a clear majority in favour of decriminalising cannabis...’. The
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correspondent went further: ’Mr Ashdown, obviously unhappy, didn’t stay to hear the 
formal result’ and concluded that 'tonight the party leadership are licking their wounds 
over the cannabis debate... it's just the kind of defeat Paddy Ashdown could do without'. 
News at Ten's contextualising remarks were in a similar vein. The anchor suggested that 
'Liberal Democrats defied and embarrassed their leaders today by voting for the 
decriminalisation of cannabis. Simon Hughes begged them to be reasonable, Alan Beith 
said they shouldn't do it, but they did'. The correspondent continued in a similar manner 
'MPs urged members to vote No, but the majority said Yes, a snub to the leadership...'. 
The correspondent concluded with a mention of the possibility of further defeat: 'the 
leadership faces further possible embarrassment here tomorrow with calls for the abolition 
of the monarchy'. In Newsnight's report the correspondent emphasised the narrowness of 
the vote: 'In a piece of radicalism that will send the tabloid press into a frenzy and also 
embarrass the leadership, the conference narrowly voted in favour of a decriminalisation of 
cannabis'. There were also three additional news items: a two-way on the BBC Six and 
two interviews - one on Channel Four News with the Home Secretary solicited his reaction 
to the vote; and the other was with Party President Charles Kennedy on Newsnight.
Cannabis: the spin
The Liberal Democrat leadership seem not to have been prepared for the outcome of the 
cannabis debate and there was little evidence of an organised public relations strategy, 
although the party elite did mount a limited reactive operation. The problem lay in part with 
the lack of planning for the debate and poor timetabling. A senior party source suggested 
they had little chance of dealing with the results of the balloted motions because of their 
position in the timetable. 'Last year [1994]... awkward votes were happening right in the 
middle of a news bulletin, who were going live to the correspondent who was saying this 
has happened. We had no chance to deal with that and that set the terms for all the 
coverage'I2. In fact in the cannabis debate the official perspective was very slow in being 
mobilised. The BBC Nine was the first target of the party elite, with Alan Beith 
establishing the leadership line that 'the overall motion was the one that mattered'. This was 
reiterated on News at Ten, and Newsnight made reference to the amendment being 
immediately disowned. But the party elite line had little impact and, as an interpretation, 
was not adopted in the contextualising commentary. The reports treated the party elite's 
perspective as a reaction to events in the hall and not as the main interpretation of those 
events, which is what the party elite would have wanted to achieve.
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Framing the Minimum Wage and Monarchy debates
The news items on Tuesday September 20 were dominated by two further debates in the 
hall and by the emerging informal agenda of conference management and the state of the 
relations between the leadership and the delegates. In addition there was also a reference in 
all reports to the previous day’s cannabis vote. The first debate was on a minimum wage 
and the second on the abolition of the monarchy. The ITN 5.40 only covered the minimum 
wage debate owing to the late conclusion of the second debate. The party elite perspective 
was one of opposition to both policy motions.
On all bulletins 23 sources were indexed 38 times. Four of those 23 were quoted 
endorsing the party elite line 8 times, but a majority (12 sources) were indexed 16 times 
arguing in favour of one or the other policy motion. Four sources provided a reaction and 
three could not be placed either way. Of the 38 quotes, the broadcasters took 20 from the 
conference proceedings and initiated a further 18 themselves from elsewhere. All the 
responses by Ashdown were initiated by the correspondents' door-stepping him. The 
initiation of delegates’ opinions by the correspondents was confined to reports on Channel 
Four News and Newsnight.
The debate was represented through the juxtaposing of different perspectives on the 
two issues being debated. The ITN 5.40 juxtaposed both sides of the minimum wage 
debate, quoting Baroness Williams and Alex Carlile MP. The BBC Six only indexed 
Williams for the first debate and two delegates from opposing sides for the monarchy 
debate. Channel Four again indexed Williams and a delegate in favour of a minimum wage 
and Alex Carlile against. In the second debate two delegates were indexed in favour and 
Archie Kirkwood (Chief whip) and one delegate against. The BBC Nine only indexed 
Baroness Williams in the first debate and a delegate in favour in the second. News at Ten 
indexed quotes from the second debate, a delegate in favour and Kirkwood against. 
Newsnight focused on both debates, on the first debate covering Williams in favour and 
Carlile against, and in the monarchy debate including two delegates in favour and 
Kirkwood against.
The correspondents exhibited further discretion in their contextualising remarks. 
These remarks were in general critical of the party elite and performed a threefold function. 
They reminded the viewers about the previous day's events, explained the current day's 
events and in the early evening bulletins speculated about the likely outcome of the
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monarchy debate. The commentary also assessed the reaction of the party elite. In addition 
a clear emerging informal agenda was conveyed on party management. What was 
particularly telling in all reports was the use of such descriptive words as 'embarrassment' 
(six times), ’defeat1 (five) and ’snub’, ’loss of authority’ ’damaging reverse’ (once each) in 
reference to Ashdown. The loss of the vote was presented as a defeat for him personally 
and the defeat of the second motion on the monarchy as a relief for him.
The defeat on the minimum wage was strongly linked by the early evening bulletins 
to the previous day’s defeat on cannabis. The ITN 5.40 in its introduction suggested that 
’...Ashdown has suffered a second embarrassing defeat...’. The BBC Six said that 
Ashdown had again been ’defeated... it’s a further embarrassment for him...’. Channel 
Four News noted that the ’defeat followed last night’s embarrassment...’. While not 
mentioning the cannabis vote, the BBC Nine and News at Ten also referred to the previous 
loss of the vote as a defeat for the leadership. The BBC Nine’s introduction suggested that 
the ’... Liberal Democrat leadership had suffered its second conference defeat in two 
days...’ and the News at Ten introduction stated that ’... Liberal Democrats went against 
their leader... again’.
The defeat of the motion calling for the abolition of the monarchy was also 
personalised. The ITN 5.40 and the BBC Six, on air before the vote, speculated about the 
likely outcome in their introductions. The ITN 5.40 said that ’... a third potential defeat 
loomed...’ and the BBC Six that they were ’... debating another topic that could end in 
embarrassment for Mr Ashdown’. The anchors on Channel Four News and the BBC Nine 
described the outcome in terms of relief for Ashdown, and Newsnight saw it as an 
annoyance.
The contextualising remarks in the reports raised an informal agenda of competent 
conference management - that is Ashdown’s and the spin doctors' ability to manage 
conference proceedings, and the mood of the party delegates. The ITN 5.40 noted that the 
setback of the minimum wage and cannabis vote '...creates an image of a leader who has 
been thrown off course...’. The BBC Six noted that 'Liberal Democrats are asking 
questions. Why did party managers fail to warn the leadership of the strength of delegates' 
opinions?'. Channel Four’s report dwelt on the same theme, suggesting that'... MPs are 
worried that delegates are ignoring how their actions appear to the outside world...'. It 
continued: '... Just as the media focus is turning on the Liberal Democrats as future 
possible power brokers, the party’s grass roots might be embarking on a new unruly
173
phase’. Further in the same report it suggested that the 'patience of peers and MPs was 
wearing thin, some worried about the divide that appears to be developing between MPs 
and the delegates, and the leader is reported to be feeling frustrated...'. The BBC Nine 
suggested that 'old hands were still muttering that he [Ashdown] really must get a grip on 
the party machine’, and continued: '...the leadership fear their loss of authority doesn't 
help the party....'. News at Ten noted that the loss of both votes suggested a 'leadership 
out of touch with the party...'. Newsnight noted that'... the leadership struggled to impose 
its will., there is almost a feeling that the parliamentary party were an irrelevant rump who 
certainly don’t know best'. And it continued: 'some wonder whether that's a sign of Paddy 
Ashdown's liberalism or just a case of hellishly unprofessional party management'.
Only Newsnight and the ITN 5.40 provided any additional news items - Newsnight 
in the form of two interviews, the first with a group of delegates and the second with 
Paddy Ashdown. ITN 5.40 had a two-way with its correspondent, seeking an explanation 
of how the debate was going, and reviewing the conference proceedings of the week so 
far.
The spin
There is surprisingly little evidence in any of the bulletins of the party elite engaging in any 
communication strategy. One might have expected, with potential defeats looming and on 
the strength of the previous day's coverage, that the party leadership would engage in the 
expectations game as part of a proactive strategy of anticipating defeat. There was also no 
organised attempt to mobilise comment for any of the news broadcasts. The party elite line 
materialised via the correspondents' door-stepping Ashdown. In fact all six bulletins 
initiated reactions to the votes in the hall. All except Channel Four acquired a reaction from 
Ashdown. The ITN 5.40 and the BBC Six carried his response to the vote in favour of a 
minimum wage; the BBC Nine and News at Ten his reaction to both the minimum wage 
and the monarchy vote; and Newsnight his reaction to the monarchy vote only. David Steel 
was indexed by ITN and Channel Four once each for the leadership line, and Kennedy 
once for the BBC Six.
In covering these three debates the broadcasters clearly demonstrated their 
discretion. They were able to represent the results of two of the debates as a personal defeat 
for the party leader and the third as only a minor relief. In the commentary they raised the 
issue of the failure of party management. The journalists were left almost unfettered to
174
construct their interpretation of events. In this situation the journalists expressed a 
preference for the most newsworthy angle on the debates, that of the defeat for Paddy 
Ashdown, and his embarrassment. By the second day this interpretation had built up a head 
of steam with the vote on a minimum wage against the leadership's advice. While there 
were few additional news items, the journalists exhibited their discretion in the fact that 
they initiated many of the party elite’s responses themselves and were not noticeably 
approached by the party spin doctors. The party leadership made no real attempt to engage 
an effective proactive or reactive media strategy. The outcome of these two days was that 
Paddy Ashdown installed in Cowley Street a Director of Strategy and Planning from his 
own office, charged with the overseeing of conference media management for the next two 
conferences.
6.3 The Conference Fringe
The fringe is a series of meetings organised by an array of different groups on numerous 
issues. These meetings took place throughout the week while the main conference was not 
in session. The fringe has grown (Harris and Lock, 1995; Norton, 1996) and ‘...is now a 
prominent feature of every conference’13. Recent research has shown that there has been a 
dramatic increase in the number of fringe meetings. There were 290 meetings held at 
Labour's conference in 1995 compared to 166 held in 1986. Similarly the Conservatives' 
conference had 173 fringe meetings in 1995 compared to 100 in 198614. The fringe acted 
as a platform for the party elite, the peripheral elite (in Labour ranks also union actors) and 
delegates to express their views on particular issues. It was also a resource on which the 
TV bulletins could draw.
The fringe provided the news broadcasters with a wide selection of potential issues 
and numerous perspectives. However, none of the fringe meetings were covered in their 
entirety and mostly formed part of a wider news package. The abundance of fringe 
meetings meant that the broadcasters actively had to make decisions about which meetings 
they were going to cover and, further, which could practicably be included in a report. Two 
main decision-making criteria arose from interviews. The first was the activities of the 
news community and other broadcasters in particular. Referring to John Redwood 
(Conservative MP and leadership challenger in 1995), a Channel Four journalist suggested: 
'Redwood is doing three speeches at this year's conference [1995]... the question is, 
which one is the one we are going to cover? Is the one we are all going to pile in on? And
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actually we will be there for every one of them1 *5. The second was news values. A BBC 
editor argued that decisions 'tend invariably to be news judgements on the day... it is 
usually fairly self-evident which are the interesting fringes’16. News judgements (including 
those of the bulletin’s competitors) formed the 'bottom line1 for deciding which meetings 
found their way into reports.
These news judgements were based on further criteria. First was the recognisability 
of the actor. A BBC source suggested: 'Who the speaker is is crucial. You know, if 
Norman Lamont, say last year [1994] or the year before [1993], is appearing on the fringe, 
then you have to be there because it is clearly important'17. This point was echoed by a 
senior Channel Four source: 'Television in some measure in political terms is about 
recognition... if you have a room of unrecognisable faces... that sounded bad and the rest 
of it, it doesn't make terribly persuasive television. It is hard to persuade the audience that 
some great moment is unfolding'18. The same BBC source raised a second criterion, 
namely the event: 'There are particular events where you would have to be, the Tribune 
rally, the Tory Reform Group or whatever'19. However, these news judgement criteria had 
to be considered alongside other factors: 'The environment, what was happening 
elsewhere, what the demands of the live programmes are, what the demands of the news 
are and how the fringe fits in the main story of the day'20. The last point was further 
emphasised: 'If the main story of the day from the conference is x then a fringe meeting 
which may at another time look quite interesting, but because it is about y we might not 
cover it, or it might not get in [and] we are less likely to put resources into it'21. This point 
was confirmed by another Channel Four source. 'If your line of attack is the economy or 
it's Europe you make sure you speak on the day the Tory party is debating the economy or 
Europe, because otherwise the news editor is not going to construct a whole news package 
just around your speech unless it is extraordinary'22.
The fringe was treated pragmatically by the broadcasters, with decisions largely 
resting on news value and ease of capture in terms of the overall package. The evidence 
from content analysis shows that the fringe featured in a substantial number of reports 
(30%) - that is 118 of 396 reports over the four-year period.
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Table 6.3; The num ber of reports featuring fringe meetings bv conference 
and bulletin 1993-1996.
ITN 5.40 BBC6 Ch 4 BBC9 ITN10 NN Total
Liberal Democrat 3 4 8 5 4 5 29
Labour 2 2 7 7 4 14 36
Conservative 2 5 13 10 8 15 53
Total 7 11 28 22 16 34 118
(BBC6 = BBC Six O'clock News; BBC9 = BBC Nine O’clock News; ITN5.40 = ITN News at 5.40 PM; 
ITN10 = ITN News at Ten O’clock; Ch 4 = Channel Four News; NN = Newsnight.)
Table 6.3 shows that of the 118 reports 29 were from the Liberal Democrat conferences, 36 
from Labour's and 53 from the Conservatives'. It further shows that fringe coverage was 
concentrated in the mid-to late-evening reports in the longer news bulletins and at the 
Conservative conferences.
The Conservative fringe
Table 6.4 shows the prominence of reports featuring the fringe in running orders over the 
four years. It confirms the interview evidence and shows that those meetings that were 
covered were considered to be newsworthy.
Table 6.4; The prominence of ail reports featuring fringe meetings bv 
conference 1993-1996 (ceil contents show the num ber of reports in each 
position).
Story Position
1st 2nd 3rd 4th 5th+ Total
Liberal Democrat 1 2 3 5 18 29
Labour 12 5 7 6 4 36
Conservative 20 9 11 6 7 53
Total 33 16 21 17 29 118
The table further reveals that the majority of reports featuring the fringe were lead news 
items. The fringe at the Conservative conference was particularly prominent over the four 
years compared to the other parties' conferences. The Conservatives’ fringe was seen by 
broadcasters as the most newsworthy (revealed in the prominence and amount of coverage 
it received). They did not perceive the main hall as the venue for genuine policy-forming
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debates or ideological divisions as understood in Labour and Liberal Democrat terms. The 
Tory motions selected for debate over the period were contextualised by correspondents as 
anodyne and supportive of government policy and a platform for ministerial speeches.
Table 6.5: The prominence of reports featuring Conservative conference 
fringe meetings hv bulletin 1993-1996 (cell contents show the num ber of 
reports in each position).
Story Position
1st 2nd 3rd 4th 5th+ Total
Newsnight 5 3 2 2 3 15
Ch 4 5 1 2 2 3 13
BBC 9 3 2 3 2 0 10
ITN 10 4 2 2 0 0 8
BBC 6 2 1 1 0 1 5
ITN 5.40 1 0 1 0 0 2
Total 20 9 11 6 7 53
(BBC 6 = BBC Six O'clock News; BBC 9 = BBC Nine O’clock News; ITN 5.40 = ITN News at 5.40 PM; 
ITN 10 = ITN News at Ten O'clock; Ch 4 = Channel Four News.)
Table 6.5 shows that the bulletins from Channel Four News onwards not only provided the 
most coverage of the fringe but also gave the meetings the highest prominence over the four 
conferences. This may be partially explained by the fact that the majority of fringe meetings 
took place in the evening. The prominence given particularly by Channel Four News and 
Newsnight shows that they saw the fringe as an important element of Conservative 
conferences, based especially on who was making the speech and what they were saying. 
Indeed, for these bulletins the fact that it was a fringe meeting was of secondary importance 
and was not always referred to in the commentary, although usually indicated to the trained 
eye from the visuals2 .^
Taking the point of recognisability, raised by editorial staff and journalists, the 
majority of fringe clips featured recognisable party actors. In 53 reports Norman Lamont 
(former Chancellor and prominent Eurosceptic) featured 18 times, Michael Portillo 
(Treasury minister 1993-94 and Defence Secretary 1994-97) 9, Michael Howard (Home 
Secretary 1993-1997) 8, Norman Tebbit (former Party Chairman and prominent 
Eurosceptic) 7, Douglas Hurd (Foreign Secretary 1993-94) 5, Thatcher 4, Quintan Davies 
(Europhile Member of Parliament) 4, John Redwood (former Welsh Secretary and
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prominent Euro sceptic) 3, Kenneth Clarke (Chancellor 1993-1997), Peter Lilley (Social 
Security Secretary 1993-97), Iain Duncan MP (Eurosceptic Member of Parliament), John 
Gummer (Environment Secretary 1993-97) and Lord Howe twice each. Recognisability 
was sometimes reduced to group identity; the speakers who were not identified personally 
were referred to as members of particular groups, say the Eurosceptics. The Conservative 
fringe therefore featured more recognisable actors than those of the other parties.
Newsnight and Channel Four News and the later evening bulletins clearly saw the 
Tory fringe as an important source of party debate that was not present in the main hall, and 
to a large extent the fringe was contextualised in this way. Out of 53 reports over the four 
conferences, only in a small minority of the reports - 6 - was the fringe a news item in its 
own right and not included as part of a wider conference package. Of the 6, three reports 
were an anchor-only short report of a minute or less, used to highlight the fringe speeches 
that occurred as the bulletin went on air or was about to do so. During the 1993 conference 
the BBC Six made a brief mention of Michael Howard's speech, the same year that 
Channel Four News briefly highlighted The Sunday Telegraph debate between Clarke and 
Tebbit, and in 1995 BBC Six covered John Redwood's speech to a fringe meeting. It was 
only Howard's speech in 1993 that was the subject of reports in its own right on BBC 
Nine, News at Ten and Newsnight.
In the remaining 47 reports the fringe formed part of a wider package including 
events in the main hall. It was a resource from which quotes from recognisable party 
actors or those under group identity could be indexed and juxtaposed with sources 
speaking in the main hall or at other fringe meetings. In other words, various recognisable 
actors with divergent views speaking at different fringe meetings were brought together 
within a report. The fringe was treated therefore as a key 'building block1 (Blumler and 
Gurevitch, 1995) in the construction of intra-party debate on a series of issues. Those 
reports which used the fringe in this manner did so in a number of ways: 12 juxtaposed the 
perspectives expressed on the fringe with those expressed in the main hall; 33 reports used 
the fringe as a sampling exercise in which the different views expressed in meetings served 
to illustrate divergent views on matters of policy, such as left versus right or pro-European 
versus Eurosceptic. And in 2 reports the fringe provided a 'professional' counter-view to 
that being expressed in the main hall by partisan actors. The bulletins displayed discretion 
both in the selection and in the presentation of those meetings. They contextualised the 
debates they had constructed as evidence of overt divisions within the party on particular 
issues.
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The fringe also provided an opportunity for certain members of the peripheral elite 
and the inner party elite to express views that they would not ordinarily express in a speech 
in the main hall24. The fringe in this sense became an integral part of these actors' public 
relations strategies, allowing them access to a wider audience than those immediately in the 
meeting. Only certain peripheral elite players and 'old stars' such as Norman Lamont, John 
Redwood and Norman Tebbit tended to follow such strategies, but not all, as an ITN 
correspondent suggested: 'They are not necessarily very sophisticated... it is just that 
Redwood in particular is very keen to be on the media [...]. He is very media friendly, he 
is always available for a quote. He knows how it works, he sends faxes round of his 
speeches'2 .^ He continued: 'the others are much more disparate, I mean the whipless ones 
[nine Tory back-benchers who had the Conservative whip withdrawn for rebelling in 
European votes], they were not very well organised. They were all saying different things 
at different times but they got a lot of coverage because of who they were’26. An actor 
using a public relations strategy was not necessarily the determining factor in whether the 
fringe meeting received coverage, but adopting the logic of news values and timing as a 
strategy enhanced the chances of an actor's views being carried in a report, providing he or 
she had the prerequisite 'capital' as a party actor.
Fringe Elements: creating and contextualising debate
This section focuses particularly on the framing of two speeches made by former 
Chancellor Norman Lamont at the 1993 and 1994 party conferences and other debates on 
the fringe between the 'left' and 'right' of the party. It examines first how such actors used 
the fringe as part of a personal public relations strategy in order to gain coverage for their 
views and second the reaction of the party elite.
Lamont at the 1993 conference deliberately timed his speech on the fringe, in which 
he criticised the Chancellor's decision to put VAT on domestic fuel, for the same day as 
Clarke's speech justifying his decision in the main hall. Both speeches were covered on all 
the bulletins. Further, all the reports constructed a debate around VAT on domestic fuel 
through juxtaposing Clarke's speech with Lamont's. Lamont was indexed once on all 
bulletins except Newsnight, which provided a 'blow by blow' comparison on four points 
of difference. The significance of Lamont's speech for journalists was that it signified a 
wider internal difference of ideological perspectives within the party on the issue which
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was not manifest in the debate in the hall prior to Clarke's speech. All the reports
contextualised the fringe speech in this manner and as undermining party unity.
The ITN 5.40 introduction made no quote from Lamont's speech. The 
correspondent in the report contextualised it as a straight contradiction of Clarke's. He 
suggested: 'Nearby the former chancellor said he would have done it differently'. The BBC 
Six in its introduction suggested: 'Mr Clarke said he'd set the toughest public spending 
limits he remembered, but it might not be enough to avoid further tax increases... Norman 
Lamont said tax increases would damage the economic recovery*. The report contextualised 
Lamont’s speech in terms of opposition to VAT on fuel, suggesting that 'opposition to 
VAT on domestic fuel has highlighted the political dangers for Mr Clarke as he attempts to 
balance the books’. It reaffirmed the difference of opinion: 'But as the Chancellor kept his 
options open his predecessor was telling him to be tougher on spending rather than increase 
taxation'. In addition it suggested that Lamont's speech reflected a wider feeling of many of 
the conference representatives 'who would have preferred to see a tougher spending 
round’.
In Channel Four's introduction the anchor suggested: 'Kenneth Clarke refused to 
back down on the government's plans to put VAT on domestic fuel and left open further 
tax increases. But., the former chancellor Norman Lamont tells him to cut spending 
instead'. The difference in perspective was reinforced further in the report when, after 
indexing Mr Clarke's speech, the correspondent suggested: 'but on the fringe Mr Clarke's 
predecessor Norman Lamont has been less helpful. He warned further tax rises would 
retard recovery and rejected Mr Clarke's claim that spending targets already agreed for next 
year were so tight that they couldn't be reduced further'. The report contextualised Lamont 
as disturbing the 'carefully choreographed truce' in the main hall.
The BBC Nine introduction suggested that 'Kenneth Clarke defended the planned 
imposition of VAT on domestic fuel... and hinted at more tax rises. But Mr Lamont said 
that any more tax increases would damage the recovery'. Similarly to the BBC Six the 
report contextualised Lamont's speech in terms of opposition to VAT on fuel and re­
emphasised the differences of opinion: 'while the current Chancellor was keeping his 
options pragmatically open, Mr Lamont was mapping out a more ideological path. Arguing 
in favour of tougher public spending rather than further tax increases'.
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While the introduction on News at Ten did not mention Lamont's speech, it was 
raised in the report. The speech was contextualised in terms of internal opposition to the 
policy. The correspondent suggested there had been 'hardly a squeak from the grass roots 
about VAT on domestic fuel despite a host of hostile motions before the conference1. Then 
having quoted Clarke the correspondent suggested there had been '...conflicting advice 
nearby from a former chancellor who counselled against tax rises', with Lamont as 
apparently the only voice of dissent
Newsnight produced a more in-depth look at both speeches, indexing Lamont's 
speech four times. The introduction set out the differences of opinion between the two: 
Tie's [the Chancellor] in a funny position, having to deliver the first autumn budget in a 
few weeks and therefore unable to boast about his achievements. His predecessor Norman 
Lamont meanwhile was telling anyone who listened that the Chancellor couldn't risk 
raising taxes'. More than the other reports Newsnight contrasted the views of the two 
actors and was also interested in other areas of their disagreement. The report 
contextualised the two speeches as signifying a personal rivalry. 'Blackpool today offered 
two competing attractions, Kenneth Clarke at the Winter Gardens and Norman Lamont 
thirty minutes later and fifty yards away at a local cinema. Under the guise of politeness 
both men were playing hard ball'. While the report suggested that both agreed on VAT on 
domestic fuel, it commented:'... but otherwise their analyses could scarcely have differed 
more'. The correspondent then went on to contrast the points of view on the state of the 
economy, on the need to raise taxes and (as the report called it) the 'core dispute': 
government spending. The divergence of views was further dealt with in interviews on 
Channel Four and Newsnight with Clarke and Lamont and in a two-way on Channel Four 
News.
Lamont's speech to a fringe meeting on the opening day of the conference, October 
11 1994, was treated in a similar manner by all the bulletins. The speech was 
contextualised as an attack on government policy on the European Union, arguing that 
withdrawal may need to be considered. It was timed to coincide with a speech made by the 
then Foreign Secretary, Douglas Hurd. Lamont's speech formed part of the lead news 
report on every bulletin and all reports juxtaposed his views with those of the Foreign 
Secretary and made reference to Major's views. The speech was contextualised in all 
reports as having a touch of personal animosity, re-igniting existing divisions over Europe 
and as representative of a wider call within the party for ideological 'clear blue water' 
between the Conservatives and New Labour.
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The ITN 5.40's introduction contextualised the speech in terms of Lamont's
personal animosity and party divisions over Europe. It stated:
'Norman Lamont, sacked from the Government and still smarting, re-opened 
Conservative party wounds over Europe on Day One of a party conference aimed at 
unity. He accused John major of deceit... He declared that we should tell the 
European Union ''Here we stand and no further" and floated the idea that Britain 
could withdraw totally and still be viable on its own’.
This context was reiterated by the correspondent, who suggested that 'thanks to Norman
Lamont the Tories' scalding row over Europe has been stoked up again'. After indexing
Lamont the correspondent suggested: ’...all of that is at odds with the Foreign Secretary's
conference speech which talked of Britain's positive achievements in Europe'. The report
ended by the correspondent raising the possibility of a leadership challenge: 'bookies say
money's already going on him [Lamont] for a leadership challenge'.
The BBC Six's introduction similarly contextualised Lamont's speech in terms of
party division over Europe. It highlighted the difference of opinion with Hurd but also
positioned the speech within the wider context of positioning within the political spectrum. 
'Norman Lamont has reopened divisions over Europe. He accused the government 
of deceiving the British people and suggested that Britain should consider pulling 
out of the European Union. But this view is firmly rejected by the Foreign 
Secretary... who warned against listening to siren voices speaking out against 
Europe’.
The report juxtaposed Lamont with Hurd and again contextualised the debate in terms of 
party divisions on Europe and also on the political repositioning of the party. The BBC 
correspondent suggested the party's strategy of 'resisting a sweep to the right suffered a 
serious blow this evening over Europe'. It then suggested that Lamont's speech had 
opened up '...the old divisions over membership of the European Union'. The report 
concluded:
This evening the debate is over Europe but the argument goes much wider than 
that. It is about how the Conservatives position themselves after the advent of Mr 
Blair... Should the Tories stay largely in the centre ground or should they shift to 
the right? And that argument will go on throughout this week’.
Channel Four's report contextualised Lamont's speech as re-opening party 
divisions and ruining the image of party unity. The introduction noted that Lamont had 're­
opened Conservative wounds over Europe... with a speech in which he warned that Britain 
one day may have to contemplate withdrawal from the European union...'. This contrasted 
with the Foreign Secretary's speech '...telling representatives not to be defeatist or to give 
in to the temptation to turn their backs on the awfulness of Europe....'. The report indexed 
the speech three times, calling it a 'complete demolition job on everything John Major has 
claimed to have achieved in Europe...’. It was contrasted with Hurd's speech, aimed, the
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correspondent suggested, at 'Eurosceptics both in the media and his own party'. The 
political editor further noted 'without mentioning Mr Lamont he [Hurd] insisted that Britain 
would win the argument in Europe over its future'. The report concluded that Mr Lamont's 
speech had 'spoiled the carefully choreographed image of unity which party strategists 
were hoping to present today1.
The BBC Nine's introduction suggested that Lamont had 'opened up the Tories'
divisions on Europe’. It continued:
'He told a fringe meeting the benefits of membership had proved remarkably 
elusive. Britain was losing the argument over Europe, he said, and if we were not 
already members there wouldn't be a case for joining now. Earlier the Foreign 
Secretary... warned the conference of the dangers of getting high on xenophobia’.
The report contrasted the two speeches. It raised Lamont's personal animosity and added
that he had 'pitched in to the debate about... the party’s future direction by backing right
wing calls for more clear blue water to be put between the Conservatives and Labour’. The
report concluded that while dissent might have been muted from the floor, 'Mr Lamont's
intervention tonight has put the focus back where the Tories didn't want it, on the eternally
divisive subject of Europe'. _ .
News at Ten's introduction highlighted Lamont's speech but made no initial 
mention of Hurd’s. The introduction suggested that divisions on Europe had been 
’dramatically forced back into the open’ and as with the other reports it went on to highlight 
the main elements of his speech. The anchor then went live to ITN’s political editor27. 
Brunson suggested that Lamont had ’directly attacked the Prime Minister, his own party 
leader, for his heart of Europe ideas'. The report put Lamont's speech in the wider context 
of the European debate within the party: 'Once again, just as the Prime Minister seemed to 
have turned the political comer, the nightmare issue which has so badly split the Tories 
over the years, Europe, has returned’. It then indexed Hurd's speech in the main hall. He 
concluded: 'in fact, though, it still remains a dispirited conference, given all the Tories 
present troubles, but now it risks being somewhat of a divided conference as well over the 
issue of Europe'.
Newsnight contextualised Lamont's speech in terms of opening up divisions over 
Europe but also in terms of Lamont's personal animosity towards the Prime Minister. 
Newsnight's introduction used a particularly graphic metaphor: 'Europe is the scab the 
Conservatives cannot stop picking. At the point the party thought it had grown something 
of a callus over the issue, the former Chancellor Norman Lamont has opened it up again'.
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Referring to his speech Paxman suggested: 'This was heresy, of course, but the reason the 
party leadership is dismayed and angry isn't just that such an eminent figure advocates such 
a policy. It's because they know that Mr Lamont is speaking for a significant section not 
just of the party but the nation too'. The contextualising remarks built up Lamont’s speech 
as a 'big news event', suggesting that 'over the summer there have been persistent rumours 
in political circles that John Major’s former friend, campaign manager and Chancellor was 
about to deliver a body blow: this was it'. The commentary further contextualised the 
speech as an attack on the Prime Minister, linked to what the report called Lamont's 
'downfall', and referred to his feelings about Mr Major: 'Mr Major’s friends say Mr 
Lamont now regards his old friend as worse than Beelzebub’. It then contrasted Lamont's 
speech with Hurd's, referring to him as the 'bete noire of the anti-European right'. But 
Hurd's speech wasn't given the prominence of Lamont's in terms of the number of times it 
was indexed.
Some of the bulletins initiated additional news items immediately after the reports. 
Newsnight and Channel Four News each interviewed Lamont and Hurd, and the ITN 5.40 
and the BBC Nine had a two-way. Both two-ways continued the process of contextualising 
Lamont's speech. The anchors of both bulletins asked the political editors to speculate 
about the impact of the speech on the party. For the ITN 5.40 Brunson suggested: 'Well of 
course it's damaging when a former Chancellor gets up and says these sort of things'. 
Oakley for the BBC Nine insinuated the same: 'Oh I think inevitably it is damaging. It's a 
direct challenge to the arguments used by Mr Major and Douglas Hurd'. He continued: 'Mr 
Lamont is really going much further than the Maastricht rebels have done in the past, and of 
course parties that look divided within their own ranks never really appeal to the public'.
Debate was not only constructed using opposite views expressed between 
peripheral elite actors on the fringe and party elite in the hall. Nine reports also used 
divergent views expressed by party elite members on the fringe. The most noticeable 
examples were reports on the BBC Nine, News at Ten and two on Newsnight on October 
7 1993. All four reports constructed the debate on the fringe through juxtaposing differing 
views of ministers and placing them in the context of an ideological debate between the 
'left' and 'right' of the party and set this against the overall party elite aim of presenting a 
unified party image.
In its introduction the BBC Nine's anchor suggested: 'Conservative party managers 
today appeared to succeed in fostering a show of unity between the prime Minister and
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Lady Thatcher' but added: '...tonight the struggle to give the Conservative party that 
distinctive ideology continued with two very different speeches from cabinet ministers'. 
News at Ten's introduction was similar in its contextualisation: "The Prime Minister got a 
hand shake from his predecessor...' and continued: 'Mr Major has been pushed to the right 
this week...'. Newsnight's introduction to the first of two reports was more acerbic: 
'Almost every single speech we've heard... has contained some protestation that the party 
is united in undying loyalty to John Major as if the mere statement is enough rather than 
perhaps drawing attention to the fact that divisions are as deep as ever, if less visible'. The 
introduction to the second report followed a similar line: 'Well if the Conservatives leave 
this conference having succeeded in convincing themselves that the party is now united by 
John Major it will be quite an achievement, because despite the fact that almost everyone is 
now using the same language the philosophical divisions still run deep'.
In all four reports the fringe meetings were framed in the context of party unity 
behind the leadership of John Major. The BBC Nine, News at Ten and the first Newsnight 
report described the day's events in the hall, Thatcher's reception by the representatives and 
John Major, Clarke's pledge of support for Major, and Heseltine's first conference 
appearance since his heart attack. All contextualised this as an attempt to reinforce party 
unity in the light of the events that week. But then came the caveat. The BBC Nine's report 
suggested: '...But her departure did little to ease the tensions outside the conference hall’. 
News at Ten's report said disdainfully: ’...But behind the theatre of reconciliation in the 
conference hall a battle has been developing over the future of government policy'. 
Newsnight's commentary ran: '...But in the last few hours two of the more thoughtful 
members of the supposedly united leadership have made plain the ideological chasm which 
separates the left from the right'. The speeches of different actors, in particular Portillo and 
Hurd, were juxtaposed in order to underline the point. Newsnight's second report 
reinforced this angle, placing the fringe meeting as the arena for a struggle between 'left' 
and 'right'. The correspondent started the report: 'This was supposed to be the conference 
that was all about unity. In fact in the vacuum at the heart of the party, ministers are 
engaged in a struggle for domination'. The report then went on to juxtapose the speeches 
from four different fringe meetings addressed by Hurd, Portillo, Clarke and Tebbit and 
Gummer.
The 'left' /’right' debate was further highlighted in a series of two-ways on the ITN 
5.40, Channel Four News, and News at Ten. The two-way on BBC Nine focused 
exclusively on the Chancellor's speech.
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Table 6.6: The number of speculative and explanatory Questions and 
answers in two-wavs 7 October 1993.
ITN 5.40
Speculation
0
Explanation
1
Non debate 
1
Total
2
Ch 4 0 2 2 4
BBC 9 0 0 2 2
ITN 10 0 1 1 2
Total 0 4 6 10
(BBC 9 = BBC Nine O'clock News; ITN 5.40 = ITN News at 5.40 PM; ITN 10 = ITN News at Ten 
O'clock; Ch 4 = Channel Four News.)
Table 6.6 shows that just under half the questions and answers in the two-ways were on 
this debate on the fringe, and none of the two-ways speculated about the outcome of the 
debate: instead they sought to explain further the nature of the debate and who the main 
protagonists were. On the ITN 5.40 the anchor enquired whether there had been a 'distinct 
shift to the right wing of the party'. The political editor Brunson suggested '...that certainly 
is the sense of it, isn’t it?' and after reading out trailed extracts from the forthcoming 
speeches by Portillo and Hurd he suggested 'the battle is on really for the soul of the 
party'.
The Channel Four News anchor similarly asked whether there was an 
'...ideological struggle going on on the fringe tonight'. Goodman, the political editor, 
agreed, and outlined the debate as taking place between '...those who say the Thatcherite 
revolution must continue and those who argue it shouldn't'. She then summarised the 
positions of four actors speaking on the fringe, Portillo and Tebbit representing the former, 
and Clarke and Hurd the latter. Asked further whether the 'bastards' (in John Major's own 
reported terminology) had had a good week, Goodman suggested: They feel in command, 
that they have taken the high ground'.
The theme of a shift to the right was also pursued by News at Ten. The anchor
stated:
The party really shifted to the right... and that was emphasised again today wasn't 
it'?
Brunson: Well I asked one cabinet minister about this in this very hotel tonight. I 
said, "Are you shifting to the right?" He said: "Look, we've always been a right of 
centre party. What I think the Conservatives have realised is that there is huge 
concern in the country especially about something like law and order". And as 
another minister said to me today: "The agenda which we have tried to tackle these 
things on in the past has not worked and so we have now got to try (if you like) a 
more right-of-centre approach". That's where all this is coming from'.
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Peripheral Spin and Rebuttal
In both 1993 and 1994 Lamont was able to mount a highly successful media operation, 
getting his views and criticisms across using the news bulletins. His success was due in 
part to the 'capital' he possessed as a peripheral elite actor, in particular his public 
recognisability as former Chancellor and the fact that his views were seen as representative 
of a party-wide divergence of opinion. But he built upon this advantage by internalising the 
news values by which the news broadcasters operated. His proactive strategy had two main 
identifiable parts. The first concerned the content of the speech. Both speeches were critical 
of the party elite and its policies, Clarke on the economy, and Major and government policy 
on Europe. One Channel Four correspondent remarked that he was 'thrilled to have a 
politician saying something and not couching it in ministerial terms... [and added] we are 
just glad for the story'28. In addition to being critical, Lamont delivered the speeches on 
the same day as the issues were being discussed in the hall in speeches by party elite 
members, further increasing the likelihood of his speech being included in a news report. 
This strategy was augmented when Lamont trailed the content of his evening fringe speech 
on 11 October 1994 for the ITN 5.40 and the BBC Six.
At both conferences the party elite engaged in a reactive strategy but with limited 
success. They mobilised comment by senior party figures, including the Chancellor and 
Foreign Secretary, in an attempt to downplay the significance of Lamont's speeches. The 
strategy involved, first, a repudiation of Lamont himself and, second, stressing the fact that 
there was no alternative to government policy. In 1993 this line was that Lamont would 
have done exactly the same if he was still the Chancellor. However, the rebuttal operation 
only had partial success and the comments were not carried by all reports. In 1993 the BBC 
Six and Nine and News at Ten included the reactions in their reports. The BBC Six and 
Nine ran the line from Clarke and his spin doctor suggesting that Lamont would have done 
the same. The BBC Six noted: 'Some Treasury insiders suspect Mr Lamont would have 
been singing a slightly different tune had he still been Chancellor'. The BBC Nine noted 
that some were calling him a 'disaffected former Chancellor1 and further referenced a reply 
from the Chancellor during a Newsnight interview: 'On Newsnight tonight Mr Clarke gave 
a robust response. "He ought to know that you make a budget judgement when the time 
comes"...'. News at Ten repeated the main line, with the political editor suggesting: 'His 
critics say it is unlikely he would have said that if he'd been Chancellor, and tonight 
Michael Portillo joined a ministerial chorus warning that unpopular decisions would have to 
be taken'.
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In 1994 comment was again mobilised by the party elite but only featured in news
items on the ITN 5.40 and the BBC Nine. The ITN 5.40 raised the reactions both in the
report and the two-way. The report carried Hurd's reaction: ’He [Hurd] dismissed Mr
Lamont's attack: "He's perfectly entitled to put his point of view. I think he's wrong, I
think partly because he's out of date"...'. This view was underlined by reference to further
ministerial comment in a two-way:
’..."beyond the pale" was one senior back bencher's comment. "A bitter man who 
always vowed to get his revenge on the Prime Minister, and he has", that was 
another minister’s point of view. Another... simply said to me "Norman Lamont's 
barking mad"...'.
The BBC Nine similarly in its report mentioned party elite views. The correspondent 
suggested that 'many former colleagues were swift to reject his call' and then covered Lord 
Howe's reaction.
While the party elite were involved in a rebuttal operation at the 1993 conference 
they were also engaged in conveying divergent perspectives on the fringe. The news 
broadcasters elected to cover these meetings because they illustrated intra-party debate and 
undermined the picture of unity that was being presented in the main hall. The activity of 
the party elite was also media-oriented and proactive. Speeches were trailed on the ITN 
5.40 and Channel Four News, but it was not the activity of a unified entity but of a group 
of key individuals, using the fringe to convey their perspectives on a particular issue, that 
the broadcasters found newsworthy.
Fringe Management
There was some effort amongst the Conservative Party elite to try and manage the fringe 
during this period, despite its normally unmanageable nature. As one source remarked: 
'There isn't a way of preventing it, because as the name suggests, it is not organised by us. 
It is actually organised by outside groups'29. For the 1995 party conference the Tory party 
elite used three strategies to counter the media attention the fringe received. First, one 
source noted that they had generated 'the political circumstances in which people speaking 
at that sort of fringe meeting do not want to rock the boat It partly comes back to... the run 
up to the general election and the instinct for unity... [which] always gets much stronger 
when an election starts to appear on the horizon'30. Second, with the leadership's political 
position stronger, words could be had with certain peripheral elite actors. 'Mawhinney 
[Party Chairman], for example, had conversation with all the people who were likely to
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cause trouble... but it wouldn't have done him any good at all twelve months ago, because
there was still the festering issue of the leadership'31. Third, they generated newsworthy
events in the hall. 'If you want to over shadow the fringe you have to have exciting events
and exciting speeches inside the hall'32. Expanding upon this tactic, the source suggested: 
'As it happened [in 1995] Rifkind had quite an interesting policy proposal... 
Portillo made a, what ever else was said about that speech, it was very well-crafted 
crowd-pleasing and therefore the most interesting and newsworthy things were 
happening inside the hall. And that was one of our strategic objectives to make 
people think the news and the excitement and value was going to come from things 
inside the hall rather than outside it'33.
Table 6.7 shows that there was some success in such management techniques.
Table 6.7: The prominence of all reports featuring Conservative conference 
fringe meetings bv year 1993-1996 (cell contents show the num ber of 
reports in each position!.
1st 2nd
Story
3rd
Position
4th 5th+ Total
1993 8 4 5 2 3 21
1994 8 1 3 0 0 12
1995 4 1 1 0 1 7
1996 0 3 2 4 3 12
Total 20 9 11 6 7 53
It shows that 1995 saw the fewest number of reports on the fringe, 7 compared to 21 in 
1993 and twelve in 1994 and 1996. It also shows a marked decline in the prominence given 
to those reports that featured the fringe. Interestingly Oakley noted in a two-way on the 
BBC Nine on 12 October 1995 that 'they [party leadership] managed to keep the stories on 
the conference floor rather than on the fringe’.
Conclusion
The coverage of debates both in the main hall and on the fringe revealed divergent although 
overlapping interests between the news broadcasters and party actors. For the unions (in 
the Labour party), peripheral elite actors and some delegates the news bulletins provided a 
platform to get their perspectives across to a wider audience. For the news broadcasters 
their overt expressions of opinion increased the newsworthiness of a particular issue and in 
the case of the fringe allowed them to explore what they saw as core issues not appearing 
on the formal conference agenda. However, while such coverage was at odds with the
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party elites’ desire to present an image of party unity to the viewers, it was still in their 
interest to co-operate with the news broadcasters. The party elite were reliant on the news 
items produced to ensure that their perspective was conveyed and to rebut the alternative 
perspectives, and used public relations strategies to this end. Intra-party debates more than 
other events involved competition between party elites and other party actors to set the 
news agenda on a particular issue. In this way both the party elite and other actors actively 
contributed to the construction of conference news.
The news broadcasters, however, also had a certain amount of discretionary 
power. Taking the first element, the prominence given to debates in the running order: the 
party elite and other actors had little direct leverage on editorial decisions about the running 
order. The prominence given by the bulletins to debates was derived from the perceived 
significance of a debate in pragmatic terms. Newsworthiness was heightened by overt 
conflict and further enhanced by the defeat or the potential defeat of the party elite in a vote, 
by the strength of the criticism of party elite policies, and by criticism emanating from a 
recognisable party actor thought to be representative of a wider ideological division. Of 
course, such factors were tempered by the availability of material. The Clause Four debate 
at the Labour conference possessed these qualities and was given prominent coverage by all 
bulletins. The 'Cannabis' and 'Monarchy' debates, because of their position within the 
Liberal Democrats' timetable, were given prominent coverage by the later evening bulletins. 
Coverage of the fringe was also affected by the time when the meetings occurred. Some of 
the meetings, particularly at the Conservative conference, possessed the above qualities and 
these were given prominent coverage, particularly by Newsnight and Channel Four News.
The broadcasters played an active role in the construction and representation of 
debates. This effect was seen in terms of the number of quotes they initiated as opposed to 
those taken from the proceedings. In the 'Cannabis', 'the Minimum Wage' and 'the 
Monarchy’ debates 20 of 47 quotes were media-initiated, and in Clause Four 18 of 45. All 
the reports on the debates acted as a common carrier for the different views. These views 
were split into binary opposing positions which were juxtaposed in reports. The weight 
given to opposing sides in a report was an indicator of the discretion held by the 
correspondents. A mixed picture emerged in terms of leadership line versus those opposed 
to i t  In the Liberal Democrats' conference coverage, 6 actors supporting the leadership line 
were indexed 13 times, while 16 against were indexed 22 times. In the coverage of the 
Clause Four debate 7 actors supporting the leadership line were indexed 23 times, 
compared to 9 detractors indexed 22 times. In terms of fringe coverage at the Conservative
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conferences the news broadcasters also played an active role in the manufacture of debate. 
The reports acted as a forum for the divergent perspectives expressed on particular issues. 
The debate between actors on the fringe and the main hall was only tangible within the 
news reports.
The contextualising remarks within the reports on all three debates also gave an 
indication of the bulletins1 discretion. Such remarks performed a twofold task. First, they 
highlighted an issue and the perspectives surrounding it. Within reports on debates there 
was a multi-layered formal and informal agenda. The commentary revealed the journalists' 
autonomy in being able to choose which issues they would 'spotlight' and which would 
receive less coverage, and also showed their ability to 'set the tone’ on the day's events. 
Secondly, the contextualising commentary also relayed the party elite’s interpretation of 
events as presented via the spin doctors. Interpretations of events favourable to or directly 
referenced by the party elite found their way into many of the reports. In some reports such 
an interpretation was taken at face value, while in others it was acknowledged as spin. But 
debates by their very nature provide a variety of interpretations. Journalists were able, 
though, to assert their autonomy through juxtaposing these different views. In the coverage 
of the debates the correspondents referenced not only the party elite line but also those 
adopted by the unions and other peripheral elite actors. However, similarities between the 
way reports contextualised debates point to the fact that there was some consensus amongst 
journalists about whose views were seen as important on a particular issue. The party 
elites' interpretation of events was always referenced, as were the views of party actors 
who opposed it. Such a consensus on angles and interpretations was partly formed within 
the wider news community. The collective of competitor colleagues clearly influenced each 
other in arriving at an interpretation of events.
A third element concerned the extent to which the bulletins ’go beyond' the given 
agenda, extending coverage through a series of pegged items, two-ways and interviews. 
Again, the party elite had very little influence on the editorial decisions about whether or not 
to produce additional items on a given issue. Over the two debates, the broadcasters carried 
16 additional news items consisting of 4 two-ways, 8 interviews and 2 pegged news 
reports. While there were no pegged items on issues initiated on the fringe there were 6 
two-ways and 8 interviews. All the bulletins had two-ways and pegged items, whereas 
interviews almost exclusively occurred on Channel Four and Newsnight A fourth element 
concerns the explanatory framework used in these items to examine the day’s occurrences 
and speculate about the likely outcome of a vote taken after a debate. Analysis of the two-
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ways showed a high level of speculation about the impact of the Clause Four, debate less 
during the 'Cannabis', 'the Minimum Wage' and 'the Monarchy' debates, but virtually 
nothing surrounding the fringe, where coverage was dominated by explanation.
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1. Paletz and Elson (1976) note of journalists, in their study of news coverage of the US 
presidential conventions: 'Their aim seemed to be to find people who would present 
opposing views on the major themes with which coverage was concerned. This process 
tended to emphasise divisiveness [...]. It was most apparent in the way NBC interviewed 
people who opposed McGovern, alternating them with McGovern supporters. The 
juxtaposition of their comments and classifications created the impression of hostility and 
disunity among participants' pp 121-122.
2. Wintour and Harper note: 'It had been agreed weeks ago by the conference arrangements 
committee... [they] could have been persuaded to say there was no need for a debate on the 
issue at this year's conference. But the provisional agenda was agreed many weeks ago, 
before Mr Blair had decided to propose the re-writing of Clause Four, similarly it had been 
agreed weeks ago that [the] debate would be staged on Thursday... Mr Blairs team... felt 
they could not go to the CAC... and ask for re-timetabling to Monday without raising 
suspicions’. 1994, p 7.
3. Letter from Nick Jones.
4. Interview with Hugh Pym.
5. Ibid.
6. Letter from Nick Jones.
7. Interview with Hugh Pym.
8. Jones notes: 'Mandelson gave a pre-recorded interview for the "World at One" in which 
he suggested that if a consensus developed behind a move to re-write Labour’s constitution 
then the issue would be resolved quickly so that the debate over Clause Four did not 
dominate the 1995 autumn conference... Prescott immediately rejected this suggestion on 
"Conference Live" "a special conference" he said "would not be necessary"...'. 1995, p 
169.
9. Speculative questions and answers were those in which the anchor asked about and the 
journalist actually commented upon the likely future outcome of a vote or the possible 
impacts of such a debate on the parties' electoral fortunes. Explanatory questions and 
answers sought to further illuminate events or provide background to the issues.
10. Liberal Democrat conference agenda Autumn, 1994, p 17.
11. Ibid, p 28.
12. Interview with Alan Leaman.
13. Norton, 1996, p 12.
14. Stanyer and Scammell, 1996.
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15. Interview with Gary Gibbon.
16. Interview with Ric Bailey.
17. Ibid.
18. Interview with Jon Snow.
19. Interview with Ric Bailey.
20. Ibid.
21. Ibid.
22. Interview with Gary Gibbon.
23. All extracts from fringe meetings were coded for and noted on the content sheets.
24. Kelly (1994) notes: 'After 1979 the fringe acquired a new dimension as it came to 
provide a platform from which sacked ministers such as Gilmour (in 1981) and Pym (in 
1985) ventured criticism of government policy [...].'. p 253.
25. Interview with Hugh Pym.
26. Ibid.
27. While the two-ways were live, reports very rarely were. This was a unique occurrence 
and something that had not occurred before or since on News at Ten. It partly indicates the 
significance of Lamont’s speech in pragmatic terms for ITN.
28. Interview with Gary Gibbon.
29. Interview with Tim Collins.
30. Ibid.
31. Ibid.
32. Ibid.
33. Ibid.
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Chapter 7
Spinning and Framing Leaders' Speeches
The leaders* speeches were the ‘highlight’ of the conferences for both the parties and the 
news broadcasters1, a key moment for underlining what the party now stood for to the 
maximum group of viewers. They were also critical episodes in the shared interests and 
co-operation between party leaderships and their staffs and the broadcasters. The leader’s 
speeches provided the party inner elites with an unrivalled platform to promote policy 
changes and internal party messages while simultaneously promoting the leader in a 
favourable setting without internal criticism. As part of this promotional drive, the parties* 
adhocracies routinely sought to add gravitas to the event through the use of promotional 
videos, lighting and changing the shape of the main stage (to include a promontory 
designed to bring the leader closer to the audience). Party insiders were dependent on the 
news broadcasters to provide wider publicity for the speeches’ content outside the 
immediate conference environment to a television audience of millions. The news 
broadcasters depended on the speeches for newsworthy developments or pronouncements 
that would hopefully attract audiences.
Shared interests of the parties and broadcasters were particularly visible around the 
advance release of information. For the party elites, the trailing of selected extracts from the 
leader's speech enabled them to maximise its publicity potential. For the broadcasters, 
trailed information was useful for 'freshening up' the evening conference reports and vital 
in planning daily conference coverage, particularly the production of pegged reports. These 
needed time to be produced and were therefore reliant on the receipt of advance 
information. Over the four years, at all three conferences, Table 7.1 shows that the news 
broadcasters used trailed information 31 times.
Table 7.1: The number of news items containing trailed information on the 
leaders* speeches bv conference 1993-1996.
IT N 5.40 BBC6 Ch 4 NN BBC9 ITN10 Tots
Liberal Democrat 2 1 3 3 2 3 14
Conservative 0 0 0 2 3 5 10
Labour 0 1 1 0 1 4 7
Total 2 2 4 5 6 12 31
(BBC6 = BBC Six O'clock News; BBC9 = BBC Nine O'clock News; ITN5.40 = ITN News at 5.40 PM; 
ITN 10 = ITN News at Ten O'clock; Ch 4 = Channel Four News; NN = Newsnight.)
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Interestingly table 7.1 shows that Ashdown’s speeches were the most heavily trailed, 
followed by Major’s and then Smith and Blair’s. Table 7.1 also shows that the late evening 
bulletins (the BBC Nine O'clock News and News at Ten in particular) carried the greatest 
number of trails and the early evening bulletins, the BBC Six O'clock News (BBC Six) 
and the ITN 5.40, the least. Since early evening bulletins had covered the day’s events 
prior to the speech, the later programmes were looking for (and were provided with) 
newsworthy information about the content of the leaders’ speeches next day, which 
allowed them to up-date their reports from the conference.
On the day of the speech itself advance information on the content of the leaders* 
speeches was particularly important for the early evening bulletins, because it provided 
them with enough time to produce a pegged item. Here co-operation between broadcasters 
seeking to expand the agenda linked with party leaderships’ concerns to maximise 
publicity.
Table 7.2: The number of pegged items on leaders* speeches bv conference
M93-199G*
IT N 5.40 ITN10 BBC6 Ch4 BBC9 NN Total
Liberal Democrat 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
Labour 0 1 0 1 2 3 7
Conservative 0 1 2 3 3 5 14
Total 0 2 2 4 5 8 21
(BBC6 = BBC Six O’clock News; BBC9 = BBC Nine O’clock News; ITN5.40 = ITN News at 5.40 PM; 
ITN 10 = ITN News at Ten O’clock; Ch 4 = Channel Four News; NN = Newsnight.)
Table 7.2 shows that there were a total of 21 pegged items on information from the 
Conservative and Labour leaders* speeches (but none from the Liberal Democrat leader’s 
speeches). The BBC produced the greatest number of pegged items, while the Table also 
shows that the Conservatives did most to co-operate with the BBC in this area. The 
broadcasters’ appetite for pegged items was in some respects also greater when a party 
enjoyed the advantages of being in government, so that any announcements made within 
the speech were likely to become law and therefore to affect the broadcasters’ audience in a 
significant way. The table also seems to reveal certain differences in editorial approach, 
with ITN producing the fewest pegged reports.
There was also a level of co-operation with the use of follow-up strategies after the 
leaders’ speeches. The most common strategy observed in the field was the informal 
briefing of journalists in the press room by various spin doctors, particularly principals. 
After the speech was finished the spin doctors would head for the press room to talk to
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various journalists, particularly the senior correspondents and political editors. There were 
occasional press conferences after the speeches, although this was not a consistent pattern 
throughout the conferences2. Post-speech co-operation was demonstrated most clearly in 
the broadcasting of interviews after the leaders* speeches.
Table 7.3; The number of interviews broadcast after the leaders’ speeches 
bv conference 1993-1996.
ITN 5.40 ITN10 BBC6 BBC9 Ch4 NN Total
Liberal Democrat 0 0 0 0 1 3 4
Labour 0 0 0 0 4 5 9
Conservative 0 0 0 0 6 3 9
Total 0 0 0 0 11 11 22
(BBC6 = BBC Six O’clock News; BBC9 = BBC Nine O’clock News; ITN5.40 = ITN News at 5.40 PM; 
ITN10 = ITN News at Ten O'clock; Ch 4 = Channel Four News; NN = Newsnight.)
Table 7.3 shows that all post-speech interviews were conducted on Channel Four News 
and Newsnight, the two longest bulletins. The party elites' communications teams 
regulated interview access to certain of their members. In return for access, both 
Newsnight and Channel Four News provided the parties with an additional forum in which 
to develop further the issues initiated in the leaders* speeches.
Despite being proactively spun, there was also an element of discretion manifest in 
the reporting of the leaders* speeches which was both beneficial and non-beneficial for the 
party elites. On the one hand the broadcasters’ view that the leaders’ speeches were the 
most significant event of the conferences chimed with the party imperative to portray the 
leaders’ speeches as a great success and to maximise coverage devoted to the speeches. 
Chapter 4 showed that the broadcasters were more pragmatically oriented towards speeches 
by other actors, deciding coverage according to the news value of their content. Coverage 
of the leaders’ speeches, though, was more sacerdotal than pragmatic. A journalistic source 
suggested:
‘We are now much more news driven except the leader’s speech. We have got to 
get the leaders. We can’t cut Paddy Ashdown back if it is a busy news day, and if it 
is a quiet news day when Blair’s on, give him a lot of time - that is just unfair. The 
easiest thing to do is say give them a big chunk each. Don’t ask any questions'^.
The same source noted that it was ‘convention’ for broadcasters to pay extra attention to the
leader's speeches.
‘You start from the premise that the leader's speech is important because it is one 
of the high points of the political year - a bit like the Chancellor’s speech at the 
Mansion House. Then you report what’s in it... If what you are saying is: “Why do 
you feel that you have to cover [the] speech in great length?” the answer is: “I 
agree. It is arguable but that is convention..”. We had made a conscious decision to 
play the leaders big. We felt that was our role'4.
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These attitudes meant that the leader’s speech received a significant proportion of overall 
conference coverage (as Table 7.4 shows), and they were always covered by each 
broadcaster’s political editors and senior correspondents, to emphasise the importance of 
the event to the viewer5.
Table 7.4; The number of news items on the leaders’ speeches 1993-1996. 
and.as_a proportion (%) of all news items on their conference.
IT N 5.40 BBC6 BBC9 ITN10 Ch4 NN Total
Lib Dem leader 5 4 4 5 5 6 29
Total Lib Dem Items 17 18 15 17 23 27 117
(As % of Lib Dem Items) 29% 22% 26% 29% 21% 22% 25%
Labour leader 7 6 7 5 9 14 48
Total Labour Items 34 36 36 38 69 80 293
(As % of Lab Items) 21% 17% 19% 13% 13% 17% 16%
Conservative leader 8 10 8 6 14 11 57
Total Cons Items 34 48 45 37 77 82 323
(As % of Cons Items) 24% 21% 18% 16% 18% 13% 18%
All leaders 20 20 19 16 28 31 134
All News Items 85 102 96 92 169 189 733
(As % of All Items) 24% 20% 20% 17% 16% 16% 18%
(BBC6 = BBC Six O’clock News; BBC9 = BBC Nine O'clock News; ITN5.40 = ITN News at 5.40 PM; 
ITN 10 = ITN News at Ten O’clock; Ch 4 = Channel Four News; NN = Newsnight)
Taken as a whole, 18% of all conference news items were on the leaders’ speeches, with 
the ratio much higher in the less newsworthy Liberal Democrat conference, and slightly 
lower for the Labour conference. Channel Four News and Newsnight devoted the smallest 
proportion of news items to the leaders' speeches, and the ITN 5.40 bulletin gave it the 
greatest share. If these proportions seem unexpectedly small, it is important to note that the 
whole of these news items were devoted to the leaders' speeches, unlike coverage of other 
senior party actors.
The leaders’ speeches were also given prominent coverage, although the 
prominence varied between the conferences and significantly between bulletins in the case 
of the Liberal Democrats' conference (as Table 7.5 shows, next page).
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Table 7.5: The prominence of reports on the leaders* speeches by 
conference 1993-1996 (cell contents show the number of reports in each 
position).
The Conservative leader’s speech over the four-year period was consistently the first news 
item on every bulletin. The prominence of the Labour leader’s speech was only slightly 
less, but the positioning accorded to Paddy Ashdown’s speeches was much worse, with 
the majority of reports across the bulletins being half way down the running order or more. 
While the leaders were treated more sacerdotally by the broadcasters compared to other 
actors within their parties, compared to the other party leaders Ashdown’s speeches were 
treated more pragmatically. The other leaders’ speeches were treated more sacerdotally, and 
were guaranteed prominent coverage unless exceptionally newsworthy events occurred else 
where.
In terms of news gathering, the leaders’ speeches required the minimum of effort. 
The visuals were largely garnered from the cameras in planned positions in the hall and the 
journalists sat through the speeches making a series of notes which would later be used for 
the report's narrative. These notes would be amended through a process of talking 
informally to various spin doctors (where any queries would be raised) and talking to other 
competitor colleagues in the news community. Once gathering was complete, the 
journalists acted as ‘packagers’ (Blumler and Gurevitch, 1995), compiling various extracts 
from the speeches to form a report. Despite the sacerdotal orientation towards the leaders’ 
speeches, the reports were not simply a relay of the information verbatim to the viewing 
audience. The packaging process involved both selection and a ‘value added* element 
(Blumler and Gurevitch, 1995).
The journalists and political editors selected certain parts of the speech, reflecting 
the limited size of the time slot within which they had to fit the report. Selection was 
accompanied by what was, in effect, a process of distilling out what the journalists 
perceived to be the core elements of any speech. The extracts were reduced to soundbites, 
although passages from the leaders’ speeches were never juxtaposed with any other actor’s 
comments. The most newsworthy elements of a speech tended to dominate any single 
report.
Story Position 
1st 2nd 3rd 4th 5th+ Total Mean position
Conservative
Labour
Liberal Democrat 
Total
24 0 0 0 0 24 1.0
18 3 3 0 0 24 1.4
5 3 3 4 9 24 3.4
47 6 6 4 9 72 1.9
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A clear element of value added was present in the reports on the speeches as well, 
with selected passages sometimes placed in context in the report's narrative in a variety of 
ways6. There was an attempt to ‘unmask* (Blumler and Gurevitch, 1995) for the television 
audience the logic behind a particular announcement in terms of explanatory variables, 
including: party competition pressures; contemporary conference events; contemporary 
issues such as the positioning of the parties in the political spectrum; and attempts to appeal 
to the conference delegates, as gauged by their reception of a particular passage. In addition 
to contextualising individual passages, there were attempts to evaluate the speech as a 
whole, through references to the leader's performance and to the immediate reception of the 
whole speech by the party. Occasional comparisons were also drawn between the current 
speech and those of previous leaders. These elements were mainly visible in the reports* 
introductory and concluding remarks. The correspondents also exhibited discretion through 
being able to solicit reactions from those in the conference hall or other media 
professionals. Reports often carried the favourable and unfavourable reactions of these 
actors to the speeches.
The bulletins also produced a number of two-ways after the leaders* speeches. As 
with the coverage of intra-party debates, they were an additional outlet for the senior 
correspondents and the political editors to comment further and speculate about the 
speeches.
Table 7.6: The num ber of two-wavs broadcast after the leaders* speeches 
bv conference 1993-1996.
ITN 5.40 BBC6 BBC9 NN ITN10 Ch4 Total
Liberal Democrat 1 0 0 0 0 0 1
Labour 3 1 2 3 1 1 11
Conservative 3 4 1 0 1 1 10
Total 7 5 3 3 2 2 22
(BBC6 = BBC Six O’clock News; BBC9 = BBC Nine O'clock News; ITN5.40 = ITN News at 5.40 PM; 
ITN10 = ITN News at Ten O'clock; Ch 4 = Channel Four News; NN = Newsnight.)
Table 7.6 shows that most two-ways were on the early evening bulletins, because there 
was not always enough time to complete the production of a pegged news item before the 
deadline and the two-way was seen as a quick replacement which could capture the 
immediacy of an event. In addition, co-operation with the parties was not a necessary 
prerequisite in the use of two-ways. They were used less frequently in the late evening 
bulletins.
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The rest of this chapter examines the framing and spinning of the three party 
leaders' speeches by six evening news bulletins in 1995. The analysis focuses on key 
elements of the framing process (prominence, selection and contextualisation), and looks at 
the shared interests between the party elites and the news broadcasters in the coverage of 
the leaders’ speeches.
7.1 The Liberal Democrat Leader’s Speech
Ashdown’s speeches were treated as the main event of the Liberal Democrat conferences by 
the news bulletins although Table 7.7 shows the prominence given to reports on his 
speeches was low.
Table 7.7: The prominence of reports on the Liberal Democrat leader’s 
speech 1993-1996 (cell contents show the num ber of reports in each 
position ).
Story Position
1st 2nd 3rd 4th 5th+ Total
ITN 5.40 2 0 0 1 1 4
BBC 6 1 1 0 0 2 4
Ch 4 0 0 1 1 2 4
BBC 9 2 0 0 1 1 4
ITN 10 0 2 0 1 1 4
Newsnight 0 0 2 0 2 4
Total 5 3 3 4 9 24
(BBC 6 = BBC Six O’clock News; BBC 9 = BBC Nine O'clock News; ITN 5.40 = ITN News at 5.40 PM; 
ITN 10 = ITN News at Ten O'clock; Ch 4 = Channel Four News.)
It was only a lead story five times, and in most cases the speeches were reported as the 
fourth item of news or lower. Ashdown’s speeches were given particularly low 
prominence by Newsnight and Channel Four News, with the highest position both 
bulletins awarded him being third.
Selection
Owing to the length of the speeches, the journalists edited them into a number of small 
sections to fit into the report. Table 7.8 (next page) shows the average number of these 
passages contained within reports.
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Table 7.8: The mean num ber of passages used from the Liberal Democrat 
leader’s speeches 1993-1996.
ITN 5.40 ITN10 BBC6 BBC9 NN Ch 4
Mean 1993-96 4 4 5 5 5 7
Stdv 0.9 1.5 1.0 1.2 0.8 1.3
(Stdv = Standard deviation. BBC6 = BBC Six O'clock News; BBC9 = BBC Nine O'clock News; ITN5.40 =
ITN News at 5.40 PM; ITN 10 = ITN News at Ten O'clock; Ch 4 = Channel Four News; NN = Newsnight.)
Table 7.8 shows that a comparatively small number of extracts were used by the journalists 
when compiling a report on the Liberal Democrat leader’s speech. ITN used the lowest 
number, on average 4, with the BBC Six, Nine and Newsnight slightly higher with 5 and 
Channel Four News the highest with 7. The length of these segments was also determined 
by the journalists. Table 7.9 gives an indication of the mean length of the passages selected 
by the journalists in reports.
Table 7.9l The mean length of soundbites (in seconds) in reports on the 
Liberal Democrat leader’s speeches 1993-1996.
BBC6 BBC9 ITN 5.40 ITN10 Ch 4 NN  Av
Mean 1993-96 15 15 19 22 22 26 20
Stdv 7.1 7.3 7.0 6.8 8.7 9.3 8.9
(Stdv = Standard deviation. BBC6 = BBC Six O’clock News; BBC9 = BBC Nine O'clock News; ITN5.40 = 
ITN News at 5.40 PM; ITN10 = ITN News at Ten O'clock; Ch 4 = Channel Four News; NN = Newsnight.)
Table 7.9 shows that the length of soundbites varied between bulletins with the BBC 
providing the shortest, some four seconds less than ITN and Channel Four News, and 
Newsnight the longest. Taking Tables 7.8 and 7.9 together: ITN selected fewer extracts 
but of a greater length and the BBC more extracts but shorter. Newsnight and Channel 
Four News quoted most comprehensively, using the most number of extracts at the greatest 
length.
Having seen the average number of passages selected and their length, Table 7.10 
(nest page) shows a more detailed examination of which passages from the 1995 Liberal 
Democrat leader’s speech were selected.
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Table 7.10: Which passages from the 1995 Liberal Democrat leader’s were 
used in reports bv bulletin.
Indentification number of the passage 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7
(Dear (Rail (Tax (Change (Cnf’nt (PR (Lib
Tony) track) Cuts) Gov’t) Issues) Ref’m) Gov’t)
ITN 5.40 x x x x x
BBC 6 x x x x
Ch 4 x x x x x
BBC 9 x x x x x x 
ITN 10 x x x x x x
Newsnight x x x x
(1, Dear Tony = an extract from a joke postcard. 2, Railtrack = renationalise Railtrack. 3, Tax Cuts = 
opposition to tax cuts. 4, Change Gov’t = a call to get rid of the existing government. 5, Cnfnt Issues = a 
challenge to the other parties to confront the issues. 6, PR Refm = a call to reform the existing voting 
system and implement proportional representation. 7, Lib Gov't = the Liberal Democrats' role in a new 
government BBC 6 = BBC Six O'clock News; BBC 9 = BBC Nine O'clock News; ITN 5.40 = ITN News 
at 5.40 PM; ITN 10 = ITN News at Ten O’clock; Ch 4 = Channel Four News.)
Table 7.10 shows that seven of a total of 11 passages from Ashdown’s 1995 speech were 
used by more than one report. There was considerable overlap between all the bulletins in 
the passages they selected as the most important from the speech. These passages 
concerned two main themes: the outlining of the Liberal Democrat leadership’s position on 
possible co-operation with Labour after the 1997 election and a reaffirmation of party 
policy and a critique of the other parties on a series of issues.
Context
All bulletins in their reports saw the most important passages of Ashdown’s speech as 
being about the Liberal Democrats’ attitude towards co-operation with Labour after the next 
election, precipitated by Blair’s offer of closer co-operation the previous day (see Table 
7.10). The speech’s aim was contextualised as providing the outline of issues where co­
operation between Labour could be considered. While all the reports mentioned his attacks 
on the Conservatives, they focused to a greater extent on the challenges Blair would have to 
meet for co-operation. The BBC Six called these a ‘checklist of challenges’; the BBC Nine 
‘challenges for Labour*. Channel Four’s report called them the ‘terms on readiness to work 
with Labour’ and Newsnight the ‘decisions Labour should not duck’.
All reports sought to contextualise each passage used?. The first passage concerned
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Ashdown reading out a joke postcard, responding to Blair’s overtures on co-operation . 
Passage 1.
‘Dear Tony, Having a wonderful time in Glasgow. We’ve always believed in 
working with others where we agree. But first you must be clear where you stand. 
We are. Lets us know when you are. Yours, Paddy’.
All reports sought to explain the significance of this element as Ashdown’s response to
Blair’s offer of co-operation. ITN 5.40 and News at Ten contextualised the response in
terms of its confidence, suggesting that Ashdown was ‘...confident enough to send Tony
Blair, after his approaches, what amounted to a saucy postcard’. The BBC Six suggested
that the passage’s significance lay in the fact that his party wanted to hear ‘his reply to Tony
Blair’s petition to talks and possible co-operation’. Channel Four’s report focused on the
passage’s aim, ‘designed to open up a dialogue without giving the impression he was
rolling over at the first approach’. The BBC Nine referred to Blair’s offer of co-operation
as ‘destabilising* but suggested that Ashdown had turned it into ‘an advantage by
lambasting his potential allies for retreating on key policies’. Newsnight contextualised it as
a reply, but one which ‘struck just the right mocking tone’.
The second passage was contextualised as a challenge to Labour to co-operate in 
opposing rail privatisation and in terms of the popularity of reception for the passage. 
Passage 2.
‘We must retain public control of Railtrack. And once again my message to Labour 
is very, very simple. Join us, join us in that pledge and if you do, no one would 
buy the shares and together we could stop this crazy rail privatisation dead in its 
tracks*.
The ITN 5.40 and News at Ten emphasised both the popularity of its reception and the 
challenge to Labour: ‘The biggest applause came when Mr Ashdown spoke about rail 
privatisation and said Labour should join them in keeping Railtrack under public control*. 
The BBC Six made no reference to the reception but used it as an example of co-operation: 
‘Labour should join them too in pledging continuing public control of Railtrack*. Channel 
Four News suggested: ‘so to the loudest applause for his speech, he challenged Labour to 
block rail privatisation’. The BBC Nine focused on the reception and noted ‘his insistence 
that they could between them stop the privatisation of Railtrack won him his loudest 
applause*. Newsnight suggested: ‘the biggest applause came when Mr Ashdown spoke 
about rail privatisation and said that Labour should join them in keeping Railtrack under 
public control*. The popularity of the reception of this passage made it more salient in the 
eyes of the journalists than other elements in Ashdown’s ‘list’.
The third and fourth most frequently used passages concerned reaffirmation of 
existing party policy on tax and education and a critique of the other two parties. The third 
passage used by all reports reaffirmed the party policy on increasing tax to fund education 
but was contextualised as a challenge to the other parties to be honest on taxation.
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Passage 3.
‘If you promise never to put up taxes, then the rest of your pledges are no more 
than pipe dreams. What’s so depressing is that Labour now seem as keen to play 
this party trick on the electorate as the Conservatives. Well, let me make it clear 
now, deceiving the electorate on taxes is not a game this party intends to play*.
The ITN 5.40 and News at Ten highlighted the passage as a spending pledge: ‘Mr
Ashdown once again promised more spending on education and the environment which
might indeed mean higher taxes’, and as an attack on the other parties: ‘about which other
parties never spoke the truth*. The BBC Six did not mention the spending pledge but
contextualised it as a criticism of Labour: ‘It was also depressing that Labour now seemed
as ready as the Tories to hide the truth about taxes’. Channel Four contextualised it
differently, in terms of tough choices: ‘Throughout he positioned the Liberal Democrats as
the party that was prepared to take tough choices in contrast to Labour’s timidity’. The
BBC Nine made no mention of the criticism of Labour but suggested there was an element
of risk in his strategy: ‘Riskily, Mr Ashdown promised that his party would tell the truth on
tax’. For Newsnight the significance lay in terms of the tax-cutting agenda of the other
parties. The report suggested the passage was a taunt: ‘On tax he taunted Labour’s
timidity’.
The fourth most-used extract (ignored only by Newsnight and the BBC Six) was 
contextualised as a call for the government ‘to go*.
Passage 4.
‘I want to use this moment as the start of a great campaign, up to and through the 
next election, in which we say simply and plainly how Britain must change and 
how the Liberal Democrats’ will guarantee that change. And the first change that 
Britain needs is a change of government. This government must go, and every vote 
and every seat that we win at the next election will see that they go*.
The ITN 5.40 and News at Ten contextualised this as Ashdown’s ‘clear alternative
message for Britain once the Tories were slung out*. Channel Four said that it showed
Ashdown ‘was unambiguous in his determination to get rid of the government*. The BBC
Nine described it rather oddly, saying ‘he didn’t spend too long discussing the Tories’.
The fifth passage used by both ITN reports and the BBC Nine was contextualised 
as a critique of the other two parties for failing to confront the ‘issues*.
Passage 5.
‘Labour won’t confront the issues because they are frightened of the electorate. The 
Tories won’t confront the issues because they’re frightened they’ll divide their 
party*.
The ITN 5.40 and News at Ten contextualised it as an attack on ‘the constant fudging of 
the issues by the two old parties*. The BBC Nine noted that Ashdown ‘assailed* the other 
two parties ‘for timidity and a failure to tell it like it is’.
The sixth used by both BBC reports and Channel Four News was contextualised as
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a critique of Labour’s policy on proportional representation (PR).
Passage 6.
4 Well let me make it absolutely clear, electoral reform is not an optional extra. It is 
not leadership to ask others to decide when you won’t decide yourself. Holding a 
referendum is not an alternative to holding an opinion’.
The BBC Six summarised it as Ashdown’s critique of Blair’s stance on proportional
representation: Tn areas such as electoral reform he should stop being half-hearted and
timid. He must say whether he supports proportional representation*. Channel Four’s
report similarly focused on the critical nature of the passage: 4Tony Blair’s promise of a
referendum yesterday was welcome, but not enough’. The passage was similarly
contextualised by the BBC Nine:4 he wants the Labour leader to come out in favour of PR,
not just to stage a referendum on it’.
The seventh passage of the speech (from its close) was used only by News at Ten 
and Newsnight. It was contextualised as a restatement of the 'Liberal Democrat Guarantee’ 
document8 to be the guarantors of change in the next parliament.
Passage 7.
4 Within the next eighteen months, perhaps before we meet again, we will be called 
upon to show that we have the courage and the firm answers and the strong vision 
to be the lever of change, the guarantee of change, in our country once again. Let 
them then say of us, that was their challenge and they rose to it’.
News at Ten report suggested: 'Come the general election the party would need to show it
has firm answers and a strong vision to be a lever of change’. Newsnight attempted to
draw some historical comparisons. It suggested 'tellingly Mr Ashdown ended on a
conciliatory note, something of the spirit of Labour’s landslide victory in 1945, noting the
vital contributions the Liberals Beveridge and Keynes made to post-war Britain, he said it
was time to play that role again’.
In addition there were four passages from the speech used by only one of the 
reports. The BBC Six used another quote to illustrate Ashdown’s call for co-operation 
with Labour. Channel Four’s report used another extract to illustrate Ashdown’s attack on 
the Conservatives’ education policy, contextualising it as another example of a policy area 
over which Labour and the Liberal Democrats should co-operate. Newsnight used a further 
two extracts to highlight the role of the Liberal Democrats in a future parliament after the 
next election. This was contextualised as the party’s mission ‘to ensure that after the 
Conservatives had gone, the next government did not fail Britain*.
Performance
Table 7.11 (next page) shows the frequency of comments on Ashdown’s performance 
when making a speech.
207
Table 7.11: The number of references in all reports to the performance of 
the Liberal Democrat leader in making his speech bv bulletin and year 
1993-1996.
BBC9 ITN5.40 BBC6 ITN10 Ch 4 NN Total
1993 0 0 0 1 0 0 1
1994 1 0 1 0 1 0 3
1995 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
1996 2 2 1 0 0 0 5
Total 3 2 2 1 1 0 9
(BBC6 = BBC Six O'clock News; BBC9 = BBC Nine O'clock News; ITN5.40 = ITN News at 5.40 PM; 
ITN10 = ITN News at Ten O'clock; Ch 4 = Channel Four News; NN = Newsnight)
Overall there were nine comments, mainly concentrated in reports on the 1996 conference 
speech and on the ITN and BBC main news bulletins, with one on Channel Four and none 
at all on Newsnight. In 1995 there were no remarks on Ashdown's performance when 
making the speech.
Reception
The reports were keen to convey to the television audience the reception the speech received 
from the delegates in the conference hall. These comments usually came at the end of a 
report but were also linked to a specific announcements.
Tahle 7.12: The number of references in all reports to the reception of the
ITN10 IT N 5.40 Ch 4 NN BBC6 BBC9 Total
1993 1 1 1 0 0 0 3
1994 1 1 0 0 0 0 2
1995 2 2 2 1 1 1 9
1996 1 0 1 1 0 0 3
Total 5 4 4 2 1 1 17
(BBC6 = BBC Six O'clock News; BBC9 = BBC Nine O'clock News; ITN5.40 = ITN News at 5.40 PM; 
ITN10 = ITN News at Ten O'clock; Ch 4 = Channel Four News; NN = Newsnight.)
Table 7.12 shows that there were 17 references to the speeches’ reception over the period. 
Both ITN bulletins consistently referred in their reports to the speeches* reception by 
delegates, whereas the BBC bulletins made only one mention of the speeches* reception. In 
1995, in addition to the reception already noted for the passage on rail privatisation, five 
reports also specifically referred to the speech’s final reception. The report on the TTN 5.40
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suggested that the speech ‘...earned Paddy Ashdown a noticeably warm ovation* and 
News at Ten that the conference ‘...rose to give Paddy Ashdown a noticeably warm 
ovation*. The BBC Six report said that it ‘...won him more than a standing ovation*. The 
Channel Four report said that after the speech ‘Delegates insisted on Mr Ashdown taking a 
second bow today*, and Newsnight noted that ‘Mr Ashdown’s speech went down so well 
he was even called back for a sort of encore*.
Reactions
In addition to referencing the reception for the speech the journalists also indexed the 
reactions of other actors, referenced by journalists in the commentary and incorporated into 
the report through indexing different actors. There were differences between the six 
bulletins in terms of the value-added, in particular between Newsnight, Channel Four 
News and the rest. These two bulletins provided considerably more reaction to Ashdown’s 
speech than the other bulletin’s. The following table shows the reactions to the leaders 
speech initiated by the journalists9.
Table 7.13: The num ber of indexed reactions in all reports to the Liberal 
Democrat leader’s speeches bv year 1993-1996.
Positive Negative Neutral
1993 0 0 3
1994 2 0 6
1995 0 0 9
1996 1 0 2
Total 3 0 20
The overwhelming number of reactions initiated by journalists after Ashdown’s speech 
were neutral over the four years, with no negative reactions. On the 1995 speech only three 
reports carried reactions, all neutral. The BBC Six indexed the reaction of MPs Liz Lynne 
and Simon Hughes; Channel Four’s report included Liz Lynne, Charles Kennedy and a 
delegate; and Newsnight covered Lord Holme and three delegates.
Concluding Remarks
The concluding remarks of the reports emphasised the positive and upbeat finale to the 
speech but alluded to potential problems from within the party for his overtures to Labour. 
The ITN 5.40 report suggested: ‘Thumbs up, another sign of his confidence that being up­
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front on tax and other issues will mean more votes and seats and influence in the next 
parliament’. News at Ten similarly suggested: ‘Thumbs up, an indication that Mr Ashdown 
believes he is carrying his supporters with him over his “Yes, we’ll put taxes up if we have 
to” strategy*. The report also noted there could be problems from ‘...a sort of hair shirt 
tendency inherited perhaps from the old Liberals... and evident today as it voted to ban 
National Lottery instant scratch cards... but most of the representatives here seem to be 
backing Paddy Ashdown’s view’. The BBC Six report said that he had succeeded in 
keeping ‘the door open to increased co-operation but his language was sufficiently 
uncompromising to make it sound more like a challenge*. Channel Four similarly noted the 
possible response of the party: ‘He deliberately didn’t respond too warmly to Mr Blair’s 
talks, knowing that might produce a backlash, as a result he kept the party with him... 
Despite the applause Liberal Democrats won’t be rushed into talks with a party that its vocal 
minority still regards as the enemy*. The BBC Nine raised the same dilemma as the other 
reports: ‘The Lib Dems have been pleased to be wooed by Tony Blair but they are by no 
means convinced they want to start walking out. But he’s kept the doors open whilst 
boosting his party’s confidence*. Newsnight were more forthright in focusing on a deal 
with Labour. Tension between delegates and MPs was raised as one potential outcome: 
‘This week has revealed a tension between MPs and officials, who would dearly love to 
pull that lever for change inside a government, and activists who’d split the party rather 
than contemplate coalition’.
Spinning
Ashdown’s speeches were widely trailed in bulletins the night prior to the speech. Table 
7.14 shows that the use of trails was more or less evenly spread across all the bulletins 
over the four-year period. The majority of trails were used by Newsnight, Channel Four 
News and News at Ten with the early evening bulletins (particularly the BBC Six) using 
trailed information least
Table 7.14: The number of news items containing trailed information on
the Liberal Democrat leader’s speeches bv vear 1993-1996.
Ch 4 NN ITN10 BBC9 ITN 5.40 BBC6 Total
1993 1 1 0 0 1 0 3
1994 1 1 1 1 1 1 6
1995 0 1 1 0 0 0 2
1996 1 0 1 1 0 0 3
Total 3 3 3 2 2 1 14
(BBC6 = BBC Six O’clock News; BBC9 = BBC Nine O'clock News; ITN5.40 = ITN News at 5.40 PM; 
ITN 10 = ITN News at Ten O’clock; Ch 4 = Channel Four News; NN = Newsnight.)
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1995 represented a low point in the number of trails used by the bulletins. There were only 
two in reports prior to the 1995 speech on News at Ten and Newsnight. News at Ten 
contextualised the information by reference to Blair’s offer of co-operation earlier that day: 
‘Tomorrow Mr Ashdown will call for a great campaign through until the next election, with 
the Liberal Democrats stating clearly how they plan to change the country. As for Labour 
it’s now up to them to say where they stand*. Newsnight similarly contextualised the 
information in terms of Blair’s offer of co-operation: ‘Paddy Ashdown tomorrow will 
attack Labour for a lack of courage on taxation...*. Trailing of the 1995 speech was limited 
and far from systematic compared to the previous year. There were no pegged news items 
on the content of Ashdown’s speech in any of the bulletins. Between 1993 and 1996 the 
bulletins also only produced a few additional news items on the Liberal Democrat leader’s 
speech. These almost exclusively took the form of interviews with senior party actors - 
Charles Kennedy (Party President) was used twice and David Steel (former leader) once on 
Newsnight, and Menzies Campbell (Foreign Affairs spokesperson) appeared once on 
Channel Four. There was only one two-way over the period, after a report by the ITN 5.40 
in 1994.
7.2 The Labour Leader’s Speech
The Labour leader’s speeches were treated sacerdotally by the different news bulletins. 
Table 7.15 shows that the significant majority of reports were lead items in all bulletins 
over the period. The leader’s speeches were always the lead story on the BBC and the only 
time they were not the lead story on ITN and Channel Four News was in 1995.
Table 7.15: Prominence of reports on the Labour leader’s speech 1993-
1996 (cell contents show the number of reports in each position).
Story Position
1st 2nd 3rd 4th 5th+ Total
BBC 6 4 0 0 0 0 4
BBC 9 4 0 0 0 0 4
ITN 5.40 3 1 0 0 0 4
ITN 10 3 0 1 0 0 4
Ch 4 3 0 1 0 0 4
Newsnight 2 1 1 0 0 4
Total 18 3 3 0 0 24
(BBC 6 = BBC Six O'clock News; BBC 9 = BBC Nine O'clock News; ITN 5.40 = ITN News at 5.40 PM; 
ITN 10 = ITN News at Ten O'clock; Ch 4 = Channel Four News.)
The 1995 conference speech provided an interesting example of temporarily diverging
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interests between party elites (especially the leader’s principal spin doctor Alastair
Campbell) and the news broadcasters’ editorial staff over the O.J Simpson trial verdict,
announced on the same day and seen by most journalists as a momentous news event This
coincidence fractured momentarily Labour’s and the broadcasters’ shared interest in leading
with the leader’s speech. Fearing that pragmatic values would take precedence over the
sacerdotal, Campbell launched a pre-emptive strike to try and persuade the broadcasters to
lead with the Blair speech rather than the verdict of the O.J Simpson trial. Campbell sought
assurances from both the heads of BBC and ITN that Blair’s speech would not be
displaced from its lead position on their bulletins. One political editor noted that Campbell
was *... imploring the broadcasters not to lead their news programmes with the O.J
Simpson verdict’10. Another journalist suggested that Campbell had ‘urged television news
organisations not to swamp the Labour leader’s speech... with coverage of the trial
verdict'11. As part of his attempt to persuade the broadcasters CampbeU appeaied to the
Director General of the BBC, John Birt, and the head of ITN Channel three news, Nigel
Dacre. He sent the following fax around midday on the day of the leader’s speech.
*1 write concerning your coverage of Tony Blair’s speech on your evening bulletin 
today. Some of the journalists have suggested to us that we are unlikely to get as 
much coverage for the leader’s speech as in previous years because of the O.J 
Simpson trial verdict at 6pm. It has even been suggested that there is little chance of 
Mr Blair’s speech leading your bulletins. Whilst of course news judgements must 
be made in the light of other stories on any particular day, and whilst I fully 
understand there is much interest in the verdict, I would implore you not to lose 
sight of the news value and of the importance to the country of Mr Blair’s speech. I 
hope you will communicate our concerns'12.
While ITN ignored the fax, Tony Hall, Managing Director of BBC News and Current
Affairs, replied immediately, saying that 'the corporation was capable of making its own
decisions’13. The response of the BBC and ITN was different. Although claiming to be
‘capable of making its own decisions’, both the BBC’s bulletins led with Blair’s speech,
whereas both of ITN’s bulletins led with the O.J. verdict.
Peter Bell, head of the BBC TV news programmes, was quoted as saying in the 
BBC’s defence: 'The order of the Nine o’clock News was determined by the editor 
Malcolm Balen. His decision was supported by editorial management, including me. At the 
time the decision was made the programme editor did not even know Mr Blair’s press 
officer had contacted the BBC'14. As to charges that the BBC had ‘bowed to Labour 
pressure’ or ‘caved in to Labour party complaints’ a further BBC spokesman was quoted 
as saying ‘The Nine O’clock News would always have led on Blair. We are quite happy 
we got it right...'15. This clearly does show that there were some differences between a 
more sacerdotal approach to the leader’s speech as an event by the BBC and a more 
pragmatic approach by ITN, albeit in extremely unusual circumstances. The previous 
leader’s speeches and the 1996 leader’s speech were lead items on both ITN bulletins (see
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Table 7.15). This case also highlights the broadcasters’ discretionary power to decide the 
running order of their bulletins. If the BBC is to be believed, the decision was made on 
sacerdotal grounds, not because of pressure. Although in terms of the conferences such 
attempts at editorial interference were far from frequent, the example shows the response of 
the party elites where news values threatened the taken-for-granted assumptions on the 
prominence of the leader’s speech.
Selection
At the Labour conference the journalists were active in selecting which extracts would be 
incorporated into a report. The news reports again edited the leader’s speech into a number 
of small sections. Table 7.16 (next page) shows the average number of these passages 
contained within the reports.
Table 7.16; The mean number of passages used from the Labour leader’s 
speeches 1993-1996.
NN BBC9 BBC6 Ch 4 ITN 5.40 ITN10
Mean 1993-96 9 8 7 7 6 6
Stdv 1.3 1.0 1.8 2.5 0.6 1.5
(Stdv = standard deviation. BBC6 = BBC Six O'clock News; BBC9 = BBC Nine O'clock News; ITN5.40 =
ITN News at 5.40 PM; ITN 10 = ITN News at Ten O'clock; Ch 4 = Channel Four News; NN = Newsnight)
Table 7.16 shows that Newsnight used the greatest number of speech extracts. The BBC 
Six and Nine on average used more extracts from the Labour leader’s speech than ITN
5.40 and News at Ten. Interestingly the BBC Six and Nine used the same number of 
extracts as Channel Four News, a longer news bulletin. Table 7.17 shows the average 
length of these extracts.
Table 7.17:__The mean length of soundbites (in seconds) in reports on the
Labour leader’s speeches 1993-1996.
NN Ch 4 ITN 5.40 ITN10 BBC9 BBC6 Av 
Mean 1993-96 27 21 21 20 18 15 20
Stdv 12.8 8.2 9.8 7.5 8.0 6.9 8.9
(Stdv = standard deviation. BBC6 = BBC Six O’clock News; BBC9 = BBC Nine O’clock News; ITN5.40 = 
ITN News at 5.40 PM; ITN10 = ITN News at Ten O’clock; Ch 4 = Channel Four News; NN = Newsnight.)
In terms of soundbites Table 7.17 shows a variation between the bulletins. Reports on 
Newsnight provided the longest soundbites. The BBC Six and Nine used the shortest on 
average, particularly the BBC Six’s soundbites, which were some four seconds shorter
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than both ITN bulletins. Interestingly there was little difference in the length of the 
soundbites on the shortest bulletin, the ITN 5.40, and on Channel Four News, one of the 
longest. Tables 7.16 and 7.17 again show that Newsnight and Channel Four News 
provided on average, the greatest number of, and the longest extracts. They also show that 
both ITN bulletins selected fewer extracts from the Labour leader’s speech but of a greater 
length, whereas the BBC Six and Nine selected more, making them shorter.
Table 7.18 shows a more detailed examination of which passages from the Labour 
leader’s speech were selected in reports on the 1995 conference.
Table 7.18: Which passages from the 1995 Labour leader’s speech were 
used in reports bv bulletin.
Indentification number of the passage
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9
(BT (Rail (Patri­ (Bam- (Love (New (Edu­ (Wind- (Crit
Deal) Nation) otic) bi) party) Brit) 'tion) fall) Cons)
ITN 5.40 X X X X X X
BBC 6 X X X X
Ch 4 X X X X X X
BBC 9 X X X X X X
ITN 10 X X X X X X
Newsnight X X X X X
(1, BT Deal = A deal with British Telecom to connect schools to the internet 2, Rail Nation = A pledge to 
renationalise the railways. 3, Patriotic = Labour as the patriotic party. 4, Bambi = A joke reference to 
Blair's nickname. 5, Love party = The leader's love for his party and country. 6, New Brit = The leader's 
vision of a new Britain. 7, Edu'tion = The importance of education and technology. 8, Windfall = The uses 
to which revenue from a new windfall tax would be put 9, Crit Cons = A critique of the Conservatives. 
BBC 6 = BBC Six O’clock News; BBC 9 = BBC Nine O'clock News; ITN 5.40 = ITN News at 5.40 PM; 
ITN 10 = ITN News at Ten O'clock; Ch 4 = Channel Four News.)
A total of 17 passages were used from Blair’s 1995 speech. Table 7.18 shows that nine 
passages were used by more than one of the reports. The most used passages concerned 
two themes; the outlining of the Labour leadership’s policy pledges and the political 
repositioning of the party. The first two most widely used passages specifically concerned 
policy pledges.
Context
All the anchors* introductions summarised the series of policy proposals in Blair’s speech 
and emphasised the visionary aspect of the speech. The BBC Six suggested that he set out
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‘his vision for a new young Britain’; Channel Four said it was ‘his vision for Britain under 
Labour’; the BBC Nine a prescription... to change Britain’; News at Ten ‘a vision of a new 
young united Britain...’; and Newsnight that the aim was to ‘reposition Labour as the party 
of the future’.
All reports except the BBC Nine contextualised the aim of the speech as revealing 
policy substance. The BBC Six said the speech was designed to ‘answer those critics who 
complain that he’s full of fine words but his promises lack substance*. Channel Four 
observed that ‘Mr Blair’s advisers wanted this speech to be seen as full of policy*. The ITN
5.40 and News at Ten noted that ‘perhaps sensing in advance that the Tories might try and 
attack the speech today for being without substance it came with a 24 page briefing paper*. 
And Newsnight said that ‘this is a party that has been increasingly restive, wondering 
“Where is the beef?” Mr Blair offered up some red meat*.
All reports in addition sought to contextualise the main passages in the following 
way. The first quote, used by all and summarised by Newsnight, concerned the connection 
of every school to the internet by British Telecom (BT).
Passage 1.
‘I can tell you that we have been these past weeks in discussion with British 
Telecom. In return for access to the market I can announce that they have agreed as 
they build their network to connect every school, every college, every hospital, 
every Library in Britain for free*.
The ITN 5.40 and News at Ten contextualised the passage in terms of advantages for both
schoolchildren and BT: ‘The cable television market currently closed to British Telecom
would be opened up, but at a price*. This passage was contextualised by the BBC Six in
terms of advantages for both schoolchildren and BT: ‘each child to have access to a
computer and British Telecom to have greater freedom to compete*. Channel Four’s report
suggested the passage was symbolic. It symbolised ‘both Labour’s commitment to
education and technology and to a partnership between the private and public sectors’. The
BBC Nine contextualised the passage as both visionary and practical. Its vision was ‘of a
country with every schoolchild having access to a lap top computer, medical centres of
excellence linked to the electronic super highway. To underline its practical purpose Labour
has done a deal with the privatised BT*. Newsnight summarised the announcement in a
straight manner ‘Labour would allow British Telecom to use cable technology to the full in
return for promising to connect up every school... in Britain for free. And he [Blair] also
said that there would be discussion about how to ensure that every child has access to a lap
top computer*.
The second passage was a pledge of tight public spending controls but with a caveat 
that there would be a publicly owned railway under Labour. The popularity of this
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announcement was emphasised by reference to the applause it received on the BBC Nine, 
News at Ten and Newsnight.
Passage 2.
‘I don’t give blank cheques in any area of policy, including this, no matter what the 
pressures. But to anyone thinking of grabbing our railways, built up over the years 
so they can make a quick profit, as our network is broken up and sold off, I say 
this: There will be a publicly owned, publicly accountable railway system under a 
Labour government*.
The ITN 5.40 and News at Ten emphasised the careful wording of the passage: ‘After 
welfare into work for single parents, transport. But there’d be no blank cheques in any 
policy area* and noted the reaction: ‘The applause for that, led by Jimmy Knapp the rail 
union leader*. The BBC Six contextualised this passage in a descriptive manner as a 
‘pledge* on ‘taking a privatised British rail back into the public sector*. Channel Four 
emphasised its reception and made reference to its careful wording: ‘Most popular of all, 
public ownership of the railways. But the commitments were very carefully phrased*. The 
BBC Nine reinforced the passage’s reception: ‘But if New Labour are warming to the 
markets Mr Blair still got his loudest applause of the day for a pledge to reverse a 
controversial privatisation*. Newsnight referred to the passage as a *a promise of a more 
traditional kind*, its aim ‘to delight the audience in the hall*.
All the reports referenced the passage of the speech which sought to label Labour as 
the patriotic party and attacked Conservative patriotism.
Passage 3.
‘So let us say with pride, we are patriots, this is the patriotic party, because it is the 
party of the people. And as the Tories wave their Union Jacks next week, I know 
what so many people will be thinking, I know what people want to say to those 
Tories. It is no good waving the fabric of our flag when you have spent sixteen 
years tearing apart the fabric of the nation*.
The BBC Six suggested simply: ‘today he also took hold of the Union Jack*. Channel Four
contextualised the passage as an attempt to occupy the moral high ground: ‘Mr Blair
returned to his theme of trying to occupy the moral high ground with an appeal for
patriotism*. The BBC Nine located the significance of the passage in terms of Conservative
attacks on Labour’s European policy: ‘Mr Blair knows the Tories will attack him at the next
election as soft on Europe and so he has sought to stress that his party is a party of
patriots*. The ITN 5.40 and News at Ten saw the passage as a critique of the
Conservatives* patriotism: ‘The Labour leader knew what ordinary people would be saying
to the flag-waving Tories at their conference next week*. Newsnight contextualised the
extract sceptically: ‘Labour the party of patriotism! an audacious move in itself, although it
suggested as an aside: ‘... the hall cleared, there was not a single Union Jack among the
debris’.
In addition to repositioning and policy pledges there was also an interest in
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humorous passages from the speech. All reports except the BBC Six contextualised the 
fourth passage, as a joke in which Tony Blair sought to respond to critics of his style of 
leadership.
Passage 4.
‘Last year I was Bambi, this year I’m Stalin. From Disneyland to dictatorship in 
twelve short months. I’m not sure which one I prefer. OK, I prefer Bambi 
honesdy’.
This was contextualised by Channel Four as ‘dealing with criticism of his leadership with a 
joke against himself’. In the BBC Nine the context was somewhat different: ‘The struggles 
for party reform were dismissed with a joke’. On the ITN 5.40 and News at Ten there was 
no mention of a joke. The passage was seen as showing that ‘Labour could change Britain 
for the better since the party itself had changed’. Newsnight suggested that the passage 
showed that Blair ‘laughed off the criticism that he’s centralised power in his hands*.
The fifth, sixth, seventh and eighth most frequently used passages concerned a 
mixture of the reiteration of existing beliefs, a vision of the future and an attack on the 
Conservatives. The fifth passage, used by both BBC1 reports and Newsnight, was seen as 
a straight attack on the Conservatives.
Passage 5.
‘I love my party, I just hate being in opposition. And I love my country and hate 
what the Tories have done to it’.
This was contextualised by the BBC Six as ‘one of his overall themes* and the report
suggested it was ‘underlined by the appearance of the widow of one of his most successful
predecessors’. The BBC Nine in a descriptive manner suggested ‘time for a change was the
theme*. Newsnight contextualised the passage as a gesture to old Labour: ‘It was time to
display a little tenderness to old Labour members who often feel unloved by Mr Blair*.
The sixth passage, used by Channel Four News and Newsnight, was 
contextualised as a vision of a new Britain.
Passage 6.
‘Where people succeed on the basis of what they did for their country rather than 
what they take from their country. Not saying “This was a great country”, but 
Britain can and will be a great country again. A country that will build the new 
economy of the future. No more bosses versus workers, partnerships at the work 
place. No more public versus private, co-operation to rebuild our nation’s roads 
and rail and inner city and regions. No more boom and bust economics...’.
Channel Four contextualised the passage in terms of President Kennedy: ‘His language as
he described his vision of Britain as a young country could have been borrowed straight
from President Kennedy*. Newsnight contextualised the passage sceptically in terms of
promises: ‘In a curious phrase he promised a young country. Indeed this man who has
steered clear of firm promises made some rather extravagant ones about new Britain*.
The seventh passage, used by Channel Four and the BBC Nine, was contextualised
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as Blair reaffirming the importance of education and technology.
Passage 7.
‘Education is the best economic policy there is for a modem country. It is in the 
marriage of education and technology that the future lies. The arms race may be 
over, the knowledge race has begun*.
Channel Four interpreted this passage in a descriptive way: ‘The key to the future he
claimed was education and technology*. Similarly the BBC Nine suggested ‘he made
education and technology the key*.
The eighth passage, used by both ITN reports, concerned uses of the windfall tax 
for a welfare to work programme.
Passage 8.
‘And we will use that money too and end up saving money by giving single parents 
the chance not to live on benefits but to plan their future, organise child care and 
training so that they can support themselves and their children*.
This was contextualised as the ‘biggest programme of work and education ever put forward
in Britain*.
The ninth passage, used by both TIN reports, was the closing passage of the speech. 
Passage 9.
‘I will do all that I can to get these Tories out and I will devote every breath that I 
breathe, every sinew of my body, to ensuring that your grandchildren do get to live 
in that new Britain, in a new and better world. New Labour new Britain. The Party 
renewed, the country reborn. New Labour, new Britain*.
This was contextualised by both as a promise ‘to those ordinary people among the flag-
waving crowd on VJ day*.
Table 7.19: Which further passages from the 1995 Labour leader»s_speech 
were used in reports bv bulletin.
(1, Wilson = The introduction of Lord Wilson's widow. 2, Soclism = The leader's definition of Socialism. 
3, Edu'tion = The importance of education. 4, Fam V"lue = Family values. 5, Party Fut're = Labour as the 
party of the future. 6, Trad V'lue = Traditional values. 7, NHS = National Health Service. 8, Europe = The 
party's position on Europe. BBC6 = BBC Six O'clock News; BBC9 = BBC Nine O'clock News; Ch 4 = 
Channel Four News.)
Indentification number of the passage
(Wil­
son)
Newsnight x
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8
V - (Soc- (Edu- (Fam (Party (Trad (NH- (Eur- 
>n  lism) tion) V’lue) Fut’re)V’lue) S) ope)
Ch 4 
BBC 6 
BBC 9
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In addition there were a further eight passages used by the different reports - four by 
Newsnight, two by Channel Four News and one each by the BBC bulletins. Newsnight 
contextualised Blair’s introduction of Lord Wilson’s widow (Mary) in terms of reaching 
out to his own party, ‘which perhaps he has deliberately failed to do over the past year’, 
and as a tribute to Lord Wilson, ‘the last man who won power for Labour*. It used a 
passage on Blair’s definition of socialism, contextualising it in a descriptive way. The 
report used another passage from the speech to illustrate the theme of education and 
technology, suggesting ‘Mr Blair dreamed of surfing the net’. And a passage on the family 
was seen as Blair stating that ‘family values were Labour values’. Channel Four’s report 
used two further quotes to illustrate Blair’s inspiring the next generation and retaining 
traditional values as the party of the family. These were contextualised in terms of ‘trying to 
position Labour as the party of the future* and trying to ‘reclaim some traditional values 
from the Tories’. The BBC Six referenced the passage on his support for the NHS 
suggesting ‘the NHS would become a service again’, and the BBC Nine the passage on the 
party’s position on Europe, which was contextualised as Blair ‘nailing his colours firmly to 
the European mast*.
Comparisons
In 1994 there were a few comparisons made on Channel Four News and Newsnight to 
Gaitskell and his attempt to rewrite Clause 4, but they were not as widespread as the 
comparison to Wilson and Kennedy made in 1995. The contextualising remarks drew 
comparisons between Blair’s speech and that made by former Labour leader Harold 
Wilson in 1963, known generically as the ‘White heat of technology’ speech, and between 
Blair’s language and that of President Kennedy. The BBC Six’s report compared one 
section of the speech dealing with new technology to Wilson’s: ‘Like Harold Wilson he put 
great emphasis on education and technological change*. The Channel Four report made a 
similar link: ‘There were echoes of Harold Wilson’s “white heat of technology” in his 
speech*. The report also made comparisons with Kennedy: ‘Together with an almost 
Kennedyesque appeal to the next generation and patriotism*. The link with Kennedy was 
further emphasised: ‘His language as he described his vision of Britain as a young country 
could have been borrowed straight from President Kennedy*.
The BBC Nine report, like the previous two reports, drew a comparison with 
Wilson. After highlighting the introduction of Wilson’s widow (Mary) to the conference, it 
suggested that the last Labour leader to end a long period of Conservative rule ‘did so 
preaching the white heat of technological change. Mr Blair too suggested the Tories had let 
Britain become a tired old country*. The report further reinforced the comparison: ‘like
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Lord Wilson he made education and technology the key’. Newsnight’s introduction like 
Channel Four’s, drew the comparison between both Wilson and Kennedy: ‘His speech 
tried to cast himself and his party in the mould of Wilson against Douglas Home, Kennedy 
against Nixon....’. The historical comparison was further developed in the report - ‘just as 
Wilson won power from the white heat of technology to drag Britain into the 1960s Mr 
Blair dreamed of Britain surfing the internet’; and then, ‘there was also more than a hint of 
the vision thing, a touch of Kennedy’s Camelot’.
Performance
Table 7.20 shows that the leader's performance was commented on some eleven times in 
reports over the period.
Table 7.20: The number of references in all reports to the performance of
Ch 4 IT N 5.40 ITN10 BBC6 BBC9 NN Total
1993 1 1 1 0 0 0 3
1994 0 0 0 1 0 0 1
1995 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
1996 2 1 1 1 1 1 7
Total 3 2 2 2 1 1 11
(BBC6 = BBC Six O'clock News; BBC9 = BBC Nine O’clock News; ITN5.40 = ITN News at 5.40 PM; 
ITN10 = ITN News at Ten O'clock; Ch 4 = Channel Four News; NN = Newsnight.)
Most of these remarks were focused on the Labour leader’s 1996 speech. Overall there 
were marginally more references to the leader’s performance on ITN than on the main BBC 
bulletins. However, there were no references to Blair’s performance in reports in 1995.
Reception
The reports on the Labour leader’s speech were also keen to convey the reception the 
speech received from the audience in the conference hall. Table 7.21 (next page) shows that 
there was frequent reference to audience reception.
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Table 7.21; The number of references in all reports to the reception of the 
LabouiU eader’s speeches bv bulletin and year 1993-1996.
BBC9 Ch 4 ITN10 ITN 5.40 BBC6 NN Total
1993 1 1 1 1 1 1 6
1994 2 3 1 0 0 0 6
1995 2 0 2 1 1 1 7
1996 1 1 1 1 1 0 5
Total 6 5 5 3 3 2 24
(BBC6 = BBC Six O'clock News; BBC9 = BBC Nine O'clock News; ITN5.40 = ITN News at 5.40 PM; 
ITN 10 = ITN News at Ten O’clock; Ch 4 = Channel Four News; NN = Newsnight.)
The late evening bulletins made more references than the early evening bulletins, with the 
exception of Newsnight which made the fewest. In addition to the noted references to the 
reception of individual passages of the 1995 speech, four of six reports referenced the 
speech’s overall reception. The BBC Six’s report suggested: ‘...there was of course a long 
standing ovation*. The BBC Nine’s said that ‘the hour-long marathon won Labour’s leader 
rave reviews from most of his audience’. News at Ten noted that ‘its reception inside the 
hall confirmed the extent to which Mr Blair is carrying his party with him’. And Newsnight 
somewhat disdainfully pointed to an ‘...inevitable standing ovation’ and argued that 
‘rhetoric that would have offended and shocked this conference a few years ago now 
genuinely pleased most here’.
Reactions
As well as referencing reception, the reports also indexed reactions to the speech by other 
actors.
Table 7.22: The number of indexed reactions in all reports to the Labour 
leader’s speeches bv year 1993-1996.
Positive Negative Neut
1993 1 2 2
1994 14 13 1
1995 8 2 0
1996 5 1 0
Total 28 18 3
Table 7.22 shows that the majority of reactions initiated after the Labour leader’s speeches 
were positive. There was a high proportion of negative reaction indexed by journalists, 
particularly after the 1994 conference, which contained Blair’s announcement that he had
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decided to rewrite Clause 4 of the party’s constitution. In 1995 Channel Four’s report 
indexed the reactions of two delegates and Diane Abbott MP, all positive; BBC Nine used 
three delegates, two positive, one negative. Newsnight’s report suggested that ‘critical 
voices were hard to find’ and carried positive reactions to the speech from Harriet Hannan 
(Shadow Social Security Secretary), Claire Short MP and a delegate, and a negative 
reaction from another delegate. In addition the BBC Six and Nine’s report referred to the 
critical reactions of both Brian Mawhinney, the Conservative Party Chairman, and Alan 
Beith for the Liberal Democrats. Channel Four referred to the ‘Tories dismissing it as little 
more than retitled version of Labour in '45 and ’64’. News at Ten noted that the ‘Tories 
dismissed it as nothing new, the same old plan for dismantling Tory success’.
Concluding Remarks
Overall there was no single theme to the reports’ concluding remarks, which focused on a 
mix of policy substance, party positioning and evaluating the success of the speech. The 
BBC Six’s concluding remarks suggested that the speech had reaffirmed Mr Blair’s 
position within the party and returned to the theme of policy substance. ‘Mr Blair has 
managed to consolidate his position as a strong party leader’. The consolidation of his 
position was further underlined by referring to the defeat of the left: ‘Earlier the left of the 
party were easily defeated over the dropping of the left-winger Liz Davies... ’. In terms of 
policy substance the report was slightly sceptical, suggesting that ‘In some areas, in 
particular over the overall balance between tax and spending, Mr Blair has not been 
specific. But at least for the party faithful here, he’s provided plenty of fresh ammunition to 
use against the Tories’.
Channel Four’s concluding remarks contextualised the speech in terms of policy 
substance pleasing the party: ‘The party has been looking for reassurance and they got it in 
the form of a policy commitment*. In addition it suggested that Blair had ‘succeeded in 
going some way to answer what Labour will do with power, without making costly 
commitments...*. But the speech was also seen in terms of positioning the party and 
electoral competition: ‘What is important in the long term is how he positions Labour as the 
party of the future. For now, there is no question of the Tories changing leader, so that 
could be a difficult strategy for the government to counter*.
The BBC Nine’s concluding remarks ignored the question of policy substance, 
summing up the speech as a personal triumph: ‘Tonight Mr Blair and his colleagues can 
afford to grin [...]. A compliant party occasionally swallowing hard has its sights on the 
next election*. It further characterised the speech as ‘stamped through with Christian
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Socialism, even prayer book language’, suggesting that it had ‘pressed nearly all the right 
buttons, while reassuring middle England with firm words on crime and the family*.
The UN 5.40 and News at Ten’s report contextualised the speech in terms of party 
competition: ‘Every word was meant to reflect Tony Blair’s belief that Labour can replace 
the Tories because Labour’s moral purpose is higher, their vision for Britain clearer*. In 
addition the concluding remarks focused on an imagined Blair response to Conservative 
attacks: ‘First he would say that in his view it’s a patriotic thing to do, to try and change the 
country, not a destructive one. And secondly, he was playing for all it’s worth the feeling 
that he has that up and down the country people are saying “It’s time for a change’” . 
Newsnight's concluding remarks suggested that ‘he had soothed a party that was beginning 
to get a little restless, and set out a strong vision*. Yet it also suggested that there were 
potential problems ahead: ‘But trying to prove that Mr Blair can afford to build what he 
calls a young country may still prove to be more awkward’.
Additional News Items
Over a period of four leader’s speeches there was a total of eleven two-ways, which Table 
7.23 shows distributed across different bulletins.
lafrlg  7i33; The number of two-wavs on the Labour leader’s speeches bv
year 1993-1996.
NN ITN 5.40 BBC9 BBC6 Ch 4 ITN10 Total
1993 1 1 1 0 1 0 4
1994 0 1 1 1 0 1 4
1995 1 0 0 0 0 0 1
1996 1 1 0 0 0 0 2
Total 3 3 2 1 1 1 11
(BBC6 = BBC Six O’clock News; BBC9 = BBC Nine O’clock News; ITN5.40 = ITN News at 5.40 PM; 
ITN10 = ITN News at Ten O'clock; Ch 4 = Channel Four News; NN = Newsnight.)
There were no strong differences in the use of two-ways between the broadcasters. As with 
the coverage of debates, the function of two-ways after the leader's speech was to elaborate 
further upon different elements of the speech's content, prompted by the anchor’s 
questions, and focus either on an explanation of a particular part of the speech or on 
speculation. In 1995 the only two-way was on Newsnight between the anchor Jeremy 
Paxman and the political pundit Peter Kellner. There were three questions in total, two of 
which on the leader’s speech both required some form of speculation by Kellner. The first
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question concerned the accuracy of widely made comparisons between Blair’s speech and 
Harold Wilson’s ‘White heat of technology’ speech in 1963. Kellner suggested that the 
parallel ‘was striking’. He elaborated on the comparison, suggesting that Wilson too had 
set out ‘the marriage of technology and education’, but that orthodox economic policies 
(such as the defence of the pound) then undermined the policies’ impact in government. He 
speculated that there were similar worries about whether Blair could ‘fight off similar 
economic orthodoxies*. It was a question, he suggested, ‘hanging in the air*. In the second 
question Paxman asked whether Blair in his speech had put enough ‘flesh on the bones’. 
Kellner suggested he had, but speculated whether or not it was a full policy package. ‘If 
these are all the polices, then it may be enough. If there are more to come, where are they’?
Spinning
Table 7.24 shows that News at Ten carried a trailed extract from the leader’s speech in 
every conference report. The other bulletins seemed to consider trailed information less 
deserving of coverage, unless the extracts were particularly newsworthy.
Table_?.24: The number of news items containing trailed information on the 
Labour leader’s speeches bv year 1993-1996.
ITN10 BBC6 Ch 4 BBC9 ITN 5.40 NN Total
1993 1 0 0 0 0 0 1
1994 1 0 0 0 0 0 1
1995 1 0 1 1 0 0 3
1996 1 1 0 0 0 0 2
Total 4 1 1 1 0 0 7
(BBC6 = BBC Six O'clock News; BBC9 = BBC Nine O'clock News; ITN5.40 = ITN News at 5.40 PM; 
ITN 10 = ITN News at Ten O'clock; Ch 4 = Channel Four News; NN = Newsnight.)
There were three trails from the 1995 speech reported on Channel Four, the BBC Nine and 
News at Ten. Channel Four suggested: ‘He’ll be asking voters to make the same choice as 
he asked Labour to make last year, i.e. decline or modernise. And he’ll try to link Labour 
with the majority and say the Tories represent the minority’. The BBC Nine suggested that 
‘tomorrow Mr Blair... will spell out more detail on class sizes and help for single parents. 
He will argue that the Tories have allowed Britain to become old and tired, and challenge its 
people to a supreme national effort under a Labour government*. News at Ten noted with 
mixed metaphors that Blair would ‘play one particular string of the political violin for all its 
worth tomorrow and it’s the string called “time for a change” .... So Mr Blair is not only 
going to say that under the Tories Britain is old and tired, but he’ll also go on to say that
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it’s up now to a new generation, as he puts it, and a newly revitalised Labour party, to lead 
Britain on the long climb into the premier league’.
In addition the news broadcasters produced seven pegged items on the contents of 
the Labour leader’s four speeches. None of the pegged items were produced by bulletins in 
the early evening, but all the other programmes used them, with Newsnight producing the 
most pegged reports. This pattern shows there was little co-operation between Labour’s 
strategists and the broadcasters.
Table 7.25: The number of pegged items on the Labour leader’s speeches
bv year 1993-1996.
NN BBC9 ITN10 Ch 4 ITN 5.40 BBC6 Total
1993 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
1994 2 1 1 1 0 0 5
1995 0 1 0 0 0 0 1
1996 1 0 0 0 0 0 1
Total 3 2 1 1 0 0 7
(BBC6 = BBC Six O'clock News; BBC9 = BBC Nine O’clock News; ITN5.40 = ITN News at 5.40 PM; 
ITN 10 = ITN News at Ten O'clock; Ch 4 = Channel Four News; NN = Newsnight.)
In fact the majority of the pegged reports were produced in 1994 after Blair’s 
announcement of the intention to rewrite Clause 4 of the party’s constitution, which was 
given no prior publicity at all. There was only one pegged item for each of the other 
speeches. In 1995 the only pegged item was produced by the BBC Nine: it examined the 
background to Blair’s pledge to connect schools and hospitals to the internet courtesy of 
British Telecom.
A wide range of individuals were interviewed by the two bulletins, not just 
members of the Labour leadership who had been offered for interviews. There was a total 
of nine interviews between 1993 and 1996 after the leader’s speech, all on Channel Four 
News and Newsnight. On Channel Four in 1993 there was one joint interview with Bill 
Morris and Robin Cook, and in 1994 there was another with Peter Mandelson, Dennis 
Skinner and John Edmonds. Further interviews in 1995 were with John Prescott and 
another with Robin Cook in 1996. John Prescott was interviewed every year by 
Newsnight, who also produced one interview with three members of the general public in 
1994 to solicit their comments on Tony Blair’s speech and whether they would be tempted 
to vote for him.
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7.3 The Conservative Leader’s Speech
The Conservative leader’s speech was treated particularly seriously and was the lead story 
on every bulletin throughout the period of study.
At the 1995 Conservative conference journalists selected a small number of extracts which 
would be incorporated into a report Table 7.26 shows the average number of these extracts 
contained within the reports.
Table 7.26: The mean num ber of passages used from the Conservative 
leader’s speeches 1993-1996.
Ch 4 BBC6 BBC9 NN ITN 5.40 ITN10
(Stdv = Standard deviation. BBC6 = BBC Six O’clock News; BBC9 = BBC Nine O’clock News; ITN5.40 = 
ITN News at 5.40 PM; ITN 10 = ITN News at Ten O'clock; Ch 4 = Channel Four News; NN = Newsnight)
Table 7.26 shows that Channel Four News provided the greatest number of extracts from 
Major’s speeches and that the BBC Six and Nine used more extracts than both ITN 
bulletins and Newsnight. The mean lengths of these extracts are shown by programme in 
Table 7.27.
Table 7.27: The mean length of soundbites (in seconds) in reports on the 
Conservative leader’s speeches 1993-1996.
NN ITN10 ITN 5.40 Ch 4 BBC9 BBC6 Av
Mean 1993-96 25 23 21 19 16 14 20
Stdv 8.5 9.6 9.7 8.6 6.9 6.1 8.5
(Stdv = Standard deviation. BBC6 = BBC Six O'clock News; BBC9 = BBC Nine O’clock News; ITN5.40 = 
ITN News at 5.40 PM; ITN10 = ITN News at Ten O'clock; Ch 4 = Channel Four News; NN = Newsnight.)
Newsnight provided the longest soundbites, while the BBC Six and Nine contained the 
briefest ones, some five seconds shorter than their rivals ITN. Interestingly, the soundbites 
on Channel Four News’s reports were shorter than those on the briefer ITN reports. Tables 
7.26 and 7.27 together reveal that again the BBC Six and Nine used more extracts from 
Major’s speeches but shorter ones than both ITN bulletins, with Newsnight using fewer
Selection
Mean 1993-96 
Stdv
11 9 9 8 7
1.3 1.8 2.2 1.3 1.5
7
1.5
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extracts but of greater length than Channel Four News.
Table 7.28 shows which passages from the Conservative leader’s speech were 
selected in reports on the 1995 conference.
Table 7.28: Which passages from the 1995 Conservative leader’s speech 
were used in reports bv bulletin.
Identification number of the passage
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9
(More (Eur- (My (Edu- (Win (Care (Ser- (Tax (Devol-
police) ope) dad) tion) Elec) Cons) ving) cuts) ut’n)
ITN 5.40 X X X X X
BBC 6 X X X X X X
Ch 4 X X X X X X X X
BBC 9 X X X X X X
ITN 10 X X X X X X
Newsnight X X X X X X
(1, More Police = 5000 extra police on the beat. 2, Europe = Party policy on Europe. 3, My dad = The 
leader’s father. 4, Edu’tion = More state assisted places for private schools. 5, Win Elec = A pledge to keep 
on winning general elections. 6, Care Cons = Caring Conservatism. 7, Serving = Serving the nation. 8, 
Tax cuts = A pledge to reduce taxes. 9, Devolut'n = An attack on Labour’s plans for devolution. BBC 6 = 
BBC Six O’clock News; BBC 9 = BBC Nine O'clock News; ITN 5.40 = ITN News at 5.40 PM; ITN 10 = 
ITN News at Ten O’clock; Ch 4 = Channel Four News.)
A total of 17 passages were used, nine of which were used by more than one news report. 
The most important passages were deemed to be those that involved the announcement of 
new policy, the position of the party on Europe and Major’s personal history.
Context
All the reports’ introductions summarised the main announcements in the speech and 
sought to contextualise the speech as the plan or formula on which Major would fight the 
next election. The BBC Six’s introduction suggested that the speech contained Major’s 
‘plan for winning the next election’ and also ‘highlighted clear policy differences with Tony 
Blair’s party...’. Channel Four’s introduction suggested it represented ‘John Major’s 
manifesto’. The BBC Nine’s introduction contextualised the speech as one in which he had 
‘spelled out the issues on which he’ll fight Tony Blair at the next election*. The ITN 5.40 
and News at Ten introduction contextualised the speech as one in which Major had
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‘stamped his personality and priorities on the... party today...’. Newsnight’s introduction 
was slightly sceptical in tone. It suggested that Mr Major had promised ‘tough choices* on 
public spending and taxation ‘but the week has ended without any clear hint of how he*s 
going to do that*. The introduction suggested the announcements were aimed at persuading 
voters that the party could still come up with ‘election-winning ideas* but posed a question: 
‘But was there really a big new idea to captivate the electorate?*.
The first passage extracted by all reports except Newsnight concerned the 
announcement of extra police on the beat; this was contextualised in terms of its popularity 
with the Tory representatives.
Passage 1.
‘We have found the resources over the next three years to put not 500 but an extra 
5000 police officers on the beat*.
The BBC Six suggested this was ‘another popular announcement*. Channel Four
contextualised the passage as part of a wider series of measures: ‘He announced new
measures to allow the security services to join the fight against drug trafficking, a new
national police squad and more policemen*. The BBC Nine contextualised the
announcement in terms of a ‘rightward drift* and its reception: ‘Policy reflected the
rightward drift this week of Toiy rhetoric. A promise to get the security services involved
in fighting crime brought cheers. So did this announcement*. The ITN 5.40 and News at
Ten contextualised the passage as a major announcement, more substantial than a promise
made by Blair and popular with the audience: ‘For those who have been asking all week
“Where’s the big one?” they now had the answer... Well, that announcement topping Tony
Blair’s promise of three thousand more constables over five years was for many
representatives not just the best thing in the speech but the best announcement of the week*.
Newsnight merely described the passage’s content: ‘then a series of announcements on law
and order, five thousand more bobbies on the beat, MI5 to fight organised crime, possibly
a national police force*.
The second passage, used by all except Newsnight, was on the Conservative 
party’s position on Europe.
Passage 2.
‘If we want to persuade our partners that their policies for Europe are wrong, and I 
passionately believe that many of their policies for Europe are wrong, then we must 
use our imagination to understand their feelings and their motives. But underneath 
the rational argument we should not be misunderstood. If others go federalist, 
Conservative Britain will not*.
The BBC Six contextualised the passage in terms of the representatives' response: ‘On
Europe some would have preferred a more strident tone, even though he gave a firm “No”
to federalism*. Channel Four contextualised the passage as dealing with the ‘potentially
most difficult issue’, and in terms of Michael Portillo the Defence Secretary's speech earlier
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in the week: ‘In a polite rebuke to Mr Portillo he said Britain must advocate its arguments 
courteously*. The BBC Nine comments were descriptive, suggesting that the passage was 
a ‘firm warning on Europe that a Tory Britain would have no truck with ending border 
controls or signing the Social Chapter, we must understand the motivations of our 
European partners and argue courteously*. The ITN 5.40 and News at Ten contextualised 
the passage in terms of the positive response of the representatives: ‘The message on 
Europe pleased this audience too*.
The third passage, about Major’s father, was used by all the reports, because 
journalists saw it as an insight into Major ‘the man* and his background.
Passage 3.
‘He made garden ornaments forty years ago. Some people have always found that 
rather humorous. I don’t. I see the proud, stubborn, independent old man I love, 
who ran that firm and taught me to love my country, fight for my beliefs and spit in 
the eye of malign fate. And I know the knockers and the sneerers who may never 
have taken a risk in their comfortable lives aren’t fit to wipe the boots of the risk 
takers of Britain*.
The BBC Six contextualised the passage in terms of a comparison between Blair and 
Major: ‘Mr Major as a candidate was contrasted with Mr Blair. He the public school 
educated socialist, Mr Major the son of a small business man*. Channel Four suggested the 
passage showed Major making ‘much of his own inheritance or lack of it... and recalling 
his own father’s struggles as a small businessman making garden gnomes*. The BBC Nine 
saw the passage as an attempt to revive the ‘core Tory vote’, using ‘his personal experience 
to demonstrate sympathy with key sectors like small business...*. The ITN 5.40 and News 
at Ten emphasised the emotion of the passage, suggesting that there were ‘tears almost as 
he spoke of the struggle his father had in running a small business... Well, both Mrs Major 
and the Prime Minister, first biting his lip, and then as the applause continued clearly seen 
dabbing at his eyes, they seemed to have quite a struggle with their emotions at this stage*. 
Newsnight saw the passage in marketing terms, drawing comparisons with Blair: ‘The next 
step selling Major the man. Unspoken the comparison of John Major, the ordinary bloke, 
with Tony Blair, the public school socialist. Mr Major reminded his audience his father 
made garden gnomes’.
The fourth passage used was about education policy and the pledge to extend the 
assisted places scheme.
Passage 4.
‘It helps children from lower income homes to go to our best private schools and it 
has been a magnificent success. But Labour hate it, hate it. And that’s true to form. 
They always claim to want to help people, but in return they demand that people 
know their place if they happen to have been helped. In Labour’s view there is no 
place for children of low income families in private schools, no place. So they want 
to abolish the scheme outright. Labour’s message to them is “no choice for the 
poor ...
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The BBC Six contextualised this passage in terms of Labour’s policy on assisted places: 
‘On education Mr Major promised to double the number of assisted places at private 
schools - Labour want to abolish the scheme altogether’. Channel Four similarly drew a 
comparison with Labour’s policy, suggesting it was an attempt to ‘undermine Labour’s 
claims to be the party of standards and choice. While Labour last week said that it would 
scrap the assisted places scheme, he said he would double it’. The BBC Nine personalised 
the comparison: ‘Mr Major announced the doubling of the assisted places scheme for 
sending children from poor homes to private schools, the scheme Mr Blair last week 
vowed to scrap...*. The ITN 5.40 and News at Ten contextualised the passage in terms of 
the popularity of the announcement and the reaction of ministers, suggesting that the 
popularity of the announcement of more bobbies on the beat was almost matched by ‘news 
about the assisted places scheme., a delighted Education Secretary signalled to William 
Waldegrave, the holder of the Treasury purse strings, that he’d have to find the money 
now’. Newsnight suggested the passage was designed ‘to catch Labour out’ and contrasted 
it with Labour policy: ‘Singling out Mr Blair’s old public school, Mr Major said he would 
double the number of pupils that the state sends to private schools - Labour would abolish 
the scheme*.
The fifth passage, used by both BBC reports and Channel Four, involved elements 
of humour, with Major’s pledge to keep on winning elections in the future.
Passage 5.
‘We’ve won four and we’re going for five, then six, and then seven. And then 
we’ll think again*.
The BBC Six contextualised the passage as an ‘unashamedly traditional’ appeal: ‘they 
would wave the flag as they always had, and they would win elections as they always 
had*. For Channel Four it was part of Major’s strategy to ‘convince them that he had a 
strategy for winning the next election*. The BBC Nine contextualised the passage as 
evidence of his new-found confidence, ‘boosted by the leadership election gamble in the 
summer that has given him a new authority*.
The sixth passage, used by Channel Four, the BBC Nine and Newsnight, was 
contextualised in terms of the theme of caring Conservatism.
Passage 6.
‘If there’s one thing in our Tory tradition that inspires me, that helped bring me into 
this party, I’ll tell you what it was. It was our historic recognition that not everyone 
is thrusting and confident and fit. Many are not and they deserve our protection. 
With a Conservative government they can always be certain of getting that 
protection now and in the future*.
Channel Four contextualised the passage in terms of a criticism made by a defecting MP the
same week: ‘He didn’t mention the defection this week of a Tory MP to Labour, but the
sub-text of his speech was a rejection of Alan Howarth’s claim that he had abandoned
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traditional caring Conservatism*. The BBC Nine contextualised the passage in terms of 
ideological positioning: ‘But Mr Major insists that his position is still on the One Nation 
centre ground of politics*. Newsnight saw the passage somewhat sceptically in terms of a 
curious vision: ‘If Mr Major did express a vision it was a curious amalgam, of Britain as 
the low tax Hong Kong of Europe, combined with caring, comforting One Nation 
Conservatism*.
The seventh passage, used by all except the BBC 1 reports, was the final section of 
the speech.
Passage 7.
‘We carry the scars of battle, that is true. But they are honourable scars. We know 
that no other party can win the battles for Britain that lie ahead. Our nation’s future 
is at stake and we Conservatives have served our country in office for longer and 
better than any other democratic political party in the world. We Conservatives are 
here, and in the future we Conservatives stand ready to serve on behalf of the 
nation we love*.
Channel Four contextualised it as an attack on Labour: ‘Mr Major predicted that Labour 
would make a lightweight alternative*. The ITN 5.40 and News at Ten contextualised it 
through a comparison with the emotion of Major’s personal memories: ‘at the end of the 
speech it was all quite different as Mr Major talked of the Tory record*. For Newsnight it 
was part of the marketing for the next election: ‘all part of a package the Tories hope will 
woo voters*.
The eighth passage, used by Channel Four, News at Ten and Newsnight, 
concerned the pledge to reduce taxes at an unspecified future date.
Passage 8.
‘In recession we had to put up taxes to protect the vulnerable. Now the recession is 
over and, as Ken Clarke said, as soon as is prudent, but not before, we must get 
those taxes down again. But be in no doubt, I don’t only mean income tax. I mean 
taxes that damage investment and stultify wealth creation. I mean inheritance tax 
and I mean capital gains tax as well*.
This was contextualised by Channel Four in terms of the ‘enterprise centre of Europe’,
based on lower public spending ‘and, to the pleasure of representatives, lower taxation*.
News at Ten contextualised it in these terms: ‘with the Chancellor listening, Mr Major said
taxes must come down*. Newsnight noted only: ‘he said taxes would be cut and not just
income tax*.
The ninth passage, used by BBC Six and Newsnight, was an attack on Labour’s 
plans for devolution.
Passage 9.
‘These are not distant problems to be tossed aside while we wony about day-to-day 
matters of politics. These are Labour’s plans for the first year of the Labour 
government if they won the election. So take the message of danger to every 
doorstep in every part of our once united Kingdom*.
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The BBC Six contextualised the passage in terms of Major’s strong feelings for the Union: 
‘It was over the constitution that Mr Major reserved his strongest fire power... Labour 
were threatening the United Kingdom itself. Newsnight contextualised it as an attack: ‘On 
the constitution he admitted there was a clamour for change in Scotland but denounced 
Labour’s plans’.
Table 7.29: Which further passages from the 1995 Conservative leader’s 
sneech were used in reports hv bulletin.
(1, Vic Cross = Increased annual payments to Victoria Cross holders. 2, Crit Lab = A critique of Labour 
policy. 3, Passion = Passion for politics. 4, Drug use = An attack on drug dealers. 5, Nat Squad = 
Formation of the National Crime Squad. 6, Record = The party’s economic record. 7, Spnd cuts = 
Government spending cuts. 9, Welfare = The importance of welfare. BBC6 = BBC Six O’clock News; 
BBC9 = BBC Nine O’clock News; ITN10 = News at Ten; Ch 4 = Channel Four News.)
There were eight further passages used by the different reports, mostly Newsnight. The 
BBC Six indexed the policy announcement of an increase in the annual payment to holders 
of the Victoria and George Cross, contextualising it in terms of patriotism and the audience 
reception: ‘Patriotism of various forms was highlighted, with the warmest applause going 
to the increase in annual payment for holders of the Victoria Cross’. Channel Four 
highlighted Major’s attack on Labour policy for ‘double think’, contextualised in terms of 
Labour hypocrisy. The BBC Nine used another passage to illustrate Major’s passion. 
News at Ten indexed Major’s attack on drug dealers and his announcement of the 
formation of a national crime squad, contextualising the passage as heartfelt, giving a 
greater insight into Major ‘the man’. Newsnight used passages on the Conservatives’ 
economic record, Major’s vision of lower government spending and his belief in the 
importance of welfare. These were contextualised in terms of the forthcoming election 
campaign.
BBC 6 
Ch 4 
BBC 9 
ITN 10
Newsnight
Identification number of the passage
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Performance
In all the reports on the Conservative leader's speech over four years, there were 14 
comments on the performance of the leader (see Table 7.30).
Table 7.30; The number of references in all reports to the performance of 
the Conservative leader in making his speech bv bulletin and vear 1993-
199G'
BBC9 BBC6 NN Ch 4 ITN10 ITN 5.40 Total
1993 1 1 0 1 0 0 3
1994 1 0 1 1 0 1 4
1995 1 1 1 0 1 0 4
1996 1 1 1 0 0 0 3
Total 4 3 3 2 1 1 14
(BBC6 = BBC Six O'clock News; BBC9 = BBC Nine O'clock News; ITN5.40 = ITN News at 5.40 PM; 
ITN10 = ITN News at Ten O’clock; Ch 4 = Channel Four News; NN = Newsnight)
These remarks were mainly concentrated on the BBC, with the Nine o’clock news 
commenting on Major’s performance after each of the four speeches. In 1995 four out of 
six programmes commented on Major’s performance. The BBC Six report said: ‘Mr Major 
was becoming an old hand at making conference speeches, and this was his best so far*. It 
also suggested that his performance had been strengthened by his leadership victory in the 
summer. News at Ten focused on certain performance-enhancing factors in Major’s 
speech, noting that ‘the Prime Minister had been practising quite hard at varying the tone 
and pace and the content of this year’s speech’. It further emphasised the ‘emotional 
staging’ of the speech: ‘Mr Major decided to step out into the centre of the hall to deliver his 
speech. He wanted to take the audience with him, and those outside the hall too, as he 
made what came across as a more heart-felt speech, giving us a greater insight into the way 
his mind works...’. Newsnight indirectly questioned the inner elite’s line that this was his 
best speech ever: ‘The spin doctors’ big line that this was Mr Major’s best ever speech was 
swallowed by many. There was something here for every vaguely Conservative taste*.
Reception
Reports frequently referred to the reception the speech was given by the conference 
audience. Table 7.31 (next page) shows that there were some 37 references to the 
representatives' reception of the leader’s speech. While the ‘clapometer* was used during 
the week by the broadcasters, it was never used to register the reception given to the
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leader’s speech.
Table 7.31: The number of references in all reports to the reception of the 
Conservative leader’s speeches bv bulletin and year 1993-1996.
Ch 4 ITN 5.40 ITN10 BBC6 BBC9 NN Total
1993 2 1 0 1 2 1 7
1994 2 1 2 1 0 1 7
1995 4 3 3 3 1 0 14
1996 1 3 3 1 0 1 9
Total 9 8 8 6 3 3 37
(BBC6 = BBC Six O'clock News; BBC9 = BBC Nine O’clock News; ITN5.40 = ITN News at 5.40 PM; 
ITN10 = ITN News at Ten O’clock; Ch 4 = Channel Four News; NN = Newsnight)
ITN mentioned the reception of the leader’s speech more often than the BBC reports, and 
there was a divergence between the two longer programmes, Channel Four News 
mentioning reception most and Newsnight least In addition to comments on audience 
reception for certain passages of the speech already noted, three broadcasters referenced the 
overall reception of the 1995 speech. Channel Four’s report focused on the audience 
response at the beginning: ‘Mr Major’s arrival on stage was delayed until he’d heard 
whether he’d won the Nobel peace prize. He hadn’t, but that didn’t take the enthusiasm out 
of his reception from the representatives, who wanted to demonstrate to the watching world 
that the divisions of the leadership struggle were over*. It also noted the conference’s final 
response: ‘The representatives waved their flags in defiance of Tony Blair’s claim last 
week that their treatment of the nation denies them the right to do so’. The BBC Nine 
suggested ‘the audience loved his sharper new style’. Similarly, News at Ten said that the 
audience ‘loved the speech’, but added: ‘they always, do of course’.
Reactions
Many reports also indexed favourable reactions of various actors to the speeches (see Table 
7.32).
Table 7.32: The num ber of indexed reactions in all reports to the 
Conservative lead e rs  speeches bv year 1993-1996.
Positive Negative Neutral
1993 11 0 3
1994 10 0 0
1995 5 0 2
1996 2 0 0
Total 28 0 5
234
There were no negative reactions indexed This pattern was especially marked in 1993 and 
1994, but in 1995 only Channel Four and Newsnight included any reactions to the speech. 
Channel Four carried three positive reactions from representatives. Newsnight’s report 
sought positive reactions from two representatives, and neutral reactions from Andrew 
Lansley, former head of the Conservative Central Office research department, and Trevor 
Kavanagh, political editor of the Sun. In addition the BBC Six referred to the critical 
reactions of John Prescott, Paddy Ashdown and Alex Salmond, and the BBC Nine, to the 
reactions of Prescott and Ashdown. News at Ten referenced John Prescott’s attack and 
Channel Four a general Labour critique.
Concluding Remarks
Overall, the concluding remarks focused on several themes. The speech was seen largely in 
terms of repositioning the Conservatives in policy terms and raising the morale of the 
representatives in the face of the looming general election. The BBC Six’s concluding 
remarks focused on the speech’s target audience: ‘Mr Major’s whole speech was directed at 
the election campaign to come. And unlike many of the speeches this week, it was aimed at 
the electorate outside the hall as well as the party faithful*. Its aim was contextualised as an 
attempt to reposition the Conservatives: ‘The Prime Minister with his brand of ‘one nation’ 
Toryism wants to reclaim the centre ground from Mr Blair*. It was also seen as an attempt 
to move the political ‘goal posts’, ‘so that if Mr Blair is tempted onto the Tories’ new 
territory he would have to move further to the right*. Channel Four’s report similarly 
contextualised the speech as a formula for ‘reclaiming the centre ground from Mr Blair*, 
but also alluded to the attempt to open up a difference with Labour on certain policy areas: 
‘Education is obviously one area in which the Tories believe they can open up “clear blue 
water” with Labour*, and ‘the Conservatives intend opening up divisions with Labour over 
law and order*. Finally the report hinted at the enormity of the task: ‘The Tory party want 
to rally behind John Major. The road to victory will be very long indeed*. The BBC Nine’s 
concluding remarks suggested that ‘Mr Major is now fully in charge’ and that Major had 
‘focused forward to the millennium, not back to the past*. It saw the speech as giving the 
representatives ‘back some self belief, and the hope that (with two budgets to come) they 
can yet get back into election-winning form*. As with the previous year, the BBC’s 
political editor Oakley generally summed up all three conferences as ‘successes’.
The ITN main channel programmes’ concluding remarks emphasised the upbeat 
ending of the conference week: ‘This year the representatives here, and the party at large, 
had wanted something to bite on. And with the law and order package, a week which had 
started slowly, tensely, ended with satisfaction and a bit of fun*. News at Ten went further,
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suggesting that the representatives ‘agreed with the Prime Minister, that the party had been 
united, renewed and healed*. Newsnight*s concluding remarks contextualised the speech in 
terms of the forthcoming election. They insinuated that Major had only just started to 
respond effectively to Labour: ‘The conference season at an end, the Tories seem to be 
getting rid of the debris of three years of infighting. They are only just starting to respond 
more effectively to Labour*. But it further derisively suggested that ‘they’ve lost the trust of 
the nation, and it may be difficult persuading the voters to return to the fold*.
Over a period of four leader’s speeches there was a total of ten two-ways (see Table
7.33).
Table 7.33: The number of two-wavs on the Conservative leader’s speeches 
bv year 1993-1996.
BBC6 ITN 5.40 Ch 4 BBC9 ITN10 NN Total
1993 1 1 1 1 0 0 4
1994 1 1 0 0 1 0 3
1995 1 0 0 0 0 0 1
1996 1 1 0 0 0 0 2
Total 4 3 1 1 1 0 10
(BBC6 = BBC Six O’clock News; BBC9 = BBC Nine O’clock News; ITN5.40 = ITN News at 5.40 PM; 
ITN10 = ITN News at Ten O’clock; Ch 4 = Channel Four News; NN = Newsnight.)
Two-ways were the main way of extending coverage of the Tory leader’s speech on the 
early evening bulletins; later bulletins featured only one two-way each, and Newsnight 
none at all. A two-way after the 1995 speech on the BBC Six involved the political editor 
Robin Oakley in both explaining and speculating. The first question from the anchor asked 
whether or not the ‘choice facing the electorate [had] become any clearer as a result of the 
speeches?* Oakley said he thought it had, and outlined briefly the main themes of Major’s 
and Blair’s speeches. He suggested that differences between them were ‘sharpening up’, 
before listing a series of issues on which policy differed. He concluded that there was a 
‘real raft of differences* between the two parties. The second question was in two parts, 
first inquiring whether ‘we are in for an eighteen-month campaign?’ and second whether 
there was ‘any politician who expected the opinion poll gap to stay thirty points?*. Oakley 
speculated that ‘we are in for an eighteen-month campaign’ and that it would be rough. To 
the second part of the question he speculated that ‘all parties expect the gap between Labour 
and the Tories to close*. Blair was not being complacent and the Conservatives could use 
the two budgets before the election to make themselves more popular.
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Spinning
There was a deliberate attempt to trail extracts from the leader’s speech in 1995. A
Conservative source recalled:
‘Thursday night I went round and I talked to all the broadcasters who would be 
putting out programmes in the morning and gave them the story of assisted places 
being doubled'l6.
Table 7.34: The number of news items contianing trailed information on the 
Conservative leader’s speeches bv year 1993-1996.
ITN10 BBC9 NN ITN 5.40 BBC6 Ch 4 Total
1993 2 1 0 0 0 0 3
1994 1 1 0 0 0 0 2
1995 1 1 2 0 0 0 4
1996 1 0 0 0 0 0 1
Total 5 3 2 0 0 0 10
(BBC6 = BBC Six O'clock News; BBC9 = BBC Nine O'clock News; ITN5.40 = ITN News at 5.40 PM; 
ITN10 = ITN News at Ten O'clock; Ch 4 = Channel Four News; NN = Newsnight.)
Looking at the evening and night-time bulletins, Table 7.34 shows that the trailing of 
information from Major’s speeches was fairly consistent, but focused on the late bulletins 
on ITN and BBC. In 1995 extracts from Major’s speech were trailed on the BBC Nine, 
News at Ten and Newsnight. The BBC Nine noted that ‘the Prime minister is expected to 
make law and order one of the main themes of his leader’s speech to the party conference 
tomorrow’. News at Ten said ‘Tomorrow Mr Major will... draw together the theme for the 
week. He’ll say once again that taxes must come down. And he’ll set out what he sees as 
the choice for Britain as it enters the twenty-first century - in hock with Europe with the 
other parties; leading Europe (he will claim) with the Conservatives’. Trailed information 
was also used on Newsnight in a report which noted that ‘politicians have recognised the 
fear of crime as an important area to deal with. Mr Major will promise to hit harder and 
harder in his speech tomorrow’. In a two-way the correspondent said: ‘What we are told is 
that he’ll concentrate on crime. They very much say the same sort of things as Michael 
Howard. And on the economy he’ll say that Britain has to be ready to fight those Asian 
tiger nations, and he will talk about a low-tax, low-spend economy’. In the event these 
were indeed key parts of Major’s speech.
There were 14 pegged items on the policy announcements raised in the leader’s 
speeches over the four years.
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Table 7.35; The number of pegged items on the Conservative leader’s
speeches bv year 1993-1996.
NN Ch 4 BBC9 BBC6 ITN10 ITN 5.40 Total
1993 1 0 1 0 0 0 2
1994 1 1 1 1 0 0 4
1995 1 2 1 1 0 0 5
1996 2 0 0 0 1 0 3
Total 5 3 3 2 1 0 14
(BBC6 = BBC Six O'clock News; BBC9 = BBC Nine O’clock News; ITN5.40 = ITN News at 5.40 PM; 
ITN10 = ITN News at Ten O’clock; Ch 4 = Channel Four News; NN = Newsnight.)
The largest number of pegged reports were produced by Newsnight, and the BBC 
produced a greater number of pegged reports than ITN. There were five pegged reports on 
the contents of the 1995 speech. All soought to expand further upon two announcements 
made in the speech. Both BBC bulletins, Channel Four and Newsnight produced an 
additional report on the speech’s main policy announcement, the formation of a national 
crime squad; and Channel Four News produced a further report on the planned expansion 
of the assisted places scheme.
There were nine interviews around Major’s speeches, all on Channel Four News 
and Newsnight. Channel Four News in 1993 interviewed Douglas Hurd (Foreign 
Secretary) and Peter Lilley (Social Security Secretary). They interviewed Lilley again in 
1994 and Steven Dorrell (Heritage Secretary). In 1995 they produced a joint interview with 
Charles Moore (editor of the Daily Telegraph) and Geoff Mulgan of the think tank Demos, 
and in 1996 interviewed Major himself. Newsnight in 1993 interviewed David Hunt 
(Employment Secretary), and Michael Heseltine (Deputy Prime Minister) in 1995 and 
1996.
Conclusion
The news bulletins did far more than merely reflect the content of the leaders* speeches. 
Journalists were involved in a process of prioritising, selecting and contextualising the 
information they received, and there were some clear editorial differences between the 
bulletins, despite the overall sacerdotal approach. There was a particularly obvious 
divergence between the longer, more ‘serious’ Channel Four News and Newsnight, and 
the other bulletins. These 'serious' bulletins devoted the least attention to the leaders' 
speeches as a proportion of overall conference coverage. Over the three conferences they 
also consistently sought to expand upon the issues raised in the leaders’ speeches through 
pegged items and interviews.
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There was less divergence in attitude between the ITN bulletins and the BBC*s. 
ITN focused more on the leaders’ speeches as a proportion of overall conference coverage 
than the BBC did. All the bulletins gave Ashdown’s 1995 speech substantially less 
prominence than those of the other two leaders, but there was a momentary divergence 
between the main BBC bulletins and ITN’s in the prominence given to the Labour leader’s 
1995 speech. Overall, ITN carried the greatest number of trails, particularly News at Ten. 
In the main, the use of trailed information was concentrated in the late evening bulletins 
whose staff were keen to update and differentiate the information contained within their 
reports. The BBC sought to expand upon issues raised in the leaders’ speeches more than 
ITN, who produced substantially fewer pegged items.
The BBC Six and Nine consistently provided more extracts from each of the 
leaders’ speeches than both ITN bulletins but crucially of a shorter length. There seemed to 
be a trade-off in reporting the leaders' speeches within the limited time slot available on 
these bulletins - namely, more breadth at the expense of length. Such a trade-off did not 
affect Channel Four News or Newsnight, whose longer bulletins could contain a greater 
number of longer extracts from the leaders’ speeches. The parties therefore had more 
opportunity to get their message across using the longer (but less watched) bulletins.
In terms of the passages of the leaders’ speeches selected by the bulletins, there was 
a high degree of overlap between all the bulletins. In 1995 the same seven passages were 
used from Ashdown’s speech, the same nine from Blair’s, and the same ten from Major’s. 
The main passages selected, while appearing at different lengths, were on policy 
announcements for the Labour and Conservative leaders' speeches, and about party 
positioning for the Liberal Democrat leader, followed in the case of the Conservatives and 
Labour by party positioning on certain policy areas indicated by an attack on the other 
parties.
The value-added in the construction of news on the leaders* speeches came in the 
contextualising remarks. This was mainly descriptive, although there were some stark 
differences. Newsnight provided a more sceptical contextualisation of the passages than the 
other reports. There was an attempt to contextualise the speech in terms of the audience 
response, revealing its popularity or not amongst the audience in the hall, a technique 
slightly more prevalent on ITN’s reports than the BBC’s. Over the four-year period ITN 
reports made 33 references to audience reception compared to twenty by both BBC 
reports. The performance of the leader in delivering his speech was also noted. In contrast, 
over the four-year period BBC 1 referenced leaders* performance factors 16 times, 
compared to ITN’s nine times. There was a tendency for both Newsnight and Channel 
Four News to ignore both factors when compiling reports. In certain situations there was
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an attempt to contextualise the leader’s speech historically. This was done in the case of the 
Labour leader’s speech, although not the others, through drawing a comparison with 
speeches made by a previous party leader.
Despite the occasional divergence of interest, the leaders’ speeches underlined the 
shared interests of the parties’ inner elites and the news broadcasters. For the broadcasters, 
the leaders* speeches represented easily reportable, newsworthy information about an event 
whose significance was already manifest and did not have to be explained to the audience. 
The party elites derived a series of benefits from the news coverage of speeches. Speeches, 
particularly those made by easily recognisable party leaders, gained more attention and 
benefited from the news broadcasters' sacerdotal orientation; they were more or less 
guaranteed prominent coverage. Although the prominence varied between parties, for the 
Labour and Conservative elites it was significant The leaders’ speeches also represented a 
controllable information channel, one which other actors (such as peripheral elites and 
external power brokers within the party) could not affect There were fewer oppositional 
sources of information for the broadcasters to access, who could effectively contest the 
official perspective.
In the light of the fact that the leaders* speeches and other speeches were of mutual 
benefit to both the inner core elite and the broadcasters, it is not surprising that there was a 
greater emphasis in reports on speeches rather than debates and particularly speeches made 
by members of the leadership. These speeches may have been part of a debate but to a large 
extent were abstracted by the reports into stand-alone events. The following picture 
emerges (see Table 7.36, next page).
240
Table 7.36: The number of news items covering speeches and debates at 
party  conferences bv year 1993-1996.
Liberal Democrats
Speech Debate Mix Other
1993 12 10 4 0
1994 10 6 8 11
1995 9 5 6 3
1996 24 0 1 7
Total 55 21 19 21
Labour
Speech Debate Mix Other
1993 9 13 13 63
1994 17 9 6 52
1995 14 9 3 25
1996 18 6 6 31
Total 58 37 47 171
Conservatives
Speech Debate Mix Other
1993 34 2 0 62
1994 26 0 0 59
1995 33 0 0 49
1996 27 0 0 33
Total 120 2 0 203
Table 7.361? shows that at the Liberal Democrat and Labour conferences there was a 
marked decline in the number of reports on debates, and a corresponding increase 
(although not year-on-year) in the number of reports on speeches alone. At the Liberal 
Democrat and Labour conferences there has also been a decline in the number of mixed 
reports. The Liberal Democrats and Labour over the four years seem to have put more 
emphasis on announcements in speeches to deliver policy, not through debates. For both 
parties these significant speeches then become stand-alone items and the focus of the 
reports. The Conservative conference has never really been a reciprocal device for policy­
making debates and has always been geared around speeches (Kelly, 1989). To a large 
extent this growing similarity in the orientation of reports towards key speeches has been 
spurred on by the parties, with the news broadcasters* acquiescence. By planning and 
design, conferences themselves have become more speech-oriented, and the coverage 
reflected this change.
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1. This has not always been the case. Kelly (1994) notes of the Conservative conference: 
‘Prior to 1965 the leader’s speech was scheduled to take place after the conference’s formal 
cessation, as if to demonstrate that the leadership was not directly affected by its events’, p 
228.
2. From observational research, only the Liberal Democrats had a press conference after the 
leader’s speech. For further discussion of the use of press conferences see Chapter 5.
3. Interview with Hugh Pym.
4. Ibid.
5. In 1995 the reports of both ITN bulletins on the leaders’ speeches were produced by 
their political editor Michael Brunson. In many respects the reports he produced for both 
bulletins were identical. In 1993,1994 and 1996 Brunson produced the main reports on the 
Labour and Conservative leaders* speeches. The BBC Six’s reports were produced 
throughout the period by chief political correspondent John Sergeant, the BBC Nine’s by 
political editor Robin Oakley, Channel Four’s by political editor Elinor Goodman and 
Newsnight’s by a mixture of political correspondent Mark Mardell and the anchors 
Paxman, Wark and Snow.
6. Scammell and Semetko (1998) suggest that contextualising comments ‘refer to the way 
reporters’ remarks surround or set the scene for party activities and statements*. Such 
comments could be ‘non-directional (straight/ descriptive), reinforcing or deflating of the 
activities and statements of politicians’, p 14. For the purposes of the leaders* speeches it 
was important to see the wider application of the notion of contextualising commentary. 
Non-directional comments were value-laden with references to the audience and the 
symbolic or visionary nature of the speech, amongst other things. Their content and not 
simply their direction was of importance, particularly in gaining an understanding of the 
journalists’ contribution to framing.
7. The length of each passage varied between reports. For the sake of analysis the fullest 
possible version of the passage is quoted.
8. The ‘Liberal Democrat Guarantee’ document, which was launched at this conference, 
was in addition only mentioned in reports on the BBC Six and Newsnight.
9. Only those remarks directly referring to the leader’s speech were coded as reactive 
comments on the content analysis sheet. A positive reaction was defined as one which 
praised the leader and endorsed his reforms or policy announcements. A negative reaction 
was defined as one which was hostile toward and critical of the leader’s speech. A neutral 
reaction was neither endorsing or critical of the speech but mainly descriptive.
10. Webster, October 4 1995, p 1.
11. Johnston, October 5 1995, p 2.
12. Ibid, p 2.
242
13. Webster, October 4 1995, p 1.
14. Culf, October 5 1995, p 1.
15. Ibid, p 1.
16. Interview with Tim Collins.
17. The focus of all news items were sorted into exclusive categories (see appendix 2, 
V12). This table used the categories in the following way: 1) Reports focusing exclusively 
on a speech, 2) ones focusing on a debate, 3) ones focusing on a mix of debates and 
speeches, and on a mix of fringe, debates and speeches and 4) News items focusing on the 
fringe, outside events, media initiated items and others.
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Chapter 8
Conclusions
Conference news was the product of a ‘composite source... [which was] inextricably 
intertwined* 1. The framework developed in this thesis adopted a combined source-media- 
centric position, or what McNair (1994) calls a ‘culturalist perspective*. It placed at its heart 
the activity, relationships and interaction that occurred at conferences, as the key to 
understanding the production of conference news. My approach placed these factors within 
a time-linear news production cycle (Gans, 1979; Golding and Elliott, 1979) and took 
account of the heterogeneous nature of both organisations. Conference news production 
was characterised by different activities and relationships at each stage of this production 
cycle. Both the parties and the broadcasters planned, the parties disseminated information 
and the broadcasters gathered, selected and presented this information. Planning by the 
broadcasters and parties was a fundamental prerequisite for dissemination and gathering; 
the essential logistical and aesthetic elements of conference coverage had all to be in place 
prior to conference starting; indeed, these elements made the next stages possible.
Each stage involved interaction between different groups of actors within 
organisations, although activity was co-ordinated from the centre. Interaction was 
structured by the news production cycle. Those actors who interacted during planning were 
largely not the same as those who interacted during the conference week. During 
conferences there was a large amount of personal interaction between the party actors and 
broadcast journalists. These actors were dependent on each other throughout the cycle, 
from pre-conference planning, through strategy-setting for the week, and then hour-by- 
hour interactions once the conference started. In the planning stages both the broadcasters 
and the parties adapted to new structural demands on television camera positions or 
changes in the timetables. And during the conference week, parties (especially the 
leaderships) adapted to the presence of the broadcasters in a strategic fashion, developing 
and implementing strategies of promotion and control. The broadcasters in turn learnt to fit 
into the controlled environment this created at conference.
From the planning stages onwards the parties and the broadcasters had particular 
interests or goals. Some of these goals were shared by the different parts of both 
organisations at each stage of the production cycle. On a general level both the news 
broadcasters and the parties had a shared interest in attracting high audience viewing
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figures. The parties wanted their conferences to be seen as a success, while the 
broadcasters wanted them to be seen as newsworthy. Where their goals converged they co­
operated - as in the logistical planning stages, both organisational bureaucracies wanted the 
event to run smoothly and look professionally produced to the viewing audience. But 
interests also diverged. The parties’ leaderships planned their conferences to be a platform 
to showcase the party, its policies and certain key actors, particularly the leader. Short of 
conflicts or disasters (such as afflicted Labour conferences in the early 1980s), the 
broadcasters went along with such aims. However, as shown, their interests also diverged 
and on some issues quite significantly. The broadcasters possessed a certain amount of 
autonomy (Blumler and Gurevitch, 1995; Gans, 1979; Semetko et al, 1991), manifest in 
the focus on and framing of events within the conference timetable. The news values with 
which the broadcasters operated still led to them focusing and giving prominence to overt 
conflictual events in the form of debates or fringe meetings. There was also a desire, 
particularly amongst Newsnight and Channel Four news journalists, to analyse events, to 
‘go beyond* (Semetko et al, 1991) the agenda initiated by the parties. The publicity this 
brought for the parties was on occasion seen as less than desirable by party elites. 
However, because they were mutually dependent, these divergences did not lead to 
sustained conflict, which might in itself have generated adverse publicity. In this sense both 
sides realised that they could not have everything they wanted. A compromise was usually 
made by both in order to allow the attainment of their goals.
While based on dependency, adaptation and co-operation (Blumler and Gurevitch, 
1995), relationships between the parties and the broadcasters were also structured by the 
production cycle. Planners had relationships with each other. During conference week 
interaction occurred between party actors and political journalists who had existing 
relationships. At the kernel of these relations were those between senior journalists and the 
parties* leaderships. The dyadic nature of conferences, the fact that each conference 
involved one-on-one interaction as distinct from any other time in the political calendar, 
amplified existing dependence and the need to co-operate and adapt. However, any 
disagreement that arose was temporary and quickly dissipated.
This chapter opens out the discussion from this broad pattern to examine, first, 
some implications from these findings for broader theories of media/political system 
relations; second, the ‘game’-like qualities of party-broadcaster interactions; and third, the 
overall trends in conference coverage charted here, and their implications for the possible 
development of party conferences in future.
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8.1: Some Theoretical Implications
Underlying this examination of the production of political news has been a wider, well- 
documented difference of emphasis between major theoretical perspectives on the 
construction of news, itself rooted in an older macro-debate within the field of 
communication, between pluralist and neo-Marxist perspectives (Curran et al, 1982; 
McQuail, 1987). A key aspect of this founding debate was the two-part question: Is what 
the audience sees on TV simply a reproduction of the information and definitions provided 
by powerful news sources? Or is it an independendy reconstructed meaning, based on 
media professionals’ values and attitudes? This question raised in a specific form a central 
debate, namely the extent of the news media's subordination to or autonomy from the state 
and other powerful societal institutions.
Pluralist and neo-Marxist or radical analysis answered the question in very different 
ways (Curran et al, 1982). Pluralists (Gurevitch and Blumler, 1977) emphasised the 
autonomy of the news broadcasters, arguing that they had a ‘semi independent power 
base*2 such as their ability to deliver and inform audiences. The neo-Marxists (Hall et al, 
1978; Schlesinger et al, 1983) emphasised the dominance of 'accredited' sources and the 
subordination of the news media. The news media ‘reproduce the view points of the 
dominant institutions not as one among a number of alternative perspectives, but as the 
central and obvious perspective’3. Exponents of both views criticised the other side’s 
position, of course, although the evidence they drew on was largely similar in nature 
(McQuail, 1987; Schlesinger, 1990). These two extreme poles on a subordination 
/autonomy continuum both have obvious shortcomings in analysing the construction of 
news. What the audience sees in a news bulletin is not merely a reflection of what news 
sources desire, but nor is it a product controlled independently by journalists.
A more effective understanding of news production requires a restitution of 
emphasis along this continuum. McQuail (1987) argued that both positions are 'ideal 
typical in the sense of accentuating and exaggerating certain features of media and it would 
obviously be possible to offer intermediate models in which the features of both could be 
found together, as they almost certainly are in reality’4. Such a restitution is now complete. 
Curran (1990) notes that there has been a shift by neo-Marxist researchers towards 
recognising the validity of the pluralist arguments, leading to the emergence of an 
intermediate position adopting what Curran describes as a 'new revisionist perspective’ 
between pluralism and neo-Marxism, one which has considerably influenced research into 
news production. Curran (1990) also notes, although he does not detail, a re-emphasis 
amongst pluralist researchers tending to confront more empirically questions of dominance.
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This new position clearly occupies what could be termed neo-pluralist terrain (Dunleavy 
and O'Leary, 1987), with pluralists responding to a neo-Marxist critical onslaught and 
revisionist neo-Marxists (Schlesinger, 1990) critically reacting to the findings of their own 
and pluralist empirical research. There is now a loose consensus on this middle ground on 
five main propositions.
First, the semi-autonomous nature of the news media is widely recognised (Blumler 
and Gurevitch, 1995; Curran, 1990b; Franklin, 1994; Schlesinger, 1990; Semetko et al, 
1991). Revisionist neo-Marxists acknowledge that the news media have greater autonomy 
than they were at first given credit for. And neo-pluralists concede that the news media's 
autonomy is constrained by news sources, by the political and regulatory environments in 
which they operate, and by financial and organisational factors. There is even a recognition 
that news media are sometimes subordinate in a detailed or specific events way, 
reproducing the definitions of key events propagated by powerful news sources.
Second, the study of news production is now solidly based on an understanding 
that relationships between news sources (in this case the political parties) and the news 
media are inherently and permanently complex. Both revised positions see definitional 
power not as the exclusive resource of either the news media or news sources. Once access 
has been achieved, the construction of news is a joint enterprise, both sources and 
journalists are co-producers, and, as with all relationships, who interacts and what meaning 
it has are grounds for contestation.
Third, revisionists seek to answer the question: Which sources regularly gain 
access and enjoy established relationships with the news media? Traditional pluralists 
emphasised that access to the news media is open to different groups within society, while 
the older neo-Marxist views argued that access is restricted primarily to powerful interests. 
Revisionists recognise that competition for access is imperfect (Schlesinger, 1990). Certain 
sources have guaranteed news media access and enjoy a privileged position, while others 
do not. The revisionist theory of dominance argues that access is determined by a news 
source's 'capital' or resources, and they are more concerned with questions of inclusion 
and exclusion of non-official news sources. However, while neo-pluralists also recognise 
that competition for access is unequal, they are less concerned with access inequalities than 
with the mechanisms by which agendas are formed. Their characteristic questions are 
posed in terms of agenda-setting best articulated by Semetko et al (1991): If the media set 
the audience agenda, who sets the media's agenda? Neo-pluralists' research tends to be 
focused on explaining how existing 'accredited' sources and the media compete to set news 
agendas, particularly at elections (Blumler and Gurevitch, 1995; Nossiter et al 1995; 
Semetko et al 1991; Semetko and Scammell, 1998). For the revisionists, the site of
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struggle is not exclusively between the news media and news sources, but rather it is a 
struggle between news sources themselves and sets of relationships located in a wider 
framework than elections.
Fourth, research undertaken by both perspectives increasingly focuses on the 
strategies used by news sources and their importance for gaining access to and setting the 
news media agenda. Neo-pluralists have emphasised the rise of a modem publicity process 
(Blumler, 1990) and the professionalisation of campaigning by political parties (Franklin, 
1994; Scammell, 1995). Scammell in particular focuses on the rise of 'disciplined' 
communications by the state and political parties, and Franklin on the use of media 
strategies. Although less party political in orientation, revisionist research has focused on 
the use of public relations strategies in source competition. Schlesinger and Tumber (1994) 
talk of a 'promotional dynamic' influencing all news sources. Both focus on the crucial 
importance of news management strategies in gaining and maintaining access to the news 
media in a competitive news environment
Fifth, while recognising a growing professionalisation amongst news sources, neo- 
pluralist authors continue to emphasise the importance of journalistic attitudes in the news 
production process (Blumler and Gurevitch, 1995; Semetko et al, 1991). Journalists are 
not passive relayers of information but active packagers. Tension may arise between the 
news media attitudes and the promotional aspirations of particular sources, seen in the rise 
of disdaining commentary in the news reports (Semetko et al, 1991). While early neo- 
Marxist studies of news production focused on the passivity of journalists in news 
gathering (Golding and Elliott, 1979), there is a growing recognition by some revisionists 
(Deacon, 1996)5 of the importance of news media and journalistic attitudes in the 
construction of news.
This research confirms both the limits of the older approaches, and the value of the 
revisionist call to 'update [the] intellectual tool kit'6 of the 'extra-organisational' (Curran et 
al, 1982) approach in political communications. It has shown that conference news 
production is inherently complex. No extra-organisational approach that is 'based on a 
single dominant causal factor will be able to get an adequate explanatory grip on... [the 
news production process]'7. The findings here show the value of re-applying the concept 
of a news production cycle to take account not only of the activity of the news broadcasters 
(Gans, 1979; Golding and Elliott, 1979) but also of the ‘production cycle’ of the political 
parties. The sequence of logistical planning, message dissemination, news gathering and 
news-presentation provides a structured way of analysing the activities of both source 
organisations and media organisations.
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Most media research from revisionist perspectives has focused on inter-source 
competition. However, these 'accredited' sources, particularly those with routine news 
media access, are not homogeneous entities. Political parties are heterogeneous 
organisations dominated by party elites with strong resource advantages (McKenzie, 1964; 
Panebianco, 1988). The revisionist concept of imperfect competition (Schlesinger, 1990) 
can be productively applied within an intra-party environment. Imperfect intra-party 
competition pits resource-rich party elites against other sections of the parties (such as 
dissident elites, factions or party stake-holder groups), giving party inner elites a 
competitive advantage in terms of setting the conference news agenda. Primary definition 
becomes the goal of the political elite, although this is not something they always 
automatically achieve. Sometimes it may be sufficient for them to create news. At other 
times they have to engage actively in a struggle to set the news agenda. The unequal access 
of non-elites to the news broadcasters clearly needs further consideration, together with 
questions about how elites come to dominate conference news and party agendas - an 
important question left unanswered in the literature.
Also in need of more examination are the strategies of promotion and control and 
their implementation, well documented by various researchers (Deacon, 1996; Franklin, 
1994; McNair, 1995; Schlesinger and Tumber, 1994). Parties’ inner elites routinely use 
these strategies not only to set the news broadcasters' agenda throughout conferences but 
as part of the competitive process to ensure that their perspective becomes the dominant 
interpretation of events at the conferences. The development of such strategies can be seen 
as part of the wider dominance of a media-centred logic which has reduced the 
distinctiveness of all the parties, while yet evoking a set of systematic countervailing 
responses developed by political parties to minimise the risk of bad publicity (Scammell, 
1995) and reduce the unpredictability of conference proceedings. Information subsidies, 
photo opportunities, proactive and reactive strategies are all aimed at regulating the flow of 
information to the news broadcasters and controlling the activity of the party. However, 
risk can never be eradicated (Thompson, 1995), so the importance of promotion and 
control strategies has to be understood within the context of a risk environment. Although 
Molotch and Lester (1974) argue that routine events are more predicable than scandals, this 
research has shown that there remains a significant element of unpredictability in the party 
conferences, which cannot be removed despite the strongest efforts of party spin doctors 
and media professionals, and despite agendas and timetables being manipulated. Party 
leaderships could not completely account for unplanned events and in many ways their 
continual quest for greater control inadvertently made those events outside its control all the 
more newsworthy. As one journalist put it: 'Politicians are risking less and less on the floor 
of conference in both camps .... If you risk less then you lay yourself open to the media 
hunting for more. And if they can't get it on the floor of the conference, they will get it in
249
Cherie Blair's wardrobe'8.
As a further indication of the complexities here, consider the possible objection to 
these propositions. Some of the parties’ leaderships were in some circumstances able to 
turn an apparently risky debate to their advantage. Within any party there have to be those 
sections that disagreed with the current policy line9, and the leadership needed to confine 
negative reactions to such sections. While unexpected negative reactions to the leaderships 
may have had dysfunctional consequences, long-expected negative reactions that are 
calculable in advance may be functional for the leaderships' aims. Strong opposing 
reactions in these specific circumstances could provide an opposition party leader 
(otherwise denied any opportunity to demonstrate ‘firm leadership’ and strength of 
character) with the opportunity to demonstrate his or her leadership abilities. Blair’s attack 
on Clause Four was an important opportunity for the Labour leader to demonstrate not only 
to his party but also to the news broadcasters a capacity for ‘strong leadership’ - a high-risk 
but none the less controllable and valuable strategy. So we cannot necessarily dismiss 
‘source dominance* in these cases simply because of the existence of some observable 
conflicts on the conference floor or the ritualised presence of opponents in TV reports.
The theme of complexity affects neo-pluralist insights into news media attitudes, 
such as Blumler and Gurevitch's (1995) typology of sacerdotal and pragmatic orientations, 
which proved useful in explaining the variability of broadcasters* attitudes to different 
elements of the conference experience, depending on the actors involved and its location - 
summarised in Figure 8.1. Certain events like the leaders’ speeches received particularly 
prominent coverage
Figure 8.1: Broadcasters’ orientation towards events at conference and 
levels of coverage.
Sacerdotal orientation------------------------------------ Pragmatic orientation
Event Leaders’ Other
speeches speeches
Coverage High Low
No Low Overt conflict
conflict conflict debate, and
debate debate fringe
meetings
No Low High
despite their newsworthiness, whereas the coverage of other events such as debates was 
determined by their newsworthiness. Such attitudes also guided journalists’ use of 
exchanged information and the exhibition of their relative autonomy or discretionary power 
to make ‘value-added* to reports.
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8.2: News Games
One way to take further the discussion of ‘the interaction between media professionals and 
their sources...* 1° is to think of it in terms of a news game. Basic game theory seems to be 
a potentially useful analytic tool for examining the simpler dyadic interactions of journalists 
with a single party at conferences! 1. As Blumler and Gurevitch insightfully note, ‘the 
communicators can be viewed as playing a game...*12, although they themselves do not 
further elaborate upon this suggestion. The news games studied here involved the 
dissemination of information by party actors verbally and in written form and the gathering 
of this information from various sources either actively or passively. In a simple model 
party elites have to decide on strategies for handling an event or an issue, and the 
broadcasters in each individual network news programme must then decide whether or not 
to award coverage to the event or issue.
The majority of news games at conference revolved around two different types of 
routine event in the timetable: speeches by the leadership and debates. The journalists’ 
interests were driven by news, they wanted something to report; the parties* leaderships 
were driven by promotion, they wanted to get their message across, maximising its news 
value first but then despite its news value, if that was not easy to provide. Taking the 
speech game first, Figure 8.2 (next page) shows the extended game form. Members of the 
party leadership giving a speech moved first, by deciding to have newsworthy elements in 
their speech, or not; the broadcasters moved second, to cover the debate or not. Of course, 
not all speeches by members of the leaderships could be salient or contain important 
reportable policy or positioning announcements, so sometimes leadership members were 
constrained to be un-newsworthy - especially ministers in government (where being 
newsworthy involved the high transaction costs of changing policy) and front-benchers in 
the Liberal Democrats, who could not realistically present themselves as an alternative 
government.
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Figure 8.2: The speech game plaved during the party conferences
(in extensive form).
Pay-offs 
Party Bulletin 
3 3
2 0 
1 2
0 1
The party elites’ top preference was obviously to be newsworthy and be covered by 
that programme (hence the top pay-off of 3 in Figure 8.2). Their second preference was to 
be newsworthy but not covered, because there would still be the likelihood of being 
covered elsewhere by broadcast or press journalists (pay-off of 2). Their third preference 
would be to be covered despite not being newsworthy, for although some voters could be 
bored, exposure is always seen as preferable by politicians (pay-off of 1). The party elite’s 
last preference would be to make a dull speech and not be covered at all.
The broadcasters necessarily move second in this game, deciding to award coverage 
to the speech or withhold it. This decision always involved the exercise of a complex 
professional judgement (for instance, about whether the speech was or was not 
newsworthy) where there was a risk of making a mistake. For each individual network 
bulletin the best outcome was for the speech to be newsworthy, and for them to cover it - 
not least because this result maximised total conference coverage, which was what mattered 
to the team on the ground (pay-off of 3). The worst outcome for each bulletin would be if 
the speech was newsworthy but they made a mistake and did not cover it, where everyone
Outcome
2) Network 
1) Party bulletins
leadership
cover
ws worthy
speech
Covi
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else did: here they would clearly lose out in competition with other bulletins. The next 
worst outcome would be for the speech to be un-newsworthy and the bulletin not to cover 
it - here the team’s professional judgement would be proven fine, since other bulletins also 
might well not cover the speech, but the role of journalists at the conference on the bulletin 
would be reduced vis-a-vis those back at the London news office, covering other stories. 
This implies that the broadcasters’ second preference was to cover a non-newsworthy 
speech, both because it avoided the risk of getting their worst outcome, and because it at 
least supported their roles at conference13.
Eigure 8.3: The speech game at the party conferences (in strategic form).
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Figure 8.3 we can see that party elites and broadcasters shared the same top preference for 
a newsworthy speech that was covered, and that this cell of the game is a Nash equilibrium 
in this sense - that so long as party elites were in a position to produce a newsworthy 
speech, the top left cell here gives both players their optimum pay-off. If for any reason the 
party leadership could not deliver a newsworthy speech, but could disguise this fact from 
broadcasters to any extent, then the distribution of broadcasters’ preferences (especially 
their risk aversion) would mean that they could best maximise their welfare by covering the 
speech none the less - thus the lower left cell would be where the game ends up in this 
situation. This analysis sheds an interesting light on the trend towards using speeches as 
the main vehicles for announcing policy change and conveying party messages to viewers.
This approach sheds some light on why parties’ leaderships wanted all speeches to 
be reported rather than not, but did not show any strong preference for being newsworthy
Network Bulletins
Newsworthy
Not
newsworthy
Putting these preference orderings together in the strategic form of the game in
Cover Don't cover
253
over un-newsworthy. A routinised compromise solution was reached at each conference. 
In order to ensure that a speech received maximum attention, party elites had to make sure 
that any speech contained a necessary number of announcements to make it newsworthy. 
An injection of news value also helped maintain an element of control over proceedings. It 
kept the broadcasters* attention focused on the event the party leadership initiated. 
Providing a series of un-newsworthy speeches did not necessarily mean that there would 
not be any coverage; it often meant that the news broadcasters gave the speeches less 
coverage or searched for another agenda on the fringe of conference or focused more 
intently on any gaffes that had been made.
While making concessions the leaderships also expected in return a certain attitude 
toward speeches made by senior party members. Even if the party leader said nothing of 
note, because of his position in the party and the country, they expected it to have full and 
prominent coverage and received it. The more senior the party actor, the greater the 
expected level of coverage, and vice versa for less senior colleagues, who were only 
expected to be newsworthy in exceptional circumstances. While not wanting to report an 
un-newsworthy speech or give it greater attention than it deserved, the news broadcasters 
had to compromise and routinely bowed to the party elites* expectations. Not to comply 
could lead to conflict or incurring penalties like the refusal of a request for an interview or 
the offering of an exclusive to a rival bulletin.
A second key form of game played between party managers and the media 
concerned conference debates. Here the party elites again move first, seeking to ‘manage* 
the debate successfully, so that the leadership would be seen to have been victorious in the 
formal floor debate or to have ‘won* the alternation with dissident elites in a fringe-initiated 
debate. Figure 8.4 (next page) shows the extended game form. Again the broadcasters 
move second, deciding whether or not to give coverage to the debate. Here the elite’s top 
preference would be for them to manage the debate successfully and to get coverage of their 
success (pay-off of 3). Their second preference would be to manage the debate 
successfully without publicity (pay-off of 2). Their third preference would be to fail in 
managing the debate but to prevent that bulletin from covering their failure (pay-off of 1). 
Their worst case scenario would be to lose out on managing the debate and have the 
bulletin give coverage of this outcome.
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Figure 8.4: The debate game played during the party conferences
(in extensive form).
Pay-offs 
Party Bulletin
3 2
2 1
0 3
1 0
Here the individual bulletin had a much stronger lack of congruence in their 
preferences with the party elites than over speeches. The journalists* top preference would 
be for the party elites to fail in managing the debate, and for them then to cover i t  Their 
second preference would be that party elites succeed but they still cover the issue and the 
debate. Their worst case result would be that the party elite fails to manage the debate but 
their bulletin does not cover the outcome, for then they would lose in competition with 
other journalists and bulletins and be seen to have made a mistake. So their second worst 
preference would be for the party elites to succeed and the bulletin not to cover the result^.
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Figure 8.5: The debate game at the nartv conferences fin strategic form!.
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Putting these preference orders together in the strategic form of the game (Figure 
8.5), we see that if the party elites can successfully manage the issue, then the top left cell 
becomes a Nash equilibrium. Once there, neither player can unilaterally improve their 
utility. But if the party elite fails to or cannot manage the issue, journalists will cover it - 
this bottom left cell is top of their preferences and hence they cannot be moved off i t  If the 
party elites even try to convince them that the debate has been managed when it has not, the 
journalist will be strongly resistant - for acknowledging such a shift would lower their 
utility.
Again, this approach is helpful in looking at why conference debates were 
routinised occurrences at both the Liberal Democrat and Labour conferences. The debates 
that received substantial coverage in reports always involved the parties' leaderships in 
some way or form. The more overt the intra-party conflict and the more important the issue 
being debated, the more attention the debates received. In some senses debates were more 
‘heavily laden with conventional news values, particularly those of conflict, drama, 
movement and anomaly’15 than speeches. Broadcasters preferred to report debates 
exhibiting intra-party conflict to those that did not, while the parties’ leaderships preferred 
debates to be covered than not covered but only if they did not feature overt conflict. The 
game had no compromise solution. The parties* leaderships, particularly in the Labour and 
Liberal Democrats, were unable to avoid such debates despite the increasing control over 
the conference agenda, and were resigned to the fact that they would attract a large amount 
of coverage. In addition the parties* leaderships competed with other factions involved in
Network Bulletins
Manage
Conflict
Not manage 
conflict
Cover Don't cover
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the debate. As was not the case with speeches, they were not in a position to ‘ration the 
goodies’; they were not the only source of news and the journalists were not, as a result, 
solely dependent on them.
Although the parties’ leaderships were forced on to the defensive, they could not 
bury their collective heads in the sand. They had to try to control the situation as best they 
could using and further developing the repertoire of strategies at their disposal, to try and 
persuade broadcasters to accept their perspective on the debate and outcome, divert 
journalists’ attention, and rubbish the perspectives of those opposed to them. The strategic 
response focused on shaping the broadcasters’ interpretations of events, and arranging 
interviews with journalists who were known to hold views favourable to the leadership. 
(At its limit this strategy could move journalists* standing up or down inside the news 
organisations.)
While interests temporarily diverged in the debate game, there were still elements of 
predictability. The parties* leaderships knew in advance what the likely awkward motions 
for debate were and could allow for them in the planning stages. But the parties* 
leaderships did not have control over the debates that fractured this routine, which were of 
high news value and could not be predicted, such as external interventions, ‘new sleaze 
allegations* or a ‘gaffe*. For instance, there was the case of the leaking of specific extracts 
from Lady Thatcher’s memoirs, commenting on Major’s performance as party leader, to 
the Daily Mirror at the 1993 Conservative party conference, which became the main news 
story on all news bulletins on that particular day of the conference. It is in these situations 
that the spin doctors sought to coerce the broadcasters back into the routine. Recent 
literature on political communications has strongly argued a trend towards ‘disciplined’ 
communications as part of a quasi-permanent campaign and that this shift has led to tighter 
central control over internal party mechanisms with potential for dissent or public 
embarrassment reduced (Franklin, 1994; Scammell 1995). However, party conferences 
show that communications were far from disciplined and that the leaderships could not, 
even when planned, exert tighter central control over certain unforeseeable elements.
8.3 Coverage Trends and the Future of Party Conferences
The news broadcasters and the parties were the co-producers, the co-constructors of the 
conference news agenda. But the long-term results of their repeated plays and counter- 
plays at successive conferences were not necessarily fully in either of their interests - nor 
necessarily productive of beneficial results from the point of view of citizen information or 
democratic accountability. In this section I consider some longer-term aspects of the
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developing co-operation or complicity of parties and broadcasters, beginning with the point 
that the party elites had relatively little direct leverage on editorial decisions about the 
amount of coverage or the bulletin running order16. The amount of coverage was 
determined to a certain extent by the size of the bulletin and also by its orientation toward 
the conferences. Table 8.1 shows that Channel Four News and Newsnight devoted 
substantially more coverage to the conferences than any of the other bulletins.
Tahle 8.1: The total amount of conference news coverage hv party  and 
bulletin 1993-1996 (in minutes).
ITN 5.40 ITN10 BBC6 BBC9 Ch 4 NN Total
Liberal Democrat 30 42 40 37 115 152 416
Labour 70 115 99 123 334 465 1206
Conservative 79 110 140 145 346 456 1276
Total 179 267 279 305 795 1073 2898
(BBC6 = BBC Six O’clock News; BBC9 = BBC Nine O'clock News; ITN5.40 = ITN News at 5.40 PM; 
ITN10 = ITN News at Ten O'clock; Ch 4 = Channel Four News; NN = Newsnight)
The Liberal Democrat conference received the least coverage - only one third of the amount 
of coverage given to the other two conferences. At the 1992 general election, news 
coverage was ‘rationed according to the allocation of party election broadcasts, which was 
5:5:4 (Conservatives: Labour: Liberal Democrats)’17. However, such criteria seem not to 
have been used in party conference coverage. In fact Semetko (1989) notes ‘outside 
election periods, when conventional standards of newsworthiness apply, broadcast 
coverage of parliament and political affairs has contained very little in the way of 
contributions from third [parties]’18. Norton (1996) suggests one reason for the low 
Liberal Democrat conference coverage: ‘The media does not see the conference in the same 
light as the other conferences. It is not the gathering of the party of government or of the 
alternative government’19. Table 8.2 also shows that, even when covered, the Liberal 
Democrat conference was seen as less newsworthy.
Table 8.2: The prominence of conference news reports bv party 1993-1996 
(cell contents show the number of reports in each position).
Story Position
1st 2nd 3rd 4th 5th+ Total
Liberal Democrat 7 6 7 13 62 95
Labour 57 38 32 24 46 197
Conservative 78 47 30 23 45 233
Total 142 91 69 60 153 525
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Table 8.3 shows that the overall amount of conference news coverage by the major 
network bulletins strongly declined over the period of study.
Table 8.3: The total amount of conference news coverage bv year and
bulletin 1993-1996 (in minutes).
IT N 5.40 ITN10 BBC6 BBC9 Ch 4 NN Total
1993 45 88 85 101 234 294 847
1994 43 70 74 77 210 263 737
1995 47 55 71 69 183 302 727
1996 44 54 49 58 168 214 587
Total 179 267 279 305 795 1073 2898
(BBC6 = BBC Six O’clock News; BBC9 = BBC Nine O’clock News; ITN5.40 = ITN News at 5.40 PM; 
ITN 10 = ITN News at Ten O'clock; Ch 4 = Channel Four News; NN = Newsnight.)
There was a particularly noticeable decline in the coverage provided by Channel Four news
and Newsnight, and also substantial declines in News at Ten's coverage, the BBC Six's
and BBC Nine's. The ITN 5.40's coverage fluctuated. Commenting on the decline of news
coverage one ITN source suggested:
We have cut back. In the old days we had Sandy Gall (Anchor) in the studio and 
Alistair Burnett (Anchor) down in Brighton and the whole of the first half of News 
at Ten would be reporting the conferences. We used to have a cast of thousands 
literally'20.
However, while the amount of coverage declined this could not be attributed to a 
shortening of report lengths. Table 8.4 shows that there was no corresponding yearly 
decline in the average length of news items across all bulletins - instead, it remained almost 
constant, but with an upward blip in 1995.
Table 8.4; The average length of conference news items bv year and 
bulletin 1993-1996 fin minutes and seconds).
IT N 5.40 ITN10 BBC6 BBC9 Ch 4 NN Av.
1993 1.47 3.01 2.45 3.05 4.52 5.20 3.28
1994 1.52 2.47 2.32 2.51 4.34 4.52 3.15
1995 2.47 2.55 2.58 2.54 4.28 8.38 4.06
1996 2.13 2.54 3.05 3.27 4.41 4.45 3.30
Av. 2.10 2.54 2.50 3.04 4.39 5.54 3.35
(BBC6 = BBC Six O’clock News; BBC9 = BBC Nine O’clock News; ITN5.40 = ITN News at 5.40 PM; 
ITN 10 = ITN News at Ten O'clock; Ch 4 = Channel Four News; NN = Newsnight.)
Further, Table 8.5 (next page) shows that coverage of one of the key events of each 
conference, the leader's speech, fluctuated over the period and did not decline.
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Table 8.5: The total amount of news coverage of the leaders’ speeches by
year and bulletin 1993-1996 (in minutes).
ITN 5.40 ITN10 BBC6 BBC9 Ch 4 NN Total
1993 12 13 18 21 30 43 126
1994 15 18 19 21 43 44 160
1995 15 15 19 22 40 64 175
1996 14 15 14 14 34 47 138
Total 56 61 70 78 147 198 599
Total Cov 179 267 279 305 795 1073 2898
(BBC6 = BBC Six O'clock News; BBC9 = BBC Nine O'clock News; ITN5.40 = ITN News at 5.40 PM; 
ITN10 = ITN News at Ten O'clock; Ch 4 = Channel Four News; NN = Newsnight.)
Table 8.6 shows that the decline in coverage can be accounted for by a fall in the number of 
news items produced by the news bulletins.
Table 8.6: The total number of conference news items bv year and bulletin
1993-1996.
ITN 5.40 ITN10 BBC6 BBC9 Ch 4 NN Total
1993 25 29 31 33 48 55 221
1994 23 25 29 27 46 54 204
1995 17 19 24 20 41 35 156
1996 20 19 16 17 36 45 153
Total 85 92 100 97 171 189 734
(BBC6 = BBC Six O'clock News; BBC9 = BBC Nine O'clock News; ITN5.40 = ITN News i
ITN10:= ITN News at Ten O'clock; Ch 4 = Channel Four News; NN = Newsnight.)
The number of news items produced by Channel Four news, News at Ten, the BBC Six 
and BBC Nine declined steadily, although those produced by ITN 5.40 and Newsnight 
fluctuated slightly but also fell back.
It is difficult to say with certainty from the available data whether the decline of 
news coverage was part of a longer-term trend across all bulletins. However, data was 
available for twenty years of live gavel-to-gavel conference coverage. Figure 8.5 (next 
page) shows an overall decline in live coverage. Although ITV’s live output was lower than 
the BBC’s, the commercial network stopped covering the conferences live in 1982. 
Channel Four matched the BBC’s live output from 1983 to 1985 before cutting back and 
only covering the leaders’ speeches live. The BBC’s coverage rose from just under 4000 
minutes in 1976 to a peak of over 5000 minutes in 1986, before declining steadily to 2500 
minutes in 1996. From the high point of the mid eighties live coverage has been in decline.
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Figure 8.6; Live coverage of the annual party conferences 1976-1996.
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Source: Radio Times, TV Times, The Times and The Financial Times.
One obvious reason for the decline in news and live coverage could be falling 
television audiences and an increasingly competitive environment in which the broadcasters 
now find themselves. Evidence from existing research shows that in such an environment 
both ITN and BBC attached a growing importance to ratings (Nossiter et al, 1995). The 
1990 Broadcasting Act subsequently intensified the commercial pressures on the ITV 
companies to obtain the maximum value for money from programme suppliers. This 
change in turn intensified the commercial pressure on ITN (the sole provider of news) to 
deliver an affordable, high quality and popular news service to the ITV network. High 
audience ratings also took on an even greater commercial significance with competition 
amongst existing news organisations. With the introduction of Sky 24-hour news in 1989 
and Channel 5 in 1997 this trend has intensified. Although the BBC’s competition is quasi­
commercial, attention to audience size (now shown in quarter-hourly ratings) is crucial in 
setting the level of the licence fee. Existing literature (Blumler, 1991; Kumar, 1977; 
Prosser, 1993; McNair, 1994) suggests that in the past public service television news 
aimed to steer a course between responsibility for the welfare of the political system and an
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awareness of the limited political appetite of the ordinary viewer. This responsibility was
threatened by the need for news and political programming to be popular and maintain high
ratings levels in a competitive news environment (Blumler, 1991). The news broadcasters'
conference commitment could be seen as a victim of this environment21. One source
highlighted an annual debate over Channel Four’s commitment to covering the conferences. 
'Every year we do have a serious debate about whether we should go [and] would 
the money be better spent some other way. I suspect if there were a different 
presenter, who didn't particularly want to go, they (Channel Four) might be happy 
to settle for not going and just have a correspondent up there. And that would 
reduce the emphasis we give to it. If we retreated, would Newsnight?'22.
Another related reason for declining coverage could be the newsworthiness of the events
themselves. The news broadcasters approached the conferences in a more pragmatic way,
although still tempered by a diluted sense of public service duty. One BBC source noted in
relation to conference coverage: 'There are tensions between strict commercial news
judgements and the public service aspect’23. An ITN source concurred:
'When the public service ethic was more prominent, you had a public service 
obligation to go down to Brighton and broadcast half of News at Ten. We are a 
long way from that situation..., now we just do packages from the scene and there 
is much more news judgement... But I suppose we still take it for granted that we 
will be there'24.
Pragmatic considerations were also raised in other interviews with news broadcasters. 
There was a common perception of conferences being stage-managed and increasingly 
lacking in newsworthiness.
However, this research has provided evidence that could be construed as 
contradictory. If overall coverage is declining, then one would expect the presence of the 
broadcasters at the conference, including the numbers of journalists and technicians who 
attend, to be declining also. But the picture that emerges from Chapter 2 is of an increased 
demand for new camera angles and for space in the conference venue, driven by a greater 
number of broadcasters, including breakfast and satellite TV plus radio, who now attend 
the conferences. Indeed Franklin (1996) and Gaber (1998) argue that there has been a 
‘rapid increase in the market for political news...[with] the advent of round-the-clock radio 
and television news outlets plus the growth in political programmes on both the BBC and 
commercial channels...'25. At conferences what seems to be happening is that total 
coverage across all media has increased because there are more media outlets present, 
although the coverage that each outlet provides remains small and has declined. Conference 
coverage is becoming more fragmented across an increasing number of channels26. One 
could argue that the process of fragmentation will continue with the digitalisation of 
broadcasting.
The debate over the impact of digital multi-channel broadcasting cannot be dealt 
with in any detail here. The advent of digitalisation may have both negative and positive
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implications. More channels covering the conferences may not mean more in-depth 
coverage, only greater coverage of conference highlights, such as speeches by party 
'luminaries' or overt intra-party conflicts. However, the potential remains for conferences 
to be covered in the same way that Parliament is, with a channel devoted to gavel-to-gavel 
live coverage, which the existing broadcasters cannot provide because of time and 
commercial restrictions. Indeed, the Parliamentary Channel provides such coverage at the 
moment and there is potential for coverage to be produced by the parties themselves.
None of the parties have as yet talked of producing their own coverage. However, 
there have been hints that the format of the conferences themselves may change. The desire 
for change seems to be driven by a need to minimise risk and future negative publicity and 
is part of a longer-term drive to reduce the policy-making power of the conference. At the 
1996 Labour conference two intra-party interest groups, Labour 2000 and the Labour Co­
ordinating Committee, produced pamphlets arguing for a fundamental change in the nature 
of the conference. Labour 2000 called for the conference to be turned into 'a good old 
fashioned, American style convention'27. The Labour Co-ordinating Committee similarly 
suggested that the party should copy the format of the presidential conventions and 'get rid 
of boring and damaging debates'2**. Margaret Hodge, who was closely connected to the
Labour leadership, suggested:
'What I think we need to do is move away from the formalised posturing debate 
that we have at conference and allow members an opportunity to express honestly 
what they feel, within smaller regional policy forums across the country or in 
smaller discussion-based groups in conference'29.
While the Conservative conference has always been seen as a rally (Ingle, 1987;
Kavanagh, 1996) there has been some speculation that its format may change also. Pierce
and Sherman note that 'Mr Hague (party leader) is being urged to scrap the traditional four
day format and replace it with a two-and-half day gathering which would end on
Saturday'30. These pressures to change the existing format of conferences have not been
acted upon but may grow, leading to a radical change in the nature of the conferences,
which will feed into the content of conference news.
These trends raise fundamental challenges for students of political communication 
to ponder. The possibility remains that the cumulative effect of the long-term hegemony of 
broadcast media priorities, combined with the development of systematic counter-responses 
by the political parties themselves, will be the production of a set of supposedly media- 
oriented conferences which attract progressively less and less media coverage - because all 
the uncontrolled features which made them newsworthy in the past have been either 
stamped out or neutralised by the development of party elites’ management techniques. 
This study shows that such an outcome is still some way off, and that the complex 
permutations of parties’ and broadcasters* complicities in co-producing conference news
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still contain elements of creative tension and space for genuinely autonomous media 
responses and dissident voices. But the space concerned is not large, nor growing - and the 
future health of party conferences themselves is called in question by long-term trends 
towards fragmented and more a-political media.
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Appendix 1
Research Methods
The thesis used a combination of quantitative and qualitative methods in its examination of 
the subject matter. Schlesinger (1990) argues that methodologically there are two 
approaches to examining the activity of news sources, internalist and externalist. Whilst not 
mutually exclusive, the former analyzes on the activities of the news media through 
interviews and / or content analysis. The latter examines the activities of news sources in 
relation to the media through reconstructing events through interviews, content analysis and 
observations. The examination of events at conference has largely taken this externalist 
approach, relying on a mixture of sources for primary data. The combination of interviews, 
content analysis and observations allowed an analysis of the activities of both the news 
broadcasters and the political parties at each stage of the conference news production 
process.
Content Analysis
There have been numerous definitions of content analysis, which have evolved and shifted 
over time (Berelson, 1971; Holsti, 1969; Krippendorf, 1980; Weber, 1990). Content 
analysis cannot be regarded as an objective quantified exercise. The researcher's values and 
predispositions inevitably influence the selection of categories, and the categories in turn 
influence the findings of the research. However, it is still a useful method for the analysis 
of news coverage.
Originally I set out to content analyse news over a longer period of time (20 years) 
but I encountered the following problems. The British Film Institute library would only 
make video tapes of one specific programme at a time, which had to be viewed on the 
premises. The BBC wanted to charge £150 per video from the archive, going back as far as 
1980. ITN were not keen to provide access, suggesting that one-off access was the best 
they could do. In this situation a historical comparison of news, say, between the early 
eighties and 1990s, was not feasible or affordable. I therefore had to tape news coverage of 
the Liberal Democrat, Labour and Conservative conferences over the four-year period from 
1993 to 1996.
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Initially I videoed all news coverage on terrestrial and satellite television. However, 
bearing in mind the sheer amount of content analysis involved, I targeted the analysis on 
six evening terrestrial news bulletins ITN News at 5.40 pm, the BBC Six O'clock News, 
Channel Four News, the BBC Nine O'clock News, ITN News at Ten and Newsnight. 
This was also in part because these bulletins attracted the largest audiences (the BBC Nine 
O'clock News and News at Ten had over 4 million viewers each) and provided the fullest 
account of the day's events. The aim of the content analysis was to examine four years of 
news output year by year on these six bulletins. A coding sheet was developed designed to 
gather information on certain elements of news coverage (see Appendix 2). The coding 
sheet focused on two main areas. First, the framing of the conferences by the different 
news bulletins and, second, evidence of the use of media strategies by the political parties.
In terms of framing, the sheet focused on the editorial attitudes towards the 
conferences. There were two different attitudes towards the conferences as a source of 
news. The first was ‘sacerdotal’: it considered that the conferences deserved *a regular and 
prominent airing as an inherent right and regardless of news value calculations*1. The 
second was ‘pragmatic*: in this approach, ‘the treatment of politicians* activities is based 
on... assessments of their intrinsic newsworthiness... [so] that consequently the 
prominence given to the stories reporting these activities, the amount of time or space 
allocated to them will be determined by a strict consideration of news values*2. The 
broadcasters were both pragmatically and sacerdotally oriented towards the conferences. 
Blumler and Gurevitch argue that attitudes ‘towards a given institution will reflect the 
interaction between two sets of influences - its more or less abiding sacerdotal standing... 
and its momentary weight on news value scales*3. These attitudes were revealed in the 
prominence and amount of attention given to the various conferences and in the selection of 
events for coverage. The sheet also analysed the selection made by journalists in terms of 
the indexing of sources, the use of different perspectives on a particular issue, the length of 
sound bites in reports and the use and initiation of visuals. In addition the content analysis 
allowed the bulletins to be compared on those points.
The content analysis also sought to reveal the use of proactive and reactive 
communication strategies by the political parties. Proactive strategies were aimed at 
enhancing the dissemination of planned party policy. There were two forms of proactive 
strategy, trailing and follow-up. The use of trailing was identified through the presence in 
news items of advanced information released before an event. The use of follow-up was 
identified in news items by the indexing of certain party actors after policy announcements 
were made, and in references made by the journalist. Reactive communication strategies 
were planned to limit potentially damaging negative publicity. There were two forms of
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reactive strategy, rebuttal and mobilising comment. The use of rebuttal was identified 
through references made by journalists in news items, and the mobilising of comment 
through the indexing of certain senior party actors trying to play-down the significance of 
an event.
The content analysis included a textual analysis of the news transcripts. As both the 
BBC and ITN wanted to charge for transcripts of the news, I directly transcribed all main 
news reports, some pegged items and all two-ways and all headlines and some interviews. 
Transcribing from video, it has been argued, provides greater accuracy. Indeed, Philo 
notes interestingly when comparing Glasgow University Media Group’s content analysis 
with that of Harrison's (1985): ‘When we compared these transcripts with the video tapes 
of the news programmes in our research archive we found that there were serious material 
differences between them and what ITN had actually broadcast’4.
The textual analysis was used to examine the packaging of particular debates and 
speeches in Chapters 6 and 7. The aim was to provide a more detailed analysis of certain 
news items on debates and speeches. The transcripts of reports and pegged items were 
used to examine the journalists' contextualising remarks and the evaluations made in the 
reports' conclusions. Two-ways were also examined particularly to highlight the use of 
speculative and explanatory questions and answers. I alone was responsible for carrying 
out the content analysis. As most of the variables were fairly clear-cut in their application 
the absence of reliability coding should not qualify the conclusions drawn. Intercoder 
reliability, though, was an important consideration in establishing the trustworthiness of 
subjective variables. However, it was difficult within the time, and with available 
resources, to find anyone else to carry out the content analysis as well. Certain variables 
were therefore defined as specifically and exclusively as possible, particularly speculative 
and explanatory questions and answers in two-ways and positive, negative and neutral 
reactions to the leaders' speeches. These were then tested on a small sample of news items 
with my supervisor. The conclusions drawn from these variables should be treated more 
cautiously.
Interviews
I conducted twenty-five interviews, some face to face and others on the phone, although all 
were taped and on the record. The interviews lasted on average one hour ten minutes and 
occurred within office hours. They were then fully transcribed. The interviews were all 
semi-structured and investigative in nature, and based around particular themes. The use of 
such interviews allowed these different themes, some of which arose in the interview, to be
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investigated more thoroughly than with a structured interview. Such techniques also 
allowed the establishment of confidence and rapport with the interviewee; this is essential in 
order to obtain more in-depth answers to particular questions. The questions on particular 
themes were open-ended, designed to get the interviewee to talk on an issue. Of course 
there were tangential comments, but in some cases they provided additional information 
which had not been previously considered. There was a particular effort when interviewing 
journalists and spin doctors to get them to discuss particular examples from conference 
news coverage. The interviews were analysed thematically, with the issues raised by 
interviewees being cross referenced to provide as complete a picture as possible.
While interviews with those involved in the pre-conference planning occurred at 
different times throughout a three-year period, some of the interviews, particularly those 
with journalists and political actors, were conducted in the months immediately after the 
conferences, when events were still fairly fresh in their minds. Although I tried to interview 
as wide a cross section of people as possible, the main problem I faced was getting access 
for interviews. Many requests were never replied to, even though I sent each subject two 
reminders. Surprisingly, the Labour party were the most recalcitrant. It was impossible to 
talk to any of the current Labour spin doctors on the record or to anyone working at party 
headquarters, John Smith House, despite repeated requests. I managed to interview former 
personnel who had recently left, who provided an insight into the planning of conferences. 
In comparison, Liberal Democrat and Conservative sources and those at the broadcast 
organisations were more forthcoming.
Observation
It has become standard practice in media research to conduct observational studies, and 
there have been many of news broadcasters (Gans, 1979; Schlesinger, 1987; Tuchman, 
1978). I attended the Liberal Democrat and Labour Conferences in 1994 and all three in 
1995 and 96. I received a media pass for these conferences, which was essential for 
allowing me access to the press room. I carried out a daily observation of journalistic and 
party activities in the press room and made a series of field notes. The press room was 
chosen because it was a key space in which journalists, press teams and spin doctors 
interacted. It was a particularly important venue to observe spinning in action. The 
observation was carried out for set periods of time, chosen to coincide with key moments 
of the day, such as when journalists returned to the press room after major speeches and 
debates or for press conferences. The periods of observation also involved eavesdropping 
on the spin doctors at work and journalists talking amongst themselves. This was made
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possible by the group nature of both occurrences. On occasions, it also involved talking to 
journalists, gauging their reactions to the spinning, if possible. I was also allowed 
unofficially to observe one journalist editing his conference report. In addition I attended all 
press conferences given during the day.
Other Resources
I also referred to The Daily Telegraph, The Times, The Guardian and The Independent, 
The Sunday Telegraph, The Observer, The Sunday Times and The Independent on Sunday 
over the period of the study for their conference coverage and to keep abreast of 
developments within the political parties. I also used the newspaper archive at the BLPES 
(LSE) to examine TV programme guides in order reliably to construct data on the amount 
of live conference coverage from 1976 to 1996.
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Appendix 2
TV News Content Analysis Sheet
V I Story ID number___________ _________________
V 2 Date of Story ________ / _________/ _________
Day Month Year
V3 Programme:_____________________________________________ _
V 4 The length of the story (in Seconds) _______
V 5 Is the story a headline Item. ___
V 6 If yes, state headline position. __
(opening, 2,3 or 4 etc)
V 7 Does the story form a teaser headline. __
V 8 Is the story a closing/ reminder headline item. __
(Yes 1 or No 2)
Quote all headlines:
V 9  Position: Where is the story in the programme.
V 10 Story format:
Report
Pegged report 
Interview with politician 
Interview with reporter
News Item.
V II  Who is the reporter?
V 12 News item focus.
1 Speech
2 Debate
3 Mix speech/ debate
4 Fringe
5 Mix fringe/ speech or debate
6 Outside event
7 Media initiated
8 Other
1
2
3
(two-way) 4
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V I 3 Who appears in the story and sound-bites.
Length (seconds)
Who Speaking
Source app 1 ____________________________
Source app 2 ___________________________
etc..
V 14 If a reaction, is it positive or negative?
V 15  Who is cited (no sound bite) as a source in the story.
Source cited 1 _____________
Source cited 2 _____________
etc...
Interview s/ Two-ways.
V 16 Who is interviewed. ___
V 17 Number of interview/ two-way questions and answers. ___
Speculation
Explanation
other
Spinning and Publicity (1 Yes 2 No)
V I8 Any evidence of trailing in report? ____
V19 Was this Trail an Exclusive? ____
V20 Who trailed? ------
V21 Reference to party /  leadership line ____
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Contributions of Fringe
V 22 Number of times fringe shown and mentioned 
V23 Length of fringe clip (in seconds)
V24 Who if anyone speaks on fringe
Visuals
V 25  Party initiated TV Visuals
Number
Photo Opportunity ____
Hall Shots ____
Clips of the Fringe ____
Description:
V 2 6  Media initiated TV Visuals
Number
Graphics__________________ ____
Library Pictures_____________ ____
Door step__________________ ____
Length
Length
276
Appendix 3
List of Interviewees
1) Ric Bailey (Editor for BBC Political News) on the 19/2/96 2.30 pm.
2) David Boddy (Former Director of Press and Broadcasting at Conservative Central Office 
in the early eighties) on the 31/10/95 9 am.
3) Bill Bush (Head of BBC Political Research Unit) on the 17/7/95 3 pm.
4) Tim Collins (Special Media Advisor and Former Director of Communications for the 
Conservative Party from 1992-95) on the 17/10/95 11.30 am.
5) Neal Eccles (Editor of BBC OBU) on the 29/8/96 2pm
6) Graham Frost (Editor of ITN News) on the 27/7/95 11 am.
7) Judith Fryer (Liberal Democrats’ Head of Press and Broadcasting) reponse to questions 
in letter, 23/11/95.
8) Gary Gibbon (Political Correspondent for Channel Four News) on the 9/8/95 2 pm.
9) Lord Gladwin of Clee (Former Chairman of Labour’s Conference Arrangements 
Committee under Neil Kinnock and John Smith) and Sally Morgan (Former Secretary to 
the CAC under Neil Kinnock and John Smith) on the 23/1/96 11 am.
10) Baroness Joyce Gould (Former Director of Development and Organization at the 
Labour Party under Neil Kinnock and John Smith) on the 12/6/96 7.30 pm.
11) Jeremy Hanley (Former Conservative Party Chairman 1994-1995) on the 1/11/95 11 
am.
12) Roy Graham (Architect designing the internal plans for the party conferences) on the 
18/1/96 2 pm.
13) Nicholas Jones (Political Correspondent for BBC News) reponse to questions in letter 
28/1/95 and interview 20/8/96 5.10 pm.
14) Alan Leaman (Director of Strategy and Planning for the Liberal Democrats) on the 
19/7/95 10 am.
15) Mark Mardell (Political Correspondent for Newsnight) on the 27/7/95 3.30 pm.
16) Penny McCormack (Liberal Democrat Conference Organiser) on the 21/2/96 3 pm.
17) Bob Oliver (Organizational Manager Sky News) on the 13/5/96 1 pm.
18) Chris Poole (Secretary of the National Union of Conservative and Unionist 
Associations) on the 16/8/95 11 am.
19) Linda Parker (BBC Conference Unit Manager) on the 10/8/95 11 am.
20) Hugh Pym (Political Correspondent for ITN News) on the 1/11/96 1pm.
21) Alan Sherwell (Chair of the Liberal Democrats Federal Conference Committee) on the
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27/6/96 6 pm.
22) Malcolm Smith (Resource Manager at ITN) on the 13/8/96 10 am.
23) Jon Snow (Presenter of Channel Four News) on the 16/8/95 11 am.
24) Philip Webster (Political Editor of the Times) on the 9/7/95 12 pm.
25) Steve White (News Engineer, in charge of outside broadcast planning at ITN) 16/4/ 96.
26) Larry Whitty (Former General Secretary of the Labour Party under Neil Kinnock and 
John Smith) 12/9/96 11am.
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Glossary
BBC British Broadcasting Corporation
BBC Nine BBC Nine O'clock News (broadcast on BBC 1)
BBC Six BBC Six O'clock News (broadcast on BBC 1)
BSkyB British Sky Broadcasting
CAC Conference Arrangements Committee
CAS Conference Agenda Subcommittee
CCO Conservative Central Office
CEO Conference and Exhibitions Office
Channel Four News Channel Four's Seven O’clock News (produced by ITN)
CU Conference Unit
DDO Department of Development and Organisation
ENG Electronic News Gathering
FCC Federal Conference Committee
FE Federal Executive
FPC Federal Policy Committee
GMB General and Municipal Boilermakers Union
ITN Independent Television News
ITN 5.40 ITN's News at 5.40 PM (broadcast on ITV)
MP Member of Parliament
NEC National Executive Committee
News at Ten ITN's Ten O'clock News (broadcast on ITV)
Newsnight BBC News at 10.30 PM (broadcast on BBC 2)
NU National Union of Conservative and Unionist Associations
NUEC National Union Executive Committee
NUM National Union of Mineworkers
OBU Outside Broadcast Unit
Pegged item An additional report expanding upon issues raised in a
speech or a debate and presenting the reactions and opinions 
of actors both in and outside the parties.
PPC Prospective Parliamentary Candidate
PRU Political Research Unit (BBC)
TGWU Transport and General Workers Union
Two-way Live questions and answers between the anchor and political
journalist.
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